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Abstract 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s bioethics was born in the USA and rapidly spread across 
the world. Bioethicists have traditionally argued that their discipline was the answer to the 
ethical challenges posed by the scientific and technological progress in biomedicine, although 
others have emphasised the abuses committed in biomedical human research and the 
dehumanisation of medicine. Notwithstanding the great excitement produced by the rise of 
the new field, its foundations, scope, and official historical accounts have been criticised. 
Calls to give bioethics better philosophical foundations –beyond the American principlism- 
and to broaden the field, particularly to include problems typical of the developing world 
such as poverty, exploitation and inequality have grown in the last twenty years. In 
Colombia, the idea that bioethics is an advocate of life, a discipline to protect life on earth 
from the dangers of an irresponsible scientific and technological advance as well as from a 
wrong model of development has been promoted by the Colombian bioethical establishment.  
Drawing on the Foucauldian view on power and knowledge, this thesis analyses the 
connections between the flourishing of bioethics in Colombia and the implementation of a 
neoliberal healthcare system in the 1990s. The historiographies and hagiographies that have 
dominated the official history of bioethics in Colombia are criticised and, instead, a historical 
approach is offered. The central argument is that bioethics, and other discourses of 
surveillance of medical practice such as medical liability are part of the governmentalization 
of the Colombian medical ethos, and that bioethics has become a totalising, all-embracing 
field, constituting a form of power exercise over the biomedical scenario. Complementing the 
analysis, information from 27 semi-structured interviews is provided. Chapter one, the 
introductory chapter, discusses medicine as a contemporary cultural phenomenon and the 
birth of bioethics in the USA, while chapter two describes the elements of the Foucauldian 
toolkit that I use in the analysis. Chapters three and four critically approach the arrival and 
development of bioethics in Latin America and Colombia. Chapter five discusses the 
transformation of the Colombian medical ethos, describing the political transformation of the 
country in the 1990s and the healthcare reform. Chapters six and seven examine the 
discourses and practices around medical ethics in Colombia as well as how bioethics, medical 
practice, medical liability and biopolitically relevant legal decisions in the context of the new 
constitutional reality of the country became intertwined discourses. 
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Chapter one 
Introduction: The bioethicalisation of medical ethics 
   
It is striking that while discussions about the means of medicine and healthcare have often 
been the subject of debate between various social actors and institutions, the debate about 
their goals and ends has been largely neglected. For this reason, in an interesting project 
launched in 1993, the Hastings Center
1
 examined the goals of medicine “in light of its 
contemporary possibilities and problems” (Hastings Center, 1999, p. 1). The premise of the 
project was that although issues related to healthcare services, medical practice and 
biomedical research have become problematic, “[t]he most common response to these 
problems has been essentially technical or mechanistic” (Hastings Center, 1999, p. 3). This 
situation is by no means limited to the United States. In the last few decades a wave of 
healthcare reforms has spread across the world. But these reforms have by and large 
exhibited an inability to integrate „substantive‟ issues such as the definition of the goals and 
ends of medicine and healthcare. Instead “matters of economics, organisation, politics, and 
efficiency” have monopolised the attention of the public, political institutions, and relevant 
social actors in this debate (Hanson & Callahan, 1999, p. ix). This might be seen as surprising 
and indeed paradoxical when one considers that ethical issues in healthcare have never been 
discussed so intensely as today.   
In the last fifty years non-medical professionals, scholars, and thinkers have turned their 
eyes to medicine. In fact, a new academic and professional field concerned with „the ethical‟ 
in biomedicine has emerged: bioethics. Born at the end of the 1960s in the USA, bioethics 
quickly expanded across the world, becoming, along with the discourse on medical liability, 
one of two fundamental regulatory discourses for medicine. In this sense, it should be 
acknowledged that bioethics has a profound relationship with the law (van Der Burg, 1998). 
Usually promoted by bioethicists themselves as an answer to the ethical challenges brought 
by the biomedical progress, bioethics has gone further as to become de facto the „natural 
location‟ for the discussion of ethical issues related to healthcare and biomedicine. Indeed, 
bioethics is now determining what kind of ethical issues „legitimately‟ deserve to be 
discussed and/or analysed in the biomedical field. Since its beginnings, bioethicists have also 
insisted that this new discipline was necessary to „humanize‟ the biomedicine and to protect 
                                                             
1 One of the most important institutions for bioethics in the world, located in Garrison, New York, USA.  
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individuals from exploitation and abuses, particularly the weak and most vulnerable. In the 
last few years, however, the history of bioethics, as it has been presented by bioethicists 
themselves, has begun to be challenged by various scholars, particularly social scientists, 
philosophers and historians. What kind of phenomenon is bioethics? Why bioethics? Is all 
about bioethics exactly as bioethicists have said? Having its origins in the USA, how has 
bioethics developed in other contexts, for example in a country like Colombia? And, finally, 
why in the bioethics era, during the first period in history when there is so much emphasis on 
the „the ethical‟ in the biomedical field, do healthcare and medical practice remain so 
'unethical' in the majority of Western societies?   
Distancing myself from the explanations offered by bioethicists themselves about the 
history of their own field, in this introductory chapter I will make a case for a critical 
approach to the history of bioethics, with special reference to Colombia. I will start by 
pointing out that medicine is again a „cultural phenomenon‟ in our day, similarly to what 
Hippocratic medicine was in the Greece of the fourth century BC. Then I will review the 
main contemporary perspectives, particularly from social sciences, philosophy and history, 
on what medicine is. After that, I will focus on the idea that present day is experiencing a 
growing process of „ethicalisation‟; a process of which, I will argue, bioethics is seemingly 
the latest expression. Against the self-legitimizing explanations used by bioethicists when 
talking about the origins of their own field, I will suggest that the „bio-ethicalisation‟ of 
medicine should be examined in terms of a „power effect‟. This perspective makes sense as 
long as one considers how much bioethics contributes to make the biomedical scenario 
„governable‟ in accordance with fashionable neo-liberal economic and political ideologies. 
Finally, to close this introductory chapter, I will outline briefly the content of each chapter.  
1. Medicine and culture    
According to the historian of medicine P. Unschuld, in ancient Greece medicine and 
science were linked for the first time in the Western world (Unschuld, 2009, p. 19). Around 
the fifth century BC, associated with the Hippocratic School of Cos, medicine not only 
became „scientific‟, as a result of its relation with natural philosophy, but also a „cultural 
phenomenon‟, i.e. paideia.2 Greek medicine of the 4th and 5th centuries BC was indeed highly 
appreciated and constituted a powerful cultural force. This can be seen in the long-lasting 
                                                             
2 This Greek word is usually translated as „education‟ or „culture‟. About the Greek paideia, which embodies the 
idea of excellence in all the aspects of human life, see the classic work of W. Jaeger (1939) Paidea: The Ideals 
of Greek Culture. Oxford: Blackwell. 
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effect that this medicine has had for throughout Western history. Modern medicine has not 
regained such the high position and prestige of medicine of the fifth century BC (Jaeger, 
1939, p. 3). But medicine has become a plurisemantic concept, particularly in the current 
complex, globalised, technology-driven world. It is related to so many objects, institutions, 
disciplines, subjects, practices and discourses that trying to fit it in one single phrase is 
difficult. However, although contemporary medicine is amazing and successful, this does not 
mean that it has the same cultural value as Hippocratic medicine in its own time. Yet, in the 
same way that Hippocratic medicine drew the attention of professional thinkers of its time 
(philosophers), modern medicine has become an „interesting‟ object for the social sciences, 
humanities, and philosophy.  
A fruitful relation between medicine and philosophy was an important aspect of 
Hippocratic medicine. The famous Hippocratic Oath included some important precepts on 
how to practise medicine that are still invoked, e.g. do no harm, the ban of abortion, and the 
duty of upholding the identity and reputation of the medical profession. In ancient Greece, 
medicine “showed a progressive tendency to give life a technical change and to create a 
special and specialized profession that required high spiritual and ethical demands only 
achievable by a few” (Jaeger, 1939). But the most remarkable aspect of ancient Greek 
medicine is that in itself it was a „perfect‟ model for philosophers to illustrate what ethics was 
and how it worked. In building up their ethical theories, philosophers like Plato and Aristotle 
appealed to medical examples, not to mathematics or natural sciences. In Gorgias and 
Phaedrus, for instance, Plato examines the parallels between the doctors‟ activity on bodies 
and the philosophers‟ on souls. The concept of arête (virtue or moral excellence) was also 
explained by showing what Hippocratic physicians actually did (Carrick, 2001, pp. 21-27), 
and Aristotle mentioned the clinical method in his Ethics (Aristotle, 2000).  
It seems that twenty four centuries later medicine is back and doctors and philosophers are 
interacting deeply and energetically again, but in a different way. If Hippocratic doctors 
„taught‟ philosophers important aspects about ethics through the way they founded and 
practised their profession, in contrast their contemporary colleagues seem to be in the 
opposite position. It seems that nowadays doctors need philosophers to learn what ethics is, 
what makes an ethical profession, and what being a good doctor is about. Furthermore, not 
only philosophers, but also other professional thinkers of our time, such as social scientists 
(particularly sociologists and anthropologists), theologians, historians, lawyers, and 
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economists have their own say on medicine. In short, medicine is again a cultural 
phenomenon (Lupton, 2003).  
As I have argued elsewhere, although the Hippocratic tradition remains in our collective 
memory the very basis of our own Western medicine, since the eighteenth century medicine 
has evolved as clinical medicine under the paradigm of the anatomo-pathological gaze (Díaz 
Amado, 2002a).
3
 Currently, though without abandoning this anatomo-clinical paradigm, 
biomedicine is becoming „molecular‟ (Rose, 2007) and has been fully colonized by the 
dynamics of capitalism to end up being a medical industrial complex (Relman, 1990, p. 209). 
Contemporary medicine is powerful, highly effective, pervasive, and in constant 
transformation. However, as E. Pellegrino and D. Thomasma (1981, p. viii) have argued, 
“Medicine suffers from abundance of means and a poverty of ends”. This assertion is at the 
heart of a fundamental problem of contemporary medicine: its crisis of identity. To say that 
medicine is an art of healing based on a rational and scientific method does not properly 
reflect the complexity of contemporary medicine. Neither would it be enough to appeal to 
intuitive definitions. Thus, ‘what is medicine?’ is a question that justifiably deserves much 
more attention, particularly to better understand the new relations of medicine and society. 
For instance, contemporary doctors, unlike their ancient Greek colleagues, have seen their 
moral authority diminished. In the last 30 years, however, doctors have increasingly become 
engaged in an attempt to recover their lost moral authority by turning to bioethics, a new 
discipline and profession seeking to make medicine ‘more ethical’.  
2. Social sciences and contemporary medicine as a cultural phenomenon    
Social scientists, particularly anthropologists and sociologists, have highlighted important 
aspects of medicine such as how it is deeply related to the ways we talk about and define „the 
human‟. For instance, N. Rose has shown how a myriad of psy-experts,4 biotechnology, and 
medicine are ways of defining ourselves (Rose, 1996, 1999, 2007). The capacity of medicine 
to intervene in our lives and its ability to be entrenched with other disciplines, professions, 
and activities, e.g. legal medicine, counselling services, genetic engineering, etc. is immense 
and pervasive nowadays. 
The encounter between sociology and medicine has led to a vast amount of literature and 
perspectives. D. Lupton has listed five “major fields of scholarship and research in the 
                                                             
3
 Following Foucault‟s arguments in The Birth of the Clinic (1973). 
4 Psychologists, psychiatrists, psychotherapists, and so on.  
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humanities and social sciences that have examined the social role of medicine in Western 
societies [and] its theoretical developments […] over the past fifty years or so” (Lupton, 
2003, p. 3). Similarly, R. Purtilo mentions a variety of approaches to the study of the 
professional-patient relationship in healthcare including those of authors like Talcott Parsons, 
Thomas Szasz, Michael Balint, and Kenneth Arrow in the functionalist approach; the 
structural conflict theory with Eliot Freidson; and Neomarxism, bureaucracy and the politics 
of health, which includes authors like Howard Waitzkin, Barbara Waterman and Vicente 
Navarro (Purtilo, 2004, pp. 2143-2144). I will follow D. Lupton‟s approach to outline the 
mainstream of the sociological view on medicine. This approach includes: functionalism, 
political economy, social constructionism, cultural studies, and the post-structural/linguistic 
turn. Notably, in her approach „power‟ deserves a whole chapter.  
In the functionalist view, which was dominant during the 1950s and 60s, as a pathological 
condition has taken over the patient‟s life, he should be exempted from social obligations5. 
Accordingly, the doctor‟s role should be to help the patient to regain the capacity to fulfil 
those obligations. In this view, medicine is a practice beneficial to society, and although the 
doctor-patient relationship (DPR) is asymmetrical in terms of power, such a relation is 
understood as “harmonious and consensual” (Lupton, 2003, p. 8). For this reason, a major 
criticism against this approach is that it tends to neglect the conflict-prone nature of the DPR. 
The political economy perspective (also called critical structuralism) has its roots in a 
Marxist critique of capitalist economy. It had great acceptance in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
This perspective is highly critical of how healthcare and medical practice have become part 
of capitalism. Supporters of this position emphasise “the cultural crisis of modern medicine 
[that is deemed as] ineffective, overly expensive, under-regulated and vastly inequitable” 
(Lupton, 2003, p. 9). Socio-economic factors affecting people‟s health and access to health 
services are underlined. The medicalisation thesis in the 1970s, exemplifying this 
perspective, stressed the bad influence of medicine on society: “The essence of 
medicalisation became the definitional issue: defining a problem in medical terms, usually as 
an illness or disorder, or using a medical intervention to treat it” (Conrad, 2005, p. 3). 
Authors like I. K. Zola (1972) accused medicine of being an exploitative and alienating 
profession, while I. Illich (1975) argued that medicine “has become a major threat to health.” 
                                                             
5 In general statements the use of the male pronoun and possessive is meant to include male and female persons.   
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It is not a surprise then that liberating society from doctors‟ influence and the „medical 
dictatorship‟ had become a political programme as well as a moral imperative in the 1970s. 
But the political economy perspective does not consider some important issues. On the 
one hand, it neglects micro-social aspects of the DPR, which is taken as one version of the 
capitalist-worker relationship. On the other hand, its calls for “a mass social movement to 
change dependency upon medical technology, decommodify medicine, challenge the vested 
interests of drug companies, insurance companies and the medical profession” were 
unrealistic, as medicine/capitalism constitute nowadays a solid unit, a strong marriage 
(Lupton, 2003, p. 11). 
In the case of social constructionism, the aim is to demystify what is taken for granted in 
the social world. It has long been assumed that knowledge is „external‟ to reality. However, a 
social constructionist would say that not only knowledge is part of our reality, but also that 
„reality‟ is a construction of knowledge. This approach has been in vogue since the mid-1980s 
and is mainly informed by the historical/philosophical work of Michel Foucault and those 
who have continued his project. As Foucault has insisted, knowledge and „truth‟ are the result 
of social relations shaped by power, and that knowledge, truth, and power are inextricably 
intertwined (Foucault, 1984c, p. 70). Thus medical knowledge is not the result of a linear, 
endless process towards more and better knowledge, but “a series of relative constructions 
which are dependent upon the socio-historical settings in which they occur and are constantly 
negotiated” (Lupton, 2003, p. 12). However, social constructionism is too much focused on 
medical discourse at the macro-level, leading sometimes to overgeneralizations and it might 
“descend into relativism and nihilism that all knowledge are social products” (Lupton, 2003, 
p. 13). Finally, there is the field of cultural studies, which is a relatively recent 
interdisciplinary academic field. The term was coined by Richard Hoggart in the 1960s and 
since then it has been a growing field, particularly in the USA and the UK.
6
 It analyses the 
production and circulation of meanings in a particular culture. Applied to medicine, cultural 
studies can help to understand health/illness and medical practice as „cultural products‟ or at 
least as culturally shaped (Lupton, 2003, p. 19).   
 
 
                                                             
6 See: Centre for Medical Humanities, Durham University in: http://www.dur.ac.uk/cmh/medicalhumanities/ 
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3. Philosophy and medicine 
Another way to theoretically approach medicine is through philosophy. Medicine and 
philosophy can be linked in various ways: philosophy and medicine, philosophy in medicine 
or philosophy of medicine (Marcum, 2008). E. Pellegrino (1998) adds a fourth possibility: 
medical philosophy, examining how philosophy of medicine can be understood in a negative, 
expansive, or specific way. In the latter sense, philosophy would ask questions about 
medicine itself. Until the nineteenth century, medicine was practised by various kinds of 
healers, who used to earn a low income and were considered of poor status. But once 
medicine was professionalised, and its status and self-image were transformed, doctors were 
pushed to reflect on the nature and specific characteristics of their own profession. In this 
way the philosophy of medicine emerged in this time (ten Have, 2000, p. 21). But although 
philosophy of medicine is a well-established field nowadays, it still requires justification in 
terms of its scope, methods, and boundaries. Some scholars, for example from the philosophy 
of science, have even denied that the philosophy of medicine is a specific field (Pellegrino, 
1998; Stempsey, 2005).  
E. Pellegrino and D. Thomasma (1981) have argued that it is necessary to set clearly the 
legitimate goals of medicine in order to give it proper philosophical –particularly ethical- 
foundations. By showing that ancient Greek medicine combined logos and techné in order to 
achieve particular ends, i.e. that medicine is a practice, and by integrating Aristotelian 
concepts, these authors have promoted a teleologically based philosophy of medicine 
(Pellegrino & Thomasma, 1981, p. 60). Pellegrino considers that if the goals of medicine are 
to be defined today, they should be based on permanent values arising from the nature of 
medicine (Pellegrino, 1999, p. 60). However, H. ten Have has argued that a philosophy of 
medicine that seeks to examine the foundations of medicine “has declined with the general 
and rapid growth of interest in moral issues over the last three decades” (ten Have, 2000, p. 
20). Linked to this trend, he describes a process of ethicalisation of medicine that has paved 
the road to the advent of bioethics (ten Have, 1997). W. Stempsey, surveying the philosophy 
of medicine‟s literature in a ten-year period, found that “[o]f the 625 articles surveyed for the 
years 1997–2006, nearly three-quarters dealt with matters of ethics, and of the 36 books 
surveyed, nearly 60% were primarily on ethics” (Stempsey, 2008).  
Other social scientists have also spotted the growing ethicalisation of medicine. R. 
DeVries and J. Subedi (1998, p. xiii), for instance, have said that as sociologists they were 
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interested in exploring why and how medicine has „gotten ethical‟. Concomitantly, R. Cooter 
(2000) has argued that in our day the ethical discourse on medicine engages a disparate set of 
people, including philosophers, economists, lawyers, doctors themselves and lay people. 
Even business people are interested in medical ethics and the field itself has become a 
“burgeoning ethics industry” (Cooter, 2000, p. 452). In the same way and more recently D. 
Wilson, analysing the history and impact of the Warnock Report in the UK, has illustrated 
how in the last few years an ethics industry has developed around what might be typically 
seen nowadays as bioethical issues (Wilson, 2011). If Relman is right that modern medicine 
has become a medical industry complex (Relman, 1990), then the „ethics industry‟ is a perfect 
counterpart. Is bioethics therefore the latest and most sophisticated version of such an „ethics 
industry‟, or more generally speaking, is it the last wave of the contemporary „ethicalisation‟ 
of medicine? 
In 1974 the Institute for the Medical Humanities at the University of Texas Medical 
Branch co-sponsored the first Trans-Disciplinary Symposium on Philosophy and Medicine, 
which resulted in a book series to debate various issues in the field.
7
 In the first volume 
medicine is portrayed as full of “social concerns [although yet it remains] underexamined by 
philosophy” (Quoted in Carson & Burns, 2002, p. ix). Twenty years later a similar 
symposium was organised, this time re-named as Philosophy of Medicine and Bioethics. In 
this second symposium the first question for participants was in “what ways and to what ends 
have academic humanists and medical scientists and practitioners become serious 
conversation partners in recent decades?” (Carson & Burns, 2002, p. ix). This question 
prefigures the idea of bioethics: a dialogue between sciences and humanities. Thus, and given 
the issues, topics, and approaches that were discussed during this second symposium, it 
would be difficult to classify the speakers who attended it: were they philosophers [of 
medicine] or bioethicists? It seems then that in just twenty years the philosophy of medicine 
had been taken over by bioethics, but what is the history of this new field? 
4. History of bioethics: “Into the whale”, or a fish unable to see the water? 
In recent years historians have become increasingly interested in bioethics. Some have 
suggested that as a discipline, history can strengthen medical ethics and bioethics. For 
Pernick (2009), history might help bioethics to discover those “unnoticed value issues at 
                                                             
7
 Philosophy and Medicine was first edited by H. T. Engelhardt and published by Kluwer Academic in the 
Netherlands.  
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stake in the non-dramatic daily events of modern health care. [As bioethicists do not care 
about] uncontroversial, routine medicine […] the values that require history to make them 
visible are hard to see precisely because they are presently so uncontroversial” (pp. 16-17). In 
this sense, history would to a certain extent share with critical structuralists and social 
constructionists the goal of revealing hidden rationalities, mechanisms, and agendas in the 
way contemporary medicine works. In the case of bioethics, a critical historical perspective 
will have a similar role.   
In the history of medical ethics, (including bioethics), according to R. Cooter, three 
important points should be considered: first, the current interest in medical ethics should be 
seen as a “problem demanding contextual explanation” (Cooter, 2000, p. 453); second, the 
“rise of medical ethical consciousness since the 1960s [is related to a] political and cultural 
context”; and, third, this fact should not be “comprehended only in terms of legal reflexes to 
abuses of professional power, or to new medical technologies and procedures. [Instead, it is 
necessary] to take cognizance not only of events in medicine, but the operation of social and 
political forces outside it” (Cooter, 2000, p. 460). In this sense, surveillance and the current 
challenges to medical authority that have become part of the contemporary medical ethos,
8
 do 
not represent just a „reaction‟ to medical abuses or medical power or reflect only a „moral 
progress‟ in medicine. Instead, they correspond to the exercise of power over the biomedical 
scenario in our contemporary society. I will expand on this point later.   
R. Cooter has convincingly argued that bioethicists have invented their own history 
(Cooter, 2000, p. 454), and that the job of historians is  to contribute to the understanding of 
ourselves by properly analysing the bioethics phenomenon (Cooter, 2010, p. 669). However, 
his claim that the contemporary rhetoric of medical ethics reflects a kind of „counter-
reformation‟ in order that the medical establishment can keep its own power and position 
(Cooter, 2000, p. 457) seems to me unsatisfactory, particularly after considering that as a 
result of this rhetoric medical autonomy has been successfully „put under control‟. If this is 
the case, I would say that contemporary medical ethics and bioethics are not providing a good 
service to doctors‟ longing for power. Quoting M. Stevens (2000), Cooter argues that 
bioethics not only saved the life of ethics,
9
 but that of medicine too, since “problems 
perceived to be generated by exotic technologies were transformed into problems manageable 
                                                             
8 By using the term „medical ethos‟ I am not only referring to discourses about medical ethics (deontology or 
based on any particular ethical system), but also to the institutions, practices, subjects, and other elements that 
contribute to outline a particular way of being in the medical arena.  
9 Echoing S. Toulmin‟s famous article How Medicine Saved the Life of Ethics (Toulmin, 1999). 
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by bioethicists who, unsurprisingly, tended to treat the technologies as inherently value-
neutral, as well as disconnect them from the politico-economics of private enterprise 
biotechnology and the soaring costs of medical care and health insurance” (Cooter, 2010, p. 
666). It might be the case, but it is not the whole story.  
For Cooter, “[b]y the 1990s bioethics had taken up its residence in the belly of the whale 
of biomedicine […]”10 (Cooter, 2010, p. 663). But within this metaphor, I would say that the 
problem of bioethics is not living “inside a whale” (namely biomedicine). Rather, bioethics is 
like a fish that is unable to see the water in which it lives. This water is made of the 
rationalities and discourses of our time, the episteme, a Foucauldian term that refers to the 
„conditions of possibility‟ for certain objects, problems, practices, and truths to appear within 
a particular historical period (Foucault, 1972; Revel, 2008, p. 45). In my view, bioethics has 
been welcomed by both physicians and patients principally for two reasons. First, it 
represents a non-threatening movement for doctors, as suggested by M. Stevens (2000), and 
for patients bioethics embodies a just and powerful advocate. Second, we are all –doctors, 
bioethicists, historians, and lay people- immersed in the same ocean of rationalities. In our 
day the liberal/neoliberal governmentality is shaping the way we think of and define multiple 
elements that populate our social and existential scenarios. As M. Epstein has argued, 
although the success of bioethics has been officially attributed to its service to the patient, the 
truth is that such a success “should be attributed to the service it has done for the neoliberal 
agenda” (Epstein, 2010, p. 226).  
In this thesis I shall argue that bioethics and other new normative discourses about 
medicine such as medical liability should be analysed as new configurations of power 
relations taking place in the biomedical field in contemporary neoliberal societies. Up until 
now the emphasis has mostly been on how medicine and doctors exercise power, e.g. with the 
medicalisation thesis, but it is time to analyse more seriously another hypothesis: that power 
is not only exercised by doctors, but also on them, and that in contemporary, neoliberal 
societies bioethics has had a highly effective power effect. If R. Cooter is right and bioethics 
has lost its impetus and critical eye that allegedly characterised it at the beginning and has 
become a “hegemonic [discourse] and its practices routinized” (Cooter, 2010, p. 663), then a 
critique of bioethics is justified. But although the critical literature on bioethics has grown 
rapidly in the last fifteen years, it is necessary to reconsider its history from a perspective that 
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 Using Charles Rosenberg 1999‟s expression, in which he saw bioethics as lubricating the gears of 
bureaucratic medicine. 
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reveals its deep and strong relation to power. This kind of analysis can be carried out by 
adapting and using the analytical tools of Michel Foucault.  
From a Foucauldian perspective, it will be possible to see that bioethics is located at “the 
encounter between the technologies of domination of others and those of the self [that 
Foucault calls] „governmentality‟” (Foucault, 1997c, p. 225). Also, from this perspective, we 
will see that bioethics is embedded in a power-knowledge dynamic and also part of neoliberal 
governmentality that has pervaded the biomedical field in the last quarter of a century. 
Additionally, we would be in a better position to understand why the „neutrality‟ that Cooter 
denounces in bioethicists‟ agenda is neither an expression of their false consciousness nor of 
their eagerness for power, but just one of the new strategies to govern the medical territory in 
our present.
11
  
5. The bio-ethicalisation of medicine 
The aforementioned „ethicalisation‟ of medicine has meant an increase of the literature on 
the „humanization‟ of medicine and on the necessary steps that doctors and healthcare 
professionals should follow to be „good‟ professionals.12 It seems that in our day medical 
ethics is experiencing a „boom‟, particularly with the rise of bioethics as its „natural‟ heir. M. 
Epstein has argued that our time has witnessed “the fall of the old medico-ethical systems, the 
rise of a global medical ethics, and the success of academic bioethics” (Epstein, 2010, p. 
226). For R. Baker and L. McCullough (2009), medical ethics scholarship has been 
dominated by three positions. First, presentism or anachronism, which is the assumption that 
if a set of medical ethics issues have drawn our attention, then other people in other places 
and in other times should also have considered such issues in a similar way. Second, there is 
traditionalism, which is a non-critical appeal to the past in order to hold a current position. 
Sometimes we hear in philosophical debates that X or Y issues have been „traditionally‟ 
addressed in this or another way. Thus, the history of medical ethics before the twentieth 
century is usually seen as a line of traditionalist authors talking about each other (Baker & 
McCullough, 2009, p. 4-6).  
The third scenario is bioethics, which Baker and McCullough depict as if the whole 
history of medical ethics pre-figured its birth (Baker & McCullough, 2009, p. 10). This 
                                                             
11 I will expand on this argument in chapters two and five, which are devoted to explain how the Foucauldian 
approach can be used to analyse the history of bioethics. 
12 See chapter six.  
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position has been contested by R. Cooter in a recent critical review. For him, Baker and 
McCullough‟s history of medical ethics fails in three aspects. First, their narrative remains 
bound to the typical view that bioethics emerged as a challenge to the monopoly of doctors in 
the field of medical ethics. Second, by considering bioethics as the latest stage in the history 
of medical ethics “bioethics remains attached to medical scenario [and the opportunity to 
examine the] more systemic shift involved in creating the possibility for bioethics [is 
missed]” (Cooter, 2010, p. 668). For Cooter it is also clear that concepts like informed 
consent or autonomy must be analysed within a particular politico-economic context and not 
simply as a „moral progress‟ in the biomedical field (Cooter, 2010, p. 668).  
But beyond Cooter‟s critique, the fact remains that bioethics has become the customary 
way of talking about „the ethical‟ in biomedicine. For this reason, it would be better to say 
„bio-ethicalisation‟ instead of „ethicalisation‟ of medicine. The reduction of medical ethics to 
a legitimately and officially recognised discipline such as bioethics entails undesirable 
effects. On the one hand, there is a tendency to consider that any other form of ethical 
reflection about medicine is assumed to be valueless. On the other hand, there is a risk that 
doctors are compelled to attend bioethics courses to gain the „permission‟ to participate in the 
discussion of different ethical issues happening nowadays in their own field. Therefore in 
order to understand what is happening to the contemporary medical ethos, it seems necessary 
to examine more carefully the rise of bioethics.  
6. The origin myths of bioethics 
In the last few years the definition, scope, and history of medical ethics as well as of 
bioethics have been „problematized‟.13 Various historical events have been seen as the 
beginning of medical ethics, e.g. the Hammurabi Code (c1772 BC) or the Hippocratic Oath 
(late fifth century BC). However, for R. Baker and L. McCullough (2009, p. 3) it is difficult, 
or at least anachronistic, to accept the existence of medical ethics before 1803, when the 
English physician Thomas Percival famously used this term for the first time. In the case of 
bioethics “it is striking that despite its relatively short life span, a number of differing 
versions exist of when and why bioethics developed in the United States, the great majority 
of which have been written by persons deeply involved in the field” (Fox & Swazey, 2008, p. 
21). According to these authors, depending on how such historical accounts are „interpreted‟, 
bioethics can be seen as a reactive outcome (against the biomedical technological explosion 
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and radical cultural pluralism), as proactive (acting as a social movement within the 
healthcare scenario as well as a social attempt to „anticipate‟ the future), or as a continuation 
(bioethics would be the latest stage of medical ethics) (Fox & Swazey, 2008, p. 29).  
R. Fox and J. Swazey (2008, p. 22) have methodically summarised the historical accounts, 
or „origin myths‟, that bioethicists have proposed about the birth of their own field in the 
USA, the cradle of bioethics. The first account sees bioethics‟ origins as technologically 
driven. For instance, the Harvard Ad Hoc Committee‟s re-definition of death in 1968 
associated to the development of cardiopulmonary life support systems, organ transplants, 
and chronic dialysis motivated a wide social debate. However, this „technological 
determinism‟, i.e. the syllogism new technology = new questions = bioethics is too simplistic 
and has been considered „empirically false‟ by sociologists (DeVries & Conrad, 1998, p. 
240). Moreover, questions generated by new technologies are not necessarily new (Emanuel, 
1991) and as D. Cooper (2002) has underlined, commenting on M. Shelley‟s 1818 novel 
Frankenstein (Shelley, 1993), new devices and technologies in medicine have always drawn 
the attention of society. Yet bioethicists are used to deeming “ethical problems of current 
therapeutic relationships [as] driven mainly by technical imperatives [and to see] bioethics 
[as] determined by the value context in which medical technology must be managed, not by 
the intrinsic qualities of the technology” (Purtilo, 2004, p. 2145). Also, as A. Hedgecoe has 
suggested, bioethicists tend “to avoid fundamental debates about the construction of 
technologies” and devote their attention mainly to problems related to technology‟s 
application instead (Hedgecoe, 2010, pp. 177-178).   
The second account sees bioethics as derived from the interest that theologians, 
philosophers, lawyers and others began to have in particular issues around the mid-twentieth 
century. Death/dying and fertility control started to be highly debated, particularly by 
scholars close to the Catholic Church. The idea that dilemmas arising in biomedicine could 
not be solved by the „traditional‟ medical ethics and that they required a „new‟ approach 
began to be promoted.
14
 The theological position was that “the new powers of medicine 
raised some novel moral questions in the sixties, questions beyond the considerable expertise 
of scientists and technicians. They were not just medical problems but moral problems” 
(Verhey, 1996, p. 2). However, as theologians themselves have recognised, “[…] Christian 
ethicists rushed into medical ethics for many reasons, not the least of which was and is 
                                                             
14 See, for example, Jonsen, A. (1998). The Birth of Bioethics. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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money and power […] So medical ethicists, being the good priests they are, went to where 
the power is in liberal societies –medical schools” (Hauerwas, 1996, p. 64). Influential 
theologians like Paul Ramsey managed to introduce personalism in this pre-bioethics period 
and helped to the formation of the field by transforming Christian ethics into medical ethics 
(Hauerwas, 1996, p. 80). 
Third, the birth of bioethics has been related to shocking events: the Nazi experiments with 
the subsequent doctors‟ trial in Nuremberg contributed to the idea that controlling biomedical 
investigation was necessary. However, as R. Cooter has argued, bioethicists forget that 
“Nuremberg was a show trial concerned with creating an image of medicine as ideologically 
pristine and uniquely orientated to the defense of humanitarianism” (Cooter, 2000, p. 459). 
The Nuremberg Code was basically ignored, particularly because the American medical 
establishment considered themselves as sufficiently shielded from the possibility of 
committing Nazi-like atrocities; doctors trusted their ability to be self-governing (Fox & 
Swazey, 2008, p. 26). But, as history has proved, many abuses have been committed by those 
who consider themselves as „the good guys‟ (Díaz Amado, 2010a). Moreover, the necessity 
of surveillance in the biomedical research field ended up being a movement seeking to 
control the whole medical profession (Rothman, D. J., 1991). 
Fourth, bioethics arose when the neologism appeared: the linguistic explanation. The 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics at Georgetown University claims to have been first in combining 
ethics and science in the new discipline of bioethics. W. T. Reich, editor of the 1978 
Encyclopaedia of Bioethics, considers nonetheless a “bi-located” origin: Van Rensselaer 
Potter, on the one hand, and Andre Hellegers and Sargent Shriver in Georgetown, on the 
other. Although Reich recognises that the former invented the term, he argues that it was the 
Kennedy Institute of Ethics‟ use of the term that made of bioethics a new academic and 
professional field (Reich, 1996). However, in my view, R. Fox and J. Swazey do not consider 
properly the linguistic effect of T. Beauchamp and J. Childress‟ Principles of Biomedical 
Ethics (first published in 1979), which marks perhaps the real moment when bioethics 
became a unified field as principlism gave the lingua franca to this area. Contentions about 
who was „the pioneer‟ are not rare in bioethics. For example, while V. R. Potter claimed to 
have coined the term (Potter, 1988, p. 3), a circumstance that would make of him the 
„founder‟ for many bioethicists, a meeting that was convened by A. Jonsen in 1992 to 
celebrate the birth of bioethics was a way to validate and enhance “Jonsen‟s own standing as 
a pioneer bioethicist” (Fox  & Swazey, 2008, p. 128).   
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Finally, there are multiyear/multicausal accounts of the birth of bioethics: in different 
ways authors like LeRoy Walters, David Rothman and Albert Jonsen  see bioethics coming 
out of a „process‟ happening in a particular period of time, generally around the middle of 
twentieth century. Fox and Swazey‟s position can be placed here since they also see bioethics 
as evolving throughout three overlapping phases between the 1950s and 1970s (Fox & 
Swazey, 2008, p. 32). The issues, events and people that I have mentioned so far regarding 
the history of bioethics are also included in these phases. It is not rare that some histories of 
how bioethics originated conceal „non-bioethical‟ motives. For instance, R. Cooter has 
suggested that Rothman‟s book Strangers at the Bedside (Rothman, D. J., 1991), considered a 
„classic‟ book on the history of bioethics, was motivated by Rothman‟s own eagerness to be 
appointed as professor at Columbia (Cooter, 2010, p. 664). A. Jonsen has admitted that he 
convened the meeting to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of bioethics in 1992 in order to 
claim the birthright to bioethics for the University of Washington, where he was working at 
that time
15
 (Fox & Swazey, 2008, p. 125). Cooter has also underlined that in telling these 
histories of bioethics, History, as a discipline, is being utilized for “shamelessly self-serving 
historical stories of origin produced by bioethical practitioners” (Cooter, 2010, p. 664f).  
7. The debates about the foundations of bioethics 
Although controversies have always been frequent in bioethics, more and more such 
controversies are about bioethics. These can be of three types. First, debates about the answer 
to the question what is bioethics. For example, bioethics might be considered either as part of 
medical ethics or constituting a new independent discipline. The second type is on how 
bioethics operates, both internally and externally. Thus bioethicists and people engaged in 
bioethical discussions also debate what ethical theory or perspective should be the 
foundations of the field, what methods are most suitable, what issues, problems, or scenarios 
should be included, and so on. And, third, there are the controversies about the origins of 
bioethics, i.e. its history, which, as I have already discussed, has been „problematized‟ in 
recent years. Those narratives and accounts, including pioneers, cornerstone facts, key issues, 
and mechanisms of legitimisation as well as of institutionalisation, have drawn the attention 
of social scientists and self-critical bioethicists, particularly in the last 15 years. 
                                                             
15 For Jonsen and other bioethicists „They Decide Who Lives, Who Dies: Medical Miracle Puts Moral Burden 
on Small Committee‟, an article written by S. Alexander and published in Life (53, p. 102-125) in 1962 (9 
November), marks the birth of bioethics.  
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Some scholars regard bioethics as the new version of medical ethics and therefore as only 
suitable for medical-related scenarios. Others see it as a broad movement committed to 
protecting the planet‟s life.  These two different approaches reflect the two main positions at 
the beginning of the American bioethics: the former is the A. Hellegers‟ narrow medical 
perspective, and the latter, the V.R. Potter‟s broader or ecological view.16 Bioethics also can 
operate at a macro-level and/or a micro-level. In the former we find issues like fair allocation 
of resources in healthcare, national and international policies for ethical human research, and 
national commissions of bioethics, while in the latter the issues related to the DPR, ethics 
committees, institutional review boards, and informed consent. J. Evans, for example, sees 
bioethics working at three different levels: foundational, clinical, and public (Evans, 2006, p. 
214). D. Callahan mentions a variety of scenarios where bioethics „happens‟: theoretical 
bioethics, concerned with intellectual foundations; clinical ethics; regulatory and policy 
bioethics, becoming law generally, but also policies, rules, guidelines, etc; and cultural 
bioethics, which “refers to the effort systematically to relate bioethics to the historical, 
ideological, cultural, and social context in which it is expressed” (Callahan, 2004, p. 281).  
From an internal point of view, bioethicists have always debated what ethical theory or 
intellectual system should constitute the „foundations‟. All bioethics textbooks customarily 
start with a section on this. Thus there are bioethicists who take stances on one or another 
position, e.g. communitarianism, pragmatism, casuistry, communicative ethics, and 
utilitarianism, to name but a few. T.H. Engelhardt, acknowledging such ethical diversity, has 
concluded that in the current secular, plural society in which we have to deal with „moral 
strangers‟, it is impossible to find “a secular, canonical, concrete ethics to ground bioethics, 
[…] authority is not derived from reason, not from God, nor from a will to power (i.e. force), 
but from the bare will to have the one authority moral strangers can share: permission” 
(Engelhardt, 1996, p. 72). He argues that although ethics and bioethics can derive standards 
from different sources like intuitions, exemplary cases, consequences, impartial observers, 
principles, impartial reasoning, and so forth, it is still impossible to decide about which one is 
best (Engelhardt, 1996, p. 41f). In bioethical debates, the discussion about what ethical theory 
or argument should be applied or prevail very often ends up in an endless „give and take‟ of 
arguments that depends on the political views of the participants. This happens, for example, 
with the abortion debate as I have shown elsewhere (Díaz Amado, 2009a), an issue that will 
be analysed in chapter seven. In bioethics, divergent political positions have recently become 
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the root of heated debates about what the role of bioethics should be (Caplan, 2005; Macklin, 
2006). 
As I suggested before, American principlism deserves a special place in the history of 
bioethics. Because of the way it was introduced by T. Beauchamp and J. Childress in their 
1979 book, now in its fifth edition (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009), principlism became 
simply synonymous with bioethics. Its specification/balance methodology that is based on 
four prima facie principles, the „Georgetown Mantra‟ (Fox & Swazey, 2008, p. 170), can be 
seen as a philosophical technological device to solve ethical dilemmas in biomedicine.
17
 But 
criticisms against this perspective have mounted throughout the years. Principlism, the model 
and not the principles themselves, has been assessed as representing a theoretical hegemony 
and as an American product that only takes into account American values and its particular 
healthcare system.
18
 Philosophical contentions have also been made, showing the weaknesses 
and main problems of principlism in bioethics.
19
 But the fact remains that principlism is 
deeply entrenched in bioethics. R. Fox et al. have argued that while it might be easy to 
explain the successful institutionalisation of bioethics in the USA, it is not the same when 
trying to explain the influence of principlism in other countries. However, in some countries 
this American principlism-based bioethics has been regarded as something not to be emulated 
(Fox & Swazey, 2008, pp. 172, 215). According to Cooter, autonomy, the most cited 
principle in bioethics, has not been understood historically. Thus bioethics has failed to 
examine how autonomy “relates to notions of „being human‟, and how these in turn relate to 
wider political economic formations which then get mediated through medical ethics” 
(Cooter, 2010, p. 669). Others have also been critical about how autonomy is used in 
bioethics, denouncing excesses committed in its name or the “moral vacuum” to which we 
are thrown after a „superficial‟ understanding of it, particularly in the US (Gaylin, 2003; 
McCormick, 1999). 
                                                             
17 They put forward four moral principles, respect for autonomy, beneficence, non maleficence, and justice, as 
moral columns to support what would be today a good medical practice. This principlism works like this: 
1. The four principles should be considered equally important (they are prima facie). 
2. Two steps should be taken when applying these principles: 
 Specification: It is to account for each principle and what does each one mean in a specific 
situation. 
 Balancing: when two principles conflict, the decision has to be made by considering 
consequences (Beauchamp & Childress, 2009). 
18 In the UK medical ethicists have preferred to remain within the boundaries of established disciplines such as 
philosophy or theology, seeing bioethics as an „Americanism‟ (Cooter, 2000, p. 455). 
19 See, for example, the critique by Clouser and Gert (1999). 
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In the last few years scholars from different backgrounds have suggested that bioethics 
should incorporate social and cultural analyses. Bioethics is seen as a field dominated by the 
individualistic, universal [self-centred] perspective of the Anglo-American tradition and 
putting the emphasis mainly on issues related to biomedical research (Fox & Swazey, 2008, 
pp. 153, 155). According to DeVries and Conrad bioethicists lack the “sociological 
imagination” necessary to see “how social structures, cultural settings, and social interaction 
influence their work” (DeVries & Conrad, 1998, p. 233f). From a philosophical and 
anthropological perspective, H. ten Have has argued that “bioethics should become more 
appreciative of the actual experiences of practitioners and more attentive to the context in 
which physicians, nurses, patients, and others experience their moral lives, e.g. the roles they 
play, the relationships in which they participate, the expectations they have, and the 
expectations they cherish” (ten Have, 2000, p. 30).   
Bioethicists, perhaps as a reaction to these criticisms, have in recent years made an 
„empirical turn‟ (Hurst, 2010). The motto of the 5th Postgraduate Bioethics Conference, 
which took place at The Wellcome Trust, London in January 2011, exemplifies this point: 
Social Scientific Approaches to Bioethics: Methods and Methodologies.
20
 However, this 
empirical turn has raised many questions about both the possibilities and limits that this turn 
represents for bioethics. Other questions would be if the empirical approach was just to 
inform bioethics, or to explain how a code is constituted, or to characterise the world in which 
bioethics operates. Moreover, what kind of empirical techniques or methodologies are to be 
used? Finally, with the empirical studies in bioethics we cannot avoid facing the problematic 
distinction between descriptive and normative: the world „as it is‟ in contrast to the world as 
„ought to‟ (Fox & Swazey, 2008, pp. 176, 178).  
Sometimes the sociological, empirical perspective goes so far so as to say that bioethics 
would be valuable only if it fully adopted the methods of the social sciences. Some authors, 
for instance, have proposed social bioethics and bioethnography
21
. Moreover, and 
paradoxically, the „empiricist turn‟ in bioethics might have facilitated its institutionalisation, 
having given it a „practical‟ face, and having produced a bioethics which is “free of ideology 
and idealism – in effect, an ethics free of ethics!” (Cooter, 2010, p. 663). In the case of my 
                                                             
20 See: Paton, A., Jenkins, S., Morlock, G. & McKeown, A. (2011, 10 February) Joint Review of the 2011 UK 
and Ireland Postgraduate Conference in Bioethics. Retrieved from 
http://pfgs.wordpress.com/2011/02/10/postgrad-bioethics-conference-review/, retrieved on 20th February 2011. 
21
 Hoffmaster proposed that ethnography can save the life of medical ethics from the “sterility of… „top-down‟ 
analyses based on abstract, general, universal moral principles” (Fox & Swazey, 2008, p. 180). 
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doctoral research, an empirical approach was incorporated in order to illustrate perceptions, 
ideas, effects, and functioning of bioethics in the particular scenario this thesis is about (see 
below).  
8. Bioethics as a subject of study 
From its very beginnings bioethics was considered a strange phenomenon. DeVries and 
Subedi (1998) are “curious22 about the who, what, where, and when of bioethics: Who are 
bioethicists? What are they saying? Where are they working? When are they called upon?”  
(p. xiii). R. Fox and J. Swazey have reviewed not only the history of the field, particularly in 
the US as aforementioned, but also have outlined „the bioethicist‟ as a particular subject and 
analysed why bioethicists celebrate so much their own field. It seems that bioethicists are 
“noticeably preoccupied with explaining, chronicling, and commemorating its beginnings” 
(Fox & Swazey, 2008, p. 123). 
Also, why bioethicists become interested in some topics while disregarding others is a 
quite interesting question. DeVries and Conrad have found that notwithstanding the strong 
bioethical presence in hospitals, places undoubtedly full of ethical issues, “not all spheres of 
activity attract bioethical attention” (DeVries & Conrad, 1998, p. 235). Commenting on fair 
allocation of resources to healthcare and on the political tactics of the American medical 
establishment to keep its power, DeVries and Subedi argue that the “clinical bent of 
bioethicists [prevents them from looking into] the most profound ethical problems of 
medicine” (DeVries & Subedi, 1998, p. xv). For example, in reference to the (bio)ethical 
issues related to intersex states, J. Nelson has argued that it is paradoxical that while 
bioethicists have all the time been so interested in different kinds of artificiality like artificial 
hearts or artificial tube feeding, they do not express the same interest in other „artificialities‟ 
such as sex and subjectivity
23
 (Nelson, 1998). A. Hedgecoe has also pointed out that 
bioethicists, contrary to their self-perception, tend to remain uncritical regarding the socio-
technical expectations brought by scientists and the industry [doctors included], limiting their 
work for the most part to “reviews of possible ethical issues”24 (Hedgecoe, 2010, p. 163).  
 
                                                             
22 My italics. 
23 See chapter seven. 
24 Hedgecoe considers that in the debate on pharmacogenetics, five types of analysis regarding ethical aspects 
can be seen. The scale goes up starting with the simplest approaches: papers “mentioning” the topic, 
“overviews”, “reviews”, papers offerering real “arguments”, and finally those that are able to offer 
“recommendations” (Hedgecoe, 2010, pp. 166-168).  
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Thus some of the questions that this thesis seeks to address, following DeVries and 
Conrad, are: “(1) How does an issue get defined as „bioethical‟? (2) Who speaks for 
bioethics?” (DeVries & Conrad, 1998, p. 235). In short, it is necessary to study bioethics 
bearing in mind “disciplinary habits, professional relationships, cultural „ways of seeing‟, 
institutional needs, economic demands, and arrangements of power and prestige” (DeVries & 
Conrad, 1998, p. 233f). In this way, we will be in a better position to define what bioethics is, 
what bioethicists are, what they talk about, and how it is that everyone nowadays speaks 
about „the ethical‟ in the biomedical scenario.  
 
9. Governmentality and bioethics 
So far I have emphasised the cultural salience of contemporary medicine, a phenomenon 
that resembles to some extent the Hippocratic School of medicine‟s relevance in the Ancient 
World. I have shown that contemporary medicine, its elements, dynamics, problems, effects, 
and interrelations have also gained the attention not only of philosophers (like in ancient 
Greece), but also of a myriad of modern „professional thinkers‟, including theologians, 
historians, and social scientists. As a result, several approaches, theories, and criticisms of 
what medicine is (or should be) have developed and shed light on the contemporary 
interrelation of medicine and society. In this way, interesting aspects on how medicine works, 
what it represents, and where it is taking us to have become more visible. For example, how 
medicine is defining „the human‟ in contemporary society, and how at the same time 
medicine is being subjected to a increasing „bio-ethicalisation‟. However, in shaping the 
contemporary medical ethos, bioethics is not working alone. Bioethics goes hand in hand 
with law and economics in a wave that seems to seek its complete „normativisation‟. 
Accordingly, we better should consider bio-ethics, bio-law and bio-economics not only as 
strategies to govern “life itself”, but also as important elements of the “„advanced liberal‟ 
governmental technologies” (Rose, 2007, p. 3).  
In this thesis I will make a case for explaining the bio-ethicalisation and juridification of 
the Colombian medical ethos, as part of liberal/neoliberal governmentality strategies 
(Foucault, 2007). Why Colombia? Let me give at least two reasons. First, as a Colombian 
physician who graduated in 1994, just three years after a new political constitution was 
enacted (July 1991) and one year after Law 100 of 1993, which led to the most radical 
healthcare reform ever carried in Colombia, was passed in the Congress, I belong to a 
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„transitional generation‟ of Colombian physicians. This led me to experience myself, in „my 
own body‟, how the Colombian medical ethos has radically changed in the last 17 years and 
to feel the necessity of making sense of these changes. Pursuing that end, I studied 
philosophy and ended up engaging in bioethics. My argument is that among the ways that 
neoliberal societies
25
 have had available to „govern‟ the complex but profitable „land‟ of 
medicine, bioethics and medical law are part of the „truth regimes‟ required to successfully 
govern in our time. Colombia is my own universe, although it is intended that my „local‟ 
analysis, also contributes to the general understanding of how bioethics was born and 
developed.  
Second, as I have shown, many scholars, but particularly social scientists and historians of 
medicine, have contested the assumption of many bioethicists who see bioethics as a pristine, 
disinterested and natural answer to the challenges „brought‟ by the biotechnological 
developments. In the field of clinical bioethics, for instance, “nearly all bioethicists would 
agree that the purpose of bioethics is to provide an independent and reasoned
26
 voice in 
medical decision making” (DeVries & Conrad, 1998, p. 234). Is this true? This is one of the 
questions this thesis wants to address. R. Cooter has argued that the growing interest in 
medical ethics is a “problem demanding contextual explanation [and says that] „at best‟ 
[scholars] acknowledge „strong outside forces‟ and the importance of „the entire social 
context‟” (Cooter, 2000, p. 453). Also he has suggested that different models of healthcare 
systems shape the discussion: “Typically, British medical ethicists frown upon the priest-like 
role assumed by American bioethicists” (Cooter, 2000, p. 455). In a US American, private, 
marketized healthcare system (which is also the case of Colombia) Cooter argues that 
“managers, not bioethicists, changed the ethical face of medicine by routinizing, if not 
alienating clinicians” (Cooter, 2000, p. 458). Other questions I want to answer include: What 
has been the role of bioethicists in the private, marketized, Colombian healthcare system? Is 
bioethics responding to D. Callahan‟s question about the way we are confronting “the moral 
puzzles, perplexities, and challenges posed by the confluence of the great scientific and 
cultural changes?” (Callahan, 2004, p. 280). And is bioethics contributing to the 
philosophical reflection of everyday realities of medical practice, as ten Have has asked? In 
short, and following N. Rose, Why are the regulatory apparatuses of advanced liberal 
societies so eagerly seeking to integrate bioethics in their ranks? (Rose, 2007, p. 30). 
                                                             
25 I do not believe that Colombia is an „advanced liberal society‟, but a developing country where drastic 
neoliberal reforms have been implemented.  
26 Authors‟ highlight and italics.  
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In order to get some answers to these questions, in particular for case of Colombia, I have 
chosen a perspective that has proved to be fruitful in the analysis of various issues, problems, 
and objects of contemporary society. This perspective is the Foucauldian approach, which has 
been largely neglected in the analysis of the „his/stories‟ of bioethics, particularly in Latin 
America, although social scientists and historians have long been familiar with it. I have so 
far deliberatively avoided examining the „power perspective‟ in depth since I will do this in 
chapter two of this thesis. 
10. Content outline  
In chapter two, I will review concepts from the Foucauldian toolkit that will help me to 
illuminate important aspects regarding the recent changes that the Colombian medical ethos 
has experienced.
27
 Amongst these concepts are practice, discourse, rationality, episteme, 
problematisation, discipline, biopolitics, governmentality, and biopower. Following R. 
Cooter, I argue that power should have a central place in the analysis of modern medical 
ethics (Cooter, 2000, p. 455). How else can one better understand the historical jump from 
medical paternalism to personal autonomy in contemporary medical ethics, i.e. as the 
problematisation of authority in medical decision making?  
In chapter three, I will discuss the „histories‟ of bioethics, the „origin myths‟, in Latin 
America. I will analyse the sources, issues, and strategies that pioneer Latin American 
bioethicists used to build the field. In so doing, I will try to characterise the Latin American 
bioethics and how the field has evolved in recent years. In so doing, I will examine the main 
historical accounts of bioethics in Latin America, trying to see them through a Foucauldian 
lens. My intention will also be to explore whether bioethics has come to constitute a „truth 
regime‟ in Latin America and/or whether bioethics might be considered a dispositif.28 
In chapter four, following on from what I have previously discussed in chapter one, two 
and three, I will examine Colombian bioethics, its „his/stories‟, main issues and protagonists. 
Also I will characterise the discourses of bioethics in Colombia in order to find an answer to 
the question, is there a Colombian bioethics? To this end I will review the main Colombian 
bioethical journals and textbooks. Other sources like newspapers, speeches, bioethics 
postgraduate programs‟ curricula, and so on will be also utilized. By using information from 
                                                             
27 Although I must say that this thesis is not about Foucault; it is just an attempt to make use of the Foucauldian 
scholarship. 
28 For a definition, see chapter two. Also: Revel, J. (2008) Dictionaire Foucault, p. 41. 
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27 interviews that I carried out in 2008,
29
 I offer a picture of how Colombian physicians, 
bioethicists, and other professionals think of bioethics. Finally, I will describe two 
phenomena that characterise the Colombian bioethics: first, a growing bioethicalisation of the 
medical ethos; and, second, the tendency of the Colombian bioethical establishment to see 
everywhere „bioethical implications‟, transforming in this way a wide array of issues, 
problems, and objects into a scenario amenable to „bioethical intervention‟, a trend that I 
would call bioethicism. 
In chapter five, I will describe the process and key features of the 1993 Colombian 
healthcare reform, which followed the new Constitution of 1991. I will show how the 
Colombian medical ethos was deeply affected by these socio-politico-juridico-economic 
transformations that meant, in the end, the „neo-liberalisation‟ of the country. My intention 
will be to show how bioethics has „fitted‟ well into this new environment, providing the 
required language to a shift of focus from power exercised by the medical profession to 
power exercised over the medical profession. In other words, as the medical profession was 
asked to operate under the new rationality of neoliberalism, a new language for the new 
medical ethos was necessary, and bioethics has proven to be successful and functional in this 
way. Using the information from the aforementioned interviews, I will show that the new 
healthcare system fosters the coexistence of different types of physicians. A central concept 
here will be „the good doctor‟. I want to show how the neoliberal governmentalities shape 
new medical subjectivities.  
In chapter six, I show how medical law, doctors‟ insurance, medical lawsuits, codes of 
ethics, legal regulations, clinical guidelines, administrative rules, and so on, can be seen as 
expressions of a sovereign/disciplinary power over the medical profession. New forms of 
power brought by neoliberalism, which represent new ways of governing that are based on 
                                                             
29 I intervieweed doctors, nurses, lawyers and philosophers mainly, although other professionals were also 
included. These interviews were fundamental to characterise different positions in Colombia regarding the 
history, scope and methods of bioethics. J. D‟Achiardi (2004), a former postgraduate student at the Bioethics 
Institute, Javeriana University, tried to offer a comprehensive historical picture of bioethics in Colombia by 
obtaining first-hand information using interviews. However, in his unpublished work, D‟Achiardi did not 
challenge the self-legitimasing historical accounts and origin myths held by the Colombian bioethicists he 
interviewed, particularly those called „pioneers‟. Rather, in those interviews such accounts and myths were 
reinforced. Different authors and institutions have acknowledged the importance of interviews for historical 
research. The American Historical Association, for example, has offered some key points to take into account in 
this kind of research. See: Statement on Interviewing for Historical Documentation, 
http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/1989/8910/8910AHA1.cfm, accessed 15 March 2013. Authors 
like Donald, Shurman, Kirkendall, et al (1991), have also underlined that “[i]nterviews are pieces of evidence 
which historians create and produce” (p. 227). Then, the information provided by my interviews seeks to 
contribute to a better understanding of the transformation of the medical ethos in Colombia in recent times. To 
see more details on how my interviews were planned, carried out, and analysed, go to the appendices (p. 225).  
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„freedom‟, have also become intertwined with bioethics. I want therefore to show the „how‟ 
of bioethics and medical liability/malpractice that, as normative discourses on medical 
practice, are governing the “milieu”30 of medicine.  
In chapter seven, I show how in the new politico-legal environment of Colombia the 
bioethical language has informed important legal decisions. Also, I will show that 
principlism, informed consent and other relevant bioethical concepts are now the lingua 
franca in bio-legal decisions. I analyse three legal decisions of the Colombian Constitutional 
Court in particular: Decision C-257 of 1997 that decriminalised mercy killing (euthanasia), 
Decision SU-037 of 1999 about intersexual states, and Decision C-355 of 2006 that 
decriminalised abortion in three types of circumstance. In the end, I argue that in Colombia 
bioethics has become part of biopolitics. 
I conclude by challenging the idea that bioethics came into being as a response to 
grievances about medicine. Instead, I argue that bioethics and medical law are nothing but 
new ways of governing the medical profession. Bioethics is just functional to a neoliberal 
understanding of medical practice. As there is an increasing feeling that somehow current 
medical practice and healthcare entail many „wrong‟, „unethical‟ assumptions (and in 
Colombia the general unhappiness with medical practice grows day by day, not only amongst 
lay people, but amongst healthcare professionals themselves), I also suggest that it is 
necessary to „de-bioethicalise‟ the discussion and not merely to broaden the scope of 
bioethics, as some social scientists and bioethicists have proposed both in Latin America and 
in other developing countries. Also I will argue that the Foucauldian perspective on ethics 
might contribute to transform bioethics. In this way, the „de-bioethicalisation‟ of medical 
ethos will contribute, paradoxically, to return to bioethics its emancipatory potentiality for 
biomedicine.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
30 A term used by Foucault to describe how neoliberal governmentality  operate (Foucault, 2007). 
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Chapter two 
„Medical practice must be governed‟: A Foucauldian approach to the transformation of 
the contemporary medical ethos 
1. Introduction 
This chapter explains why and how the Foucauldian toolkit is useful in creating an 
alternative critical assessment of the history of bioethics and medical law, particularly in 
relation to Colombia. As already mentioned in the introductory chapter, the status quo history 
and nature of bioethics have become unsatisfactory for social scientists, historians, and even 
for some perspicacious bioethicists who do not believe things are so simple. As bioethics has 
turned to be a „field‟ to be studied, critical accounts of its history have started to appear. 
Some critics such as R. Cooter denounce bioethics for being an extension of biomedical 
power. My view is that bioethics is the ultimate expression of the ethicalisation of 
contemporary medicine and from a Foucauldian perspective it should be understood basically 
as a „power effect‟. Traditionally, power analyses have emphasised how medicine and 
doctors exercise power over society (e.g. via medicalisation)
31
 as well as over individuals 
(e.g. via paternalism in the DPR). However, I want to go beyond this one-sided view by 
adopting a Foucauldian approach. This will allow me to show that medicine and doctors, and 
not only patients or society, are subjected to power in contemporary societies, and that 
bioethics and medical liability are discourses through which such a power is exercised. 
Bioethics entails new discursive practices, new systems of thought and truth, new 
subjectivities, and represents a new stage in the relationship between medicine and society, 
especially in what N. Rose has called “advanced liberal societies”, or what Latin Americans 
would simply call neoliberalism. With the new rationalities established under neoliberalism, 
new relations between truth, health, and capitalism have been formed. Thus, the bio-
ethicalisation of medicine should not be comprehended only as a reaction against medical 
professional power, or to new medical technologies and procedures, as R. Cooter (2000, p. 
460) has suggested, but as a strategy that contributes to the smooth operation of the medical-
industrial complex (Relman, 1990). 
 
                                                             
31 The „medicalisation thesis‟ refers to a phenomenon happening in contemporary societies that consists in 
transforming non-medical problems and different aspects of human life into illnesses and diseases. See: Conrad, 
P. (2007) The Medicalization of Society: On the Transformation of Human Conditions into Treatable Disorders.  
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The Foucauldian approach has largely been neglected by bioethicists when examining the 
history of their own field, although it has already been used to discuss particular bioethical 
issues.
32
 In the case of Latin America and Colombia, there are only very few references to 
Foucault in the analyses of bioethical issues as well as the history of bioethics.   I want to 
show in this chapter that using the Foucauldian concept of governmentality in the analysis of 
the history of bioethics will demonstrate that the rise of bioethics in Colombia has to do more 
with a power displacement than with moral progress in the biomedical field. This perspective 
emphasises the power/knowledge/subjectivity relationship out of which disciplines, 
institutions and experts have been created in the modern world. It can thus help us to 
understand the „mushroom-like‟ phenomenon of bioethics (Lindemann & Nelson, 1999, p. 
xi). I want to use the Foucauldian perspective as a „key‟ to read particular „notes‟ on the 
history of bioethics and the transformation of the contemporary medical ethos, which have 
remained superimposed by the bioethicists‟ narratives about the history, nature, goals, 
methods and elements of their own field.  
As the German historian of medicine P. Unschuld argues, for medical theories to flourish 
in a particular historical period, the socio-political, cultural, and economic structures of such 
a period provide plausibility to these theories (Díaz Amado, 2010b). This is true about our 
time as well. By considering the case of AIDS, the emblematic disease of the late twentieth 
century, Unschuld illustrates his argument by imagining, in a thought experiment that in the 
future scholars, maybe historians of medicine, will refer to our present-day medical 
explanations of this disease in this way: 
The disease model of HIV/AIDS that emerged in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first century –and found broad acceptance in teaching, research, and 
therapy- was clearly marked by the social and economic circumstances of the 
time. It had plausibility, but as we know today, it did not correspond with 
reality. This plausibility gains its persuasiveness through several factors. At its 
center was systems thinking in economics, criminal law, and many other 
domains, which had been emerging since the mid-twentieth century. (Unschuld, 
2009, p. 187) 
                                                             
32 See, for example, Juritzen, T.; Grimen, H. and Heggen, K, et al. (2011) Protecting Vulnerable Research 
Participants: A Foucault-inspired Analysis of Ethics Committees. Nursing Ethics, 6, June, 640-649. Also see the 
articles in volume 31, issue 3, 2006 and volume 34, issue 4, 2009 of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy.  
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Thus, molecular biology, genetics, infectology, do not simply provide facts or represent 
scientific advances, but are models that explain the malfunctioning of our bodies that we all 
experience at some point during our lives. These models reflect not only a particular state of 
scientific knowledge but also social structures and culture. The explanatory model for AIDS, 
for example, is related to neoliberalism, market economy and globalization, which are 
elements that characterise our present. For Unschuld, a cynic in the scientific academia would 
say something like this: “if AIDS hadn‟t come by itself, it would have been invented” 
(Unschuld, 2009, pp. 186). Being medical theories socio-politically, economically and 
culturally determined, no matter how much scientific they are, there is no reason to think it is 
different with regard to the available "theories" that explain and rule the medical ethos. The 
ethical, political, legal and economic approaches to medicine need to be also plausible to be 
accepted. So the question is, what elements of our societies (cultural values, rationalities, 
political structures, and so forth) have given bioethics and medical liability their plausibility 
to and become widely accepted as the suitable regulatory discourses on biomedicine and 
medical practice today?  
It is, therefore, necessary to analyse what factors of the current socio-political, economic, 
and cultural environment have been so propitious for the rise of bioethics. In doing so, 
different questions need to be examined: how the bioethical discourse has become a set of 
„indisputable truths‟; why bioethics has been enthusiastically embraced; why and how the 
concept of medical paternalism, as a historical truth and a despicable image of what medicine 
„used to be‟, is opposed to the advent of the „new kingdom‟ of patients‟ autonomy announced 
by bioethicists the; the rise of a rhetoric that justifies limitations to individuals‟ medical care 
in the name of fair allocation of resources, while at the same time big private corporations 
investing in healthcare business make huge profits, is a contradiction that should be 
explained;
33
 and why we became convinced that increasing legal intervention in the medical 
scenario truly guarantees better medical attention. In short, why is there so much concern 
about the power doctors exercise, when the „real‟ power is exercised elsewhere? Excessive 
medical professional autonomy and abuses in biomedical research do not completely explain 
the boom of bioethics or the burgeoning industry of legal insurance of our day either. What is 
necessary to recognise is that bioethics, medical liability, and health economics are not 
simply new normative discourses and/or mechanisms to solve ethico-legal dilemmas, but also 
new and powerful ways to redefine the whole biomedical scenario: what being a doctor 
                                                             
33 I will analyse this in detail for the case of Colombia in chapter five. 
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means, what being a „good doctor‟ implies, what medicine is about, who decides in medical 
matters, and so on. Bioethics, medical liability, and health economics have indeed reshaped 
the very nature of medicine, and the history of medicine in the twentieth century cannot be 
written without taking into account these developments (Cooter, 2000, p. 452).  
In this chapter I want to provide the necessary elements that will let me explain why, in a 
similar thought experiment as Unschuld‟s about AIDS, I foresee future historians of medicine 
referring to the phenomenon of bioethics at the turn of the twentieth century in this way: 
Regulatory discourses like bioethics, medical liability, and health economics 
that emerged as seemingly natural and necessary answers to biomedical 
progress in the second half of the twentieth century quickly became the 
customary ways to understand the nature of medicine, the goals and structure 
of healthcare services, and the roles healthcare professionals should play. 
Widely publicized scandals about malpractice and abuses in biomedical 
research contributed to reinforce the idea that through bioethics and medical 
liability medicine would be „re-humanized‟ and patients‟ rights properly 
guaranteed. But as we know today, the pervasiveness and persuasiveness of 
such new regulatory discourses had to do more with new power mechanisms 
operating in the biomedical arena, as in this time medicine became a new 
„territory‟ to be governed according to liberal/neoliberal rationalities. By then, 
medical practice was rendered to the service of the transnational capital and 
from being a „sovereign profession‟, medicine ended up being basically a trade 
controlled mainly by powerful private corporations and much less by doctors 
themselves who were subjected to new rules in the name of a new and 
necessary medical ethics.  
In what follows, I shall describe the main elements of the Foucauldian toolkit that will be 
the basis of an analysis of the history of bioethics and medical liability in the particular case 
of Colombia. To start with, I will discuss how Foucault understood power. After that, I will 
show that in order to be governed, medicine would first be mapped as a particular territory, 
while doctors‟ actions became one aspect of a particular human relation that gained 
prominence in twentieth-century medical ethics: the DPR. Then I will show how some 
scholars have started to use the Foucauldian perspective in the analysis of bioethical issues, 
but that this perspective has not yet been used to explain the process of ethicalisation of 
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medicine. In my conclusions, I will show why the Foucauldian approach can be useful in the 
analysis of the history of bioethics and medical liability, outlining some points that are 
developed in the following chapters.  
2. The Foucauldian toolkit 
The importance of M. Foucault‟s contribution to the discussion and use of theory and  
methodology in history, philosophy, and social sciences is well established. He carried out a 
particular kind of social critique in which power relations are essential in explaining how 
knowledge, practices and subjectivities are formed. His work reflects various intellectual 
influences and are worthwhile highlighting. On the one hand, Nietzsche inspired Foucault‟s 
analyses of the relations power-truth-knowledge and the genealogical method. In the 
Nietzschean perspective, history is mostly about revealing the contingency of our present, 
and how historical accounts become „truths‟ about ourselves as a result of power action.34 
History is mostly about revealing the past of our truths rather than the truth of our past 
(Morey, 1983, p. 23). Foucault expanded on these ideas in his essay Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History (1984b), in which he distinguished between Ursprung (myths of origin) and 
Entstehung (constructions of historical truths). On the other hand, the Kantian concept of 
„critique‟ inspired Foucault‟s “investigation into what we are (how we think, what we value, 
how we understand ourselves, how to treat others) [and also] what else we might be – how 
we could be different from ourselves” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 11). Working on the same 
question that Kant answered in 1784, in another essay, What is Enlightenment?, Foucault 
(1984d) held that we should see modernity “rather as an attitude than as a period of history” 
(p. 39).  
However, Foucault does not provide a new master-narrative for my project, nor am I 
considering his theoretical perspective as the ultimate approach to analyse the transformation 
of contemporary medical ethos and the birth of bioethics and other normative discourses on 
medicine. In a preface to Deleuze‟s book, Foucault, P. Bové (1988), the renowned American 
professor of English literature, said that in the last few years “the academic effort to 
appropriate, correct, or dismiss Foucault has gone on even more intensely –sometimes 
brilliantly, sometimes stupidly, and sometimes with troubling seriousness” (p. viii).  It is 
necessary then „to be on the alert‟ to avoid either considering the Foucauldian perspective as 
                                                             
34
 See, for instance, Nietzsche, F. (1980) On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life. (P. Preuss 
Trans.) Indianapolis: Hackett. 
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a set of fixed, immutable, and permanent categories or adopting them in an inaccurate or 
inappropriate way, or to make of Foucault the object of a cult of personality, invoking him as 
an indisputable authority. 
Concomitantly, it is necessary to take into account the criticisms that Foucault has 
received.  During his lifetime he was involved in many polemics such as the well known 
debate with Noam Chomsky, aired on Dutch television in 1971, about human nature, justice, 
power, and political action.
35
 In 1977 Jean Baudrillard published Forget Foucault in which 
he criticised Foucault‟s conception of power (Baudrillard, 1978). Later on, other authors 
came forward with similar criticisms, like Mark Poster (1984), from a Marxist point of view 
and Nancy Fraser (1989), from a feminist point of view, criticising Foucault‟s conclusions on 
modernity, power, and humanism. Most famous among these controversies is the polemic 
exchange between Habermas and Foucault, which was in some sense a version of the clash 
between modernism and post-modernism, representing different views about rationality, 
progress, knowledge, subjects and the meanings of modernity (Ashenden & Owen, 1999). 
Often, Foucault‟s work was received by the Anglo-American academic world with hostility, 
indifference, and scepticism, when he was accused of inventing a „fantasy‟ and creating a 
kind of inverse version of Whiggish history (Jones & Porter, 1994, p. 3).
36
  
2.1. Archaeology, genealogy, and ethics 
Foucault‟s intellectual work has traditionally been considered as encompassing three 
overlapping perspectives or methods: archaeology, genealogy, and ethics. The Foucauldian 
archaeology is an inquiry into knowledge formations, and is focused on the analysis of 
discourses.
37
 Genealogy is an investigation into power and focused on the analysis of 
practices. Ethics, finally, follows the question of how to lead a good life, which, for Foucault, 
is related to the possibility of self-knowledge, self-creation, and self-care, i.e. about what he 
calls “technologies of the self” and “practices of freedom” (Díaz Amado, 2007a, p. 18). It is 
important to underline, however, that all these forms of inquiry entail to a lesser or greater 
                                                             
35 Excerpts from this debate can be watched on Youtube, online at: 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WveI_vgmPz8, accessed 1 December 2011.  
36 Clifford Geertz and Richard Rorty are also among the well-known scholars who criticised Foucault. There is a 
complete summary of the main criticisms against Foucault‟s ideas in the introduction of Foucault. A Critical 
Reader, edited by D. C. Hoy (1986). Additionally, in order to understand the academic and existential struggling 
of Foucault, two biographical works are worth consulting: Michel Foucault, by D. Eribon (1989) and The Lives 
of Michel Foucault, by D. Macey (1993).  
37
 Foucault also used the term „archivistic‟ to refer to his archaeological method. For a proper definition of the 
term „archive‟, see Foucault (1972) The Archaeology of Knowledge.   
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extent the question of power. In a Foucauldian sense, an archaeologist is interested “in 
discovering the rules which enable [certain] questions to be posed at one time, not to be 
posed at another, and always within the same discourse” (Soper, 1986, p. 134). The 
archaeological research should include an analysis of first, the relation between the „sayable‟ 
and the visible; second, the relation between statements, between subjects and statements; 
third, the rules of the repeatability of statements; fourth, the surfaces of emergence of objects 
of knowledge and the institutions that determine discursive objects; and fifth, the forms of 
specification of discursive objects (Foucault, 1972; Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 26).  
But while archaeology is about revealing the underlying structures of our present, i.e. the 
past of our truths rather than the truth of our past (Morey, 1983, p. 23), genealogy is a history 
of the present,
38
 or a glimpse of our past from the perspective of our current time in relation 
to complex causal antecedents of the socio-intellectual reality (Gutting, 2005, p. 12f). 
Genealogy, or the history of the present, therefore can be understood as “an analysis of the 
power relations which have constituted our interpretative horizon […] showing how the 
crutches of legitimacy of modern truth and impartial judgment are simply a reflection of 
social relations saturated with power” (Haugaard, 2002, p. 182). From a Nietzschean 
perspective, the history of the present “[…] involved investigating the historical origins 
[Entstehung] of powerful institutions and discourses which claimed to be universal and 
eternal” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 24), a perspective that allowed Foucault to reveal “how it is 
that we have come to understand (and be in) the world the way we do (are)” (Haugaard, 
2002, 182). Thus, central to the Foucauldian genealogical approach is the analysis of 
institutions, practices, and names which have been taken for granted (McGowen, 1994, p. 
96). In short, the genealogical perspective aims at examining the „origins‟ –of us, of our 
institutions, of the disciplines, and of any object populating our world –to show their 
contingency as well as the mechanisms through which power has contributed to make us 
what we are (Díaz Amado, 2007a, p. 27). 
N. Rose has argued that, in the biomedical scenario, a historian of the present has to 
decompose the “medical complex” in terms of its constitutive practices, apparatuses, 
expertises, technologies, and strategies (Rose, 1994, p. 50). For J. Bishop (2009a), “[t]he task 
of the historian of the present is […] to find the historical and political conditions for the 
possibility of what we find interesting about our time and about ourselves” (p. 333), which in 
                                                             
38 Foucault coined this term in Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1979, p. 31). 
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the case of the contemporary transformation of medical ethos means to explain how, for 
example, the DPR or the principle of respect for autonomy became relevant „objects‟ for 
medical ethics. In Foucault‟s work the old assumption that knowledge can only develop when 
power relations are suspended is rejected, giving way to a new understanding that indeed is 
the opposite: there is no knowledge without power. For Foucault (1979) “[w]e should admit 
[…] that power produces knowledge […] that power and knowledge directly imply one 
another; that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of 
knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time 
power relations” (p. 27). Although the history of the present perspective has been useful to 
carry out interesting historical/sociological analyses, N. Rose has recently suggested that, as 
challenging our present is not a novel project anymore, it is time to go beyond “the familiar 
tropes of genealogy and „histories of the present‟”39 and try what he calls a “cartography of 
the present” (Rose, 2007, pp. 4-5). The difference is that while in the history of the present 
we see the contingencies of what we have taken for granted, in the cartography of the present 
we reshape our present by considering the „openness‟ of the future. 
In his last works Foucault‟s intellectual efforts were devoted to the question of ethics, 
which for him was about the relationship we have with ourselves. It is worth bearing in mind 
that “by „ethics‟ Foucault means a self‟s work on itself, the way it makes itself a moral agent 
as it finds the kind of relation it ought to have with itself” (Scott, C. E., 2009, p. 353). Also it 
is important to underline that the concept of governmentality (which I will address below) is 
fundamental to understand the Foucauldian view of ethics, as for him governmentality is 
about the relationship “of the self to itself, [covering] the whole range of practices that 
constitute, define, organise, and instrumentalize the strategies that individuals in their 
freedom can use in dealing with each other” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 300). It is necessary, 
according to Foucault, to take distance from those analyses that mainly stress our nature as 
„subjects of law‟. Instead, by using the concept of governmentality we will be able to explain 
how „free‟ individuals use different instruments “to control, determine, and limit the freedom 
of others” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 300).  It is the government of freedom by freedom. One 
important conclusion from Foucault‟s work on power and ethics is that a new relationship to 
ourselves is necessary for our time (Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 227).  
 
                                                             
39
 I would say, however, that in Latin America a history of the present is still a task to be carried out. Yet, a 
cartography of the present is also a useful perspective that should not be disregarded. 
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2.2. The Foucauldian toolkit to undertake an archaeological analysis 
Foucauldian terminology is extensive and Foucault himself uses his own concepts in 
different ways. As my interest is to carry out a critical analysis of the history of the new 
normative discourses on medical practice, namely bioethics and medical liability, in terms of 
their links with power dynamics, I shall describe in the next lines six basic Foucauldian 
concepts –taken mainly from his first period when he was devoted to archaeological 
investigations- that will help me fulfil my goal of revealing the links between the history of 
bioethics, particularly in Latin America and Colombia, and power. With the concept of 
episteme I will show the conditions of possibility for the rise of bioethics, also I will analyse 
to what extent bioethics is a discourse, a dispositif, and a truth regime, how it has grown up 
in the context of particular institutions, and what kinds of problematizations are linked to its 
birth and rapid development. I take archaeological perspective and I analyse the formation of 
bioethics as an independent field of knowledge, profession, and expertise. This analysis is 
necessary if we are to see how much bioethics owes to power mechanisms and power 
relations.    
In the preface of The Order of Things Foucault mentions a Chinese encyclopaedia that, 
according to J. L. Borges, includes a particular taxonomy of animals (Foucault, 1971, p. xvi). 
Foucault stresses how weird and nonsensical this taxonomy might appear to us. This is not 
because Borges is working simply with „fiction‟. Foucault argues that the shared system of 
meaning that would let us make sense of this classification is not available to us. This „shared 
system of meaning‟ is constituted by, in Foucauldian terms, the epistemes or discursive 
formations, which provide the conditions of possibility for certain events, objects, statements, 
institutions, and ideas to be meaningfully „conceivable‟ and „sayable‟ (Foucault, 1971; 
McGowen, 1994, p. 96).
40
 In his archaeological analysis Foucault mentions two great 
discontinuities in the episteme of the Western culture, which gives way to three differentiated 
epistemological periods: Renaissance, Classical, and Modern (Foucault, 1971). These are 
“periods of history […] that were organised round their own specific world-views [and which 
are] the product of certain organising principles which relate things to one another” (Danaher, 
et al., 2000, pp. 15-17). However, an episteme does not follow another in a linear manner nor 
are they part of continuous historical progress. They are merely “shared systems of 
                                                             
40 P. Bourdieu‟s concept of habitus and A. Giddens‟ practical consciousness knowledge are concepts related to 
the Foucaultian episteme (Haugaard, 2002, p. 225). T. Kuhn‟s concept of paradigm is certainly very near to 
episteme, too. 
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knowledge, which are relationally self-constituting layers of historical thought […] marked 
by discontinuities” (Haugaard, 2002, p. 183). Our perception of history as a solid, linear, 
meaningful and necessary set of events, periods, subjects and ideas is indeed a sort of 
„historical artefact‟ created by power. In The Order of Things Foucault highlights the 
transition between Classical and Modern epistemes, asserting that it is a shift in the „truth 
regime‟ that parallels changes in the way Western societies are governed (Castro-Gómez, 
2010, p. 163). Later, according to Haugaard, Foucault replaced the concept of episteme by 
that of discourse, which works in the Foucauldian genealogical project “as the technical term 
for the tacit knowledge which informs particular ways of making sense of the world” 
(Haugaard, 2002, p. 185). 
The analysis of discourses is fundamental to understand the mechanisms of power, and in 
The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) Foucault described in detail the formation and 
functioning of discourses. For Foucault a discourse “can be both an instrument and an effect 
of power” (Foucault, 1998, p. 101). Kimsma and Van Leewen (2005) define a discourse as “a 
consistent system of thought, speech, and actions, in short a particular way of dealing with 
issues that combines the significance of different aspects of human behaviour into an ordered 
social practice” (p. 566). They argue that in the contemporary biomedical scenario three 
practical discourses are in conflict: medicine, law, and economy. By taking the case of the 
AIDS pandemic they argued that legal and economic discourses have come to predominate 
over the medical, a situation that is evident in how language has changed in the medical 
scenario where new subjectivities such as the „consumer‟ and the „legal rights holder‟ have 
replaced the traditional „patient‟ (Kimsma & Van Leewen, 2005, p. 571). These categories 
reflect particular discourses about the body that become visible when the experts (physicians, 
lawyers, economists) „speak‟. The relation between discourses and power can be seen in the 
construction and action of these „experts‟. They are constituted and legitimized through a 
particular knowledge that gives them the ability to fulfil the function of „disciplining‟ 
subjects at different levels and in different spaces (Scott, J., 2001, p. 11). For Foucault 
discourses were just “elements or blocks operating in the field of force relations” (Foucault, 
1998, p. 101). Moreover, a discourse is not only a linguistic phenomenon as some discourse 
analyses seem to suggest (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 35). A discourse is „language in 
action‟. For this reason it is better to talk about discursive practices, which “[…] are not 
purely and simply modes of manufacture of discourse. They take shape in technical 
ensembles, in institutions, in behavioral schemes, in types of transmission and dissemination, 
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in pedagogical forms that both impose and maintain them” (Foucault, 1997d, p. 16). These 
discursive practices “occurred at a particular time, and are like events in that they create 
effects within a discursive field” (Danaher, et al., 2000, pp. 31,33).  
Another Foucauldian concept that is deeply related to discourses in the constitution of 
disciplinary practices is institution, “a relatively enduring and stable set of relationships 
between different people, and between people and objects” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 36). In 
our societies institutions are engaged in the production of truth, and they can be of different 
kinds, e.g. public/private, and operate in different fields, e.g. culture, politics, etc. The quest 
for truth has become a fundamental task at different levels in contemporary western societies 
(Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 42). But we should bear in mind that, as Foucault stresses, “truth is 
not outside power [and that] each society has its regime of truth, its „general politics‟ of truth: 
that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true” (Foucault, 1984c, 
p. 73). As Rose (1994, p. 58) has argued, we cannot talk about „truth‟ outside “institutional 
and organisational conditions”. What Foucault calls a truth regime41 is “a set of procedures 
that lead to a certain result, which, on the basis of its principles and rules of procedures, may 
be considered valid or invalid” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 40). A truth regime is the relation 
between „truth‟ “as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation, and operation of statements [and] systems of power which produce 
and sustain it” (Foucault, 1984c, p. 74). These truth regimes are also related to the mechanics 
of power in our societies. As Haugaard underlines, when particular kinds of knowledge 
become and are imposed as „truth‟, they usually operate as a strategy to govern (Haugaard, 
2002, p. 185f).
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Problematization is another essential Foucauldian concept that lets us understand how 
certain objects, which were previously non-existent, ignored or disregarded become 
legitimate objects of thought. For Foucault a history of thought should elucidate the 
problematizations behind all kinds of „solutions‟ we have found (Foucault, 1997b, p. 118).  
For him “there was one element that was capable of describing the history of thought - this 
was what one could call the element of problems or, more exactly, problematizations” 
(Foucault, 1997b, p. 117). For J. Bishop, what Foucault calls “problematizations of thought” 
corresponds to what A. MacIntyre calls “epistemological crises”, the set of „problems‟ acting 
                                                             
41 Foucault sometimes also talks about “games of truth” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 297). 
42
 The Chilean biologist and philosopher H. Maturana has shown how, for example, „objectivity‟ is sometimes 
used as an argument to impose certain „truths‟ (Watkins, 2004). 
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as the „fuel‟ for thought (Bishop, 2009a, p. 335). For P. Miller and N. Rose the term 
„problematization‟ is better than „problem‟ as the aim in a Foucauldian analysis is to 
understand how certain issues are „problematized‟, e.g. by „experts‟, resulting in particular 
kinds of interventions. In terms of governing this is important since “the activity of 
problematizing is intrinsically linked to devising ways to seek to remedy [the problem].” 
Thus, there is no sharp separation between „problems‟ and „solutions43 (Miller & Rose, 2008, 
p. 15). 
We also have the concept of dispositif, which is usually translated into English as 
„apparatus‟. Although this is another plurisemantic Foucauldian term that has been 
understood in different ways (Bussolini, 2010; Deleuze, 1992), in an interview Foucault 
himself defined a „dispositif‟ as “a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, and philosophical, moral and philanthropic statements. In 
short, the spoken as well as the unspoken […] The dispositif is the network that can be 
established between these elements” (Revel, 2008, p. 42). According to Castro-Gómez, a 
dispositif is just a practical operator working in the context of relations – between objects, 
discourses, subjects, etc (Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 65). By thinking of bioethics in terms of a 
dispositif, one can better understand two things: first, how bioethics has successfully created 
relations with other fields, a trend that has greatly contributed to its rapid institutionalisation, 
and second, how bioethics has been able to put in the same space old discussions that have 
returned in our day (e.g. abortion) with a set of disparate social problems and concerns (e.g. 
the reduction of poverty and strengthening of democracy) and the new anxieties brought by 
the biomedical advance (e.g. cloning and critical medicine).    
Finally, for S. Castro-Gómez three fundamental concepts are necessary for any 
Foucauldian analysis: practices, rationality, and technologies.  First, practices refer to what 
people actually do. Practices emerge in the context of particular historical conditions and they 
should be analysed as being part of a dispositif (Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 29). Second, for 
Foucault rationalities explain the way practices take place and how they work in different 
                                                             
43 In Governing the Soul, N. Rose (1999) offers a comprehensive definition of problematizations: “the 
emergence of problems in relation to particular moral, political, economic, military, geopolitical or juridical 
concerns, or within the operations of particular practices or institutional sites (courts, armies, schools, 
prisons…); the authorities who define phenomena as problems (educational, legal, religious, political…); the 
criteria in relation to which certain persons, things or forms of conduct come to be seen as problematic 
(institutional norms, military requirements, legal regulations…); the kinds of dividing practices involved 
(sickness from health; madness from criminality, normality from pathology…)” (p. xi).   
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networks of power. In contrast to Weber‟s and Habermas‟s approaches, Foucault is not 
interested in the „individual‟s actions‟, but in the rationalities that constitute the conditions of 
possibility of such actions (Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 31). And third, when Foucault mentions a 
technology, he is referring to the strategic dimension of power and how technologies work 
within a particular framework of power relations. Foucault examined different kinds of 
technologies, mainly technologies of the self (Foucault, 1997c) and technologies of 
government. In both cases we are confronted with two possibilities: either to accept to live 
under states of domination
44
 or to choose to live „ethically‟, i.e. according to practices of 
freedom (Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 39), “[…] for what is ethics, if not the practice of freedom, 
the conscious [réfléchie] practice of freedom?” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 284). I will expand on 
this point in the conclusions of my thesis where I will suggest possible ways for bioethics to 
become part of practices of freedom in the field of medical practice that has been taken over 
by different forms of domination.     
2.3. Foucault and power: From sovereignty to governmentality 
Although Foucault is perhaps more famous for his analyses of power relations, it is 
necessary to avoid making the Foucauldian perspective a way to reduce every issue to a 
problem of power. Nor should we imagine that power is an inexorable force on us, that 
people are “completely dominated by and subjected to power, [and that] we are merely the 
dupes of dominant social groups, never knowing what we do, and therefore unable to resist 
power – whether it is employed by governments, the ruling classes, capitalism or the ordinary 
institutions that regulate and control our day-to-day lives” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 4). This 
view of power might be related to a Manichean view of the world. But in the Foucauldian 
perspective power is not necessarily negative and repressive. Instead, power is also a 
productive force. Additionally, it is important to underline that for Foucault power relations 
entail „resistances‟. According to Foucault (1998), “[w]here there is power, there is 
resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority 
in relation to power” (p. 95). Power and resistance can be seen just as the two sides of the 
same coin. Resistance is not merely a „reaction‟ against power,45 but also an opportunity to 
self-creation through the “practices of freedom”, as Foucault suggests in The Ethics of the 
                                                             
44 Foucault distinguishes between “power relations”, which he defines as “strategic games of liberties”, and 
“states of domination”, in which the exercise of power is absolute and „resistance‟ is not possible (Foucault, 
1997a, p. 299).  
45 See: Hartmann, J. (2003) Power and Resistance in Later Foucault. Paper presented at the 3rd Annual Meeting 
of the Foucault Circle, John Carroll University, Cleveland, OH, February 28th – March 2nd, 2003. Available at 
http://mypage.siu.edu/hartmajr/pdf/jh_fouccirc_03.pdf.  Retrieved 3 March 2011, p. 4. 
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Concern for Self as a Practice of Freedom (1997a). It is necessary to bear in mind then that 
power does not exist alone. Instead, one always finds the couple „power exercise/resistance‟. 
In this scenario, freedom should be seen as a necessary pre-requisite rather than as a 
possibility.  
If power can be resisted, it is because there are subjects who are able to recognise it 
(Haugaard, 2002, p. 209).
46
 But power is not set in stone nor does it come from a particular 
person. Instead “power […] functions in terms of the relations between different fields, 
institutions, bureaucracies, and other groups […] within the state” (Danaher, et. al., 2000). It 
outlines new objects of knowledge, shapes new subjectivities, and, most importantly, founds 
practices. In doing a history of the present, by analysing contemporary social practices, such 
as medical practice or legal expertise, we should point to the effects of power. I need to 
clarify here that I am not suggesting a theory of conspiracy, where “power is always 
something hidden in the background doing dirty work” (Kendall & Wickham, 1999), nor am 
I on the path towards a critique of the power of the state like that Marxists put forward. In a 
history of the present, which includes an analytical and a historical account of power, the 
question is how different forms of knowledge, practices and subjectivities are produced and 
relate to strategies of control and domination, parallel to different forms of resistance. 
Against „power determinism‟ it is possible to argue that people do indeed have chances to 
choose what to believe and what to accept (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 79). Power is not only 
about producing “docile bodies”, to use the Foucauldian expression in Discipline and Punish 
(Foucault, 1984a, p. 182), but also about active, self-creating individuals. According to J. 
Bishop (2009a), “[t]hrough the internalization and habituation of dispersed 
power/knowledges, the subject is created [and] it is this self-creating that defines authentic 
subjectivity for Foucault” (pp. 338f). Resistance can be a very effective force, even causing 
opposite effects to those that were originally intended by power. For example, prisons are 
created as a „power effect‟ seeking to produce “compliant bodies and behaviour”. Yet 
paradoxically, prisons are in reality “criminal factories”. This means that although prisons are 
successful disciplinary spaces in terms of the transformation of people into „prisoners‟, i.e. 
creating a new category of subjectivity, the purpose for which prisons were created –
allegedly rehabilitation – is not necessarily achieved (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 79f).  
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 The possibility of resistance proves that the subject is not „dead‟, as Foucault himself announced, but still 
“alive and well” (Haugaard, 2002, p. 209).   
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Five other concepts are central in understanding how Foucault used power as an analytical 
concept in his analyses: sovereignty (sovereign power), pastorate (pastoral power), discipline 
(disciplinary power), biopolitics
47
 and governmentality. Particularly in Security, Territory, 
Population (a compilation of his Lectures at the College de France 1977/78 (Foucault, 2007), 
and in The Birth of Biopolitics (his Lectures in 1978/79) (Foucault, 2010a), Foucault 
reshaped all his previous ideas about power, first, by analysing different modern technologies 
of government; second, by linking biopolitics to contemporary political rationalities such as 
liberalism and neoliberalism; and third, by highlighting the role of the practices of freedom, 
an issue on which he expanded in his last lecture, The Government of Self and Others 
1982/83.
48
 (Foucault, 2010b) In fact, it seems that the real interest of Foucault was not power 
in itself, but power in the context of explaining the process of subjectification through 
different historical periods. Thus, in 1982, two years before his death, Foucault declared that 
what he wanted with his work was to “create a history of the different modes by which, in our 
culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault, 2000, p. 326). The way we become 
subjects entails, paradoxically, a process of objectification, which happens as a result of, first, 
the production of scientific knowledge about us (linguistics, history, biology, and so on) that 
will constitute the „truth‟ about us; second, the creation of dividing practices to classify and 
place individuals within the social space;
49
 and, third, the use/application of self-knowledge in 
the creation of ourselves, for instance, in the context of the sexuality dispositif (Foucault, 
2000, p. 327). 
Sovereign power refers to the feudal monarch‟s privilege to kill or let live. In modern 
times, however, as the king‟s head has been cut off, instead of disappearing, sovereign power 
has spread across disparate social scenarios like schools, hospitals, family, factories, etc. 
(Foucault, 1998, pp. 136, 141).  In this context, sovereign power has come to work “in terms 
of the relations between different fields, institutions, bureaucracies, and other groups (such as 
the private media and other businesses) within the state [as power is] not set in stone, [but] 
mobile and contingent” (Danaher, et al., 2000, p. 71). Sovereign power has become embodied 
particularly in “the juridical and executive arms of the state” (Nadesan, 2008, p. 7), although 
its function is now different: fostering or disallowing life instead of suppressing it (Foucault, 
1998, p. 138). Therefore, sovereign power did not disappear with the bourgeois revolutions of 
                                                             
47 In Foucault‟s work biopower, disciplinary power, and biopolitics are terms that very often overlap. 
48 Foucault died in 1984.  
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 Foucault says that through these practices people are classified, e.g. as “the mad and the sane, sick and the 
healthy, the criminals and „the good boys‟” (Foucault, 2000, p. 326).  
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the eighteenth century, but has remained an important technology of government, based on 
authoritarian and centralised rules (Nadesan, 2008, p. 10), which in Foucault‟s words means 
that “in political thought and analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king” 
(Foucault, 1998, p. 88f). 
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries new power mechanisms operating not “by 
right but by technique, not by law but by normalization, not by punishment but by control 
[…] took charge of men‟s existence, men as living bodies” (Foucault, 1998, p. 89). Foucault 
called this kind of new power biopower, power over life that evolved in two ways. First, as a 
kind of power  
centred on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of its 
capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and 
its docility, its integration into systems of efficient and economic controls […]: 
an anatomo-politics of the human body. The second, formed somewhat later, 
focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life and 
serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and 
mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity […]: a biopolitics of 
the population. (Foucault, 1998, p. 139) 
By the seventeenth century pastoral and territorial rationalities of governing assembled 
into what Foucault called security apparatuses. In contrast to the traditional problem of 
sovereignty related mainly to possessing and ruling a territory, security apparatuses are 
concerned with how to manage populations. And this shift affected all social structures. For 
instance, from being a model for the state‟s administration, the traditional nuclear family was 
converted into an instrument of political intervention (Foucault, 1991, p. 100). The process of 
securitization entailed the dissemination of new disciplinary spaces like hospitals and 
schools, the production of particular knowledge like biostatistics to categorize population, the 
institutionalisation of certain practices like hygiene, generating not only “everyday 
panopticons of surveillance and social control, but also […] technologies of the self premised 
in the idea of individuals as self-governing agents” (Nadesan, 2008, p. 22). What is more 
important is that, as Foucault himself explained, we are not in the presence of three 
consecutive and exclusionary forms or mechanisms of power exercise, i.e. sovereign power, 
disciplinary power, and government. Rather, they constitute a kind of triangle of power acting 
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together over populations through securitizing apparatuses (Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 79; 
Foucault, 2007). 
2.4. Liberalism, neoliberalism and governmentality 
With the emergence of population as an independent and identifiable domain by the 
eighteenth century,
50
 the art of government based on the sovereign power model was 
„problematized‟, leading to a new form of power in western societies, biopower or 
biopolitics. In the Foucauldian terminology biopower is usually taken as synonymous with 
biopolitics since it is a synchronised combination between political aims and medical 
knowledge,
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 operating over populations through the use of different types of knowledge and 
the action of a wide array of experts (Nadesan, 2008, p. 8). Biopolitics is then related to a 
new “control over life […] aimed at producing subjective actions that are more attuned to the 
post-industrial way of life. For such life, it is no longer of interest to „cause to live or die‟ but, 
fundamentally, „to cause to survive‟, thus producing what Giorgio Agamben called „bare 
life‟” (Agamben, 1998; Aran & Peixoto, 2007, p. 2).52 Biopolitics is also linked to pastoral 
power. While sovereign power is about possessing and governing a „territory‟ as well as 
repressing, the pastorate is a non-territorial power inherited from the Christian ideal of the 
priest looking after his people as a shepherd with his flock. Pastoral power was integrated 
within the rationality of the modern state, e.g. through welfare institutions like state schools 
and hospitals, making it possible to govern at the same time the population and the individual 
(Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 110).  In short, biopolitics is a social strategy of policing and 
controlling populations by “increasingly ordering all realms under the guise of improving the 
welfare of the individual and the population for the purpose of reproducing and furthering the 
social order” (Towes, 2001, p. xxvi). 
Biopolitics was fundamental in the institutionalisation of new forms of governing, i.e. the 
formation of modern governmentality associated to the birth of classical liberalism. Until the 
eighteenth century the art of governing was based on police strategies and pastoral 
technologies aimed at increasing the power of the state. Under the sovereign rationality 
maintaining order was the main goal of government, and disciplinary technologies were 
                                                             
50 It is important to stress that population does not mean “people”, but a “set of processes” (Castro-Gómez, 
2010, p. 61), which will constitute the raison d'etre of the new art of government in the Modern era, i.e. 
governmentality.  
51 Although the term biopolitics is usually linked to Foucault, R. Esposito has carried out a genealogy of the 
term biopolitics, showing that other authors and in other times have also used this term (Esposito, 2008, p. 16). 
According to Esposito, for Foucault „life‟, as a concept, has been insufficiently analysed (Esposito, 2008, p. 44).  
52 I will expand on this idea in chapter seven when analysing the issue of euthanasia in Colombia.  
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conceived to assure people‟s wellbeing. With mercantilism, the art of governing was seen as 
the regulation of economy, and later on, physiocrats challenged this assumption and inverted 
the equation: the state should leave economy alone since economic processes are „natural‟. 
For physiocrats the problem was not the “abuse of sovereignty” but the “excess of 
government” (Castro-Gómez, 2010, pp. 138,139). Thus a liberal art of government, operating 
through “a biopolitics of the population [and enframing] the population within apparatuses of 
security”, was born. These forces operate today at a transnational level and are not limited to 
one state (Nadesan, 2008, p. 9). Moreover, from the late nineteenth century onwards to 
produce “the rational, autonomous agents presupposed by liberal, democratic capitalism” has 
been the main goal within the state, and in the twentieth century freedom became the ultimate 
telos of government (Nadesan, 2008, p. 26). 
Liberalism only works if individuals have freedom both to make choices and to act. 
However, as G. Burchell (1996, quoted in Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 169) has underlined, for 
Foucault freedom is not merely a human faculty, as many philosophers would say, but a 
technical condition for a „rational‟ performance under the rationality of liberal 
governmentality. Freedom, Foucault (2010a) says, “is never anything other – but this is 
already a great deal- than an actual relation between governors and governed, a relation in 
which the measure of the „too little‟ existing freedom is given by the „even more‟ freedom 
demanded” (p. 63). The great innovation of liberalism was the invention of the government 
over actions rather than over individuals, which meant that instead of seeking either to 
constrain or to control people‟s behaviour directly, the aim would be to create favourable 
conditions for freedom to be consumed and the non-intervention of the sovereign in the 
private lives of individual; a true political programme that neoliberalism has fully carried out 
across the twentieth century and first years of the twenty-first (Castro-Gómez, 2010, p. 170). 
From “the advice to the prince” (in Machiavelli) to the “art of government” (in modern 
times) we see the rationalisation of government in which economists, not philosophers or 
lawyers, will decide what governing means. According to Foucault, between the sixteenth 
and eighteenth centuries governing was problematized at different levels: self-government, 
the government of family, and the government of the souls and lives. Out of this historical 
process “the state of justice became […] an administrative state that gradually becomes 
„governmentalized‟” (Foucault, 1991, p. 103). It is a „history of governmentality‟ that 
Foucault wanted to address in his Lectures of 1978/79, which would include, first, “[t]he 
ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and 
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tactics” to exercise power over populations, using political economy as its principal form of 
knowledge and apparatuses of security as its technical means, and second, the analysis of 
“[t]he tendency over a long period of time in the West of this form of power (over 
sovereignty, discipline, etc.), which includes particular governmental apparatuses and 
savoirs” (Foucault, 1991, pp. 102-103). 
In short, governmentality is about “the conduct of conduct” and with this expression 
Foucault redefined the term “government” (its mentalities, arts, and regimes) in the way it 
began to exist from the sixteenth century onwards (Dean, 1999, p. 2). When I use the term 
governmentality I am referring to a characteristic ethico-political and economic trend that has 
been developed in Western modern societies since the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. By 
using the concept of governmentality we can explore “how individuals are privileged as 
autonomous self-regulating agents or are marginalized, disciplined, or subordinated as 
invisible or dangerous” (Nadesan, 2008, p. 1). However, in Foucauldian terms to consider 
individuals as “autonomous and self-regulating agents” is not a recognition of certain 
properties of individuals, but a revolutionary shift on how different issues related to 
governing should be analysed in modernity.      
3. Biomedicine: A new „territory‟ to be „securitized‟  
In the last 40 years a variety of discourses and strategies have been developed in order to 
limit medical power. As I have shown, bioethics and medical liability are depicted as 
promoters of the interests of patients and society. Their discourse is about autonomy, 
individual rights and protection against medical malpractice. In fact, the official history of 
bioethics has become “the history of the emancipation of the patient from medical 
paternalism” (Epstein, 2010, p. 228), which in other words means the challenge of medical 
authority. The rationality of these discourses fits perfectly into the current environment 
dominated by neoliberal ideas, e.g. primacy of individuals‟ autonomy and decisions based on 
free choice. According to Foucault, there is an anti-authority movement against “power 
effects as such”, which in the case of the medical profession has to do less with its profit-
making orientation than with its “uncontrolled” exercise of power “over people‟s bodies, 
their health and their life and death.” The attack is not against a particular institution, group 
or elite, but against “a technique, a form of power” (Foucault, 2000, p. 330). That medical 
power should be controlled might be a very valid argument, but what I want to show is that 
other power dynamics remain hidden behind the calls for limiting medical power in the name 
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of people‟s rights. In other words, bioethical discourses constitute a way to make medicine fit 
into neoliberal forms of governmentality. We are currently embedded in a neoliberal 
episteme, in which human beings are considered as rational and autonomous agents who are 
responsible for themselves while the state would just play the role of a „guarantor of rules‟, 
and if we want to understand why certain discourses, practices, and rationalities, such as 
bioethics or medical liability make sense, we need first to recognise what this episteme is and 
how it works. 
In the last fifty years medicine has been fully integrated into capitalism, becoming an 
„economy within the economy‟, the “medical industrial complex” (Relman, 1990), as 
medicine is now an important field for investment and business opportunities. Moreover, as I 
argued in the introductory chapter, medicine is in our day an important cultural phenomenon 
and doctors still hold a great deal of power despite the criticism of medical paternalism. 
However, doctors were not always powerful people. According to Stephen Watkins (2004), 
in the Britain of the nineteenth century, doctors “were of higher status than the other groups, 
but the rich still saw them as a high-grade domestic servant [and by 1932] the average 
medical practitioner was a man of little culture or general education” (p. 37). For the USA, P. 
Starr (1982), quoting an American professional journal of 1869, observes that “medicine was 
despicable as a profession. The worst election for a liberally educated man” (p. 7). But at 
least in the USA and other western countries, medicine entered a “Golden Age” in the first 
part of the twentieth century and became a kind of “special market”53 (Towes, 2001, p. 525), 
where doctors were „sovereigns‟, i.e. doctors had the prerogative in deciding how the medical 
field should be governed. Referring to American medicine, P. Starr (1982) argued that “from 
a relatively weak, traditional profession of minor economic significance, medicine has 
become a sprawling system of hospitals, clinics, health plans, insurance companies, and 
myriad other organisations employing a vast labor force” (p. 4). In other words, capitalism 
discovered how profitable medical practice might be. For Starr, the Golden Age of medicine 
meant not only amazing outcomes in terms of technical achievements, but also full 
recognition and respect for the autonomy of the profession.  
                                                             
53 Although medical practice has always been an economic activity, traditionally it had not been considered of 
the same nature like, for instance, trading goods or commerce. The take-over of medicine and other professions 
by capitalism was even foreseen by K. Marx and F. Engels who in 1861 observed that “the bourgeoisie has […] 
converted the physician, the lawyer, the priest, the poet, the man of science into its paid wage-labourers” (Marx 
& Engels, 2008, p. 37). By the late-twentieth century medical practice was indeed fully integrated into 
capitalism.    
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However, the special market of medicine from the beginning of the twentieth century has 
ended up being absorbed by the global market, in which patients have become consumers and 
consumers have become patients (Towes, 2001, p. 523). Moreover, doctors have been 
transformed from independent professionals into employees of powerful corporations in the 
Post-Fordist era. In this environment, “there is a general consensus amongst social scientists 
that the challenges to medical autonomy […] are real and that declining medical autonomy is 
more widely evident across a range of liberal democratic states […]” (Harrison, 2004b, p. 
57). Concomitantly, as medicine has been „neoliberalized‟, it has passed through a process of 
deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation. The former refers to the fact “that there has 
been a decline in public trust of medicine and the threat this poses to the principle of 
professional self-regulation” (Elston, 1991, quoted in Chamberlain, 2010, p. 7). The latter 
refers to how medicine has “become subject to rationalisation and routinisation [rendering 
medical work], subject to managerial bureaucratic control in the name of controlling costs 
and promoting consumer choice” (Elston, 2004, quoted in Chamberlain, 2010, p. 7).  
The new form of governmentality in the medical scenario of the twenty-first century 
consists of regulatory bodies, the cost-effectiveness calculus, clinical guidelines, and a wide 
range of mechanisms to control doctors „at distance‟ and limit patients‟ options. Moreover, as 
is happening in Britain and many Western countries, in the new bureaucratic environment of 
medical practice, governance/government discourses and rationalities are used to contrast “a 
mode of coordination based on networks rather than on hierarchy” (Harrison, 2004a, p. 180). 
In the new bureaucratized model, medical professionalism (and good doctoring) emphasises 
formal rules, scientific evidence, use of protocols, and clinical guidelines (in connection with 
EBM), cost-effectiveness, external regulation, and a stratified approach to the medical 
profession in which there is “explicit recognition of elites based on medical research and 
medically qualified management” (Harrison, 2004a, p. 185). The problem is, as Harrison 
points out, that “[t]he golden age of medicine as a profession may be gone… but its 
replacement by bureaucracy does not constitute unalloyed progress” (Harrison, 2004b, p. 59). 
Regarding EBM, it is necessary to take into account that 
the politics of standards should not be located solely in the regulatory-political 
environment from which standards emerge but in the standards themselves. 
Standards [including clinical guidelines] are inherently political because their 
construction and application transform the practices in which they become 
embedded. They change positions of actors: altering relations of accountability, 
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emphasising or desemphasising pre-existing hierarchies, changing expectations 
of patients. (Timmermans, 2003, p. 22)   
Since the 1970s the political project to demedicalize society, promoted particularly by 
social scientists, has been on the rise and it constitutes a particular form of resistance against 
medical power. Although Kimsma and Van Leewen (2005, p. 560) have argued that this 
project is being carried out via the „juridification‟ and „economization‟ of medicine, I would 
add that the aforementioned „bioethicalisation‟ of medicine is part of that process, too. These 
phenomena reflect a shift in power relations in the biomedical field. In Foucauldian terms, the 
biomedical field has passed from being a „sovereign territory‟ to being a „governed 
population‟, which would explain the flourishing of pastoral discourses such as bioethics, 
medical liability and medical economics in the last few years.  Medicine might rightly be 
seen as a „territory‟ where doctors used to exercise sovereign power. However, beginning 
with the problematization of the DPR in the mid-twentieth century, medicine has since 
become a „population‟ to be governed. In this process, bioethics, with the help of law and 
economics, has provided the necessary pastoral discourse to „securitize‟ medicine. In this 
context bioethics is arguably part of clinical strategies which are being used to govern the 
biomedical field. In the UK, for instance, during the early 2000s, the application of a 
technology of governmentality to professional expertise went hand in hand with regulation 
and new forms of self-surveillance in the medical arena (Flynn, 2004, p. 20). In this 
environment, the principle of regulated autonomy has become an important tool to govern 
healthcare organisations; with autonomy and regulation it is possible to control at distance 
(Flynn, 2004, p. 21). In this context, „good doctors‟ are those who practise with „responsible 
autonomy‟, using the expression of Degeling, Maxwell, and Iedema (2004, p. 163), i.e. 
doctors, who are still considered „free professionals‟, although in reality they are subjected to 
certain neoliberal principles operating through strategies of self-surveillance. 
In order to make the entire medical-industrial complex work properly as well as to 
minimize resistance and avoid rebellions, it is necessary that discourses, rationalities, 
institutions, subjects, and strategies are attuned. Recall that in Foucauldian terms, the 
question is not „why‟, but „how‟. The „how‟-perspective is related to „governance‟, which 
also should include an appropriate „truth regime‟ and an apparatus (dispositif) in order to 
“keep things going”.54 In other words, a „power regime‟ is usually attached to a „truth 
                                                             
54 Using the expression of Hunk and Wickham, quoted in: Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 49. 
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regimen‟ (Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 49). According to A. Gray (2004) “[t]he 
communion mode of governance is a relationship based on an appeal to common values and 
creeds” (p. 5). My argument is that bioethics operates within this set of “common values and 
creeds”, „lubricating‟ the cogwheels of the medical-industrial complex. In the case of 
Colombia, as I will show in chapter four, bioethics flourished in the 1990s, parallel to a 
radical neoliberal health care reform. Under the umbrella of the neoliberal rationality, a new 
medical ethics was indeed necessary. Thus, as N. Rose (2007) has argued, “the apparatus of 
bioethics has achieved the salience that it has, in contemporary biopolitics, because of the 
problems of governing biomedicine in an age of choice and self-maximization in which the 
body and its capacities have become central to technologies of selfhood” (p. 8).  
Furthermore, as Miller and Rose (2008) have argued, “[i]n any event, economic power 
could only maintain itself, could only reproduce itself, on the basis of a particular legal 
system, a set of ideas about the organisation of work and the definition of profit, a set of 
institutional arrangements for shaping and moulding the hopes, aspirations and capacities of 
individuals and collectivities, and much more” (p. 2). Hence, not only the discourse of 
bioethics but also the juridification of medicine provides a central element of the power 
relationships which govern healthcare today. Law and economics have also played an 
important role in sustaining neoliberal forms of government in various areas, including 
medicine. Foucault (2010a) himself suggested that in modern neoliberal societies, “[t]he 
economy is a game and the legal institution which frames the economy should be thought of 
as the rules of the game” (p. 173). However, while in classical liberalism there was a 
separation between law and morality, since the nineteenth century law has become more and 
more normative and not merely prohibitive, giving way to the birth of “social law” in which 
individuals are responsible not only before the state, but before others (Castro-Gómez, 2010, 
p. 233). Ewald, a former student of Foucault, has shown that in the nineteenth century the 
idea of health insurance to manage risks was born as liberalism wanted to manage the social, 
a category that had become problematic with the development of capitalism. The rise of „the 
social‟ in the nineteenth century, as it had happened with „population‟ in the eighteenth 
century, became a technology of government. Yet the term „risk‟, “which one finds being 
used nowadays apropos of everything has no precise meaning other than as a category of this 
technology. [In fact] there is no risk in reality. But on the other hand, anything can be a risk” 
(Ewald, 1991, p. 199). 
 
57 
 
4. The Foucauldian approach in Bioethics 
In 1987 a whole issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy was devoted to “Michel 
Foucault and the philosophy of medicine” (Rawlinson, 1987). Twenty five years later, in 
2009, the same journal devoted a special issue to “revisit Foucault” (Bishop, 2009b). 
Although the Foucauldian approach has already been used in the analysis of particular 
bioethical issues, it has been neglected in the analysis of the „ethicalisation of medicine‟ in 
the second half of the twentieth century. In the opening article of the 2009 special issue of the 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, Bishop argues that Foucault‟s work is an “interpretative 
analytics”. It is analytic in a Kantian sense “as he searches out the conditions for the 
possibility of unreason in Madness and Civilisation […]; of medicine in The Birth of the 
Clinic […]; and of life, language, and labor in The Order of Things (1994) [and it is 
interpretative in] that it seeks a pragmatic reading of the coherence of our practices – 
practices in which our knowledge are instantiated” (Bishop, 2009a, p. 331).   
In another article in the special issue mentioned above, C. Scott argues that, although 
Foucault was not particularly interested in medical ethics, his work can illuminate not only 
those debates currently taking place in this field, but also “the knowledge and practice of 
biomedical ethicists” (Scott, C. E., 2009, p. 351). Scott also argues that in order to make 
ethical studies effective, they must go beyond than just clarifying terminology and revising 
other philosophical texts. This means “to interrupt dominant rationalities, […] to show the 
wide range of impact by knowledge and practices in many dimensions of society, and to 
develop vocabularies and concepts that form in experiences of concrete, highly problematic 
situations” (Scott, C. E., 2009, p. 360). This could be achieved by adopting the Foucaultian 
genealogical analysis of institutions, practices, and names that have been taken for granted 
(McGowen, 1994, p. 96). However, for a critical history of discourses such as bioethics and 
medical law it is necessary to remember that the “genealogical thought is at times difficult 
because it is counterintuitive [and] Foucault‟s genealogical thinking includes major 
confrontations with many established and authoritative values and truths” (Scott, C. E., 2009, 
p. 353). Therefore, arguing against many bioethicists‟ taken-for-granted “values and truths”, 
might not be an easy task at all.  
To take a critical perspective on bioethics it is necessary to ask, “[w]hat is the function of 
bioethics? What is the role of bioethics in the new political economy of medicine? Is the 
discipline honest about its relationship to individual freedom and its neutrality regarding the 
good?” (Lysaught, 2009, p. 387). For Lysaught, doctors and patients have become „docile 
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bodies‟ for pharmaceutical companies and big healthcare corporations. As such, this is a 
power effect that can neither be unveiled by analytical philosophy approaches nor 
principlism. Only a biopolitical approach might explain how the “political economy of 
biomedicine and transnational research” have evolved at the turn of the twenty first century. 
In short, for Lysaught,  
[t]o see bioethics as a mode of biopolitics is to illuminate the myriad of ways 
that behind the rhetoric of freedom, empowerment, and improving the welfare of 
the individual and the population, bioethics functions to produce, organise, and 
manage the bodies of real, human persons –to police and control populations- 
towards the ends of larger institutional agents such as the state or, more recently, 
the biotech industry. To see bioethics as a mode of biopolitics is to raise 
questions about bioethics‟ role in the political economy of biomedicine, 
particularly when that political economy impinges on human bodies. (Lysaught, 
2009, p. 387)  
To examine bioethics in terms of biopolitics can be a fruitful way to reveal the power 
relations working behind the curtains in the history of bioethics. Inspired by Foucault, J. 
Bishop and F. Jotterand stressed the “political turn” of bioethics in recent years and claimed 
that bioethics has always had a deep relation with biopolitics. For them, to consider bioethics 
as biopolitics is to consider the relationship between medicine and politics (Bishop & 
Jotterand, 2006, p. 206). This does not come as a surprise, since medicine has been a 
fundamental component of biopolitics since the eighteenth century (Lysaught, 2009, p. 387). 
However, when bioethics and biopolitics are linked, authors can be referring to different 
things. For J. Bishop and F. Jotterand (2006) “bioethics has always been a biopolitics and the 
political dimension is only now coming into relief for bioethicists” (p. 205). For N. Rose 
contemporary biopolitics is at the intersection of medical and political perceptions and 
practices (Rose, 2007, p. 5). In this context, bioethics is related to somatic expertise: the rise 
of experts of the soma, and around them “[…] a whole variety of new pastoral experts [like 
genetics counsellors] –whose role is to advise and guide, to care and support […]” But, 
according to Rose (2007), “perhaps most remarkable has been the rise of a novel expertise of 
„bioethics‟ claiming the capacity to evaluate and adjudicate on these activities, which has 
been enrolled in the government and legitimation of biomedical practices from bench to 
clinic and marketplace” (p. 6) In the same way, the rise of Economies of vitality, i.e. 
bioeconomy and biocapital are born: “Life itself has been made amenable to […] new 
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economic relations [and] in the process, a novel geopolitical field has taken shape, and 
biopolitics has become inextricably intertwined with bioeconomics” (Rose, 2007, pp. 6f).  
T. Koch (2006) has criticised the narrowness and poverty that characterises the current 
bioethical debate. For him bioethics operates as an ideology whose „axioms‟ are “arbitrary 
and exclusive rather than necessary and inclusive” (Koch, 2006, p. 251). From another angle, 
L. Hall argues that bioethics has become a mere “procedure”, a formality to make up “ethical 
decisions” in biomedicine, while it remains complacent of the “imperative of progress” that 
characterises western societies. For this reason, she argues, is it necessary to ask: “How might 
Western bioethicists be more aware of the ways that our language depends upon a set of 
assumptions about progress, rationality, and development? [H]ow might Western 
bioethicists‟ intent to be useful in countries classified as within the two-thirds world be 
cognizant of the ways that we enforce through our language a set of „rules that govern what 
can count as knowledge‟? How might our very efforts to be of use deal in deadly ways, 
reinforcing „rules that determine which human lives can be lived?‟” (Hall, 2006, p. 289).  
More recently, T. Juritzen, H. Grimen and K. Heggen (2011), with their analysis of power 
“in the exercise of guiding and monitoring procedures related to research ethics”, have 
illustrated how a Foucauldian approach is fruitful in bioethics. After reviewing the 
interrelation between power and knowledge and the concept of pastoral power, they warn 
about the exercise of power that might entail a risk of abuse in the biomedical field (e.g. 
domination, exploitation, coercion, and so on) not only on the part of sponsors (e.g. 
pharmaceuticals) and researchers, but also on the part of the guiding and monitoring bodies 
(e.g. ethics committees). Based on the Foucauldian insight that power and knowledge coexist 
in an intrinsic relation, these authors criticised the “administrators of research ethics [for 
positioning themselves] as external to the power that is being wielded in the field of research 
ethics” (Juritzen et al., 2011, p. 646). Juritzen et al. argue that by holding a view according to 
which research ethics committees are intrinsically exempt from power effects and merely 
devoted to “regulate the obviously asymmetric relationship between the researcher and the 
participant, […] other essential positions and relationships of power [remain] invisible” 
(Juritzen et al., 2011, p. 647). This criticism might well apply to bioethics in general, as 
bioethics can be characterised for its „will‟ to regulate different relationships in the 
biomedical scenario, e.g. doctors-patients, doctors-health care professionals, doctors-health 
corporations and medicine-society relationships, to name but a few, while remaining blind to 
the way power shapes such relations.       
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5. Conclusion: Towards a Foucauldian approach to Bioethics in Colombia 
 
Bioethicists have hitherto systematically neglected and/or disregarded the role power 
relations have played in the creation of their field. To fill this gap, in this chapter I have made 
a case for a Foucauldian approach to the history of bioethics and its relation to power. Three 
main reasons explain why the Foucauldian approach should be included in any historical 
analysis of bioethics. First of all, such an approach does not consider power as such, but 
situates it in the context of practices, rationalities, discourses and knowledge. Today, 
bioethics and medical liability are regarded as new disciplines that claim to possess new 
knowledge necessary to make contemporary biomedicine ethical. Indeed, they represent a 
„truth regime‟ in biomedicine as they define subjectivities and prescribe courses of action, 
e.g. what being a doctor and a patient is and how they ought to act. In contrast to Whiggish or 
naïve accounts, the Foucauldian perspective reminds us that there is not “a potential for 
knowledge which is undistorted by power” (Haugaard, 2002, p. 229). We must bear in mind 
that “the various types of knowledge of man and the historical forms of power entertain a 
necessary connection in which the two terms are indissociable” (Han, 2002, p. 115). Hence, a 
history of bioethics should not only include an analysis of power-knowledge relations, but 
also of the production of subjectivities and how different forms of power, i.e. sovereign 
power, disciplinary power, biopolitics and governmentality operate in the field of bioethics 
and medical liability.  
Second, the Foucauldian approach is mainly focused on the „how‟ rather than on the 
„why‟. For neo-Foucauldians like P. Miller and N. Rose the passage “from why to how” was 
a fundamental move for their research programme. They wanted to avoid “why-type” 
questions (the kind of question many political scientists like to ask), “naturalized” answers, or 
falling for the temptation of considering the current state of things as “necessary” (Miller & 
Rose, 2008, p. 6). Thus, the Foucauldian perspective focused on „how‟ rather than „why‟ will 
let me show that the process of bioethicalisation of medicine in Colombia is a strategy to 
govern the biomedical field in accordance to the dominant rationalities in advanced liberal 
societies.  
Third, by adopting a Foucauldian approach, one is neither limited to analyse power 
relations by reference to the State nor is power necessarily seen a negative or repressive 
force. This approach will therefore let me show the productive effects of power and how it 
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operates at different levels in the case of the history of bioethics and medical liability. 
Thereby, it will be possible to understand how neoliberal practices and rationalities have 
caused a profound transformation of the Colombian medical ethos. 
The history of bioethics in Latin America, and particularly in Colombia, both in terms of a 
history of the present and a history of governmentality, should then include questions such as: 
how did this new academic and professional field come to be? How did new experts, the 
„bioethicist‟ and the „medical lawyer‟ emerge and how were they integrated at different 
levels, e.g. universities, hospitals, ethics committees, etc? What do „bioethical problems‟, 
„bioethical knowledge‟ or „bioethical aspects‟ mean? What is „the bioethical‟? How do 
categories such as „autonomy‟, „human dignity‟, „interdisiciplinarity‟, or „medical liability‟ 
work? What forces, actors, structures, and mechanisms constitute the “conditions of 
possibility” for ethics committees, a national bioethics commission and academic programs in 
bioethics to appear? And, how have bioethics and medical liability come to affect, shape, and 
be part of other discourses and practices like in the legal scenario– e.g. medical malpractice 
and judicial decisions on „bioethical matters‟ -, managed care, governmental policies on 
environment, and biomedical research? Why bioethics and why medical liability? Are they a 
„natural‟ answer to the advance of biomedical sciences? Are they as beneficial as their 
advocates eagerly suggest? How, when, where, under what circumstances, and with what 
kind of institutions do these new „discourses of expertise‟ work? What are the historical 
„forces‟ and „conditions of possibility‟ that led to the rise of the new normative framework 
for medical practice? Which objects, scenarios, problems, and subjects do bioethics and 
medical law talk a lot about and about which do they remain silent?  
We must think in terms of the fertile conditions that have promoted the formation of new 
normative discourses in the field of medical practice –bioethics and medical liability-, the 
characteristics of this new knowledge about „good‟ and „right‟, the new subjects of expertise 
which have arrived and stayed in a net of new institutional relationships, in sum, the new foci 
of control and discipline which determine the medical ethos today. We are in the presence of 
new relations between truth, health and capitalization which have led to new forms of 
administering individuals‟ lives. The new controls over medical practice should not be simply 
thought of as mechanisms to protect people from doctors‟ abuses. They are one element of 
the medical-industrial complex and its governmentalization. In this context, the Foucauldian 
approach also offers an interesting and fruitful alternative, which is to understand ethics in 
terms of the possibility of creating a new relationship with oneself. If bioethics and medical 
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liability have to help liberating people from domination, exploitation and abuse in the 
biomedical scenario, they should be scenarios where practices of freedom and self-creation 
are promoted, not only among patients or research subjects, but also among doctors and 
health care professionals. In the next chapters I will apply the Foucauldian approach I have 
described here. I will start with the analysis of the history of bioethics in Latin America. 
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Chapter three 
Bioethics in Latin America: 
The American bioethics meets the South 
 
1. Introduction 
Latin America refers to a vast region that includes Central and South America as well as 
the Caribbean islands. It is made up of 27 countries and Spanish and Portuguese are the main 
languages, although French and English are also spoken, not to mention the many indigenous 
languages and dialects which are still in use in the region. But more than this, Latin America 
is the outcome of a complex process of cultural amalgamation of European –particularly 
Spanish and Portuguese–, Indigenous, and African traditions. After the independence wars of 
the nineteenth century, the construction of the Latin American identity was a process deeply 
linked to the USA. By the late nineteenth century the term „Latin America‟ was coined to 
differentiate the Anglo-Saxon America, mainly represented by the USA, from the region that 
was conquered and colonized by Spain and Portugal, which represented a „Latin‟ tradition 
(Tealdi, 2008a, p. 1).
55
 In this complex, multifaceted, contradictory and vast region, bioethics 
has been evolving since the late 1970s. But, as in many other fields, there are contesting 
views about what the role of bioethics should be in this setting. Since bioethics is an 
American product, how have Latin American bioethicists understood their own history and 
what role has the North/South tension played in the development of bioethics in Latin 
America? Have the Latin American bioethicists been aware of such power relations in the 
development of their own discipline, and, if yes, how have they responded to them? 
At present bioethics is a well established academic, professional, and social community in 
Latin America. In the past fifteen years the number of people and institutions working in this 
field as well as of events organised to discuss bioethical issues has substantially increased. 
Several journals, books, bulletins and documents are published now, offering an interesting 
picture of how bioethics is thought and done across the region.
56
 Some bioethicists have even 
argued that bioethics both in the Iberian peninsula and Latin America has developed a distinct 
identity (Pessini & de Barchifontaine, 2010, p. xvii), but in this sense the idea of „Latin 
                                                             
55 France promoted „Latin America‟ as the best term since other terms like „Hispanic America‟ or „Ibero-
America‟ would only evoke the Spanish and Portuguese influences (Tealdi, 2008a, p. 1).  
56 For an overview of Latin American bibliographic production, see: León, F. J. (2008) La bioética 
latinoamericana en sus textos [The Latin American Bioethics Through its Texts]. Santiago de Chile: Universidad 
de Chile. 
64 
 
American bioethics is mainly a geographical reference. In regard to this, A. Salles and M. 
Bertomeu (2002, p. 2) have justifiably asked: “Is there a Latin American bioethics, with 
peculiar touches?” In order to answer this question it would be necessary to ask if there are 
particular „realities‟ of bioethics in Latin America, how they were formed, and what they 
mean within the complex net of power and knowledge relations in which biomedical 
practices are embedded. In order to get some answers, a genealogical approach to the history 
of bioethics in Latin America is useful, and provides the basis for understanding how 
bioethics developed in Colombia. This genealogical approach is the consideration of how 
power dynamics have shaped the field in this region. 
Although power has already been used as a pivotal concept by Latin American bioethicists 
to denounce dominant models of bioethics that gloss over socio-political and economic 
inequalities in the region, it has nevertheless barely been used to analyse the internal 
dynamics of the bioethics community itself. In this sense, the use of power as an analytical 
category not only helps to reveal oppressive and exploitative constellations in the biomedical 
scenario in the region, but also helps to understand better how bioethics has evolved as a 
discipline in Latin America. As elsewhere, Latin American bioethicists talk about bioethical 
issues and stress the importance of their own field. However, when it comes to the conflicts 
within the field, those „non-bioethical issues‟ that have shaped the ethos of bioethics in the 
region such as power struggles, they tend to turn a blind eye. Hence the central aim of this 
chapter will be to show this aspect in order to understand how power is behind the 
development of bioethics in Colombia. 
As one of the aims of this thesis is to carry out a philosophical and historical analysis of 
bioethics in Colombia, I begin this chapter by offering a comprehensive view of the history of 
bioethics in Latin America to outline the context in which bioethics in Colombia has 
developed. In so doing, I will start by introducing Iberian and Latin American bioethicists 
and discuss the historical accounts they have offered about the birth and development of their 
own field. Such accounts are dispersed in the bioethical literature published in the region in 
Spanish and Portuguese, and to a lesser extent in international journals and textbooks in 
English. What interests me about these historical accounts is the role they have played in the 
construction of the „origin myths‟ that Latin American bioethicists, like their American 
colleagues, have created to legitimize the way their own field has evolved.      
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2. The three-stage history of bioethics in Latin America 
Some Latin American bioethicists have divided the history of bioethics in their region into 
three periods, and this understanding has become almost canonical for the Latin American 
bioethics community. Two pioneers of Latin American bioethics have shaped this view: José 
A. Mainetti
57
 (2009, p. 501) and Alfonso Llano
58
 (2010, p. 45).
59
 According to them, the 
three periods were, first, the “reception” or “transplant”, second, the “assimilation” or 
“development”, and third, the “consolidation” or “recreation” of bioethics. Although for A. 
Llano (2010, p. 46) bioethics remained unknown in Latin America during the 1970s, starting 
its history in this region in the 1980s, Mainetti has argued that it arrived in the early 1970s via 
the Institute for Medical Humanities
60
 that had been founded in Argentina by his father, José 
María Mainetti, in 1972. According to J.A. Mainetti, this Institute promoted bioethical studies 
following the Spanish historian and philosopher of medicine Pedro Laín Entralgo, “the 
patriarch of Ibero-American medical humanism” (Mainetti, 2009, p. 502).  
The “assimilation” of bioethics took place between 1985 and 1995 when the first 
institutions for bioethics in the region were created and the first specialized publications in 
the field appeared. By the mid-1980s American bioethicists, mainly from the Kennedy 
Institute of Ethics, at Georgetown University, were going to Argentina as speakers on the 
courses and the first Ibero-American programme on bioethics organised by the Latin American 
School for Bioethics
61
 (Figueroa & Fuenzalida, 1996, p. 613; Llano, 2010, p. 47). According to 
Mainetti, in this period bioethics in Latin America showed its “radical nature [by going] 
beyond a philosophy of medicine to become a philosophy of culture and technology […]” 
(Mainetti, 2009, p. 503). But I differ from Mainetti in this point as such a conception of 
bioethics, it is my contention, is still a potentiality rather than a realisation of bioethics in this 
region. As in Latin America bioethics encompasses a disparate set of discourses, practices, 
institutions, and subjects that are organised around social aspirations, anxieties, and hopes 
related to biomedicine, it would be better to understand bioethics in Latin America as a 
dispositif, in Foucauldian terms, rather than “a philosophy of culture and technology”.  
                                                             
57 Argentinean physician, bioethicist and philosopher of medicine. 
58 Colombian Jesuit priest, medical ethicist, and bioethicist. 
59 This historical categorization has been amplified by other Latin American bioethicists, for example, the 
Venezuelan bioethicist L. Schmidt (Schmidt, Mainetti, León, F.J. & Pessini, 2008, p. 5). In Colombia J. Escobar 
has divided the history of bioethics in this country following a similar periodization (PBUEB & Escobar, J., 
2002, p. 11). 
60
 Instituto de Humanidades Médicas. 
61 Escuela Latinoamericana de Bioética. 
66 
 
The third period, the „consolidation‟ and „recreation‟ of bioethics, would stretch from the 
mid-1990s until today. In this period, Latin American bioethicists became more visible on the 
international stage, and the concept of a Latin American bioethics received its own place in 
the international bioethics literature. For the first edition of the Encyclopaedia of Bioethics, 
the Venezuelan physician A. León (1978) wrote the article Latin America in the Twentieth 
Century. Although for Mainetti (2009, p. 503) this was an article on bioethics in Latin 
America, it is not difficult to see that instead of examining bioethics in the region, A. León 
just summarised a few points about medical ethics in Latin America and hardly mentioned 
bioethics. Yet, in this period it is possible to identify the first debates about the nature, scope, 
and methods of bioethics that have divided the Latin American bioethicists. But, before going 
on with the characterisation of Latin American bioethics, I will examine how powerful 
institutions sponsored bioethics in the region and then supported the process of its 
„implementation‟.  
 
3. Powerful sponsors: PAHO and UNESCO 
In the early 1990s, the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) began to promote 
bioethics in Latin America, allegedly to make biomedical research initiatives in the region 
more „ethical‟ (Drane, 2010, p. 32). James Drane62 was commissioned by this organisation 
“to take leave from Edinburgh University to become PAHO's first resident bioethicist, and in 
that capacity to develop some foundational medical ethics projects in Latin America” (Drane 
& Fuenzalida, 1991, p. 325). In Drane‟s view, Latin America required bioethics as an answer 
to the ethical violations of pharmaceutical companies in the region and the creation of 
Institutional Review Boards had to be promoted (Drane, 2010, pp. 32, 41). Eventually Drane 
travelled across Latin America, visiting five countries
63
 and speaking with influential people 
– professionals, academics, and government officials. On his trip Drane argued that American 
bioethicists could contribute to the expansion of bioethics in Latin America, particularly as 
there were medical professionals eager to adopt the new discipline in this region. However, 
he acknowledged that cultural and socio-political differences between Latin America and the 
                                                             
62 American Catholic ex-priest and bioethicist. In the 1970s he distanced himself from the Roman Catholic 
Church official stance on issues like contraception. His influence was crucial in the development of bioethics in 
Latin America (Lolas, 2005b, p. 164).  
63 Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and Brazil. 
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USA should be taken into account in the process of adopting American bioethics (Drane & 
Fuenzalida, 1991, pp. 325, 336f). 
 
In 1990 the Bulletin of PAHO published a special issue on bioethics (PAHO, 1990). For 
A. Llano this issue “formally introduced Latin America to bioethics” (Llano, 2010, p. 49). It 
opens by quoting the Encyclopaedia of Bioethics‟ definition of bioethics and goes on to 
describe bioethics as an inclusive field in four respects: first, by embracing value-related 
problems in healthcare professions; second, by including biomedical and behavioural 
research issues; third, by giving room to a broad range of social issues; and fourth, by taking 
into account not only human life, but animal and plant life as well (Connor & Fuenzalida 
Puelma, 1990, p. vi). In 1994 PAHO, in agreement with the government of Chile and the 
University of Chile created the Regional Program on Bioethics for Latin America and the 
Caribbean
64
 (RPB), which initially operated from Santiago. According to F. Lolas, former 
RPB director, PAHO wanted to have a “technical office” to carry out an “ethical supervision” 
and also work on legal issues related to biomedical research projects in the region (Lolas, 
2005b, p. 163). In retrospect, Lolas described RPB‟s purpose as “to serve the needs of the 
countries and territories of the Americas and the Caribbean by providing the necessary 
assistance to stimulate reform in their health care systems, to improve their scientific 
infrastructure, and to provide essential medical and sanitary services for their population” 
(Lolas, 2010b, p. 55f). RPB became an important catalyst for bioethics in Latin America, 
offering courses and channelling international initiatives as well as important debates in the 
region. The programme indeed fulfilled J. Drane‟s dream of making more bioethical literature 
available in Spanish to disseminate bioethics across the region. Since 2000 RPB supported 
Acta Bioethica,
65
 perhaps the most important bioethics journal in Latin America (Lolas, 
2010a, p. 116), which is now published solely by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Bioethical 
Studies
66
 (ICBS) at the University of Chile.       
In 1996 RPB, in alliance with the University of Chile, offered the first MA in bioethics in 
Latin America.
67
 As its first director was the renowned Spanish historian of medicine and 
bioethicist Diego Gracia (Lolas, 2010b, p. 56), whose views on bioethics have strongly 
                                                             
64 Programa Regional de Bioética para América Latina y el Caribe. 
65 All the issues of this journal are available at: http://www.scielo.cl/scielo.php?script=sci_serial&pid=1726-
569X&lng=es&nrm=iso, accessed 5 Oct 11. 
66 Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios Bioéticos. 
67
 Also in 2002 a training program on human research ethics was launched thanks to a grant of the National 
Institutes of Health in the USA, through the International Fogarty Center (Lolas, 2005a, p. 8).  
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influenced many Latin American bioethicists. Consistent with its vocation of spreading 
bioethics across the region, this postgraduate programme moved to other countries, for 
example the Dominican Republic, Peru, and Argentina. Since its creation, RPB promoted 
national commissions on bioethics and ethics committees in the region. In recent years, as 
RPB moved to PAHO‟s office in Washington,68 part of its staff have continued working at 
ICBS, which was designated as a collaborating centre of WHO/PAHO for bioethics.
69
 In 
short, “[t]he Pan American Health Organisation demonstrated by its pioneering effort to 
develop bioethics that it had identified a real need and responded to it in an appropriate form” 
(Lolas, 2006, p. 118).  
UNESCO has also been deeply involved with the development of bioethics in Latin 
America, particularly after the creation of RedBioetica in 2003, a net of institutions and 
individuals working on bioethics in the region. RedBioetica has particularly been committed 
to social bioethics, a perspective that many Latin American bioethicists have promoted and 
according to which politics are considered of fundamental importance for bioethics in Latin 
America. Instead of privileging ethical implications linked to the latest biotechnological 
device, Latin American bioethics should promote discussions about justice in healthcare, 
poverty and the social determinants of health. Alya Saada has argued that Latin America 
initiated the so-called social bioethics, which for him meant a move from a bioethics centred 
on the individual to a holistic perspective, with a focus on social justice, equality and human 
rights (Saada, 2008, p. xxi).  
The aim of RedBioetica is “to provide the countries and peoples of Latin America and the 
Caribbean with an additional new instrument for improving democracy, citizenship and 
human rights in the region, from constructing an expanded and more politicised concept of 
Bioethics and promoting wholesome transdisciplinary interchange (regional and worldwide) 
on this theme” (Garrafa, N.D., p. 24). RedBioetica has been very active in the region since its 
beginnings in 2000, promoting the creation of ethical committees and national commissions 
of bioethics, organising conferences, supporting academic initiatives on bioethics, and 
making bioethical relevant bibliography available through their webpage.
70
 Regarding the 
role that bioethics should play in the region, it is worth mentioning that in 2004 RedBioetica 
rejected a draft of UNESCO‟s Declaration on Bioethics in which only biomedical issues 
                                                             
68 About bioethics in PAHO, see PAHO‟s webpage at: http://www.paho.org/english/bio/about.htm, accessed 22 
April 2011.  
69
 See: http://www.bioetica.uchile.cl/acerca/centroc.htm, accessed 22 July 2011. 
70 See: http://www.unesco.org.uy/shs/es/areas-de-trabajo/ciencias-sociales/eventos.html, accessed 4 may 2012.  
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concerned with individual rights were addressed. Instead, RedBioetica called for a broader 
understanding of bioethics and the inclusion of health, social and environmental questions in 
a new agenda. 
It is clear then that powerful institutions such as PAHO and UNESCO were profoundly 
related to the institutionalisation of bioethics in Latin America. These organisations 
contributed resources and political support for bioethics to develop in the region. This 
institutional development went hand in hand with the rise of particular discourses that 
characterise Latin American bioethics.  
 
4. The discourses of bioethics in Latin America 
4.1. „Origin myths‟, pioneers, and genealogies 
Latin American bioethical literature has reproduced, by and large, the same „myths of 
origin‟ that R. Fox et al. (2008) described in their book on American bioethics. The most 
widely accepted myth among Latin American bioethicists is that bioethics is the natural and 
necessary answer to the ethical dilemmas posed by biomedical progress. However, a set of 
disparate issues, facts, circumstances and events are usually invoked to explain why bioethics 
emerged in Latin America. For A. Llano some of them are “negative”71 while others are 
“positive”72 (Llano, 2002, pp. 11-12). Similarly, Ludwig Schmidt73 mentioned “20 hits” or 
particular events in the history of the second half of the twentieth century that would justify 
the birth of bioethics, including issues such as the allocation of haemodialysis in Seattle in 
1962, the liberalization of abortion, genetic engineering, and Vatican documents such as 
Donum Vitae in 1987, to name but a few (Schmidt & Cecchetto, 2008, p. 19).  
Another way to talk about the origin of bioethics in Latin America is by referring to V. R. 
Potter as the founder of the field. Unlike the American bioethicists who usually quote Potter‟s 
work just when discussing the origin of the term,
74
 Latin American bioethicists have made 
him almost a figure of veneration. Potter is presented as a man who excelled in science, 
                                                             
71 He mentions, among others, the technification of death/dying, the existence of guerrillas, and precocious 
puberty, to name but a few.  
72 Here he includes the rise of a global awareness of the importance of human dignity, the encyclical Humane 
Vitae on reproductive matters, and the Belmont Report, to name but a few.  
73 Venezuelan bioethicist. 
74 See, for example, Reich, W. T. (1994). The Word „Bioethics‟: Its Birth and the Legacies of Those Who 
Shaped It. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 4(4), 319-335 and Reich, W. T.  (1995). The Word „Bioethics‟: 
The Struggle over its Earliest Meanings. Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 5(1), 19-34.  
70 
 
successfully engaged with the humanities and lived an exemplary life.
75
 For many Latin 
American bioethicists the Potterian bioethics is the true bioethics, because they advocate life 
„in general‟ and not only in the biomedical scenario. Potter‟s ideas about bridge bioethics 
(bioethics as a „bridge‟ between sciences and humanities, and between the present and the 
future), global bioethics (bioethics as concerned with life in general), and deep bioethics 
(bioethics in relation to different fields of knowledge) have strongly influenced the way 
bioethics have been understood in Latin America. From the Latin American perspective 
Potter‟s great achievement was not only to have coined the term „bioethics‟,76 but also to 
have created a system of harmony between science and ethics (Llano, 1998, p. ix). However, 
as many Latin American bioethicists have lamented, the kind of bioethics that prevailed in 
the USA was not the „Potterian‟ one, which was committed with the defense and promotion 
of life, but that of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, which was focused on the morality of the 
individual‟s decisions in the context of biomedicine. 
Much of the historical literature available about bioethics in Latin America corresponds to 
first-person narratives. For instance, the section on “the discourses of bioethics in Latin 
America” written by J. A. Mainetti (2009) in The Cambridge World History of Medical 
Ethics is more about his „personal‟ contribution to Latin American bioethics than a proper 
examination of such discourses. Mainetti‟s article is, arguably, incomplete, biased, and 
lacking a critical approach to what the discourses of bioethics have been in Latin America. 
Moreover, F. Lolas has claimed that although Mainetti‟s influence was very important in the 
development of bioethics in Latin America, it was not the only one (Lolas, 2005b, p. 163). 
Although for the renowned American bioethicist T.H. Engelhardt (2010) these personal 
accounts are important because “the voices of the founders will soon be silent [as] dead men 
write no autobiographies” (p. 6). This, however, raises the question as to why the idea of 
„pioneering‟ has become such an important issue for bioethicists in Latin America? One of 
the difficulties with the current historical accounts of bioethics in Latin America is that they 
are full of self-praising and cult-of-personality narratives, as Latin American bioethicists 
seem to have developed special taste honouring „pioneers‟. With regard to this, F. Lolas has 
argued that “within each country some people have taken upon themselves the status of 
                                                             
75 A. Llano claims that “[Potter] stands out as a whole symbol of bioethics for his personality, his marriage (64 
years with the same wife Vivian Christensen, and three children) […] and his message. [He] initiates the 
dialogue between Life and Ethics” (My translation. Translations into English are, if not stated otherwise, by me) 
(Llano, 2002, p. 14).  
76 The first publications in which the word „bioethics‟ allegedly appeared are: Potter, V.R. (1970) Bioethics: The 
Science of Survival. Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, v. 14, autumn, 127-153 and Potter, V.R. (1971) 
Bioethics: Bridge to the Future. Englewood Cliffs Hemel Hempstead: Prentice-Hall, 1971.   
71 
 
pioneers of irrefutable word, whereas others have worked in an honest and diligent manner 
and, even more so, some others have gone forth to search for connections and ties with more 
mature traditions” (Lolas, 2004, p. 18). This is perhaps because being a pioneer means to 
occupy a privileged position in the bioethical field. Even some bioethicists want to be 
recognised as such. For instance, J.A. Mainetti has claimed more than once that Argentina 
and he himself “pioneered the reception of bioethics in Latin America” (Mainetti, 1996, p. 
676; 2009, p. 502).
77
 But depending on how the word is defined, many other people might 
also be considered „pioneers‟. 
 
By and large a characteristic of bioethicists is their special desire for talking about their 
„origins‟. In the case of Latin America, in the last few years bioethicists have been curiously 
searching for the earliest antecedent of bioethics. F. Lolas, for instance, suggested that 
psychoanalysis and bioethics had their German origins in common. According to him, “a few 
years ago it was discovered that the word „bioethics‟ was not a creation of Van Renssealer 
Potter […] but an invention of the German Protestant theologian Fritz Jahr” in an article 
published in 1927 (Lolas, 2008b, p. 3). Lolas goes on to say that Jahr suggested, echoing 
Kant, a “bioethics imperative”, according to which every living being ought to be considered 
an end in itself and not only as a means to an end. This approach anticipated, according to 
Lolas, Potter‟s idea of bioethics and the ethics of animal experimentation. Ironically, 
bioethics would return to Europe as an American invention in the 1970s (Lolas, 2008b, p. 
3).
78
 However, Lolas himself acknowledges the futility of such discussions about the origins 
of bioethics. Instead, he argues, Latin American bioethicists should better spend their time 
debating more fundamental questions such as the role that bioethics has to play in a region 
historically plagued by a wide range of problems (Lolas, 2009, p. 7).  
The claim that Jahr is the „true father‟ of bioethics has received much attention from Latin 
American bioethicists.
79
 Far from challenging the official history of bioethics, this has instead 
                                                             
77 Baker and McCullough have argued that with the publication of „La crisis de la razón médica. Introducción a 
la filosofía de la medicina‟ in 1988, Jose A. Mainetti “introduces the bioethical paradigm to Latin America” 
(Baker & McCullough, 2009, p. 91) However, I would challenge this view, since other people had already 
initiated activities and published articles on bioethics in Latin America before, for instance, F. Lolas, quoted by 
Baker and McCullough themselves, published also in 1988 “a guide to bioethics for Latin American readers” 
(2009, p. 90), which at least has the name „bioethics‟ in its title. Furthermore, in Colombia, from the early 
1980s, articles on bioethics were published and groups working in the new field were created (see chapter four).     
78 See also: Lolas, F. (2008b) El „imperativo bioético‟ de Fritz Jahr y la neobioética estadounidense [Fritz Jahr‟s 
„Bioethics Imperative‟ and the American Neo-Bioethics]. JANO (Barcelona); 1710, pp. 10-16. 
79
 See, for instance, Garzón, F. (2009) Fritz Jahr, ¿el padre de la bioetica? [Fritz Jahr, the Father of Bioethics?]. 
Revista Latinoamericana de Bioética, 9(2), 6-7. 
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reinforced the idea, held by the Latin American bioethical establishment, that the genuine 
bioethics is the Potterian variety, representing a new ethical approach to life in which science, 
humanities and social sciences go hand in hand, in contrast to the American „deformation‟ of 
bioethics, which remains within the scope of biomedicine and is identified with the 
„Georgetown mantra‟. For some Latin American bioethicists F. Jahr is the new „patron saint‟ 
of bioethics. L. Schmidt, for instance, referring to Jahr and Potter, argues that these “people, 
from theology and health sciences, sought to strengthen an ethics of life in contemporary 
societies in which conflicts with reason, truth, and right conscience take place. [Thus, Latin 
American] bioethics promotes life based on an anthropological-ethical paradigm” (Schmidt, 
2008, p. 5). Others have gone even further by suggesting that F. Jahr, notwithstanding the fact 
that he was a Protestant theologian, presented “Saint Francis of Assisi, the Catholic saint of 
ecologists and pacifists, as the true discoverer of Bioethics” (Roa & Bauer, 2009, p. 158). On 
this account, it would not be a surprise if one day a committed bioethicist claimed that the 
Pre-Socratic philosophers were the real fathers of bioethics because of their love and interest 
in natural philosophy.      
4.2. Bioethics, the medical establishment and religion 
 
Debora Diniz,
80
 has offered an interesting view on the history that might help to illuminate 
the discourses of bioethics in Latin America. Speaking from a feminist perspective, she 
argues that, at least in Brazil, “the initial impulse came from two masculine fields: medical 
politics and Catholic theology” (Diniz & Guilhem, 2010, p. 298). On the one hand, 
theologians contributed with three aspects to Latin American bioethics: first, a return to the 
humanities in healthcare; second, a thematic agenda that emphasised issues like peace or 
justice compatible with Catholic doctrine, but disregarded others like reproductive issues; and 
third, an alternative point of view that destroyed the “hegemony of the representatives of the 
medical class institutions as a legitimizing discourse in bioethics.” On the other hand, the fact 
that bioethics was strongly identified with the biomedical scenario helped to catalyse its 
legitimization. This deep and strong relationship between bioethics and biomedicine also 
gave Latin American bioethics three characteristics it still displays today: first, a strong 
emphasis on ethical reasoning, “which explains the fascination with checklists theories, as 
was the case of principlism”; second, bioethics as a „subject of interest‟ for medical education 
and practice; and third, a bioethics agenda driven by a medical perspective. In the end, 
                                                             
80 Brazilian anthropologist and bioethicist 
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bioethics quickly became in Latin America an “elite intellectual enterprise”81 (Diniz & 
Guilhem, 2010, p. 299).  
 
The role of the Roman Catholic Church has been of particular importance for the 
development of bioethics in Latin America, a continent that has not experienced the religious 
pluralism of countries like the USA (Pessini, 2008, p. 9). C. Campbell (1990, p. 388) has 
argued that to better understand bioethics in Latin America it is necessary to take into account 
the religious roots of bioethical debates as well as the secularisation in the West. Indeed, 
religious beliefs do influence bioethical discussions, but in modern societies this influence 
has a secular facade. For Campbell, secularisation leads to the “[…] removal of central 
institutions (medicine) or values (health) from the influence of religious thought and 
practice.” But religion‟s effects endure even within a secular environment: “values and 
beliefs once explicitly affirmed as religious may command widespread acceptance, even if 
their religious grounds do not”. This has happened, for instance, with the concept of sanctity 
of life in bioethics or, particularly in the case of Latin America, when the Theology of 
Liberation claims that “justice is informed by a „preferential option‟ for the poor” (Campbell, 
1990, pp. 387-389).
82
 Campbell‟s most insightful idea is perhaps that bioethics narratives 
could be better understood if we took a look at their religious links, for example, in some 
frequently used metaphors such as „playing God‟83, the „good Samaritan‟. A. Llano, for 
example, criticises contemporary physicians because they are wrongly „playing God‟, 
concluding that God must continue being God while man should accept to be “a tool in the 
hands of God” (Llano, 1990, p. 451).  
 
In Latin America the content and the structure of many bioethical debates have to do with 
conflicts between the Roman Catholic Church‟s official doctrine on the one hand, and legal 
decisions, state policies, medical decisions and/or social movements on the other hand. In the 
last few years, there have been heated debates, for instance, about euthanasia, abortion, 
conscientious objection and so forth.
84
 F. Luna and R. Macklin have stressed that links 
                                                             
81 As I will illustrate with the case of Colombia in the next chapter, medical ethics discourses have always been 
dominated by the medical elite.  
82 According to M. dos Anjos, (2008b, p. 12) the Liberation Theology, with its methodology of seeing-
assessing-acting, became emblematic of the Latin American thought and was „exported‟ to other parts of the 
world. 
83 However, this metaphor carries positive as well as negative meanings.  
84
 In chapter seven I will outline the debate on the decriminalisation of both euthanasia and abortion in 
Colombia.  
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between religion and state are still strong in Latin America. As religion still plays an 
important role in society, “there is an identification of ethics with the view of morality 
propounded by the Catholic Church and virtually no awareness that there exists a secular 
approach to ethics” (Luna & Macklin, 1996, p. 146) They note that at the World Conference 
on Population and Development, Cairo 1994, and at the World Conference on Women, 
Beijing 1995, Carlos Menem‟s government in Argentina, for example, backed the Vatican‟s 
position. Also, in Argentina, in October 1995, a bill to guarantee free distribution of 
contraceptives was blocked in the Congress by an alliance between the government and the 
Catholic Church. This Argentinian case might rightly be extrapolated to other countries in the 
region. 
 
M. F. dos Anjos,
85
 has argued that “the polarization between a lay bioethics and a religious 
bioethics deserves particular attention” especially in Latin America, particularly because in 
this context “the autonomy of reason” is used against “religious authoritarianism” (dos Anjos, 
2010, pp. 293, 294). Elsewhere dos Anjos has also argued that Liberation Theology has made 
important contributions to Latin American bioethics in two particular ways: first, by seeking 
to reveal social injustice and states of domination, and second, by balancing the strong 
individualism of American bioethics with an emphasis on macro-environmental as well as 
social issues (dos Anjos, 2008b, p. 14). E. Rodriguez
86
 has argued that if religion is neglected 
in bioethics, three undesirable effects might occur: first, morality would be reduced to law; 
second, the accumulated wisdom of religions would be wasted; and third, the discourse of 
pluralism paradoxically would become oppressive (Rodríguez, E., 2010, p. 7). In this sense, 
V. Bellver has argued that contemporary bioethics discourse is hegemonic because it ignores 
the social roots of the ethical issues in the biomedical scenario and tends to exclude religious 
perspectives. For him, this situation is related to the fact that bioethics was born in an Anglo-
American environment in which individual autonomy supersedes questions related to social 
justice (Bellver, 2007, p. 24). A critical stance against the American principlism is part of the 
discourses of the Latin American bioethics.  
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 Brazilian theologian and bioethicist. 
86
 A Roman Catholic priest, former researcher at RPB and currently working at the ICBS in Chile. 
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4.3. Overcoming principlism, a Latin American dream 
As has been the case almost everywhere outside the USA, in Latin America principlism 
has been so pervasive that it has shaped the field since T. Beauchamp and J. Childress 
introduced this theoretical framework in the 1970s. Nevertheless, Latin American bioethicists 
have tried to „resist‟ this dominant model. Critics have pointed out three issues with 
principlism: its problematic philosophical foundations, its „alien‟ nature to Latin America 
(culturally, philosophically and politically), and its narrowness. J. J. Ferrer,
87
 following K. W. 
Wildes,
88
 has summarised the three main philosophical criticisms against American 
principlism: first, it lacks a convincing justification as to why these four principles and not 
others should be adopted; second, there is no satisfactory explanation of the principles‟ 
relationship between each other; and third, their definition and meaning is not sufficiently 
explained (Ferrer, J., 1998, p. 10). According to A. Llano, “medical, principlist, and 
utilitarian” American bioethics was not easily accepted by a medical community more 
familiar with a Catholic and paternalistic style. For him, principlist bioethics was 
„transplanted‟ “without questioning whether […] this new „medicine‟ was apt to cure the 
diverse problems of evils of these various populations” (Llano, 2010, pp. 45,47).  
K. Finkler, analysing the case of Mexico, has argued that the four principles “reflect an 
American cultural emphasis on individualism, as well as on Christian, specifically Calvinist, 
theology” (Finkler, 2003, p. 38). For her, instead of a “universal bioethics”89 that has proved 
to be problematic, a “contextualized ethics” should be promoted. Moreover, the 
understanding and practice of personal autonomy in the USA is not necessarily the same as in 
other cultures. In Latin American medical culture, trust and solidarity are as important as 
autonomy is for the Anglo-American medical culture. Yet, Finkler observed that in Mexico, 
after the arrival of bioethics, “trust is being supplanted by routinised procedure of informed 
consent” (Finkler, 2003, p. 45). In contrast, other Latin American authors like D. Lavertu and 
A. Linares have supported the „universality‟ of bioethical principles, although emphasising 
that important differences need to be considered for them to be applied in non-American 
cultural contexts. For these authors “[…] what constitutes a basic unmet need in our countries 
is often a concrete achievement in developed countries” (Serrano & Linares, 1990, p. 473). 
                                                             
87 Puerto Rican Jesuit and bioethicist. 
88 See: Wildes K. W. (1992) Principles, Rules, Duties, and Babel: Bioethics in the Face of Postmodernity. 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, (77) 483. 
89 Which usually means „American bioethics‟.  
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To distance themselves from the American principlism, many Latin American bioethicists 
have adopted the model of D. Gracia (León, F. J., 2009, p. 74; Rodríguez, E., 2009, p. 90). 
For Gracia bioethics is, first, the “ethics of the twenty-first century”, concerned with the 
protection of life and the rights of future generations. Second, its method is the same as that 
of ethics: deliberation (Gracia, 2002, p. 38). Third, he hierarchically orders the four 
principles: a private level which includes the principles of respect for autonomy and 
beneficence, and a public level with the principles of justice and non-maleficence (Gracia, 
1995, p. 192).Ontologically speaking, the public level would precede the private one (Gracia, 
1999).
90
 Fourth, in the biomedical scenario he says that patients are guided by autonomy, 
physicians by beneficence, and society by justice (Gracia, 1990, p. 359). J. J. Ferrer, for 
instance, has argued that Gracia´s classification of the four principles overcomes the 
Beauchamp and Childress model (Ferrer & Alvarez, 2004, p. 68). But this model has also 
been criticised.
91
 In Latin America, Guillermo Hoyos
92
 has disagreed with D. Gracia`s 
assertion that the ethics of our time “will be bioethics or nothing”. Hoyos argues that two 
extremes should be avoided. Ethics – as a philosophical discipline on its own – should never 
be reduced to bioethics and bioethics should not be taken as a fashionable ideological 
inspiration. Instead, it would be better to assimilate bioethics to civil ethics, promoting a 
public debate about techno-scientific progress and the realisation of democracy (Hoyos, G., 
1998, p. 89).
93
 The Spanish philosopher Adela Cortina has also considered that bioethics can 
be seen as an applied ethics instead of a contemporary substitute for ethics. Moreover, 
bioethics would be important for the construction of a democratic society following the 
postulates of a civil ethics
94
 (Cortina, 2000). Similarly, when J. J. Ferrer criticised Baker and 
McCullough‟s stance on bioethics supports the idea that bioethics is an applied ethics and 
                                                             
90 Non-maleficence and justice “oblige with independence from the opinion and the will of those people 
implicated and, therefore, have a superior rank than the other two” (Ferrer & Alvarez, 2004, p. 64).  
91 For a summary of these criticisms, see: Ramos, Sergio. (2008). El Principialismo de Diego Gracia: crítica y 
alternativas [The Principlism of Diego Gracia: Critic and Alternatives]. Bioètica & Debat. Accessed from 
http://www.bioetica-debat.org/modules/news/article.php?storyid=232, accessed 1 Oct 11 
92 Director, Instituto de Bioética, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá. 
93 This position is informed by Habermas‟ comunicative ethics. Following Habermas‟ position in The Future of 
Human Nature. Towards a Liberal Eugencis, published in 2001, G. Hoyos argued that freedom and morality are 
not founded on scientific knowledge. Instead, their definition and scope belong to philosophy and the public 
sphere, inhabited by citizens (Hoyos, G., 2003, p. 23). 
94 Thus, an “„ethics of minima‟ for civic ethics and an „ethics of maxima‟ for ethics which make proposals for a 
happy life [and] there is indeed a sort of „intersection‟ between the different conceptions of a good life, of a 
happy life, which cohabit in a pluralist society. [I]t is fitting to use the term „ethics of maxima‟ for these 
proposals which attempt to show how to be happy and what the meanings of life and death are, while the „ethics 
of minima‟ would not make statements on questions of happiness and the meaning of life and death, but on 
questions of justice, morally demandable of all citizens” (Cortina, 2003, p. 105). 
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also supports D. Gracia‟s view that bioethics is indeed something „new‟ and not a mere 
„application‟ of ethical systems (Ferrer, J., 2009, p. 37).  
Human dignity can be also seen as a concept or category that has been utilised to 
counterbalance the influence of the four principles. It has been proposed as the quintessential 
guiding principle of bioethics in Latin America, particularly by those who hold a religious 
position, although this is not say that secular bioethicists ignore it. In Latin American 
bioethics the concept of human dignity is deeply linked to the sacredness of life, in a religious 
sense. Some authors have used human dignity as the central category to ground certain 
perspectives in bioethics, for instance, a philosophical anthropology  (Schmidt, et. al, 2008, 
p. 8) or  personalism (León, F. J., 2009, p. 74; Martínez, 2007, p. 127)
95
, which are concepts 
that reveal nostalgia for a metaphysical approach to human nature. However, there is no more 
vague concept in bioethics than human dignity. Very often human dignity is invoked either as 
an argument, or a principle, or a criterion to legitimate a particular stance in bioethics, but the 
concept itself usually remains unclear (Cuéllar, J., 2006). Given this difficulty, some 
bioethicists like R. Macklin (2003) think that “dignity is a useless concept” (2003). Still some 
Latin American authors like Pyrrho, et al. (2009, p. 68) have argued nonetheless that human 
dignity cannot be replaced by the “aseptic concept of autonomy”. Rather, they suggest, Latin 
American bioethicists should infuse the general, open concept of human dignity with 
appropriate content and meaning, taking into account the particular historical, cultural and 
political contexts of the region. In this respect, far from being a “useless concept” as R. 
Macklin argues, human dignity –like other bioethical categories– has a political function that 
has neither been properly acknowledged nor sufficiently analysed. As I have argued 
regarding the abortion debate, for instance, how a concept is used in bioethics “depends less 
on the rightness or wrongness of a theory than on the purposes, intentions or beliefs of the 
people involved in the discussion” (Díaz Amado, 2009a, p. 118).   
Much of the debate about the appropriateness of the American principlist model for Latin 
America has happened in relation to questions about the „epistemological status of bioethics‟ 
(Garrafa, Kottow & Saada, 2005; Schmidt & Garzón, 2006, p. 66). There are three elements 
that have characterised this debate in Latin America. First, Latin American bioethics is „a 
field in construction‟, making it difficult to properly delineate its contours. However, this 
                                                             
95 In The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and on Bioethics, in 2005, human dignity was taken as a 
foundational principle. See: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180e.pdf, accessed 20 October 
2011. 
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kind of „incompleteness‟ of the field has become a licence for Latin American bioethicists to 
include in the scope of bioethics any issue or problem using the strategy of seeking the „the 
bioethical aspect of‟. Second, bioethics is proclaimed as a non-religious discipline, although 
in Latin America it is easy to see how bioethics is full of hidden religious agendas. Third, 
bioethics is presented as an interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary field in which decisions 
are made by consensus.
96
 For Schmidt and Garzón (2006) the epistemological status of 
bioethics derives from Ethics and it is characterised as “human, techno-scientific, rational, 
reasonable, dialogal and consensual, pluralist, interdisciplinary / transdisciplinary / 
plulidisciplinary, and in continued improvement” (p. 69). Regarding the debate on empirical 
studies in bioethics, Kottow has argued that although empirical data can be useful for 
revealing gaps between theory and practice as well as for acknowledging failures in the 
application of bioethical norms, such data should not be taken as the central criterion to 
decide on modifications of „the theory‟. He argues that it is necessary to be careful about how 
some bioethicists make use of empirical bioethics‟ conclusions since they can be a way to 
facilitate the imposition of alien ethical theories on Latin America (Kottow, 2009, pp. 65, 68). 
 
4.4. Towards a „political bioethics‟ for Latin America  
In 1994 C. Olweny, a Canadian author, suggested a bioethics agenda for the developing 
world. For him, in the industrialised world bioethicists usually discuss issues like gene 
therapy, organ transplantation, surrogate motherhood and euthanasia. These issues, however, 
should be put in a second line in the developing world since “the ethics of scarcity, sacrifice, 
cross-cultural research, as well as the activities of multinational companies, are germane.” 
(Olweny, 1994, p. 164). The Chilean bioethicist M. Kottow suggested it would be bizarre for 
a bioethicist not from a developing country to define the bioethics agenda for Latin America. 
For Kottow, such an agenda should include a reassessment of the role of autonomy and 
techno-science in economically fragile environments as well as a review of the role that 
academia and legislative bodies are playing in channelling public opinion regarding 
bioethical issues (Kottow, 1995, p. 56). The bioethical discourse is often focused on 
biotechnological advances and futuristic scenarios while the reality proves that basic 
                                                             
96 Some bioethicists, e.g. P. Hooft (2000), have talked about a “rational and interdisciplinary debate”. For J. A. 
Mainetti, “[t]he most revolutionary achievement of the current medical ethics is the „introduction of the moral 
subject in medicine‟ and the promotion of a rational and free agent in the doctor patient relationship” (Mainetti, 
1990, p. 56).  
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questions including poverty, inequalities and corruption remain unsolved. The contradiction 
between the appalling social reality in Latin America and what is said by the dominant 
discourse of bioethics has led some bioethicists like V. Garrafa to initiate a movement against 
“imported ethical packages” in bioethics (Garrafa, 2000, p. 169).  
 
The Latin American Dictionary of Bioethics (Tealdi, 2008b) opens by outlining the 
characteristics of the Latin American Critical School of Thought according to which problems 
like dependency, poverty, exploitation and subjection to „imperialist‟ influences should 
constitute the front line of a genuine Latin American intellectual endeavour (Salas, 2008, p. 
3). As bioethical problems are inseparable from the culture and geographical place (Neira, 
2008, p. 156), it seems that for some Latin American bioethicists the socio-economic and 
political conditions of subjection and exploitation that have characterised Latin American 
history should constitute the departing-point for bioethics. They talked of a „libertarian‟ 
bioethics, although I would prefer the term „emancipatory‟. This bioethical approach is linked 
to so-called Latin American Philosophy whose existence is nevertheless a matter of debate 
and which, according to C. Lértora (2008, p. 5), might mean either a philosophy originating 
in the region or a philosophy taking Latin America as its object of analysis.   
Some Latin American bioethicists have seen in the ethical double standard used in 
biomedical research
97
 an expression of the imperialism that allegedly characterises the 
dominant bioethical discourse. V. Garrafa, for instance, has argued that powerful actors, such 
as pharmaceutical companies and other interested parties, have callously tried to 
“accommodate” the content of the Declaration of Helsinki to American interests (Garrafa, 
2008b, p. 535). Along similar lines, M. Kottow claimed that “international bioethicists” have 
appealed to different strategies to circumvent international norms. He cites the renowned 
American bioethicist Robert Levine as an example when arguing that Helsinki was just a 
declaration, that is, that it is mere rhetoric. According to Kottow, (2004) “international 
bioethics” is more interested in protecting the interests of researchers, institutions and 
sponsors from the First World than in helping to meet the necessities of the Third World.  
 
By and large, bioethicists in Latin America have promoted a broader understanding of 
bioethics. In contrast to Anglo-American bioethics, which seems to have clearer boundaries, 
                                                             
97 About the discussion about the double standard in biomedical research, see: Levine, R. (1998) The „Best 
Proven Therapeutic Method‟ Standard in Clinical Trials in Technologically Developing Countries. Journal of 
Clinical Ethics, 9(2), 167 – 172. 
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and usually focus on the ethical issues raised by the techno-scientific advance in biomedicine, 
Latin American bioethics seeks to save life from the dangers of techno-scientific progress, 
and from the moral degradation of modern life at different levels, including politics, 
environment, family relations, economics, etc. Many Latin American bioethicists, no matter 
what their political orientation, emphasise the social and the principle of justice. For example, 
F. Leon,
98
 argues that is necessary to widen “the field of bioethics in Latin America from 
clinical ethics to a social bioethics, in order to deal with ethical dilemmas in institutions, 
public health, healthcare policies and reforms, and legislation” (León, F. J., 2009, p. 70). 
Similarly, for E. Rodríguez, social inequalities threaten human dignity in Latin America. For 
this reason, bioethics in this region should be focused on the social, and bioethicists should be 
familiar with research in the social sciences (Rodríguez, E., 2009, p. 90f). Other Latin 
American bioethicists, such as M. Ferrer (2003), have tried to offer a solid philosophical 
ground to make of justice a central principle as “bioethics should be focused on populations‟ 
health rather than individuals” (p. 115).  
 
For V. Garrafa and D. Porto, (2003, p. 400) Latin America is part of a group of peripheral 
countries where certain problems such as social exclusion, concentration of power, poverty, 
misery, and delinquency are a daily reality.  These are, in their view, persistent problems as 
they are endemic in such countries. But there are also emerging problems arising out of 
biotechnological advances, which seem to receive much attention in developed countries. 
This situation has led to two distinguishable kinds of bioethics. Thus, a bioethics of emerging 
situations was created to deal with “issues arising from the hasty scientific and technological 
development of the last fifty years, among which are the new reproductive techniques – 
including reproductive and therapeutic cloning – the Human Genome Project, and the 
advances in the field of genetic engineering, human organ and tissue transplantation, [while a 
bioethics of persistent situations is] related to those conditions that have persisted among 
human societies since ancient times, such as gender discrimination, social exclusion, racism, 
inequity in the allocation and distribution of sanitary resources, child and elderly 
abandonment, abortion, and euthanasia, among others” (Garrafa & Porto, 2003, p. 401). 
 
According to Garrafa and Porto, the bioethics of emerging situations has been pervasive in 
the developing world and led people in these regions to discuss alien or for them inexistent 
                                                             
98 Chilean bioethicist close to the Roman Catholic Church‟s bioethical positions.  
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situations. Sometimes, Garrafa and Porto argue, bioethical issues that are relevant for the 
developed world look just ridiculous compared to the persistent problems in the developing 
world. For example, “Peter Singer‟s fair preoccupations with animal defence sound 
anachronistic, out of place” compared to the terrible problems of poverty and injustice in 
developing countries (Garrafa & Porto, 2003, p. 403).
99
 They insist that the dominant 
bioethical discourse fails to properly address practical and factual situations by diverting 
attention to fashionable issues like the environment or the discourse on tolerance. They say 
that “[…] for not having yet found the minimum patterns to establish a universal ethics that 
we need, we try to soften the conflicts through palliatives like the idea of tolerance in 
relations and inter-relations. Even though tolerance may be the obvious minimum for the 
production of a dialogue in the conflicts of differences, it is incapable of suppressing 
inequalities” (Garrafa & Porto, 2003, p. 409). For Garrafa and Porto, bioethics has privileged 
a market approach, particularly in regions like Latin America, which means that the current 
capitalist logic has transformed societies just in big markets and is driving science and 
technology. In this way, they argue, “the idea of equality, seeded randomly in a soil parched 
by injustice, has become another tool used to maximise profits and to justify domination” 
(Garrafa & Porto, 2003, p. 408). 
 
In this approach, the socio-political and economic struggles of the developing world 
should be the first concern for bioethics. Furthermore, it raises a radical criticism of the 
dominant model in bioethics since “[…] even being numerically the minority, dominant 
societies tried to annul, ideologically and morally, the legitimacy of the others, trying to 
impose themselves as the only pattern. In practice, the different moralities were subjugated in 
the process of economic expansion and domination” (Garrafa & Porto, 2003, p. 406).100 Thus, 
apart from discussing the typical ethical dilemmas arising from the biotechnological advance, 
bioethicists should be critical about the dominant models that characterise global bioethics 
today. Moreover, for Garrafa and Porto (2003, p. 410) the developing world should be more 
determined to condemn the permanent aggression of developed and rich countries towards 
nature. As long as this situation remains, a sense of „injustice‟ can be even reinforced by the 
                                                             
99 Salles and Bertomeu (2002), insisting on a similar point, have said that the existence of bioethical problems 
“should not be allowed to obscure most Latin American concerns with democracy, the rule of law, and the 
autonomy of citizens that requires the effective realization of the rights and liberties sanctioned by the 
constitutions of their own countries” (p. 1).  
100 B. Azerrad and D. Viegas (1998) have argued, based on the critical philosophy of the Frankfurt School, that 
bioethics might have what I would call “an emancipatory role” in Latin America. It is interesting to see how the 
conditions of subjugation have become naturalised in Latin America in a context of a process of exploitation. 
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dominant model of bioethics in which “[…] we consume pain as merchandise, seated in our 
armchairs” (Garrafa & Porto, 2003, p. 413). 
 
4.5 Organisations, populism and identities 
In 1991 the Latin American Federation for Bioethics
101
 (FELAIBE) was created in Caracas 
following an agreement between Pablo Pulido, a Venezuelan physician for the Pan American 
Federation of Medical Schools
 102
, José A. Mainetti for the Centre for Bioethics of the José María 
Mainetti Foundation
103
 and Alfonso Llano for the Centre for Medical Ethics
104
 of the Colombian 
Association of Faculties of Medicine
 105
 (ASCOFAME).
106
 FELAIBE embodies the ethos of the 
Latin American bioethics establishment: its role has been reduced to organising regional 
congresses,
107
 and power struggles over what group or ideology should be adopted in this 
federation are frequent. Moreover, a lack of clear policies to control the quality of academic 
work submitted to its congresses have contributed to turning FELAIBE into a bureaucratic 
apparatus that helps little to improve the quality of Latin American bioethics. In its 
beginnings FELAIBE was important for the socialisation of bioethics in the region. For 
example, more than 1500 people attended its second congress that took place in Bogota in 
1998, which, according to its organiser A. Llano, helped to spread bioethics in the region, 
underlined the role of human dignity in ethical debates, and facilitated a dialogue between 
science and ethics, particularly at the level of those in charge of making decisions in society 
(Llano, 1998, p. x). But it seems that while attendance has decreased since then, mediocrity 
has increased and, moreover, right-wing groups have now taken over the federation, 
imposing a particular ideological agenda and restricting certain debates, e.g. on abortion, as 
was manifest in FELAIBE‟s latest congress, at Viña del Mar, Chile, in June 2011.108 
 
Latin American bioethicists have a special predilection for a language full of neologisms, 
metaphors and baroque language. This linguistic „excess‟ sometimes complicates and 
obscures discussions. For this reason some bioethicists, e.g. G. Calderón (2010, p. 364), have 
called for avoiding the „pamphletism‟ and the „tropicalism‟ that has sometimes characterised 
                                                             
101 Federación Latinoamericana de Bioética. Its current president is F. Leon Correa. 
102 Federación Panamericana de Facultades y Escuelas de Medicina. 
103 Centro de Bioética de la Fundación José María Mainetti. 
104 Centro para la Ética Médica. 
105 Asociación Colombiana de Facultades de Medicina. 
106 See: http://www.bioeticachile.cl/felaibe/quienes.html 
107
 Sao Paulo 1995, Bogotá 1998, Panamá 2000, Puerto Rico 2003, Argentina 2007 and 2009, and Chile 2011. 
108 This was a qualified opinion given to me during a visit to Colombia in June 2011 by one of its attendants.  
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the bioethical discussions in the region. Moreover, for him, the sharp distinction that is 
usually made between American and Latin American bioethics should be avoided. Although 
issues like poverty and injustice are usually linked to the Third World, it is worthwhile 
bearing in mind that the First World also has “its own underdeveloped world within its 
borders.” However, it was Latin American bioethicists who promoted the inclusion of social 
problems, giving Latin American bioethics “a distinct openness not found in other bioethics” 
(Calderón, 2010, p. 360). Unfortunately, this understanding of bioethics has ended up 
facilitating in Latin America a „totalising‟ conception of bioethics: bioethics is about 
everything. This position causes serious issues. As I will show in the particular case of 
Colombia, bioethicists are able to demonstrate the „bioethical angle‟ of everything and 
therefore make virtually any situation or problem amenable to a „bioethical solution‟. Most 
importantly, I argue that this totalising nature of bioethics hides a „will to power‟, because 
this allows bioethicists to intervene at all levels, something of which even bioethicists 
themselves have remained unaware. Furthermore, what bioethicists see as a „bioethical 
solution‟ is just a renaming of social problems by using „bioethical labels‟ instead of properly 
addressing them in order to find a suitable solution. 
 
F. Lolas urged bioethics to avoid being ideologically compromised and militant political 
activism. For him, some bioethicists in Latin America have flooded bioethics with outdated 
discourses like that about „imperialisms‟. He argues that “[t]here is, as has always been the 
case in Latin American initiatives, a picturesque group of pro-natives and another […] one of 
defenders of a third-world marginality, who purport to know and appreciate, and on behalf of 
which they disown, European or USA academic work, taking upon themselves the germs of 
irreversible alienation” (Lolas, 2004, p. 18). Lolas has warned of different dangers for 
bioethics in Latin America. He argues that there is a bioethics that can be characterised by its 
“superficiality, intellectual villainy, and academic banditry” (Lolas, 2008a, p. 133). Also for 
him, beyond “nominal questions”, in Latin America it is necessary to know what actually do 
those who suppose “do bioethics”, how they spend their time, what they want to achieve, and 
what their motivations are (Lolas, 2005b, p. 162). In short, for him there is a chapter yet to be 
written on the history of bioethics in Latin America: a chapter about the ethics that those who 
have called themselves bioethicists actually practise (Lolas, 2009, p. 8).  
 
Lolas‟ critical stance is against the belligerent positions that some bioethicists, particularly 
in RedBioetica and the so-called Brazilian group, led by V. Garrafa, have adopted. When V. 
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Garrafa claimed in a recent publication that some conservative bioethicists in Latin America 
have used an alien mentality –Anglo-Saxon or Spanish – to analyse our conflicts, a trend that 
is expressed in academic meetings and publications (Garrafa, 2008c, p. xvii), the members of 
the Latin American bioethics community knew whom he was referring to: F. Lolas and his 
group in Chile. Against what he considers an undesirable „alien‟ approach in bioethics, 
Garrafa has promoted RedBioetica‟s approach that, according to him, seeks to analyse 
“bioethical problems [with] our own mentality and perspective” (Garrafa, 2008c, p. xviii). 
 
4.6. Clinical bioethics, committees, and national commissions 
 
According to D. Gracia (1990), medical practice was for centuries a sort of dictatorship 
and the “pluralism, democracy, and civil and political human rights, [which can be seen as 
the] leading achievements of the modern era […] only reached medicine very recently” (p. 
357). For him, bioethics and the rise of autonomy are parallel phenomena, representing the 
advent of „true ethics‟ in medicine. Accordingly, bioethics is promoted in Latin America as a 
way out of medical paternalism. In 1996 R. Macklin and F. Luna (1996) argued that in Latin 
America “medicine is still practiced in a paternalistic way. Patients rarely ask for information 
and physicians are not in the habit of providing it” (p. 140). For these authors, medical 
paternalism is reinforced by “the myth of illiteracy”, i.e. that patients are in principle 
uneducated, which is not only false, but also unjustifiably associated with mental 
incompetence (Luna, 2007, p. 282). For J. C. Tealdi (2009, p. 588) although Latin American 
medical ethics expressed the values of domination in its paternalism, it “has turned from 
deontology to bioethics” and according to him, bioethics is an opportunity to transform the 
field of medical ethics in this region through the inclusion of the language of human values. 
 
Also in 1990, J. Drane contrasted the formalistic, theory-driven, and rule-dominated 
American clinical bioethics with the more humanistic European and Latin American 
approaches.  He argues that while American medicine, culture, and society have led to a 
“technologized, secular and pluralistic” approach in bioethics, medical traditions in Europe 
and Latin America “are more humanistic [and] not so tied to deontological and utilitarian 
theories” (Drane, 1990, p. 401f). Drane furthermore emphasises the difference between the 
cultural backgrounds of the USA and Latin America (Drane, 1996). Drane argues that the 
bioethical issues linked to poverty in Latin America have been largely ignored by bioethicists 
in the USA and Europe. For him, a dialogue between different cultural approaches to 
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bioethics is not only possible, but also necessary since there are “common problems” in the 
field (Drane, 1996, pp. 559f).  
 
Although ethical issues in clinical settings are widely discussed in the Latin American 
bioethics literature, issues related to public health and healthcare systems have received much 
less attention. In the last twenty years there has been a wave of neoliberal healthcare reform 
in Latin America, but there has been little space to analyse this phenomenon in the regional 
bioethical literature. Critical voices have attacked this silent complicity. A lack of 
opportunities and an effective social protection, particularly for the poor, are still common in 
the region, as is illustrated by the case of Chile (Olavarría, 2005, p. 47). Yet, as S. Litewka 
(2010, p. 149) has argued, Latin American bioethicists have been passive and even negligent 
in discussing the ethical issues raised by the neoliberal healthcare reforms in the region. For 
him, justice remains an abstraction among bioethicists, and the dominant bioethical discourse 
in Latin America, with its common phrases, e.g. that bioethics is the defence of life and 
repetition of the same rhetoric again and again, e.g. respect for human dignity and personal 
autonomy, has led to an “ethical atonia” (Litewka, 2010, p. 152). 
 
At the same time, some bioethicists have talked of the necessity of implementing an 
„ethics culture‟ in the field of human research, i.e. the adherence to international norms such 
as the Council for International Organisations of Medical Sciences (CIOMS) guidelines and 
the Declaration of Helsinki (Rodríguez, E., 2005, p. 11). In this sense, the role of bioethical 
commissions and committees goes beyond the protection of research subjects. They are 
political bodies that can have enormous influence in institutions and channel different kinds 
of debates, for example, as Ulloa and Barrantes (2008, p. 204) have shown in the case of 
Nicaragua with the discussion on abortion. In a paper at the VI International Bioethics 
Association‟s Congress in Brasilia, 2002, I argued that clinical bioethics committees might 
play an important role in the positive transformation of healthcare institutions. Ethical 
committees are not only privileged to „approve research protocols‟ or „solve ethical dilemmas 
arisen in clinical practice‟, but also to „facilitate‟ self-reflection among healthcare 
professionals (Díaz Amado, 2002b). Unfortunately, the growing institutionalisation of ethical 
committees and bioethics in general has also meant a loss, to a certain extent, of their ability 
to criticise and/or denounce negative aspects, elements or circumstances in or around the 
biomedical field.  
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Bioethics commissions and committees are part of the „ethicalisation‟ of biomedical 
research in Latin America. The number, performance and quality of bioethics committees 
have been taken as an indicator of the development of bioethics (Zwareva, 2010, p. 90). In 
the last 20 years national commissions for bioethics and bioethics committees have spread 
across Latin America, where they have been enthusiastically welcomed as a mechanism to 
firmly establish bioethics in the region. They are seen as guarantors of ethical standards in 
biomedical research and clinical practice. However, it is important to recognise the power 
mechanisms which were involved in their creation and functioning. The literature on 
bioethics committees has mainly focused on the application of human research ethics norms, 
decision-making methods and the role of national commissions to provide guidelines (ethical 
and legal) on sensitive issues like embryo research, abortion, euthanasia and so on.  
 
Moreover, as A. Bota (2003, p. 33) has argued, while bioethics promotes sophisticated 
mechanisms such as informed consent, basic problems (e.g. poverty, healthcare access, 
exploitation and the like) remain unsolved in Latin America. This paradox reveals that some 
issues are privileged while others are neglected. To deal with this situation, some bioethicists 
have suggested that the scope of bioethics should be expanded. Perhaps, but nevertheless it 
would be necessary to examine other possibilities, for example, that bioethics is in itself a 
kind of truth regime that determines what is ethically, politically and legally relevant to be 
discussed in and about the biomedical field. In order to see this dynamics, considering the 
Foucauldian approach in the analysis, as I explained in the previous chapters, might be a 
promising path. For instance, from a Foucauldian perspective, bioethics committees and 
national commissions embody a pastoral discourse as they are set up to protect patients and 
research subjects (Juritzen, et al., 2011, p. 644). This characteristic might partially explain 
why they have been so welcomed in contemporary societies in which the language of threats 
and risks has also had a great impact. 
 
5. Bioethics, biopolitics, and power 
Some Latin American bioethicists have used the concept of „power‟ mainly in connection 
with the oppressive military, political, cultural and economic conditions that characterises 
this region. For F. dos Anjos (2008a, p. 534), an explicit enquiry about power began in Latin 
American bioethics with the International Bioethics Association‟s Sixth World Congress in 
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Brasilia in 2002, with the motto Bioethics: Power and Injustice.
109
 For V. Garrafa, who was 
the organiser of this congress, power should be analysed in three spheres: economic, political 
and ideological. He argues that as an effect of bioethics socially problematic situations 
become “aseptic and neutral” categories. For this reason, he calls for a „politicization‟ of 
bioethics that would make a contribution to truly overcome exploitative social practices. 
Therefore, bioethics would have an emancipatory role in Latin America and liberate people 
by means of decisive „political‟ intervention. According to Garrafa, this would be possible if 
bioethical discourses and practices promoted empowerment, liberation, and emancipation 
(Garrafa, 2008a, p. 532). From this point of view, “[t]he politization of bioethics is a concrete 
contribution to the construction of social justice […] of true democracy” (Garrafa, 2008a, p. 
533). Hence, what V. Garrafa terms “intervention bioethics” seems to be a particular 
contribution of Latin American bioethics to the global theoretical framework of the field. 
Latin American bioethicists have also used the term biopolitics, although with different 
meanings depending on who speaks and in what context it appears.  For instance, G. Cely
110
 
has argued that V. R. Potter‟s global and deep bioethics should “biopolitically illuminate the 
macro-decisions that will determine the future of the world” (Cely, 2007, p. 444). What 
„biopolitically‟ means here is not clear. When Cely quotes Potter, saying that “for the next 
100 years a political bioethics is required… Global bioethics or anarchism!” (Cely, 2007, p. 
445), it seems that in Latin America bioethics represents a kind of salvation. It is worth 
remembering that V.R. Potter argued that the survival of humankind depended on a kind of 
ethics anchored in biological knowledge. For Potter the leaders of the world should be taught 
social sciences and humanities (Potter, 1971, pp. 1, 69). For C. Maldonado, biopolitics and 
bioethics are neighbouring fields, as they share similar questions and horizons, resulting in 
the emergence of new phenomena like biolaw and bioeconomics (Maldonado, 2005, p. 9). 
Stressing this view, F. Garzón argues that bioethics and biopolitics are linked at the level of 
the human rights discourse. According to him, bioethics should enrich the biopolitics and 
biolaw by bringing in “fundamental human values and ethical principles in order to make 
scientific and human progress compatible” (Garzón, 2007, p. 7f).  
According to L. Schmidt and S. Cecchetto (2008) bioethics is leading to biopolitics. 
However, their attempt to link bioethics and biopolitics is highly rhetorical and unclear. For 
instance, the link they try to create between biopolitics and bioethics is problematic. They 
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 See: Benatar, S. (2003) Bioethics: Power and Injustice: IAB Presidential Address. Bioethics, 17, issue 5-6. 
110 Colombian Jesuit and bioethicist.  
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suggest that in both fields a rational and dialogical discussion takes place on particular 
situations created by socio-political and techno-scientific developments entailing negative 
consequences for humankind, nature and science. However, they argue, while bioethics 
happens between persons, biopolitics is between citizens (Schmidt & Cecchetto, 2008). 
Similarly, the Colombian bioethicist S. Osorio mentions a “biopolitical imaginary”111 that 
would constitute a political horizon to carry out a process of healing of the social fabric 
which has been broken by several conflicts in Latin America. For Osorio the neoliberal 
reforms carried out in the region are linked to such conflicts (Osorio, 2008, p. 106). With this 
in mind, M. dos Anjos has stressed that in Latin America neoliberalism has left the individual 
„alone‟ and „the technical‟ has become „ethical‟ (dos Anjos, 2008b, p. 13). As de Carvalho 
has argued, at the same time that the state guarantees that individuals make decisions, it 
avoids intervening in people‟s lives, a typical neoliberal feature. Although de Carvalho´s 
view echoes the Foucauldian idea about how neoliberal rationalities and governmentality go 
hand in hand, he does not mention Foucault (Carvalho, 2008, p. 540).  
M. Kottow‟s view is that bioethics and biopolitics are incompatible. While bioethics is 
concerned with bios, biopolitics reduces life to mere zôì.
112
 Thus bioethics “has precisely the 
task of protecting the bíos of not being treated only as a zôì […]”  (Kottow, 2005, p. 110)113 
Drawing on G. Agamben‟s recasting of the Foucauldian concept of biopolitics, particularly 
by including those biopolitical spaces that Foucault did not considered such as the 
concentration camps and the totalitarian states of the twentieth century (Agamben, 1998), M. 
Kottow has pointed to the “artificial dichotomy” that in Western societies is frequently 
presented in terms of freedom vs. life. For Kottow, instead of trying to convert bioethics into 
biopolitics, bioethics should inform politics, remaining focused on biomedical and ecological 
issues (Kottow, 2005, pp. 119-120). However, although Kottow uses the term biopolitics, he 
does not mention Foucault either. Although bioethicists have indeed used the term biopolitics 
and carried out reflections on power, they barely consider in depth the Foucauldian 
scholarship. There are a few exemptions. In 1998, for instance, B. Azerrad and D. Viegas 
(1998) addressed specifically the question of how the Foucauldian approach might be useful 
in bioethics. They emphasised that power is basically a relation of forces; that the question is 
not who possesses power, but how it is exercised; that it is necessary to „denaturalise‟ the 
                                                             
111 Although with a different meaning, this term has also been used by M. Dillon and L. Lobo-Guerrero (2009) 
The Biopolitical Imaginary of Species-Being. Theory, Culture & Society, 26(1), 1-23.  
112
 While bíos refers to the human life in the polis, zôì refers to a kind of animal life.   
113 See chapter seven on the euthanasia debate. 
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taken-for-granted daily experience; that fragmentation facilitates the exercise of power; and 
that power contributes to forming identity. Yet, they only offered two examples, discussed in 
a narrow way, of how the Foucauldian perspective could be applied to/in bioethics. First, they 
argued that the idea of autonomy should be placed in a context of power relations, 
particularly regarding complex issues like euthanasia or abortion. Second, they argued that 
although the legal (penal) discourse is generally about remedying rather than punishing, the 
penal system is essentially punitive (Azerrad & Viegas, 1998, pp. 41-44). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Latin American bioethicists have told the history of bioethics in their region in heroic 
terms, the rebirth of humanistic values and the victory against destructive and life-threatening 
forces promoted by irresponsible techno-scientific endeavours in the twentieth century. By 
and large, Latin American bioethicists shared with their American colleagues the same 
„origin myths‟ of the field, i.e. bioethics is an answer to the ethical challenges posed by the 
biomedical progress as well as a reaction to the abuses committed in the name of science. 
Additionally, Latin American bioethicists developed the idea of a three stages history, which 
has let them make sense of how bioethics was born and developed on the region. This 
approach privileges the work of a few people who, having learned of the new field in the 
USA, were tenacious and committed to transplant bioethics to Latin America. Hence, the 
history of bioethics has been told in terms of the achievements made by the so-called 
„pioneers‟. These pioneers promoted an understanding of bioethics linked to a progressive, 
growing „process of awareness‟ about the dangers behind many scientific and technological 
advances, particularly in biomedicine. Bioethics would then be a new conscience, a new kind 
of relationship between human beings, and between human beings and nature. Bioethics was 
announced as the „new ethics‟, a kind of „awakening‟ of human civilisation.  
It is clear that bioethics arrived in Latin America as an import from the USA. After its 
birth and expansion in the USA, bioethics went out to spread the word and Latin America 
was one of the first destinations of American bioethics in the early 1980s. In Latin America 
bioethicists have presented bioethics as a „way-out‟ from medical paternalism and as a 
movement of „defence of life‟. In its beginnings it was a discourse strongly linked to medical 
associations and the Roman Catholic Church. Moreover, international powerful organisations 
played a big role in creation of bioethics in Latin America. In the 1990s, both PAHO and 
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UNESCO greatly contributed to framing the bureaucratic organisation of the field, promoting 
centres for research and for training bioethicists.  
However, resistance against the hegemonic American discourse formed very soon, against 
the content, the methodology and the effects of bioethics in Latin America. A group of Latin 
American bioethicists began in the 1990s to criticise the dominant model of bioethics, which 
privileged the discussion of issues important for the First World, while those relevant to Latin 
America were neglected. The methodology, mainly based on the American principlism, 
reinforced an analytic, formalistic approach to bioethics, cast in terms of „dilemmas‟ between 
two or more principles, while concealing the real causes of the bioethical problems, which in 
Latin America have socio-political and economic roots linked to an inveterate history of 
subjugation, poverty, dependency and exploitation. Although many bioethicists have 
emphasised that in bioethics it is necessary to take into account differences between the North 
and the South, between the developed and the developing world, bioethics has still worked as 
an ideological compass: pointing to the North and neglecting the South. Against the 
background of this kind of bioethics, a group of Latin American bioethicists developed  a 
more politicised bioethics. Instead of being focused on the First-World‟s problems, their 
bioethics would take into account regional problems and their real causes. Thus some Latin 
American bioethics then developed a line that can be seen as countering the effects of 
American bioethics. But not all bioethicists in Latin America shared this position. For some 
Latin American bioethicists, who would prefer an „academic‟ approach to the field, 
politicizing bioethics was dangerously near to „populism‟ and „tropicalism‟. Differences 
between Latin American bioethicists have shown that they were not only concerned with 
healthcare justice, human research ethics, respect for autonomy or for human dignity, but also 
with who controls the bioethical discourse, who decides what to discuss in bioethics, who has 
the power to organise conferences and attract more people, etc., i.e. who holds power within 
the field.     
From a Foucauldian point of view, the birth and development of bioethics in Latin 
America is by no means simply the result of moral progress or an answer to the ethical 
challenges brought by biotechnological advances. In fact, it was the result of a fervent 
activity of a few people who took the idea and inspiration from American bioethics. As 
bioethics in Latin America has become a „heterogeneous ensemble‟ of discourses, 
institutions, experts, rules and practices that conveys not only the typical dilemmas related to 
biomedical progress, but also the socio-political and economic problems affecting this part of 
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the world, it is possible to assimilate it to what M. Foucault called a dispositif. This is also 
true because apart from being a „heterogeneous ensemble‟, the development of bioethics as a 
new field in Latin America reveals a power dynamics. On the one hand, bioethics was very 
welcomed as it represented a kind of solution for a disparate array of problems, e.g. abuses in 
biomedical research, medical paternalism, poverty, corruption, inequalities and so on. In this 
sense, bioethics was clearly introduced in Latin America as a pastoral discourse. On the other 
hand, bioethicists in Latin America represent the new experts who know about the rights and 
wrongs in the biomedical field. Even with the idea that bioethics should be politicised and 
take into account more resolutely „the social‟, the Latin American bioethicists have expanded 
the „truth regime‟ of bioethics beyond the biomedical field. It is possible to think that there is 
a „Latin American bioethics‟, which would be characterised by three aspects: first, a 
reframing of the principlist, biotechnology-driven American bioethics in terms of discourse 
of defence of life in general; second, a strong Catholic Church‟s and medical establishment‟s 
influence; and third, an emphasis on „the social‟ that seeks to make of bioethics a „politicised‟ 
field. In short, what is called „Latin American bioethics‟ is then a mixture of American 
bioethics and a whole array of discourses and institutions that reflect Latin America: Catholic 
influence, professional dominance and thirst for freedom. 
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Chapter four 
Bioethics in Colombia 
1. Introduction 
Having defined the contours and distinctive elements of Latin American bioethics, I now 
want to offer a critical analysis of the history of bioethics in Colombia, a country which has 
played a key role in the development of bioethics in Latin America. It was one of the first 
countries in the region where bioethics was established through the creation of institutions 
and academic programmes. The dissemination of bioethics across Latin America owes much 
to the work of passionate Colombian bioethicists who promoted it not only on a national but 
also on a regional level. For example, when FELAIBE was created, Colombian bioethicists 
were important in the organisation of several events –e.g. conferences, courses, workshops, 
etc.–, and in the production of bioethical literature. Also Colombian bioethicists have made 
significant contributions to the formation of the discourses and practices that characterise 
bioethics in Latin America, as I have shown in the previous chapter. As is the case for Latin 
America as a whole, not much has been published on the history of bioethics in Colombia. 
Most of the existing historical accounts are personal accounts of people who are still active 
scholars or professionals and are considered „pioneers‟ by the Colombian bioethics 
community.
114
  
 
My analysis of the historical narratives that Colombian bioethicists have used to explain 
the birth and development of their own field, is an attempt to „de-mythologise‟ the origins of 
bioethics, to reveal the particular forces that have led to its „naturalisation‟, and, most 
importantly, to show how much these narratives are saturated with power in a Foucauldian 
sense. It is a genealogical approach to the already accepted history of bioethics in Colombia. 
The aim is not to discover the „essence‟ of bioethics, but to point out how particular 
discourses, e. g. about the nature and scope of the field, have become „truths‟, and how these 
truths have shaped bioethicists‟ practices and identity. Colombian bioethicists have long 
neglected such an angle. Thus, my task is to go beyond the Whiggish narratives in the 
bioethical historical literature in Colombia and make a first step towards a comprehensive 
history of the field. I have argued elsewhere that instead of appealing to self-indulgent, self-
legitimising, and „messianic‟ accounts of why bioethics emerged, it is necessary to analyse 
                                                             
114 Some of them were interviewed as part of my research. See end of the chapter.  
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how this process in a particular historical time and space, digging deep enough to reveal the 
conditions of possibility for and the power dynamics involved in the birth of bioethics in 
Colombia (Díaz Amado, 2011).  
 
As I have shown in the introductory chapter, bioethicists have a special propensity to talk 
about their own origins and their raison d'être. They devote time and energy to discuss what 
moment, event, person, and/or circumstance marks their „birth‟, and the Colombian 
bioethicists are no exception. But „birth‟ is a polysemantic concept, not a simple and unique 
fact. Therefore, the question about the birth of Colombian bioethics entails several answers. 
Which is the correct one? All and none. Whatever answer is given, it will be necessary to 
consider contexts and who is speaking. Particular answers are linked to particular 
contingencies and myths of origin. In Colombia, bioethics might have been born in the 1960s, 
mid-1970s, or the 1990s. It depends on the chosen perspective. However, I am not seeking to 
date Colombian bioethics as an archaeologist would do with an unearthed object, but to show 
that in writing its history, the process of recalling and recording names and dates, there is a 
power effect that has been underestimated. Therefore, instead of identifying the „first year‟, 
„singular event‟, or „true pioneer‟ in this chapter, I want to make visible the rationale behind 
the official historiographies of bioethics in Colombia and the role it plays in keeping things 
going, to use Hunk and Wickham‟s expression (quoted in Kendall & Wickham, 1999, p. 49). 
My aim is to shed light on how certain bioethical discourses, rationalities and truths were 
formed in relation to particular people, institutions and politico-economic agendas. The two 
questions that summarise my inquiry about Colombian bioethics are: What were the 
„conditions of possibility‟ for the rise of bioethics in Colombia? And, is there a „Colombian 
bioethics‟ as such? To answer them, I will start by examining the narratives of Colombian 
bioethicists about the beginnings of their own field. Then, I will show how the 
institutionalisation of bioethics in Colombia was carried out; a process of which the 
production of the new expert called „bioethicist‟ was an important part. After that, I will 
summarise the main ideas and discourses of the Colombian bioethics. Finally, I will present 
relevant information about the history of bioethics in Colombia obtained from the interviews 
I conducted as part of my research.
115
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2. The beginnings: pioneers, death/dying and biomedical advance 
Colombian bioethicists have referred to a period called the „pre-history of bioethics‟, 
which would be between the late-1970s and mid-1980s, when some academics started to 
discuss bioethical issues without having adopted bioethics as their discipline yet (PBUEB & 
Escobar, J., 2002). Are Colombian bioethicists referring to the „conditions of possibility‟ for 
bioethics to emerge in Colombia? To some extent, the answer is „yes‟. But, disappointingly, 
bioethicists have used the expression „prehistory of bioethics‟ mainly as a way to extol those 
who are called in Colombian bioethics the „pioneers‟; the ones who supposedly did bioethics 
even at a time when the word was still unknown in their region. For El Bosque University’s 
Program of Bioethics, PBUEB
116
 and J. Escobar (2002), the central figure in this period was 
Jaime Escobar,
117
 who allegedly was first to introduce in Colombia the interest in „bioethical 
issues‟ through the seminars he organised in the mid-1970s when he was head of the San 
Juan de Dios hospital ICU.
118
 These seminars were on death and dying, patients‟ rights and 
ethical dilemmas in intensive care. They conclude that “in one word, undoubtedly, Jaime 
Escobar was the pioneer of bioethics in Colombia” (PBUEB & Escobar, J., 2002, p. 17). It 
should be noted that this quotation comes from a book co-authored by J. Escobar. It seems 
that the idea of „pioneering‟ in the history of bioethics in Colombia is as relevant as in Latin 
America in general and that it should be analysed carefully.  
Within the bioethics community
119
 in Colombia, a „pioneer‟ is not only a „title‟ through 
which those who founded the field are acknowledged, but also a „position‟ that empowers a 
particular group of bioethicists. Pioneers are usually invested with authority, and when they 
speak, for example, about the history of bioethics in Colombia, their statements constitute a 
kind of „true‟ indisputable a-priori for understanding such a history. Thus, they are not only 
authoritative voices on the past of bioethics in Colombia, but also on its nature, scope and 
aims in the present. However, a careful analysis of what these pioneers said shows that what 
they call „history‟ is by and large a record of particular facts (e.g. when a certain group for the 
                                                             
116 Programa de Bioética de la Universidad El Bosque. 
117 General surgeon and former professor at the Faculty of Medicine, National University of Colombia. He is co-
founder of El Bosque University, where he organised, together with A. Llano the first postgraduate program on 
bioethics in 1995.   
118 The university hospital of the National University of Colombia, one of the most important university 
hospitals at the time. 
119 I distinguish the Colombian bioethics community from the Colombian bioethics establishment. The former is 
constituted by all the people who, directly or indirectly, are working on bioethics or bioethics-related issues, 
while the latter is made up of those who control the means of production of bioethics, e.g. associations, 
publications, postgraduate programs, and so on and, therefore, exercise power on the whole bioethics 
community. 
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study of bioethics was formed or when the first postgraduate program in bioethics was 
created), people and institutions involved in the building of the field in Colombia, selected 
according to their personal criteria but chronologically ordered, thus giving the impression of 
an „objective‟ account. In other words, what dominated so far in the history of bioethics in 
Colombia is really hagiography. For this reason, I argue that the history of bioethics in 
Colombia so far lacks a critical perspective of how it emerged and flourished as an academic 
and professional field.   
 
Some authors have pointed out that death and dying boosted an ethical reflection on the 
new relations between medicine and society in Colombia during the „pre-history of 
bioethics.‟ According to J. Mendoza,120 by 1975-78 some physicians, particularly in Bogotá, 
promoted an academic discussion through workshops on dignified death in university 
hospitals (Mendoza, 2006, p. 34). In 1979 Beatriz Kopp, “a highly prestigious lady, an 
intellectual and a lover of classical ballet” (Mendoza, 2006, p. 40), created in Bogotá the 
Fundación pro-derecho a morir dignamente,
121
 a private non-profit organisation. Mendoza 
argues that, “the issue through which bioethics reflections were introduced in [Colombia] – 
the death of the human being and the respect for the rights of the persons who reach the end 
of their life –, had a rather unique development [with the creation of this organisation]” 
(Mendoza, 2006, p. 40).  
 
In 1988 A. Llano published in The Hastings Center Report, In Colombia, Dealing with 
Death and Technology, in which he discussed the negative effects of the biotechnological 
advance on the otherwise „natural‟ process of dying as well as the “deplorable loss of ethical 
values in the practice of the medical profession” in the last few decades (Llano, 1988, p. 23). 
In a further article, he argued that dying had become a prolonged, passive, profane and 
isolated experience in contemporary society. “The hospital, and to some extent family 
members, take charge of the death of the patient, who is no longer allowed to die his own 
death [and now] people die „scientifically‟ in hospital and clinics” (Llano, 1990, p. 448f). 
This phenomenon was linked to the „dehumanisation‟ and „detachment‟ from traditional 
moral values in the clinical setting. But for Llano, “[…] the response, when it came, assumed 
a name: bioethics, [which] is not a discipline that is cold, calculating, abstract, defined, and 
                                                             
120 Neurosurgeon and university lecturer. Renowned medical ethicist and bioethicist in Colombia. Member of 
the National Academy of Medicine.  Current director of The World Federation of Right to Die Societies.  
121 Foundation for the Right to Die with Dignity.  
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precise in its methods and content. It is rather a movement, an interdisciplinary effort, a 
growing process of searching out moral values […]” (Llano, 1990, p. 450). Thus, bioethics 
was presented since its beginnings as a solution for the growing dehumanisation of medicine 
and a true advocate of patients and anyone who suffered because of the techno-scientific 
take-over of our lives.   
 
The beginnings of bioethics in Colombia were also linked to the idea that biomedical 
progress entailed new ethical dilemmas for which traditional (Hippocratic) medical ethics 
was deemed insufficient or inadequate. F. Sánchez
122
 has argued that the ethical 
consequences of new medical technologies began to be widely discussed in Colombia by the 
early 1980s (Sánchez, 1990a, p. 510). By this time, euthanasia was considered a crime and 
there was a lack of legal regulation regarding transplants, although brain death was legally 
defined.
123
 Reproductive technologies were also a big concern and abortion was illegal in all 
circumstances, although “virtually everyone, including the health authorities and police, 
know that the large cities harbour abortion clinics staffed by physicians and nurses, and no 
corrective action is taken”124 (Sánchez, 1990a, p. 512). According to Sánchez (1990a, p. 511), 
there was little bioethics literature available in Colombia in the 1980s, basically just the Code 
of Medical Ethics of 1981
125
 and three textbooks: first, General Medical Deontology,
126
 by 
Gerardo Paz, first published in 1955; second, Medical Ethics,
127
 by Luis A. Vélez, first 
published in 1988; and, third, the Spanish translation of Main Issues in Bioethics,
128
 by A.C. 
Varga, originally published in the USA in 1984.  
 
3. Institutionalisation of bioethics 
 
Between the mid-1980s and early 2000s there was a period that the bioethical 
establishment  has called “the normalization of bioethics”, characterised by the creation of the 
first professional associations and groups working in the field, the first journals and book 
series, and the first postgraduate programmes (PBUEB & Escobar, J., 2002, p. 19). In the 
                                                             
122 Gynaecologist and obstetrician, Emeritus professor of medicine at the National University of Colombia, and 
renowned medical ethicist and bioethicist. He has been member of Courts of Ethics and is currently  member of 
the National Academy of Medicine. 
123 According to Decree 2363 of 1986. 
124 Abortion and euthanasia will be discussed in chapter seven. 
125 See chapter six. 
126 Deontología Médica General. 
127Ética Médica. 
128 Bioética. Principales Problemas. The translation was made by A. Llano in 1988. 
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1980s, according to A. Llano (1988), “three developments in Colombia [gave] hope that 
responsibility will be renewed in the practice of professional medicine” (p. 23f): the Code of 
Medical Ethics of 1981, the Medical Ethics Program of ASCOFAME, and the Colombian 
Institute for Bioethical Studies
 129
 hereafter ICEB. I want to expand a little on the latter. ICEB 
was founded in 1985 by F. Sánchez and Alfonso Tamayo
130
 and adopted the definition of 
bioethics provided by the Encyclopaedia of Bioethics
131
 (PBUEB & Escobar, J., 2002, p. 20; 
Sánchez, 2008). ICEB is currently attached to the Colombian National Academy of Medicine
 132
 
(hereafter „the Academy‟) as a “consultative body” for bioethical issues. With the support of 
the Academy, ICEB has organised conferences and published books on different bioethical 
issues like euthanasia, abortion and health care reform. Although its president, F. Sánchez, 
has insisted that bioethics is a new interdisciplinary, plural and secular field that is committed 
to the protection of life „in general‟ and that has overcome the old Hippocratic ethics 
(Sánchez, 2006, p. 182), for other bioethicists ICEB has remained too close to the 
Hippocratic tradition (PBUEB & Escobar, 2002, p. 20). This aspect is worth mentioning 
because, by and large, for bioethics groups in Colombia it is important to clearly state that 
they have embraced the „new paradigm‟ of bioethics in which there is no room for the 
paternalism of the old Hippocratic tradition.  
 
In the historiography of bioethics in Colombia ICEB appears as a „fact‟ for the 
development of the field, but neither its creation nor the role it has played has ever been 
discussed. My contention is nevertheless that its existence should be problematized and not 
simply taken as a fact. ICEB is theoretically an independent group, but it is practically 
speaking part of the Academy. Not only are its headquarters located in the Academy‟s 
building, but the ICEB also shares the same ethos with the Academy: an environment of 
conservative values and elitism. The National Academy of Medicine was founded in 1887 
and ever since it has been a body of „selected‟ Colombian physicians and healthcare-related 
professionals. At present it does not have more than 250 members,
133
 an astonishingly small 
number in a country with more than 58,000 physicians. Moreover, the Academy is mainly 
                                                             
129 Instituto Colombiano de Estudios Bioéticos.  
130 A legal expert in medical ethics and law. He participated in writing the Code of Medical Ethics of 1981. 
131 “The systematic study of human behaviour in the field of biomedical sciences and health care insofar as this 
behaviour is examined in the light of moral principles and values.” See: 
http://anmdecolombia.net/web2/component/content/article/100.html.  
132 Academia Nacional de Medicina de Colombia. See: http://anmdecolombia.net/web2/ 
133
 See: http://anmdecolombia.net/web2/acerca-de-anm/listados-de-miembros.html, retrieved 20 September 
2011. 
98 
 
constituted and controlled by specialists,
134
 despite the fact that around 70% of Colombian 
physicians are general practitioners (GPs).
135
 By and large, the vast majority of Colombian 
physicians, particularly the GPs either do not know or do not care about the Academy‟s 
activities, while others would not meet the necessary requirements to be admitted.
136
 
According to one of its members, E. Otero (2004), the Academy should be regarded as the 
Colombian equivalent to the American College of Physicians. In practical terms, the 
Academy is an epicentre of power over the medical profession in Colombia. It might be 
assimilated to an exclusive club of doctors; however, it is by law an authorized consultant 
body for the Colombian government regarding public health and other medical issues, 
assuming de facto the representation of the whole Colombian medical professionals.
137
  
 
Also in 1985 the Centre for Medical Ethics
138
 was created in ASCOFAME by “the Jesuit 
priest Alfonso Llano Escobar, who was interested in the rise of bioethics in the international 
arena and the hard task that its introduction in Colombia represented” (Mendoza, 2006, p. 
34). Although ASCOFAME had been a powerful medical association,
139
 and its Centre for 
Medical Ethics played an important role in the development of bioethics in the field of 
medical education in the 1980s, its importance declined after the healthcare reform of 1993. 
Through this centre, A. Llano offered courses and seminars on medical ethics, mainly to 
lecturers in faculties of medicine and nursing as well as other healthcare professionals. 
According to J. Mendoza (2006), the attendants “were taken for three or four days, and were 
held in a quiet place, almost always a house of spiritual retreat like the ones some religious 
communities have in warm weather localities close to tourist cities” (p. 35). This is not a 
simple or innocent description. Rather, it reflects the environment in which the academic 
discussion about medical ethics has characteristically taken place in Colombia: in private, 
elitist, conservative, religion-related circles. In the case of bioethics, this has not been 
different. On the one hand, its origins and development as an academic and professional field 
                                                             
134 „Consultants‟ in the UK.  
135 See: http://www.medicosgeneralescolombianos.com/index.htm, accessed 27 September 2011. In the power 
dynamics of the Colombian medical establishment, general practitioners are usually considered and treated as 
„lower rank‟ medics.  
136 E.g. a recommendation letter issued by two „academics‟ and/or academic work.   
137 Recently, amid the most serious crisis experienced by the health care system since its creation in 1993, the 
Ministry of Social Protection twitted that: „today we got a historical agreement with doctors, they back the 
government‟s healthcare roadmap‟ (El Espectador, 2011a) According to the news, “the government” and “the 
doctors” made an agreement on the necessary changes for the health care system. But, who were “the doctors” 
here? The answer is: the representatives of the Academy, acting on behalf of the whole medical profession. I 
would content that such an agreement represented the will of the majority of medical professionals in Colombia.  
138
 Centro para la Ética Médica. 
139 At present it associates 53 faculties of medicine.  
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were deeply linked to a professional/social elite related to private universities, medical 
professional bodies and the Roman Catholic Church. On the other hand, it is interesting that 
bioethics was announced and promoted as a „new ethics‟ as well as a „movement‟ to which 
everyone, no matter their professional background or work, not only was invited to, but 
actually encouraged to join. For example, A. Llano wrote in a newspaper column: “[…] you 
will feel guilty if you do not know about bioethics” (Llano, 1993), “everyone no matter their 
profession or condition should assume the bioethical challenge” (Llano, 1996), “bioethics is 
the international language of those who fight for the humanization of human life” (quoted in 
Nieto, L., 1995), and bioethics was described as “the sun” that will get us out of problems 
such as “guerrillas, paramilitaries, political corruption which have kept Colombia in an 
endless and dark winter” (Llano, 2004). In this way bioethics became a „land of experts‟, 
powerful people and institutions, but at the same time a field where everyone was welcomed 
if they wanted to join „the movement‟. 
    
In 1993 A. Llano created the, National Centre for Bioethics,
140
 hereafter CENALBE, an 
interdisciplinary group for the study and diffusion of bioethics in Colombia, which helped 
him to spread his own ideas about bioethics. In 1995 CENALBE in alliance with El Bosque 
University offered the first postgraduate programme in bioethics in the country (see below). 
In 1998 CENALBE hosted the 2
nd
 Latin American Congress of Bioethics that took place in 
Bogotá and signed an agreement with the newly created the Bioethics Institute at the Javeriana 
University,
141
 hereafter IBPUJ, where another postgraduate programme in bioethics was 
offered –a one year program that it is called in Colombia Specialization-. Since the end of the 
alliance with the IBPUJ in 2009, CENALBE has continued working as an independent 
organisation still headed by A. Llano. Meanwhile, the IBPUJ has also continued its research 
and educational activities, launching an MA programme in bioethics in 2008. It is worth 
mentioning that CENALBE created the first and most complete bioethics library in 
Colombia, currently attached to the Universidad Javeriana‟s main library. 
   
In 2002 the National Association for Bioethics,
142
 hereafter ANALBE, was announced as an 
organisation to promote research and discussion in bioethics. Its creation, directives, and 
policies have been largely controlled by the bioethics establishment. So far its activities have 
                                                             
140 Centro Nacional de Bioética. 
141
 Instituto de Bioética de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. 
142 Asociación Nacional de Bioética. 
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comprised a few conferences and workshops, but its academic impact has been modest. 
ANALBE reflects, to a greater extent, the politics and dynamics of bioethics in Colombia. 
Inasmuch as internal bureaucratic and ideological disputes are insidious and pervasive 
practices within the Colombian bioethics circles, there has been little room to really promote 
a systematic and critical approach to the field. The bioethical establishment dominates the 
production of discourses, delineates the practices and controls the mechanisms and 
institutions related to bioethics in Colombia. If one looks at the content, organisation, 
speakers and debates of the workshops, congresses and forums organised by ANALBE, one 
will see by and large the same people with variations of the same discourse and conclusions. 
My view is that there is still much to do to guarantee an acceptable minimum of academic 
quality in these congresses, conferences and forums of bioethics in Colombia, where 
alternative or challenging positions for the bioethical establishment‟s views remain marginal.  
 
In 2005 with the support of a bioethics group based at the National University of 
Colombia, the Colombian branch of Redbioetica was created. Like other organisations, it was 
established to analyse bioethical issues, and it is mainly oriented to issues related to human 
research ethics, promoting a more politicised view of bioethics. It has organised several 
events like workshops and conferences. It is worth mentioning that in 2007, sponsored by the 
Ministry of Social Protection, Redbioetica held workshops and produced publications aimed 
at increasing the public appropriation of the Constitutional Court‟s 2006 legal decision that 
decriminalised abortion (M.P.S. & U.N., 2007).
143
 In partnership with the National University 
of Colombia it also published the Diccionario Latinoamericano de Bioética
144
 in 2008, which 
comprises different perspectives and authors on bioethics in Latin America. More recently, 
on 23 – 26 November 2010, Redbioetica organised in partnership with El Bosque University 
and the National University its 3
rd
 International Congress for Latin America and the 
Caribbean with the motto „Bioethics in a continent of exclusion: from reflection to action‟. 
Although it was indeed an extensive congress that covered a wide arrange of issues, like 
many other congresses on bioethics in the region it lacked a section to discuss in depth 
historical and philosophical issues related to the field itself in Latin America.
145
 Regarding 
this issue I have argued elsewhere that bioethicists in Latin America still continue working 
                                                             
143 See chapter seven.  
144
 Latin American Dictionary of Bioethics 
145 The proceedings of this congress are available at www.bioeticaunbosque.edu.co. Accessed 23 April 2011. 
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with too many taken-for-granted truths about their own field, and proper historical reflection 
is still a pending task for Latin American bioethics (Díaz Amado, 2011). 
 
In the so-called „pre-history‟ of bioethics some publications were considered as 
„announcing‟ the coming of bioethics. J. Mendoza has claimed that his article Considerations 
on Brain Death in Colombia, published in 1977, was the first article addressing end of life 
ethical issues in Colombia (PBUEB & Escobar, J., 2002, p. 15). Meanwhile Bioethics, or 
Defeating the Fear?, published by J. Bernal in 1981,
146
 is considered by others to be the first 
bioethical article in Colombia (PBUEB & Escobar, 2002, J., p. 17; Sánchez, 2008). By the 
mid-1980s, A. Llano published several articles on the field and translated Main Issues in 
Bioethics, by A. C. Varga. This book represented bioethics as the answer to the problems 
created by scientific progress and included Pontifical documents related to bioethics. To 
illustrate the „transcendence‟ of the new field of bioethics, Llano mentioned in its 
introduction that J. Testard had decided to devote his entire life to the study of ethics after 
having created the first test tube baby in France in 1982 (Varga, 1988, p. 9). However, the 
first book in Colombia with the word „bioethics‟ in its title and written by a Colombian 
author was, according to J. Mendoza (2006, p. 34), The Bioethical Horizon of Sciences,
147
 edited 
by G. Cely in 1994. As I have shown in the previous chapter, Cely has also been one of the 
Colombian bioethicists who hold that bioethics is a „new ethics‟, and like A. Llano, he has 
been a tireless proselytizer of bioethics in Colombia. However, it was not until 1990s when 
the word bioethics really entered the Colombian mainstream. At the end of this decade the 
emergence of postgraduate courses, ethics committees, public events, the rise of a corpus of 
specialised literature and the impact of highly contentious decisions made by the 
Constitutional Court contributed to create the demand for bioethics.
148
 
 
One of the most successful forms of institutionalisation of bioethics in Colombia has been 
the ethics committees, both clinical and on human research, in healthcare and academic 
institutions.
149
 Since bioethics was primarily related to the biomedical scenario, ethics 
                                                             
146 In: Universitas Medica, Vol 23, No. 3. Universidad Javeriana, Bogotá. Bernal is a geneticist.   
147 Original in Spanish: El Horizonte bioético de las ciencias. 
148 See chapters six and seven. 
149 According to Drane there are three kinds of committees: clinical ethics committees (to solve ethical dilemmas 
in daily clinical practice, also called in Colombia bioethics clinical committees), institutional review board, the 
so-called IRBs (for the ethical analysis of biomedical protocols and trials, also called in Colombia bioethics 
research committees), and professional review committees (to decide in cases of professional misconduct, 
generally seen as breaches of the code of ethics) (Drane & Fuenzalida, 1991). This classification has been 
followed in Colombia. See: Hackspiel, M. M. (Ed.) (1998) and Díaz Amado, E. (2003). 
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committees were thought to be the best way to promote the new discipline among health care 
institutions (PBUEB & Escobar, J., 2002, p. 26f). In fact, in Colombia a way to distinguish 
bioethics from the „traditional‟ medical ethics was the distinction between „bioethics 
committees‟ and „ethics committees‟. In the Colombian healthcare scenario, „traditional‟ 
ethics committees mean „professional ethics committees‟. These committees analyse cases of 
professional misconduct, which are generally put in terms of breaches of a code of ethics. 
However, with the healthcare reform of 1993 and the rise of bioethics in the 1990s, 
professional ethics committees have become just one type of ethics committee, co-existing 
with the newly created „bioethics committees‟, which in some sense became fashionable in 
the Colombian healthcare system. Yet by 2002 the number of health institutions in the five 
biggest cities of the country with an institutional review board and/or a clinical ethics 
committee was still low and no information was available about how these committees 
actually worked (Alterio, et al., 2008, p. 113). According to some authors, these committees 
in Colombia are mostly dysfunctional and it is likely that they cannot provide the „ethical 
control‟ they are supposed to exercise (Suárez, 2008).     
 
In 1991 the Ministry of Health, following international recommendations related to human 
rights and ethics committees, decided to create Hospital Ethics Committees in Colombia 
(Sánchez, 2008).
150
 However, these committees were conceived more as a mechanism to 
promote the participation of the local community in healthcare decisions, rather than as 
advisory committees in the clinical decision-making process. In other words, their role was 
more related to politics than to the ethics of medical decisions. In fact, according to the 
Decree 1797 of 1994, and in the context of the new healthcare system created by Law 100 of 
1993, it was stated that 4 out of 7 of the members of these committees should be members of 
the lay community.
151
  
 
In 1998 the Ministry of Health sponsored a manual on clinical committees and in its 
foreword the minister Maria T. Forero argued that “within the new social security system 
scenario clinical ethics committees are fundamental to make decisions, defend life, and carry 
out an ethical assessment of biotechnology” (Hackspiel, 1998). The perspective and 
methodology proposed in this book followed the Spanish bioethicist D. Gracia‟s approach as 
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 See: http://www.encolombia.com/medicina/enfermeria/Enfermevol130310/Comitedeetica.htm, accessed 5 
July 2011.  
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well as American principlism. At present, although there are still no clear regulations, many 
healthcare institutions, depending on their level of complexity, have some type of ethics 
committee. In the last few years the number of institutional review boards (IRB) has 
increased, both at private and public institutions. But, I argue, their institutional affiliation 
remains an issue to be discussed in Colombia. The independence of these committees is 
fundamental to guarantee possible „conflicts of interests‟ and to keep them focused on their 
primary role: the ethical assessment of research protocols. The problem is that „independent‟ 
IRBs, in a context of a lack of regulation and eagerness for profit in the age of biocapital (see 
introduction), might be working as „legitimising‟ bodies of clinical trials sponsored by 
pharmaceutical companies. Thus, these committees have ended up being another „business 
sector‟, as the members of these committees can earn money by carrying out the ethical 
assessment of clinical protocols that require „ethical‟ approval.  
 
After years of lobbying by the bioethical establishment, in 2001 the
152
 was created by the 
presidential Decree 1101 of 2001 as a body attached to the Ministry of Health. This 
commission had four ministerial delegates (the ministries of Internal Affairs, Health, 
Education, and Environment) and seventeen permanent members. These permanent members 
were supposed to be distinguished scientists, scholars or professionals. However, who could 
actually become a permanent member also depended on the kind of relationship the person 
had with the Colombian bioethical establishment. Some of the people who became members 
of this commission had no idea what bioethics is about Intersectoral Commission for 
Bioethics,
153
 as the Colombian bioethical establishment had been keen to include in their ranks 
influential people, no matter their academic background or experience or work in bioethics. 
Sometimes it seems that for the Colombian medical ethics and bioethics establishment grey 
hair, old age, social position, fame or professional expertise in any area guarantee ipso facto 
enough knowledge and ability to deal with „bioethical issues‟. According to F. Sánchez, who 
was one of those permanent members, the Comisión Intersectorial was conceived as a 
governmental advisory board to “analyse and design public policies aimed at protecting 
human beings in the context of science and technology research, development, and 
application” (Sánchez, 2008). However, F. Sánchez himself recognised that, no matter the 
good intentions, this commission never fulfilled this aim and was dysfunctional from its very 
                                                             
152 Comisión Intersectorial de Bioética. 
153
 It is a matter of discussion whether having a basic knowledge about bioethics should be a pre-requisite for a 
person to be a suitable candidate for a commission like this.  
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beginnings. According to him, this was because the commission was just another bureaucratic 
body, stripped of real powers to influence the government‟s decisions, and whose members 
never shared similar views on its purposes and modus operandi (Sánchez, 2008).  
 
More recently, the Colombian bioethical establishment swapped this Comisión 
Intersectorial for a Comisión Nacional de Bioética,
154
 “following the example of the most 
developed countries” as F. Sánchez said (2008). Then, after meetings and political lobbying, 
in a process full of intrigues and manoeuvrings as each bioethical group of interest wanted to 
get control over how to organise such a commission, the Comisión Nacional de Bioética was 
created by Law 1374 of 2010,
155
 although the process to officially install such a commission 
has not yet ended. The Colombian bioethics establishment announced the creation of this 
commission as a „triumph‟ of bioethics, but it will be necessary to see if it passes the test of 
time. How, for example, will this commission effectively influence national policies on 
human research, deal with ethical-legal-political-economic problems related to healthcare, 
and so on? 
 
4. The production of a new expert: „The bioethicist‟ 
 
Since the late 1990s the number of academic programmes in bioethics has multiplied in 
Colombia.
156
 The first postgraduate programme in bioethics in Latin America was offered in 
Colombia in 1995 by El Bosque University in alliance with CENALBE as a Specialisation (a 
one-year programme) in bioethics (Garzón, 2000, p. 35; PBUEB & Escobar, J., 2002, p. 
22),
157
 or, in other words, it was created by J. Escobar and A. Llano. The content and 
structure of this programme laid the foundations for future academic programmes in bioethics 
in Colombia. In this programme students attended seminars and lectures on scientific and 
philosophical issues, aimed at outlining the „new paradigm‟ of bioethics: the defence of life 
in a technologicised, scientificised, dehumanised and anti-ecological world. Bioethics was 
presented in a Potterian way, as a „bridge‟ between the sciences and humanities. Bioethics 
was on the one hand understood as an interdisciplinary dialogue, and a holistic approach to 
                                                             
154 National Commission for Bioethics 
155 The main difference, apart from changes in the number of members, is that the National Commission has a 
higher rank in the legal/administrative hierarchy as it was created by a Law, i.e. by the Congress, while the 
former Intersectoral Commission was created by a presidential Decree.  
156 J. D‟Achiardi (2004) mentions at least 20 bioethical programs offered in the biggest Colombian cities. 
However, at present the number is probably even higher. 
157 A one-year postgraduate program. 
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knowledge and science in general, On the other hand, bioethics was also regarded as “a 
bridge to the future”  (Potter, 1971). Accordingly, bioethics was presented as a new ethical 
perspective, committed to the protection of life on the planet, and particularly concerned with 
the survival of the human species under threat because of irresponsible biotechnological 
advances. The alliance between El Bosque and CENALBE lasted less than a year as personal 
disagreements and disputes between J. Escobar and A. Llano led to a premature end.
158
 After 
that, El Bosque University eventually continued to offer postgraduate studies in bioethics 
under the direction of Escobar, while Llano moved to the Universidad Javeriana where he 
later, in 1998, also organised an option in bioethics in a postgraduate programme.  
 
In the history of the academic institutionalisation and professionalization of bioethics in 
Colombia, El Bosque University has undoubtedly played a major role. Apart from a 
Specialisation, this university started a MA programme in bioethics in 2000 and in 2005 a 
PhD programme. Besides, since its beginnings, PBUEB has championed the organisation of 
events such as conferences, workshops, forums and courses in bioethics. It is the major 
publisher of bioethics literature in Colombia, and in the ranking of the Colombian research 
groups made by Colciencias
159
, it ranks first among the research groups in bioethics. 
However, from a Foucauldian perspective the question is how bioethics in Colombia came to 
be almost synonymous with El Bosque University. I would suggest three factors that might 
provide an answer. First, as a co-founder of this university and having been its Chancellor for 
three consecutive periods, from 1996 to 2002, J. Escobar was in a privileged position to 
create an academic programme in bioethics according to his own ideas about the field 
(PBUEB & Escobar, 2002, p. 27). Second, from the very beginning the PBUEB developed 
strategic national and international relationships, for example, with the RPB in Chile and 
collaborations with bioethicists like Gilbert Hottois in Belgium or Mahal Da Costa in Chile. 
Also, from the very beginning the PBUEB adopted a proactive policy of publications and 
organised several events on bioethics. In this way the PBUEB built up its prestige as a 
leading institution in the field of bioethics. Finally, the discourse about the institutional 
identity of El Bosque University matched the bioethical discourse, since at its foundation in 
1978 this university adopted a bio-psycho-social and interdisciplinary approach in all its 
                                                             
158 I was one of the students attending this first postgraduate course in bioethics. This episode between these two 
„pioneers‟ of Colombian bioethics showed me very early that the development of the field was not simply a 
unselfish and philanthropic effort to solve urgent ethical dilemmas brought by the biomedical progress, but also 
a „power struggle‟ between interest groups and particular individuals.    
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 Colciencias is the Colombian governmental agency that supports and regulates academic research in different 
fields. See: http://www.colciencias.gov.co/, accessed 24 July 2011  
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programmes (El Tiempo, 1997a).
160
 It is not a surprise then that bioethics had found a fertile 
soil to grow.  
 
For the PBUEB itself this institutional identity, „bio-psycho-sociality‟ and 
„interdisciplinarity‟, explains its own creation and successful development (PBUEB & 
Escobar, 2002, pp. 15, 33). According to J. Escobar, since the very moment of its foundation, 
El Bosque University brought „bioethical issues‟ to the centre of its academic life and the 
promotion of bioethics became an “institutional policy”.161 In 1995, for instance, bioethics 
was included as one of the modules of the faculty of education with the argument that school 
teachers might promote “bioethics thinking” in their host institutions (De Zubiría, S., 2008, p. 
8). Bringing bioethics into school education was justified as “[t]he teaching of general 
bioethics [is] an input and a tool for the building of a civil ethics [and] bioethics should be 
taught from primary to high school […] as a separate subject [for] learning respect, 
responsibility and love” (Escobar, Sarmiento & Gordillo, 2008, pp. 83, 128). PBUEB has 
emphasised that it holds a “pluralist and civil” approach to bioethics, instead of a “clerical or 
religious” one (PBUEB & Escobar, 2002, p. 34). This emphasis is intended, among other 
things, to clearly set a contrast with widely known bioethical approaches in Colombia of the 
1990s like that of A. Llano, whose column in the main newspaper in Colombia gave him the 
opportunity to „announce‟ the „advent‟ of bioethics, which at the same time contributed to his 
reputation as a bioethicist. Once his alliance with El Bosque University was dissolved in 
1996, he went to the Universidad Javeriana, a Jesuit university, where he formed a new 
alliance, this time with the Bioethics Institute recently created in this university in 1997. 
Thus, the Bioethics Institute at the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana
162
 was born. This institute 
was initially attached to the faculty of science where another bioethicist, the Jesuit priest G. 
Cely, had already introduced bioethics. He started to teach bioethics courses for postgraduate 
students in this faculty in 1988, and in 1993 initiated a weekly research seminar on bioethics 
with an „interdisciplinary‟ group that later formed the basis for the creat ion of the IBPUJ163 
(D'Achiardi, 2004). In 1998 A. Llano was appointed as the director of this Institute, which 
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161 See: http://www.bioeticaunbosque.edu.co/presentacion.htm, accessed 20 September 2011. However, slogans 
and/or the inclusion of certain modules in the curricula, e.g. bioethics, is not enough to counterbalance the 
effects of extended institutional practices in Colombia. In short, I contend that despite the discourse of El 
Bosque University about „bio-psycho-sociality‟ and „interdisciplinarity‟, this university is very similar to any 
other private university in Colombia.  
162Instituto de Bioética de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana.  
163 See: http://www.javeriana.edu.co/bioetica/ 
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had been removed from the faculty of sciences to become an independent institute 
administratively attached to the Academic Vice-Chancellor‟s office. It was said that this 
move was “to be consistent with the interdisciplinary work [in bioethics] and to guarantee 
that no particular discipline would predominate”164 (IBPUJ, n.d.). 
 
In contrast to PBUEB, which emphasised civil ethics as foundational discourse for 
bioethics, under the direction of A. Llano the IBPUJ would emphasise human dignity as the 
quintessential criterion in bioethics (IBPUJ, n.d.). Also appealing to human dignity, La 
Sabana University, an Opus Dei university, has promoted a personhood-centred approach to 
bioethics (personalism). For authors who hold this position such as I. M. Hoyos, Colombian 
bioethics and jurisprudence should recognise personhood as the foundational concept in 
which human being, human life, and person are concurrent terms (Hoyos, I. M., 2000, p. 3). 
People with religious commitments (certainly Roman Catholics, the predominant religion in 
Colombia, but also Protestants, Muslims and others) have found in human dignity a „meeting 
point‟ between bioethics‟ secular demands and religion-oriented values. It is a concept deeply 
rooted in the Christian tradition and has recast as a semi-secular version of the sacredness of 
life (Cuéllar, J., 2010). The Vatican promulgated a directive, according to which Catholic 
universities should become engaged in bioethics (IBPUJ, n.d.). But, of course, the bioethics 
promoted by these universities is supposed to go hand in hand with official Catholic doctrine, 
although, as in other fields, there are dissident voices.
165
 Human dignity also appears in the 
Preface of the Colombian Constitution and it has been used in important declarations 
pronounced by international organisations like UNESCO.
166
 Yet some Colombian 
bioethicists have pointed to the lack of clarity surrounding this concept, making it difficult to 
use properly as guidance in practical situations (Cuéllar, J., 2006).  
 
                                                             
164 Since its creation in 1998 there has been an endless debate as to a bioethics institute should be attached to a 
faculty of philosophy or theology or medicine or sciences. Bioethicists like A. Llano and others have held that 
owing to its nature, bioethics should not be identified with any particular discipline and its presence in the 
university is to be metaphorically seen as an „umbrella‟, i.e. given its interdisciplinary nature, bioethics has to 
inform all fields of knowledge without belonging to any in particular. If the institute went to the Faculty of 
Philosophy, bioethics would probably become a „practical or applied ethics‟, in the Faculty of Medicine a 
„biomedical ethics‟, or in Theology a “moral perspective”. Bioethicists have argued that only in their hands 
bioethics can really develop as a new field.   
165 See chapter seven about the abortion debate.   
166 E.g. The Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, 1997, by UNESCO. See: 
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=1881&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html, 
accessed 20 August 2010. 
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By taking the Specialisation programme in bioethics of the Universidad Javeriana as a 
case-example, it will be possible to see what producing a bioethicist is for the Colombian 
bioethical establishment. First of all, this programme was virtually open to anyone with a 
university degree, thus reinforcing the idea that bioethics was suitable for any discipline, 
profession or field of knowledge. The programme was divided in four modules. Three were 
about the scientific, philosophical (mainly ethics), and anthropological „foundations‟ of 
bioethics, while the fourth was devoted to analysing particular issues in bioethics (genetic 
engineering, euthanasia, etc.). A seminar on the history of bioethics was also included. In my 
view, in this seminar the „myths of origin‟ of bioethics and the idea that bioethics was a 
necessary answer to the ethical dilemmas posed by the biomedical progress were reinforced. 
The rationale behind this programme was to provide the student with the „right‟ angle so that 
he/she would be able to „see‟ the necessity of a „new approach‟ to deal with the „new 
problems‟ posed by techno-scientific advances.  
 
Although it was at El Bosque and Javeriana Universities where bioethics first consolidated 
in postgraduate programmes in Colombia, other universities have also played an important 
role in the academic institutionalisation of the field. For instance, La Sabana University in 
Bogotá offered a Specialization in bioethics in 1998, but it lasted only two years (PBUEB & 
Escobar, 2002, p. 23). Since La Sabana is an Opus Dei university, it is not a surprise that its 
ideological orientation is aligned with the official doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church.  
Three other universities have made also a significant contribution to the institutionalisation of 
bioethics in Colombia. In the Military University Nueva Granada had in the philosopher 
Gustavo García another „pioneer‟ of bioethics in Colombia, and the Revista Latinoamericana de 
Bioética
167
 was created here in 2001. In the faculty of medicine of El Rosario University, 
bioethics has been promoted as a „transcurricular‟ field, which means that bioethics is not 
taught in a particular year or level, but throughout the whole curriculum from the first to the 
final year. In 2002 the Centro Interinstitucional de Estudios en Bioética y Derecho Médico
168
 was 
created in that university with the important support of Juan Mendoza (Rubiano, 2010). There 
J. Mendoza also promoted the creation of a module called „Ethics, Holoethics and 
Legislation‟, in which bioethical issues would be addressed. Mendoza said that with this 
name he wanted to emphasize the idea that bioethics is not an „enlarged medical ethics‟. 
Finally, the Externado de Colombia University, where bioethics has developed in the context 
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 Latin American Journal of Bioethics. 
168 Inter-institutional Centre for Bioethical and Medical Law Studies.  
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of a law school. Under the direction of Emilssen González, a lawyer and expert in bioethics, 
this university created in the 1990s the Centro de Estu ios so re  en tica y  erecho
169
 that has 
offered since 1999 an option called Law and New Life Technologies, focused mainly on the 
legal challenge that new biotechnologies represent for Colombian law. In 2003, this Centre 
organised the First French-Andean Seminar on Bioethics, which showed important ties 
between the Colombian and European understanding of bioethics (González, E. 2003). 
 
Although I have so far only mentioned institutions located in Bogotá, it is worth 
mentioning that, particularly from the 1990s onwards, in other big regional cities there were 
people and institutions also promoting bioethics,
170
 but their impact and influence at a local 
or regional level has not yet been properly studied. It would be tedious and unnecessary to list 
here the names of all the people and institutions working in bioethics in other regions and 
cities in Colombia other than Bogotá. Rather, I will just stress that since the late 1990s and 
the beginnings of the 2000s, as a kind of „domino effect‟, bioethics has appeared more and 
more as an independent field of knowledge and professional field, and was very often linked 
to biomedical sciences departments or institutions.    
 
Although altruistic motives, love of knowledge, and social necessities are invoked in the 
creation of new academic programmes, very often political and economic factors as well as 
power dynamics are deeply implicated. In the case of the PBUEB, it is clear that the powerful 
position of J. Escobar and in the case of the IBPUJ the social relevance of A. Llano played an 
important role. Bioethics has been a successful academic and professional field in Colombia 
not only because it is a relevant field in our day, but because powerful people have been 
behind its development. A critical history of bioethics in Colombia should consider this 
aspect, i.e. how the arguments have very often followed the big names, and not the other way 
round. In Foucauldian terms, it is important to determine the role of the author in Colombian 
bioethics, otherwise its history will continue being told as if bioethics simply and 
spontaneously flourished and came to be what it is in the present. The development of 
bioethics in Colombia has remained deeply linked to „pioneers‟ and particular powerful 
people, those who belong to what I have called the Colombian bioethics establishment. The 
content, methodologies, ideological orientation and issues that are usually included in an 
                                                             
169 Centre for Genetic and Law Studies.  
170
 The unpublished work of D‟Achiardy (2004) is a complete list of the main bioethics institutions, centres, and 
scholars working on the field up to 2004. An updated census is still an awaiting task.   
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academic programme in bioethics, workshop and/or association, as well as the scope, nature, 
and dynamics of the field, have often been capriciously determined by this establishment.  
 
In 1998, the Second Congress of FELAIBE was held in Bogotá organised by A. Llano. 
This congress was widely covered by the Colombian media and had approximately 1,500 
delegates (Llano, 1998, p. ix). This high attendance was not only because bioethics was a 
„novelty‟ for Colombian academia, but also because the enormous charisma of A. Llano in 
Colombia. This mass event and its resonance in Colombian society were proudly taken by the 
Colombian bioethics establishment as a proof of the health and importance of the new field. 
Moreover, it was an opportunity for the Colombian bioethics establishment to show how 
broad, interesting and „necessary‟ the new field was. One of the most interesting debates 
during this congress was on euthanasia, which had recently been decriminalised (in 1997).
171
 
By the late-1990s bioethics was clearly linked in Colombia to biomedical achievements 
widely commented on in the mass media like cloning, in-vitro fertilization and so on. When 
biotechnological breakthroughs were publicised in the news, e.g. Dolly the sheep in 1996 or 
the Human Genome Project in 2000, bioethicists would be consulted along with renowned 
Colombian scientists and lawyers (Nieto, 1995). Furthermore, once the Constitutional 
Court
172
 began to make decisions on highly debatable social issues related to medical 
practice, e.g. the aforementioned decriminalisation of euthanasia, the Colombian bioethics 
community also had the chance of becoming more visible in Colombian society. By the early 
2000s bioethics had already entered the Colombian mainstream as the right and appropriate 
setting for discussing important issues related to „the survival of humankind‟ at the same time 
as bioethicists were indirectly announced as „necessary‟ for our society.  
 
5. Ideas and discourses on bioethics 
 
In the 1990s the idea that bioethics encompassed much more than biomedical ethical 
issues had gained momentum within the bioethics community. This position was, moreover, a 
form of resistance against American bioethics which was regarded as being too much focused 
on the biomedical scenario and a medical product itself. In Colombia bioethics was promoted 
as the „ethics of life‟ in general. J. Mendoza‟s illustrates this point: “some voices, however, 
started pinpointing the inconvenience of such limitation [of considering bioethics mainly 
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 See chapter seven. 
172 The highest court in the Colombian legal system. See chapters six and seven. 
111 
 
related to biomedical issues] and asking for an ampler field of action for bioethics, one of 
general ethics geared towards the regulation of the human beings‟ behavior in their relations 
towards themselves as well as with everything surrounding them, be this living or inanimate” 
(Mendoza, 2006, p. 36). In some universities and professional associations bioethics was 
introduced as the „modern way‟ of humanising medical practice. J.F. Patiño,173 for instance, 
argued that bioethics was the “new ethics” for medicine under the new economic conditions 
ruling this profession in our day (Patiño, 1993, p. 199f).  
 
In general, bioethics is seen as the „life advocate‟ in the contemporary world. Much of the 
promotion of bioethics by the Colombian bioethics establishment has to do with amplifying 
V.R. Potter‟s warnings about the future of the planet and his proposal to create „the new 
science of bioethics.‟ Thus, in a biotechnologically-driven and dehumanized world, bioethics 
has to promote and protect life (Cely, 2007, p. 28). This is the mantra of many Colombian 
bioethicists. At present, although the Colombian bioethics literature remains mainly focused 
on biomedical issues, it includes more and more a disparate array of issues and problems, e.g. 
political violence, armed conflict, professional ethics, environmental crisis, poverty, to name 
but a few. Furthermore, nowadays „bioethics‟ has become a word that gives particular 
prestige to debates, conferences, workshops and courses addressing dissimilar subjects. The 
idea that a wide variety of social concerns, political problems, scientific issues, etc. have a 
„bioethical implication‟ has become paradigmatic in Colombia. Today, there is virtually no 
issue that does not deserve or require a bioethical reflection (Díaz Amado, 2007b, p. 92). I 
have called this „totalising‟ and all-encompassing vocation the bioethicism of the Colombian 
bioethics.  
 
Another extended discourse within the Colombian bioethics community is that bioethics is 
a discipline still in the making. This has resulted in turning bioethics into a „grey zone‟ where 
it is very often difficult to distinguish which topics/issues belong to its scope and which ones 
not. This might explain why the so-called epistemology of bioethics, a field of study that has 
been promoted also in Latin America (Garrafa, et al., 2005),
174
 has become a prominent 
research area in Colombia.
175
 As F. Lolas has warned, bioethics in Latin America is under 
risk of becoming a commercial brand that guarantees many things: respect for the sacredness 
                                                             
173 Renowned general surgeon in Colombia, university lecturer, member of different medical associations, 
among them the National Academy of Medicine.  
174
 See chapter three. 
175 The „foundations of bioethics‟ is an important issue to be studied in postgraduate programs in bioethics.  
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of life, love for nature, and respect for human dignity.
176
 By using the word „bioethics‟ many 
institutions, e.g. universities, hospitals, governmental offices and even particular individuals 
are sending a message of „moral excellence‟ that sometimes contrasts with the reality.  
 
A sort of axiom of Colombian bioethical discourse is interdisciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity 
is to bioethics what democracy is to modern politics: an a priori, but also an ideal. It is not 
only an intrinsic epistemological characteristic of bioethics, as many Colombian bioethicists 
like to point out, but also a political strategy. It is worth mentioning that, according to J. 
Moran (2002), “interdisciplinary study within the humanities is often an attempt to challenge 
the pre-eminence of the sciences as a model for disciplinary development, based on the belief 
that they can obtain neutral, objective forms of knowledge within their own areas of enquiry” 
(p.8). Therefore, interdisciplinarity is an important way of social, academic and professional 
legitimation for bioethical discourses. By identifying bioethics with interdisciplinarity, 
bioethics has achieved a powerful position, as bioethical debates, analyses and statements are 
seen as comprehensive, holistic and inclusive. As a result, resistances against bioethics are 
undermined and, concomitantly, its intervention in any field is seen as „natural‟. For this 
reason, any group working on bioethics nowadays wants to stress its „interdisciplinarity‟, 
particularly if there is a particular but hidden ideological agenda that otherwise would be 
immediately rejected. 
 
In 1990 A. Llano outlined the main characteristics of bioethics (Llano, 1990, p. 452) in a 
way that would set the foundations for the understanding of bioethics in Colombia which 20 
years later has not changed (Llano, 2002, 2010). This has also been reproduced by many 
Colombian bioethicists. Summarising his main points, A. Llano argued that bioethics, 
1. originated to protect human life and the environment. 
2. is interdisciplinary. 
3. offers new solutions for new problems, not „prefabricated‟ ethical formulas. 
4. appeals to reason and good moral judgment instead of the authority of any school of 
philosophy or religion.   
5. entails the „practical‟ aim of guiding the decision making process rather than a discussion 
of elaborated theories.  
6. seeks to humanise the clinical scenario as well as to promote patients‟ rights. 
                                                             
176 See chapter three. 
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7. regulates biomedical research, but not medical practice as this is the task of medical 
ethics. 
8. integrates ethics and biomedical sciences to humanise healthcare professions. 
9. is embodied mainly in academic centres for bioethics and national commissions of 
bioethics. 
10. is concerned with new problems arising from biomedical developments and approaches 
„traditional‟ issues, e.g. euthanasia or abortion, with new perspectives. 
 
These ideas and characteristics attributed to bioethics were disseminated and amplified 
through the first journals and serials that also emerged in the 1990s. By the end of this 
decade, the number of publications about bioethics had significantly increased and the first 
journals in the field had been set up. In these journals not only were typical bioethical issues 
discussed, but diverse ideological positions regarding bioethics became visible. There are 
four main bioethical journals have been published in Colombia. The oldest one is Persona y 
Bioética
177
 which was launched in 1998 by La Sabana University, an Opus Dei-run 
university. This journal stands for a philosophical anthropology-based position that takes on 
personhood as the unifying principle for bioethics (Arango, P., 1997; Santos, 1998, p. 61).  
 
In 2002 Bioethics Selections, a magazine published by the IBPUJ in alliance with 
CENALBE at Universidad Javeriana, was first published. According to its director, A. Llano, 
this journal was aimed at making classical or foundational works in bioethics available for the 
greatest number of Colombians (Llano, 2002). In 2007 the research group on clinical 
bioethics and philosophy of medicine, which I founded in 2005, initiated the publication of 
Anamnesis, a bulletin focused on ethical and philosophical issues arising in the biomedical 
scenario. This publication was originally conceived to promote an in-depth debate on a 
largely neglected issue in Colombian academia, particularly after the take-over of the medical 
ethics academic field by bioethics, the philosophy of medicine.
178
 After a re-launch in 2010, 
Anamnesis has become the official journal of the IBPUJ and now accepts articles addressing 
any bioethical issue, although it is not yet indexed (Díaz Amado, 2011, p. 5).
179
 In 2000 the 
Military University New Granada launched the Revista Latinoamericana de Bioética.
180
 This 
                                                             
177 Person and Bioethics.  
178
 See Anamnesis webpage at: http://puj-
portal.javeriana.edu.co/portal/page/portal/Bioetica/publicaciones/anamnesis, accessed 5 June 2012. 
179
See: http://www.javeriana.edu.co/bioetica/publicaciones_Anamnesis.htm, accessed 23 September 2011. 
180 Latin American Bioethics Journal. 
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colourful and glossy journal includes articles addressing bioethics from a variety of 
perspectives. As any other bioethical journal it also states its pluralist, interdisciplinary, and 
non-confessional character. Finally, PBUEB launched in 2008 the Revista Colombiana de 
Bioética,
181
 a peer reviewed journal. PBUEB is the largest academic centre for bioethics in 
Colombia and concomitantly the major Colombian publisher of bioethics literature, which 
includes important collections such as Bios & Ethos, with 28 issues from 1997 to 2007, and 
Bios & Oikos with nine issues, several translations, special issues, and books.
182
 
 
But bioethics also encounters „resistances‟. In the institutionalised, ordered and 
hierarchical academic arena, for example, bioethics is now competing and conflicting with 
traditional, well-established disciplines, such as philosophy, theology or social sciences. In 
various circles, particularly philosophical ones, the epistemological status of bioethics has 
been questioned. There are unresolved internal disputes and disagreements on the status and 
place that the „new field‟ should have in the university.183 Sometimes there is a gap between 
the rhetoric that praises bioethics as a new and necessary kind of knowledge, and a daily 
reality that takes it as something „secondary‟ or even useless. This is the case in hospitals and 
medical schools, which have now introduced modules in bioethics and where bioethics has 
received „official‟ support, but where students frequently experience a gap between the 
„official‟ curriculum and the „hidden‟ one. For example, in an article I co-authored in 2005 
we illustrated how the informed consent carried out in a private university hospital in Bogotá 
was just an administrative requisite, which lacked the characteristics of needed to be valid 
(voluntariness, disclosure, and competence) that were taught in the bioethics module (Suárez 
& Díaz Amado, 2005). In Colombia, an elaborate rhetoric about interdisciplinarity, respect 
for autonomy, human dignity, health equality, justice
184
 and the necessity of promoting the 
so-called „culture of life‟ has gone hand in hand with the request for „implementing‟ bioethics 
at different levels. However, it is not clear if this has meant a real transformation of practices 
and a solution of problems at different levels. This is not a mere disjunction of theory/practice 
or incoherence. Rather, it is part of the „nature‟ of bioethics in a world governed by neoliberal 
rationalities: bioethics is a „buffer-discursive formation‟, particularly in the healthcare 
                                                             
181 Colombian Journal of Bioethics 
182 See: http://www.bioeticaunbosque.edu.co/publicaciones/Biosyoikos/biosyoikos.html, accessed 20 August 
2011.  
183 See above about the creation of the Institute of Bioethics in the Javeriana University.  
184 For G. Calderón, a Colombian bioethicist, in the case of Colombia “[o]ne‟s understanding of justice must go 
beyond its distributive nature to recognise its abilities as a reparative or restorative means, particularly in regions 
where citizens have been the victims of violence related to armed conflict” (Calderón, 2010, p. 363). 
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scenario. This aspect is illustrated with the opinions and experiences related by the 
individuals I have interviewed in Colombia as part of my research.  
 
6. Bioethics in Colombia: some views (from interviews) 
According to FAS,
185
 a physician expert in public health, by the late-1970s different 
groups, unrelated to the medicine, became interested in medical ethics in some Colombian 
universities, some of them with a clear Christian identity. According to STF, an expert in 
medical ethics and bioethics, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, discussions about the 
„ethicality‟ of the pill, Pomeroy tubal ligation, in-vitro fertilization, abortion, and human 
research, to name but a few issues, led to ethical debates, drawing the attention of mass media 
and other important social agents like the Roman Catholic Church, which has traditionally 
influenced many and shaped the country‟s socio-political life. He added that during the 
1980s, some doctors, particularly those working in academia, considered this ethical debate 
„too medicalised‟, when the first groups interested in bioethics appeared.  
For ETJ, physician and bioethicist, bioethics evolved when “medical ethics was 
challenged by biotechnology, although he underlined that bioethics should not be reduced to 
medical issues. According to him, while medical ethics is medical profession-oriented, 
narrow, aimed at „controlling‟, and deontological in character (including courts of medical 
ethics that are little more than „para-judicial‟ bodies), bioethics instead is deliberative, non-
normative, non-prescriptive, open to other professionals like lawyers, economists, etc., and 
oriented to debating rather than to control. It should be noted that Colombian bioethicists 
very often emphasise that bioethics is not –and should not be– confined to the biomedical 
scenario. In fact, the Colombian bioethics establishment has promoted a very wide, 
sometimes grandiloquent idea about what bioethics is, for instance, as MVJ, a physician and 
medical ethicist, claims: “bioethics is the ethics of everything.”  
In the same way, as the opinion of a Catholic priest and bioethicist, LEA, illustrates, 
bioethics in Colombia is usually seen as the „overcoming‟ of traditional ethics and not merely 
as a sort of applied ethics or practical philosophy: “if someone thinks bioethics is „applied 
                                                             
185 The interviewees authorised to use quotations as long as they were anonymised. Therefore, each one is 
identified with three letters. To see how the interviews were planned, general information about the 
interviewees, and the informed consent form as well as the cover letter, see the appendices. Furthermore, as the 
answers were originally given in Spanish, all the quotations from interviews in this thesis are my own 
translation.   
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ethics‟, as usually philosophers do, it is because he/she is ignorant about what bioethics really 
is… Bioethics is a new discipline!” In his view, “while applied ethics means that a given 
particular ethics is „applied‟ in the analysis of a case/problem, in bioethics ethics is to be 
made; while ethics is about teaching, bioethics is about a method.” Moreover, LEA added, 
“traditional medical ethics is not suitable for modern day medicine. It is better bioethics, 
which is an interdisciplinary field, based on dialogue that facilitates the ethical debate on 
biomedical issues.” Similar to its origins in the USA, bioethics in Colombia has been closely 
linked to religious groups and debates. Yet, for some bioethicists religion is influencing 
bioethics too much. In HVG‟s view, a philosopher and bioethicist, “in Colombia bioethics 
was born surrounded by soutanes”, and for ETJ, a physician and bioethicist, “the influence of 
religion has led bioethics to be sometimes „biomoral‟.” In this regard, I would say that a 
major problem is extremist and dogmatic positions in bioethics. For instance, in the debates 
about abortion, euthanasia, same-sex marriages and reproductive medicine, to name but a 
few, people with religious commitments in powerful positions have used their power to 
constraint, threaten, and manipulate in order to impose their own view of the world. But, as 
HVG pointed out, bioethics in Colombia must avoid “the dogmatism and moralism that 
characterise some bioethicists, particularly those linked to the Opus Dei… Dogmatic 
positions represent a perversion of bioethics”. For him, bioethics should promote a public 
debate around ethico-political issues related to biomedicine and the protection of life. 
For the lawyer BPA, Colombian bioethics has remained as “a kind of sophisticated 
knowledge, an intellectual exercise, which is neither an important part of medical education 
nor does it take into account particular and contextual situations.” In contrast, HVG argued 
that “bioethics has meant a way to criticize the Roman Catholic Church‟s power regarding 
the regulation of medical issues as well as to demystify medical ethics as a field of 
knowledge only available for experts.” For UTC, a medical anthropologist, “the special 
interest of the Colombian Roman Catholic Church in bioethics is not casual; it is 
comprehensible, since bioethics is about issues related to Catholic dogmas.” UTC stressed 
that unlike public universities in Colombia, private Catholic universities, such as Javeriana 
and La Sabana, have shown great interest in bioethics. The perception that bioethics is 
something related to religion has prevented bioethics developing at public universities as an 
independent and relevant field because of their secularist tradition.   
Bioethics has also been taken up in Colombia as a way to „humanise‟ medical practice as 
well as to improve doctors‟ behaviour. For example, for LBG, a physician and medical 
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educator, “bioethics should help to, first, re-define the new relationships between users and 
providers in healthcare; second, help medical practice to be based on lex artis;
186
 and third, 
update the Code of Medical Ethics of 1981 to take into account the necessities of the new 
times.” For other medical teachers, such as VRR, “bioethics is not about teaching or 
increasing the number of ethics or bioethics modules in the faculty of medicine, but about 
making visible the power relations in which doctors are nowadays embedded.” Moreover, for 
him, although bioethics is a „heterogeneous‟ field, the dominant bioethical discourse in 
Colombia “misses the link between the ethics of a medical decision and the economic 
determinations of it.” Furthermore, he added, differences on how bioethics is taught reflect 
the personal views of those who are in charge. ETJ stressed that a „secular‟ approach to 
bioethics was necessary, particularly in postgraduate bioethics programs. For GCA, another 
medical teacher, medical students should be taught fundamentally on how to recognise, 
disclose and deal with conflicts of interest, while for LEA, as for many bioethicists holding a 
religious, particularly Roman Catholic, perspective, “bioethics should be anthropologically 
grounded, appealing to human dignity as the fundamental principle to make decisions.” In 
contrast, physicians without formal bioethical training tend to be more pragmatic regarding 
medical education. LCM, for instance, argues that “regardless the definition of bioethics, the 
crucial point is the protection of people and the guarantee of their rights.”  
By and large many doctors in the clinical setting, if asked about bioethics, would agree 
that medical ethics and bioethics are an important part of medical education and practice 
today. However, in reality, clinicians are satisfied with only a basic knowledge on these 
matters or, more frequently, are not really interested in them. Some circumstances, in my 
view, contribute to seeing medical ethics and bioethics as useless for doctors‟ daily practice. 
First, the structure of the healthcare system that imposes its own „way of practising‟ and does 
not give doctors much room to make political, ethical, legal or economic reflections about 
what they do. Second, the abstract and „overgeneralising‟ way in which bioethicists often 
address biomedical issues, reinforcing the notion that medical ethics and bioethics are 
„disconnected‟ or „inaccurate‟ discourses in relation to doctors‟ real life. And third, the 
juridification of medicine, i.e. the reduction of doctor/patient and medicine/society 
relationships to merely legal contracts, making medical ethics and bioethics appear as useless 
in practical terms. As a result, although clinicians are keen to back ethical regulations, in 
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 The law of the skill. Colombian physicians frequently use this Latin expression to refer to generally accepted 
standards in medical practice. See chapter six.  
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reality they are most concerned with demonstrating that they have been bound to the law 
rather than committed to important values and/or principles. Of course, this poses the 
question of what “good doctoring” is, which I will address in chapter six. It is worth noting 
that keeping oneself bound to the law does not necessarily guarantee good doctoring. 
Sometimes the irony is that good doctoring entails acts or decisions which might actually 
break the law. 
Finally, according to LMR, a physician and bioethicist working in a governmental office, 
the Intersectoral Commission of Bioethics had a poor performance. First of all, it lacked 
adequate funding and, secondly, it was a politicised body in which some issues would be 
discussed while others were considered taboo. For instance, this commission did not really 
participate in important national debates such as the decriminalisation of abortion in 2006, 
and many issues related to medical practice were never discussed. He mentioned that one of 
its members once suggested discussing the official policy on illegal drugs, which Colombia 
has kept unmodified over years, particularly in relation to the deleterious environmental side 
effects of spraying glyphosate to control coca and poppy, a policy that has been backed by 
the USA. This proposal was, according to LMR, immediately rejected by the Ministry of 
Social Protection on the grounds that such an issue was beyond any discussion. For LMR, 
this episode illustrated the weakness of this commission and the „Realpolitik‟ behind many 
bioethical discussions that it made.  
7. Conclusion 
As for Latin America as a whole, not much has been published on the history of bioethics 
in Colombia. Most of the existing historical accounts are personal accounts of people who are 
still active scholars or professionals and are considered „pioneers‟ by the Colombian bioethics 
community. As any history, this history is also made up of images, tales, subjects and places 
that have become „emblematic‟, entailing a particular point of view, a rationality that 
provides a meaningful sense of what happened and why we are where we are. The history 
that Colombian bioethicists tell about themselves and about the development of their own 
field provides a rationale that legitimises the current state of Colombian bioethics. Bioethics 
in Colombia was established and is still managed by powerful medical organisations, private 
universities and „pioneers‟. The Roman Catholic Church and conservative groups exert great 
influence on how bioethics is actually understood and practised. Given that bioethics was 
conceptualised in Colombia as a pluralist, secular, interdisciplinary, and „in formation‟ field, 
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it seems that for Colombian bioethicists there is virtually nothing without a „bioethical side‟. 
In this way, Colombian bioethicists, particularly those who belong to the „bioethical 
establishment‟, have been able to claim their authority about almost any contentious issue. 
The eagerness of Colombian bioethicists to seek the „bioethical side‟ of anything has led to 
what I have called the „bioethicism‟ of Colombian bioethics. Bioethics in Colombia is then a 
totalising discourse, which is available to most of the public, but which is produced, 
managed, and controlled, by a minority (the bioethical establishment). 
According to the historical literature, which has been produced by the Colombian 
bioethics establishment to explain the birth of their own field, bioethics was already 
„prefigured‟ in the academic activities carried out by certain people at the end of the 1970s, 
later on known as „the pioneers‟, who organised in that time seminars in university hospitals 
and/or published articles on the transformation of death/dying and the impact of 
biotechnological progress in medicine. These „pioneers‟ were renowned medical lecturers 
and Catholic priests linked to elite medical associations and private universities. In the 1980s 
the new discourse of bioethics appeared in the medical scenario in Colombia. While global 
media coverage of biotechnological advances increased, and the clinical setting had allegedly 
become inhumane, impersonal, technology-centred, and socialised, some medical lecturers 
and Catholic priests introduced the idea that a new ethical approach to medical practice was 
necessary. In the 1990s, this new discipline made its breakthrough, and a wave of intense 
academic and social activities related to bioethics spread across the country. This 
breakthrough coincided with the implementation of a new political constitution and a radical 
healthcare reform, which took place also in the 1990s. I will expand on this „historical 
coincidence‟ in chapter five. By the 2000s there were university postgraduate programmes 
and courses, institutes, associations and journals devoted to the new field, and bioethicists 
were already a recognisable new type of expert. 
At the beginning, American bioethics brought bioethics to Colombia. This meant a focus 
on principlism, an emphasis on autonomy, an analytical philosophical approach to ethical 
discussions in medical practice, and technology-driven ethical discussions. However, scholars 
who introduced bioethics to Colombia very soon transformed bioethics into a „holo-ethics‟, a 
word used by some Colombian bioethicists, meaning an ethics with a dominion over virtually 
any issue or discussion, with „power‟ to intervene in any field or debate. Bioethics then 
became an „ethics of life‟, a „salvific‟ discourse, or in Foucauldian terms, a „pastoral 
discourse‟. V. R. Potter‟s totalising understanding of bioethics has been a fertile soil for such 
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a view. There are two main consequences of taking bioethics as a pastoral, totalising 
discourse. First, a lack of definition of the field, which has contributed to the theoretical 
weakness of Colombian bioethics and, at the same time, has facilitated the ideological uses of 
it. In short, the scope and aims of bioethics seem to have no limits in Colombia and then 
anything can be said in the name of bioethics. Second, bioethics has become a field in which 
social hopes and fears of different kinds have been reconceptualised in terms of life-related 
issues. Thus, problems such as poverty, violence, inequalities, exploitation and corruption, 
which have been widespread in the country, have been reconfigured by bioethicists in terms 
of violations of human dignity, limitations to personal autonomy and disrespect for life on 
earth. As a result, such conditions are striped of their particular socio-political and economic 
roots. Instead, they are seen as abstract and universal problems to be solved in the individual 
sphere by the „interiorisation‟ of right attitudes and behaviour, e.g. love for nature, 
recognition of human dignity, respect for personal autonom, and protection of life in general.   
My interviews revealed coincidences as well as discrepancies with the historical literature 
about bioethics in Colombia. Some interviewees recalled that at the end of the 1970s, medical 
bioethics emerged in the aftermath of public debates about death/dying, biomedical advances 
and issues related to DPR, which were no longer considered issues to be discussed 
exclusively by doctors. The influence of elite medical associations and the Roman Catholic 
Church in the development of the field is obvious, and conflicting views about the nature and 
scope of bioethics remain until today. While some bioethicists argue for bioethics as a „new 
discipline‟ and an ethics of everything (holo-ethics), others have tried to find a narrower 
definition of bioethics. Those with a philosophical background have tended to see bioethics 
as applied ethics or practical philosophy. For those with a medical background, bioethics 
represented a way to „humanise‟ the biomedical field, to promote a medical practice based on 
the lex artis, and a way to update the discourse of medical ethics. However, some 
interviewees mentioned that bioethics should be more critical about the power relations and 
economic constraints that determine medical practice in Colombia today, and that bioethics 
should avoid becoming an abstract and discourse disconnected from the Colombian reality.      
 
Finally, it is important to underline that, from a Foucauldian point of view, the 
institutionalisation of bioethics in Colombia owes much to the fact that the so-called 
„pioneers‟ were powerful and influential people, mainly related to the medical establishment 
and the Catholic Church, who were able to introduce the new field at different levels: private 
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universities, mass media and medical associations. Also, it should be noted that the 
flourishing of bioethics in the 1990s coincided with the implementation of a new political 
constitution and a radical healthcare reform. This „coincidence‟ will be analysed in the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter five 
The wave of neoliberal reforms in the 1990s and the transformation of the medical ethos 
in Colombia 
1. Introduction 
In the preceding two chapters I summarised the main accounts that bioethicists have 
offered to explain the history of bioethics in Latin America and Colombia, outlined the 
discourses, rationalities and debates that constitute the field, and analysed the contribution of 
particular people as well as different organisations to the successful institutionalisation of 
bioethics in the region. I also examined how power relations and the interaction between 
power and knowledge can help to understand the myths of origin, the importance of pioneers 
and the conflicting views on bioethics co-existing in this part of the globe. By using a 
Foucauldian lens, I made a case for a view in which bioethics is seen as a kind of pastoral 
discourse and also a dispositif. In the particular case of Colombia I argued that the bioethical 
establishment has promoted an understanding of bioethics as an all-embracing field that has 
led to the bioethicism that characterises the Colombian bioethics, i.e., the tendency to see 
bioethical problems everywhere. Having done this, I want now to examine two 
circumstances: first, what the coincidence between the flourishing of bioethics in Colombia 
and a wave of neoliberal reforms happening in the country in the 1990s and, second, in what 
way the transformation of the milieu, and in particular of the medical ethos, has made the 
biomedical scenario governable, i.e. how bioethics can be seen as part of contemporary 
governmentality in the biomedical field. In short, I intend to show how the biomedical 
scenario is being governed nowadays in Colombia and how bioethics is part of it.   
This chapter is structured as follows: I will first review the political evolution of Colombia 
in order to better understand the importance and significance of the constitutional change that 
occurred in 1991. Then I will describe the healthcare reform of 1993. A description of the 
antecedents in terms of „conditions of possibility‟, content, rationalities and impact of this 
reform is provided. After that, I will discuss to what extent the rationalities of bioethics and 
those of the healthcare reform overlap. In so doing, I will argue, from a Foucauldian point of 
view, that the emphasis that both bioethics and the healthcare reform have made on personal 
autonomy, far from being an expression of emancipation, can be seen as part of a new 
strategy to govern the biomedical scenario. At the end of the chapter I will add information 
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from the interviews I carried out as part of my doctoral research, seeking to complement 
and/or contrast what was said previously.      
2. The way towards the Constitution of 1991 
Although the historical process through which Colombia has come to be what it is has 
been long and complex, it is necessary here to consider some elements to better understand 
the current socio-political, legal, cultural and economic conditions in which a conflictive but 
productive relationship between the medical profession, healthcare services, and 
bioethical/ethical discourses has been evolving since the early 1990s. The history of modern 
Colombia can be traced back to the early nineteenth century when many Latin American 
countries were born as a result of the wars of independence. In 1823 the former Viceroyalty 
of New Granada seceded from Spain. These territories included current Colombia, 
Venezuela, Ecuador, and Panamá, which together became the Republic of La Gran Colombia. 
Following internal political and military struggles, Venezuela and Ecuador seceded in 1830, 
and Panamá in 1903.
187
 The war of independence was basically a bourgeois revolt against 
Spanish rule, taking the advantage of the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and, moreover, the 
realisation of the dream of Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité that inspired this war did not come 
automatically. In fact, following the war of independence the country entered a long period of 
chaos for almost the whole of the nineteenth century. For some authors, independence was 
just a „name changing‟ while an oppressive regime continued in the former Spanish colonies. 
As L. Eslava has argued, “[…] the historical revolutionary process in Colombia came to be 
seen as transference of power from a foreign monarchic elite to the local Creole elite” 
(Eslava, 2009, p. 193).   
    
Throughout the nineteenth century Colombia had a variety of political constitutions and 
experienced several civil wars. Some of these constitutions included revolutionary ideas 
ahead of their time, such as the recognition of citizen‟s rights for indigenous people in 1812 
or universal suffrage in 1853, earlier than in many European countries (Posada, 2011). In 
1863, the radical liberal government in office introduced a new constitution that turned 
Colombia into a federal state, The United States of Colombia. However, when the 
conservatives were victorious in another civil war in 1886 they gave Colombia yet another 
constitution to counterbalance the previous influence of radical liberalism. With the 
                                                             
187 This time instigated by the US government that wanted to control the planned Panama Canal. 
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constitution of 1886 the now re-named Republic of Colombia became a paternalistic, 
protectionist and centralised state with a strong presidential system. The country adopted a 
clear confessional identity when Roman Catholicism was recognised as the official religion. 
This constitution was so anti-liberal that some have argued it prevented Colombia taking part 
in the first wave of globalisation (Mejía, ND, p. 5). Yet two constitutional reforms (carried 
out by Liberal governments in 1910 and 1936) softened this authoritarianism and made the 
constitution more inclusive, something that according to R. Uprimny (2011) allowed the 
constitution of 1886 to have a long life.   
 
In 1948, when the liberal leader Jorge E. Gaitán was assassinated, the country went into a 
period known as „La Violencia‟ [The Violence], which has had strong and lasting effects on 
Colombian society until the present day. The origins of Colombia‟s current guerrillas can be 
traced to this period, when many liberals had to flee to the countryside to escape the 
persecution of the conservatives. The only period in which Colombia was under a military 
dictatorship in the twentieth century was 1953-1957, and when it finished, the ruling classes 
made an agreement to share power during the following years. Thus, until the early 1980s, 
conservatives and liberals would each have their opportunity to be in office.
188
 But violence 
never ceased. In the last 50 years, Colombia has experienced an irregular and complex armed 
conflict. Moreover, in the last 30 years it has developed a global reputation for drug 
production and trafficking. Hence, apart from suffering internal violence in different forms 
(armed conflict, state repression, inequalities, corruption and so on), additionally Colombians 
had to tolerate the international stigma of being considered drug-traffickers. Nonetheless, 
Colombia is the oldest democracy in Latin America, and its economy is one of the most 
stable of the region. Violence, however, is so pervasive in Colombia that some consider it an 
„epidemic‟ (Franco, 1997; Quevedo, Hernández & Miranda, 1993, p. 233) in which different 
factors converged: leftist guerrillas, ultra-right paramilitaries, drug-dealers, criminal gangs 
and even state military forces. Yet, as L. Eslava (2009) has argued, “[c]ynically, Colombia is 
still considered a model of democratic stability and economic growth in Latin America, [a 
situation that some have called] the Colombian paradox […] the country‟s resilient capacity 
to remain in a painful state of stability” (pp. 192, 195f).  This irrational, paradoxical, painful 
and endless way of living of Colombians was masterly depicted by the Colombian Nobel 
laureate writer G. García Márquez in his celebrated novel One Hundred Years of Solitude.  
                                                             
188 This period was called El Frente Nacional [The National Front].  
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At the end of the 1980s the country seemed to have reached the absolute low point. Four 
presidential candidates were killed, many people massacred or displaced, bombs rattled the 
cities and corruption was endemic in the country. It was the time of Pablo Escobar Gaviria, 
the infamous and most powerful drug baron. Against this backdrop, a political student 
movement, embodying a wide societal desire for change, succeeded in promoting a process 
that led to the creation of a National Constituent Assembly in 1991 (Dugas, 2001; Murillo & 
Gómez, 2005, p. 2f). Thus, the new constitution of 1991 was enacted, marking the most 
fundamental break in the more recent history of Colombia (Uprimny, 2011). The intention 
behind this constitution was to pull the country out of a profound institutional and ethico-
political crisis that had been manifest since the late 1980s (Cardona, J., 2011).  
 
Under the new constitution Colombia defined itself as a “social rule-of-law state189 [which 
is] democratic, participatory and pluralistic, founded on respect for human dignity, work, and 
solidarity between all citizens […]”(PC, 1991) Also, a “truly effective system for the 
protection and promotion of a new, generous bill of rights” was introduced, following the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Articles 11 to 95 (Cepeda, 2004, p. 575f). The 1991 
Constitution also introduced the acción de tutela [tutelage action or demand of custody], 
popularly known as tutela, “a writ of protection of fundamental rights [that] enables any 
person whose fundamental rights are being threatened or violated to request that a judge with 
territorial jurisdiction protect that person‟s fundamental rights” (Cepeda, 2004, p. 552). This 
innovative legal tool has given Colombians the possibility of demanding from the state that 
their fundamental rights are guaranteed and protected. As L. Eslava has argued, without 
tutela the status quo in Colombia would have remained untouched (Eslava, 2009, p. 209). 
Moreover, the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the Colombian legal system, was 
designated the ultimate “guardian of the constitution”.190 
 
Twenty years after the impact is still a matter of debate. By and large, Colombian citizens 
think positively of the Political Constitution of 1991 (hereafter PC of 1991), particularly 
because it guarantees fundamental human rights, promotes the idea of a secular society based 
on pluralism and human dignity, and gives citizens legal security before the state (Cajiao, 
                                                             
189 The idea of adding „social‟ to the concept of „rule of law‟ was inspired by the 1948‟s German as well as 
1978‟s Spanish constitutions (Eslava, 2009, p. 185).   
190
 Under the Constitution of 1886, the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice carried out this 
function. 
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2011; R. p. El Tiempo, 2011a, 2011b). However, the PC of 1991 did not mean the end of 
problems for Colombian society. According to the renowned constitutionalist R. Uprimny 
(2006), “[t]he constitution of 1991 came into being amid the crisis of 1989-1991, but it did 
not solve it. The war has not finished, corruption is pervasive, and the political establishment 
continues as if nothing had happened. On the contrary, even positive aspects of the Charter 
have been reversed” (p. 81). Although it was introduced only fairly recently, the original text 
of the PC of 1991 has already been modified 34 times (El Tiempo, 2011b). Some have argued 
that the PC of 1991 was too idealistic that it was “best suited for Switzerland”, while others 
repeated what Victor Hugo said of the Colombian constitution of 1863: “it is a constitution fit 
for angels” (Cepeda, 2004, pp. 532, footnote 1). Yet the more ferocious criticism of the PC of 
1991 and the laws which derived from it, for instance, the healthcare reform of 1993, has 
been against its supposedly „neoliberal inspiration‟ (Cruz, 2010, p. 274; Vega, 1999).  
 
3. The neoliberal inspiration of the constitution of 1991 
 
At the end of the 1980s important changes were happening in the world like the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the end of the Soviet Union when the polarization of the Cold War began to 
fade. Concomitantly, neoliberalism had been on the rise since the late 1970s and finally came 
to dominate globally as the new economic paradigm. According to D. Harvey (2005), 
neoliberalism is  
a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can 
best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an 
institutional framework characterised by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework 
appropriate to such practices. (p. 2)  
 
By the late 1980s, neoliberal ideas and rationality had already spread across Latin 
America. The Reagan/Thatcher era had prompted the rise of neoliberal thought which 
entailed four main aspects: economic individualism, elimination of legal obstacles to flexible 
labour markets, restructuring of the service sector according to market criteria and the 
promotion of national as well as international competition. The neoliberal approach also 
criticised the welfare state by relating it to bureaucracy, trade unionism, patronage, state 
corruption and inefficiency (Estrada, J., 2004, pp. 25-30).    
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At the turn of the 1980s, the economic crisis was getting worse and external debt was 
dangerously growing in Latin America, when “all the Latin American countries became 
involved in the programs of stabilisation and structural adjustment prescribed by the 
International Monetary Fund” (Ahumada, 1998; Vega, 1999, p. 62). By the beginning of the 
1990s, the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2004) was launched.
191
 This has been seen as 
an economic agenda imposed by powerful institutions like the World Bank (WB) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) on developing countries and promoted by the USA 
(Cruz, 2010, p. 7). The aim of the Washington Consensus in Latin America was to protect 
private property and to promote trade liberation, privatization and deregulation. These 
policies imposed from the outside became legitimate state policies through the ratification of 
treatises and the introduction of new laws (Estrada, J., 2004, pp. 31, 50). In the new 
neoliberal logic, everything had to be commodified, including health. Interestingly, 
international investors widened their scope to embrace „social‟ issues. The World Bank, for 
instance, initiated a series of reports in areas like education, health and environment as a 
strategy of this institution to take on a „human face‟ (Estrada, J., 2004, p. 51).  
 
Then, it seems that the PC of 1991 embodied two antagonistic models of statehood as it set 
the foundations for a social rule-of-law state and also the juridical basis for a neoliberal state 
(Alvarez, J.R., 2007, p. 126; Cruz, 2010, p. 12; Murillo & Gómez, 2005, p. 1). This situation 
has been at the bottom of the permanent tension between „social responsibility‟ and 
„economic growth‟ during these twenty years (Murillo & Gómez, 2005, p. 15). It has also led 
to a polarization of the debate around the constitution of 1991 since it seems that one can be 
either state-centred or market-oriented regarding the conception of the state (Álvarez, 2007, 
p. 132). It seems, however, that during the last twenty years the Colombian government has 
gone for the market-oriented, neoliberal model (Arango, R., 2011). This dichotomy, even 
schizoid situation, is reflected in the transformation of healthcare after Law 100.  
 
4. Law 100 of 1993, the „neoliberal‟ healthcare reform 
 
The wave of neoliberal healthcare reforms that spread across Latin America in the late 
1980s started in Chile and was soon followed by Colombia, Argentina and Brazil. In the case 
of Colombia, where neoliberal ideas and international financial institutions‟ policies were 
                                                             
191 See also: http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html, accessed 1 April 2010. 
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adopted most closely, the reforms took place in the 1990s (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005, p. 84). 
Between 1986 and 1994 Colombian governments introduced neoliberal policies in healthcare 
that “resulted in the emergence of a new way of governing Colombian health care services 
and the population‟s health, [thus governmental intervention was based on] different domains 
of knowledge and technologies of power such as public health, public administration, 
hygiene, health economics, and social security, among others” (Vega, 1999, pp. 35f, 54f). 
Law 10 of 1990 was a first big step towards deregulation at different levels. This law aimed 
“to diminish the cost of health care by promoting a cheap primary medical care for the poor, 
by enhancing community participation and self-care, and by increasing efficiency in the 
performance of the system” (Vega, 1999, p. 40). Article 1 of this law declared the Colombian 
healthcare system as a public service, “that is to say, a set of institutions regulated by the 
central state but not necessarily under its direct administration and ownership” (Vega, 1999, 
p. 41) which paved the way towards a stronger market orientation in healthcare. 
 
In the period from 1992 to 1998, during the third liberal government in office in a row, 
deregulation was aimed at facilitating the creation of „new markets‟ (Estrada, J., 2004, p. 85). 
During the 1990s one policy was “to create conditions for making private profit. In the future, 
the modernising ideals of progress, efficiency, and equity would take the form of state-
regulated market relationships, private initiative, and individual choice” (Vega, 1999, p. 62). 
There were important legal-political reforms during this time inspired by a neoliberal 
rationality, e.g. Law 50 of 1990, which introduced labour flexibilisation; Law 30 of 1992, 
which deregulated the education system; Law 142 of 1994, which introduced market rules in 
the provision of public services; and Law 226 of 1995, which allowed the privatisation of 
state assets. 
 
The arrival of a new generation of technocrats, managers, consultants, advisers and experts 
of all kinds boosted neoliberal ideas in Colombia. Most of them came from the social elites, 
had studied in leading American universities and shared with international financial 
organisations similar cultural and economic interests (Estrada, J., 2004, p. 51; Vega, 1999, p. 
63). Some authors have argued that the neoliberal wave of reforms in Latin America “was not 
based on people‟s needs, but strongly inflamed by the needs of foreign – especially North 
American – corporations” (De Vos, et al., 2006, p. 1604). Latin America was indeed a 
promising market, but it was necessary to create adequate political and legal conditions in 
order to implement the neoliberal project without causing trauma. During the economic crisis 
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of the 1980s, the IMF and the WB “took advantage […] and pressed for health reforms as a 
condition for borrowing.” Thus, a market-oriented model for healthcare was promoted as the 
right thing to do in Latin America, with the participation of USAIDS,
192
 IADB,
193
 and even 
PAHO (Bertranou, 1999, p. 1; De Vos, et al., 2006, p. 1604; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005, p. 
83).  
 
In 1993, the year when Law 100 was implemented, the World Development Report of the 
WB stated the “need to improve equity and allocative efficiency through guaranteeing 
universal access to a basic package of services” (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005, p. 84). In 
Colombia, the PC of 1991 established “the principles and the rules for the operation of a 
minimum state, and defined the conditions for the wide operation of private market relations” 
(Vega, 1999, p. 43), then providing the foundations for a new social order based on the 
market. The implementation of different measures to reduce public spending as well as to 
reduce poverty was the strategy of the WB and the IMF to introduce this ideology in Latin 
America. According to the new policies, state involvement in healthcare should be limited to 
the provision of essential clinical, public health services and the correction of the 
“deficiencies of the market”. These deficiencies were “[…] problems of adverse selection, 
moral risk, and others such as externalities and imperfect competence between providers of 
health services” (Vega, 1999, p. 55). Then, the WB‟s recommendation was to implement 
universal insurance in a context of regulated competence, i.e., healthcare services would be 
ruled by a market rationality while the state would guarantee the correct functioning of the 
system (Rodríguez-Monguió & Infante, 2004, p. 137f). In short, Law 100 was a turning point 
from “a unified, integrated, and regulated system [to] a regulated market based on the 
separation of functions” (Rodríguez-Monguió & Infante Campos, 2004, p. 131), a separation 
between the purchaser and the provider, between financing and provision in the name of 
efficiency (De Vos, et al., 2006, p. 1605). As Juan Luis Londoño, the Colombian mastermind 
of the healthcare reform, who would later become Minister of Health, put it: Law 100 sought 
to implement a “structured pluralism and managed performance” in healthcare (Londoño & 
Frenk, 1997, p. 17; Rodríguez-Monguió & Infante, 2004, p. 132), which in practical terms 
entailed a process of deregulation, decentralisation and privatisation of healthcare (Homedes 
& Ugalde, 2005, p. 84).  
 
                                                             
192
 United States Agency for International Development. 
193 Inter-American Development Bank. 
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Based on Law 100 international financial organisations demanded from the government to 
cut spending for public services and to act only as regulator but no longer as provider 
(Homedes & Ugalde, 2005, p. 83f). In the name of democracy and community participation, 
with the decentralisation technical responsibility and financial resources returned to 
municipalities (Kalk, 03, p67). However, this meant that an increasing financial burden of 
public services was transferred from the central government to the provinces. Yet, “[t]he 
policy of decentralization was wrapped under the hard-to-oppose principle of transferring 
power from unconcerned and inefficient central bureaucrats to the people” (Homedes & 
Ugalde, 2005, p. 84). In 1995 the PAHO, the WB, and the IADB “agreed on concrete 
strategies for health sector reform in the continent” (De Vos, et al., 2006, p. 1604) and PAHO 
became one of the main supporters of the Colombian reform (Coronell, 2011). For many 
critics of the reform it was ironic that in 2000 the WHO ranked the Colombian healthcare 
system first in the world despite of its tremendous deficiencies. It was clear that there was an 
ideological overlap between the ideologues of the reform and the staff of international 
organisations such as WHO/PAHO (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005, p. 89).  
 
In the National Assembly that was responsible for the new political constitution of 1991, a 
Transitory Commission discussed issues related to social security and health. However, its 
recommendation to include in the constitutional text issues like the creation of a national 
healthcare service similar to the NHS in the UK, and a national policy on prescription drugs 
were never considered properly (de Currea-Lugo, 2003, p. 91). In the end, only two articles 
about health were included: Article 48, which stated the right to health, although not a 
fundamental right,
194
 and Article 49, which decentralised health services (PC, 1991), leaving 
the organisation of a healthcare system in the hands of the Congress. Unfortunately, the 
Colombian Congress is a place full of hidden agendas, where many interests are at stake and 
powerful lobbyist groups influence the decision making process. The bill 34 of 1992 
illustrates how much the neoliberal rationality had penetrated the legislative by then. 
According to this bill, the state would only have a regulatory and normative role in the 
economy and therefore private companies should be allowed to participate in any area. 
Concomitantly, non-profitable areas considered of „social importance‟ would remain in the 
state‟s hands (Estrada, J., 2004, p. 98). In the end, Law 100 of 1993, the most radical 
healthcare reform ever carried out in Colombia was adopted, creating the General System of 
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 „Health‟ was understood as part of „social security‟, which was defined by the Constitutional Court‟s 
Decision T-116 of 1993.  
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Health and Social Security,
195
 hereafter GSHSS, a mixed private/public system in contrast to 
a tax-financed systems like in Portugal or the UK and social insurance systems like in France 
and Spain.  
  
5. The new healthcare structure 
 
The text of Law 100 begins by setting out its ethical foundations embodied in six 
principles: proficiency, quality, effectiveness, universality, social solidarity and participation 
(Jaramillo, I, 1999). Moreover, Law 100 states that, first, healthcare is a public service 
administered by the state; second, the private sector can participate in the GSHSS; third, local 
governmental bodies should play an active role in the organisation and funding of healthcare 
services; and fourth, the affiliation to the GSHSS is compulsory for everyone in Colombia. In 
the new GSHSS new actors, institutions, and concepts were created, which include:
196
 
 
1. National Council of Social Security for Health197, which is responsible for 
standardizing, regulating, controlling and directing the system together with the 
Ministry of Health and local authorities. 
2. Compulsory Plan of Health198, which is the basic health package including 
procedures, treatments and prescription drugs that health insurance companies should 
provide to their affiliates.  
3. Health Insurance Companies, which can be either Health-Promoting 
Entities
199
 or Subsidised Health-Promoting Entities
200
. These two kinds of entities 
should guarantee, through Health Service Providers
201
, the delivery of the 
Compulsory Plan of Health to their affiliates. In turn, Subsidised Health-Promoting 
Entities are responsible for the delivery of services included in a different package, 
                                                             
195 Spanish: Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud. This includes health, pensions, and labour risk 
management. As pension funds were created, not only health, but the whole field of social security was 
commodified (Estrada, J., 2004, p. 97). 
196 For a complete description of the GSHSS and how it works, see: Arroyave, I. D. (2009). La organización de 
la salud en Colombia [The healthcare structure in Colombia]. Medellín: Hospital Universitario San Vicente de 
Paúl. Also see: United Nations Development Program. Colombia. Available at 
http://tcdc2.undp.org/GSSDAcademy/SIE/Docs/Vol18/SIE_v18_ch9.pdf, accessed 1 June 2012.   
197 Consejo Nacional de Seguridad Social en Salud. 
198 Plan Obligatorio de Salud. 
199 Empresas Promotoras de Salud. 
200
 Administradoras del Régimen Subsidiado. 
201 Instituciones Prestadoras de Servicios, which include hospitals, clinics, laboratories, and the like.  
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the Subsidised Compulsory Plan of Health, a smaller version of the Compulsory Plan 
of Health for the poor (Rodríguez-Monguió & Infante, 2004, p. 131). 
4. Solidarity and Guarantee Fund,202 which guarantees the financing the system. 
Employees and the self-employed are required to support the system with 
contributions, while the poor and the unemployed are subsidised. This Fund delegates 
in the Health-Promoting Entities the collection of the compulsory premiums of their 
members. Of the total collected, the Health-Promoting Entities reduce the value of the 
Capitation Payment Unit
203
 and transfer the difference to the Fund (Article 220, 
Law 100/93). It is important to stress that when difference is negative the Fund should 
compensate the Health-Promoting Entities for the difference (Rodríguez-Monguió & 
Infante, 2004, p. 132).  
 
The new healthcare system led to the creation of a sophisticated bureaucratic structure 
grounded on a discourse about justice in healthcare in which private health insurance 
companies would have an important participation. However, as early as the mid-1990s, the 
first signs of failures, problems and inconveniences related to the system came up, a situation 
that has increasingly worsened since. To paraphrase the celebrated Colombian writer and 
Nobel Prize winner G. García Márquez‟s book, this was a „chronicle of a crisis foretold‟204 
 
6. Chronicle of a crisis foretold 
 
Under the new healthcare system, the number of public complaints about the poor service 
delivered by healthcare companies grew exponentially. The Colombian mass media coined 
the term “the way of death” to metaphorically describe the „bumpy road‟ that patients in 
Colombia sadly must walk in searching of adequate medical attention. Many of them die on 
the way. There is a huge gap between the rhetoric of the reform and reality since, 
paradoxically, the healthcare system has become an „obstacle race‟ for Colombian citizens 
because of the “bureaucratic itineraries” that characterise it:  
 
the Colombian health care system has created new kinds of itineraries in 
which health care does not depend on people‟s needs or medical 
                                                             
202 Fondo de Solidaridad y Garantía. 
203 The value of Capitation Payment Unit is defined by the National Council of Social Security for Health.  
204
 In his famous novel Chronicle of a Death Foretold (1982) G. García Márquez told us a tragedy: the death of 
an innocent and how the people of his community could have stopped it.  
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assessment, but on meeting successfully the system‟s administrative 
norms and financial costs (new access and quality barriers). When it is 
impossible to receive the necessary care, access depends on knowing and 
performing legal processes, the results of which are based not only on the 
judges‟ interpretations, but also on the institutions‟ compliance with the 
ruling. These itineraries have a profound effect on the person‟s health, 
quality of life, and even life expectancy. (Abadia & Oviedo, 2009, p. 
1156) 
 
As early as 1997 the GSHSS was already in crisis, in 2001 some financial and 
administrative adjustments were necessary and, in fact, every year there were some news 
about the looming crisis in the sector. In 2008 the Constitutional Court ruled that the system 
required through the Case Decision T-760/08 a profound transformation in order to offer 
good healthcare service (González, L. E., 2011). However, little has changed (Huertas, 1998). 
What Rodríguez-Monguió and Infante argued in 2004 still adequately describes the current 
situation: “although total expenditure and public spending in health have increased, Colombia 
is still far from achieving the universal coverage and equitable provision of compulsory 
health plans foreseen by Law 100.” Not to mention that the public health deficit is growing, 
people have neither real access nor good medical service and healthcare professionals have 
been downgraded (Homedes & Ugalde, 2005, p. 91; Waitzkin, 2011, p. 73).   
 
At the end of 2009 the government declared a state of social emergency when the GSHSS 
became financially untenable; the deepest and most serious crisis of the healthcare system 
since the reform was implemented through Law 100 in 1993. For some authors linked to the 
government and private health organisations, “[w]hile the reform substantially increased 
health insurance coverage, progress was slower than forecast and entailed a substantial 
increase in expenditure […] Additionally, competition has not resulted in the exit of 
seemingly inefficient public providers” (Gaviria, Medina, Mejía, et al., 2006, p. 29). After 
this crisis, while some private healthcare institutions have entered administration others are 
under criminal and civil investigation for corruption, embezzlement monopolistic acts and so 
on. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the crisis of healthcare embodies the worst 
case of corruption that the Colombian society has seen in the last twenty years.  
 
134 
 
It became clear for the Colombian society what had been all these years an open secret: 
that the alleged improvement in the access and quality of healthcare had been inflated, as 
many of the goals of the reform stayed on paper. Moreover, while the healthcare system 
implemented by the reform of 1993 went to bankruptcy, private healthcare insurance 
companies have showed a permanent and huge economic growth all these years (Coronell, 
2011; Fernández & Perilla, 2011; Robledo, 2011; Semana, 2001). For instance, SaludCoop, a 
Health-Promoting Entity that was set up in 1994, one year after the healthcare reform, was 
able to increase its initial capital 176 times in just 15 years (from $2,500 to $439,391 million 
Colombian pesos), coming to rank eighteenth amongst the biggest companies in the country. 
This Health-Promoting Entity was accused of misusing the money destined to cover 
healthcare costs when its investments in real estates, golf camps, pharmaceutical industries, 
and even the creation of its own buffet of lawyers became public (Coronell, 2010). It became 
even public that ACEMI,
205
 the association of healthcare companies, had promoted a „a pact‟ 
to systematically and subtly deny medical services to which their affiliates were legally 
entitled in order for them to increase their profit (González, L. E., 2011). Despite this, the 
government and private healthcare institutions still backed the system. Why? The answer 
comes easier if the question is rephrased: who are the winners within the current state of 
affairs? As many authors have pointed out, the winners are transnational corporations, 
consultant firms, the WB staff, private investors and even universities (de Currea-Lugo, 2003, 
p. 253; De Vos, et al., 2006, p. 1605; Homedes & Ugalde, 2005, p. 83; Jasso-Aguilar, et al., 
2008, p. 158).  
 
In this environment, ethical discourses about healthcare and medical practice have 
increased. This situation is exemplified by bioethics, a field that gained relevance at the end 
of 1990s, at the moment when the healthcare reform was being fully implemented. The 
question is therefore, how do bioethics, medical practice and the healthcare reform relate to 
each other?   
 
7. Bioethics, medical practice and healthcare 
 
Considering how bioethicists address bioethical issues in Colombia, F. Suárez, a lecturer 
in genetics and bioethics, ironically asked in 2007: “Where is bioethics?” (Suárez, 2007). 
                                                             
205
 Spanish acronym for Asociación Colombiana de Empresas de Medicina Integral [Colombian Association of 
Health Companies]. 
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From the start Colombian bioethicists have discussed the same classical issues as their 
colleagues in the US, i.e. mainly the ethical implications of new biotechnologies. 
Accordingly Colombian bioethical literature mostly discusses informed consent, embryo 
research, genetic engineering, principlism and so on. Some bioethicists who have tried to 
enhance the scope of the field have added issues particularly relevant to Colombia such as 
violence, human rights abuse, armed conflict, illegal drugs and multiculturalism. After a 
critical review of this literature, particularly what it has been published by the most important 
journals in the field in Colombia such as the Colombian Journal of Bioethics
206
 and the Latin 
American Journal of Bioethics,
207
 I would like to make two observations. First, although the 
American principlist model is constantly criticised, it is nevertheless the „lingua franca‟ 
spoken by the vast majority of Colombian bioethicists. The attempts to create alternatives to 
such a model remain generally too theoretical, ideology-laden and bureaucracy-driven. 
Second, the analyses of the Colombian bioethics regarding the transformation of the 
healthcare system and the medical ethos in relation to neoliberal rationalities have largely 
remained limited to truisms. This trend has shown the detachedness from the actual socio-
political, cultural and economic conditions of Colombia that mirror the Colombian bioethical 
establishment.
 
 
 
In 2007, for example, in the panel Violence and Bioethics at the Third International 
Congress of Scientific Research Ethics in Bogotá, I presented a paper where I criticised the 
pseudo-scientific and pseudo-philosophical language used by many bioethicists to address 
ethical issues that have arisen in the biomedical scenario. Such a language has contributed to 
camouflage forms of social injustice and structural problems as „ethical dilemmas‟. In this 
paper I argued that it was necessary to revise the role that the so-called clinical bioethics is 
playing in the current clinical scenario (Díaz Amado, 2007b). Unfortunately, in Colombia 
clinical bioethics is frequently reduced to a set of „technicalities‟ to solve „ethical dilemmas‟ 
and doctors are misled to believe that by dealing with such technicalities they have done their 
duty towards a „good medicine‟. But in this way fundamental reflections, for instance, about 
the nature of their own profession and the new relationships between medicine and society in 
the context of the medical industrial complex and neoliberal rationalities are not possible. In 
other words, in the way the bioethical discourse has taken over the biomedical scenario, the 
possibility of emancipatory and critical discourses has been drastically reduced. 
                                                             
206
 Revista Colombiana de Bioética.  
207 Revista Latinoamericana de Bioética.  
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Another example is the first „designer baby‟ in Colombia in 2006. After a tutela (writ) one 
judge ruled that a healthcare insurance company should provide the assisted reproductive 
technology required to guarantee a couple a healthy embryo as the bone marrow donor to 
their first child who suffered from Fanconi anaemia. Apart from a laconic headline in a 
Colombian newspaper,
208
 this case passed unnoticed by bioethicists. The Colombian 
bioethics establishment remained virtually silent about this. The ethical assessment of 
reproductive technologies,
209
 as it happens with many other issues like genetics, availability 
of prescription drugs and policies on science and technology is discussed in an abstract way 
or with little reference to actual medical practice. Moreover, empirical research in bioethics 
remains largely undeveloped, with only a few exceptions. In contrast, issues highly moralised 
or deeply linked to religious beliefs have traditionally drawn the attention of bioethicists, 
such as abortion or euthanasia. But regarding the healthcare reform and its recent crisis, no 
one in the Colombian bioethics community has yet offered a comprehensive analysis. To 
carry out this analysis I consider two perspectives. On the one hand the question of how 
bioethics has been used by healthcare professionals, particularly by doctors, as a theoretical 
and conceptual tool in their daily practice. On the other hand the question whether bioethics 
has been able to critically examine both the healthcare reform and the simultaneous 
transformation of the medical ethos. The same detachedness of the Colombian bioethical 
establishment from the particular conditions of the country occurs in relation to other issues: 
embryo research, reproductive medicine, medical tourism, commodification of health and 
medical education, healthcare system corruption, bad quality medical attention, doctors 
exploitation, healthcare insurance companies abuses, pharmaceutical companies‟ influence on 
health policies and so on. All of these issues remained largely unanalysed from a bioethical 
perspective and the few analyses that have been carried out by Colombian bioethicists are, to 
a large extent, incomplete, inadequate and full of commonplaces.    
 
In 1999, the Colombian physician and expert in health economics R. A. Castaño published 
Medicine, Ethics and Health Care Reform, a book in which the language of principlism is 
combined with the language of economy in order to „demonstrate‟ that the Colombian 
healthcare reform was „morally‟ necessary. He argued that medical practice had so far been 
                                                             
208 “A Woman Is Undergoing In-vitro Fertilisation Treatment to Save the Life of his Oldest Son.” El Tiempo, 24 
March 2006.  
209
 This is a flourishing industry in Colombia, with several fertility centres, but so far bioethicists have given it 
virtually no attention.  
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guided by the principle of beneficence that advocates patients‟ welfare, but that this principle 
neglects issues of distributive justice. For Castaño, the basic conflicts between the medical 
profession and society nowadays can be reduced to two dilemmas: first,  octors’  eneficence 
v. social justice, and second,  octors’  eneficence v. patients’ autonomy. Then, for him, a 
new „social contract‟ with the medical profession was necessary. In this contract the medical 
profession should embrace new duties, particularly related to justice. Unfortunately, this 
argument has been used to justify the current model of healthcare and in the name of justice 
health insurance companies have implemented practices of intermediation, labour 
flexibilisation and health commodification. The approach of this author illustrates well how 
the principlist model has served to reinforce a truth regime facilitated by the rise of bioethics. 
According to this regime „ethics‟ in healthcare has ended up meaning an abstract conflict 
between principles called „a dilemma‟. This model has become canonical in talking about 
ethics within the medical scenario in Colombia. The Beauchamp and Childress principlist 
method became synonymous with ethical analysis in medicine. As a result, only what can be 
presented in terms of a dilemma is seen as an ethical problem. Then, there is a power effect of 
bioethics that should be recognised. On the one hand, the reduction of ethics in medicine to 
principlist dilemmas to be solved by a bioethics committee or by a bioethicist reveals a truth 
regime determining the morality of contemporary medical practice. On the other hand, with 
the help of bioethics certain contingencies have been transformed in natural and necessary 
scenarios or outcomes, for instance, the current model of healthcare and the current way of 
being a doctor remain taken for granted truths at the same time as bioethicists permanently 
invoke human dignity or individual autonomy in their „analyses‟.   
  
By and large, the aforementioned journals of bioethics have published only a few articles 
that address ethical issues related to the healthcare reform.
210
 These articles show three main 
characteristics. First, they do not analyse in depth the relationship between healthcare system, 
socio-political conditions and the transformation of the Colombian medical ethos. Second, 
what is called in these articles a „bioethical perspective‟ is merely a set of additional 
paragraphs where the four principles are mentioned. In other words, they do not offer any 
                                                             
210 For example in the series Bios & Ethos, published by El Bosque University over almost ten years, between 
1997 and 2007, there are only two articles (in the issue No. 25) that examine the healthcare reform, but from a 
bioethical perspective neither of them is a comprehensive and critical analysis of such a reform nor do they 
address properly the impact of it on medical practice. Thus, while the first article is just a list of common places 
about administrative, political, and economic aspects of the reform summarised (Rodríguez, C. E.,  2006), the 
second one is an attempt to demonstrate that the healthcare reform failed to realise the concept of sanitary 
justice (Galvis, 2006).   
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original, innovative or critical perspective. And, third, when these articles seem to discuss the 
crisis of the Colombian medical ethos, they mainly express „a professional point of view‟, i.e. 
a medical ethics approach but using the language of American principlism. Hence, in 
Colombia it seems that any discourse is „bioethical‟ as long as it cites or appeals to the four 
principles. The approach of the Colombian bioethics establishment to the crisis of the medical 
ethos, in the context of the healthcare reform of 1993, first, has not been consistent with the 
dimensions of this crisis, second, has contributed to leave some structural problems 
unnoticed, and third, has reduced the philosophical reflection on medical practice to a game 
of balancing the four principles. In fact, the grandiloquent discourse of bioethics about 
personal autonomy and free choice fits well in the new neoliberal environment that 
characterises the current socio-political and economic life of the country. In this point, 
however, it is necessary to take into account the counterintuitive aspect of Foucault‟s 
position: freedom is not just a precious good or right that should have guaranteed to every 
human being in a modern liberal and democratic society, but rather a strategy to govern. 
8. Freedom as a strategy to govern 
One question remaining is why a healthcare system like the one in Colombia was accepted 
at all? A possible answer is that these systems offer something that is attractive, fashionable 
and much valued by people: the promise of free choice. Although the affiliation to the 
GSHSS in Colombia is mandatory, i.e. even against their will, individuals are told all the time 
that they have options, i.e. they can choose. This is true, but it only refers to the possibility of 
choosing between one health care insurance company and another. That‟s it. This is 
obviously a very poor concept of what a right to free choice means in healthcare. According 
to R. Vega (1999, p. 45), in Colombia there is a monopoly of healthcare insurance 
companies, although I would say „cartel‟ since there is more than one company involved, 
which have previously agreed on the range of products and prices, according to their own 
interests, even though they talk about „options‟ for customers. Not to mention that in this new 
market-oriented environment, which is deeply linked to the discourse of free choice, the 
individual has ended up being responsible for his/her own health, while the social 
determinants of health such as style of life, public services and labour conditions, to name but 
a few, are usually disregarded (de Currea-Lugo, 2003, p. 56; Huertas, 1998).   
 
De Currea-Lugo, a Colombian physician and expert in health policy and international 
humanitarian law has argued that there are two different levels in the debate about healthcare 
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in Colombia. On the one hand, there is the debate about the „theoretical foundations‟ of the 
right to health, healthcare ethics and medical ethics. This level, he says, admits a 
„philosophical‟ discussion and solution. However, on another level, there is the debate about 
the provision of healthcare services. This level is presented in terms of practical matters to be 
solved administratively (de Currea-Lugo, 2003, p. 48). This view has facilitated the rise of 
new practices like management with a market approach and new technologies to govern 
healthcare, such as ethics committees or clinical guidelines, which not necessarily reflect or 
follow the „theory‟. For example, „health economics‟ is a new academic and professional 
field that has quickly developed in the last few years in Colombia and which is now the way 
to know the „truth‟ about how to spend the money in healthcare. In fact, as de Currea-Lugo 
observes, “when one searches for the word „health‟ in a library, one discovers that it is now 
deeply associated with the word „economy‟” (de Currea-Lugo, 2003, p. 15). Today it is 
undeniable that healthcare has become an important economic activity, the medical-industrial 
complex mentioned above (Relman, 1990).  
Other examples of technologies to govern medical practice include medical audit, clinical 
protocols and bioethics committees. In this sense, it is worth mentioning that the Colombian 
healthcare reform sought to increase the efficiency through, first, a macro-administrative 
process to allocate resources at primary level via administrative decentralisation, and second, 
“a micro-administrative procedure based on the containment of costs and the control of 
performance by using specific managerial techniques” (Vega, 1999, p. 59). However, the 
distinction between „philosophical‟ and „administrative‟ problems of the healthcare reform 
should be read in terms of a power effect. By labelling different issues and discussions as 
„philosophical‟, they are confined to the undifferentiated space of the „theoretical‟ where they 
are seen as abstract, „inoffensive‟ questions that have nothing to do with reality. Then, this 
strategy allows that particular issues and discussions are stripped of their structural, socio-
political and economic origins. Moreover, when these issues and discussions are examined in 
the bioethical field, particularly in the case of „clinical bioethics‟, they usually are 
transformed in „ethical dilemmas‟, i.e. a conflict between two or more bioethical principles 
which solution is provided through the specification/balancing process of Beauchamp and 
Childress (see introductory chapter). As a result, the healthcare structure, healthcare 
institutions and medical subjectivities usually remain untouched. Concomitantly, when the 
issues and discussions represent problems related to the „administrative‟ level, the solutions 
offered have usually to do with new managerial strategies and the implementation of 
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additional strategies of control and surveillance. How the Colombian medical ethos was 
transformed by the healthcare reform is also illustrated in the answers I gathered during the 
interviews I made in 2008-09 as part of my doctoral research.  
9. Interviews: The impact of healthcare reform  
The impact of the healthcare reform of 1993 on the Colombian medical ethos can be 
illustrated by the different views that doctors and non-doctors expressed in my interviews.
211
  
9.1. Market rationality and the commodification of health 
Many interviewees agreed that the healthcare reform came into being mainly as the 
outcome of a political and economic program promoted by international organisations like 
the IMF. For ETJ, a physician and bioethicist, the real origin of the reform was the 
Washington consensus. Others, like VRR, a physician and lecturer in healthcare 
administration said that “Law 100 was passed by the Colombian Congress following a global 
policy to transform healthcare systems into scenarios ruled by a market-oriented rationality.” 
For a lawyer like PAG, Law 100 was a direct consequence of the Constitution of 1991 and it 
meant the „demonopolisation‟ of social security in Colombia. However, the demonopolisation 
of social security did not mean a fairer healthcare system and, ironically, it led to the 
implementation of another monopoly, that which healthcare insurance companies have 
created in Colombia. For ABC, a dentist and lecturer in social sciences, many people in 
Colombia are convinced that although the content of Law 100 was good its implementation 
was the problem. However, this was a naïve position for ABC since Law 100 of 1993 meant 
the arrival of managed care to Colombia and, according to him, “the nature of managed care 
requires a permanent search for strategies to expand the portfolio of healthcare business. 
Thus, in Colombia powerful healthcare insurance companies have formed a monopoly that 
controls the whole healthcare market.” Therefore, the 1993 healthcare reform was not a way 
to guarantee a fair allocation of resources for health, but the best opportunity for 
transnationals to invest in healthcare business in Colombia. 
Yet the discourse about limited resources for healthcare was an important part of the 
rhetoric in support of the implementation of the 1993 healthcare reform. Regarding this, 
VRR, a physician and expert in health administration, argued that it was necessary to 
consider certain questions, for instance, how the notion of limited resources became a „truth‟, 
                                                             
211 For more information about the interviews, see the annexes at the end of the thesis. 
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how resources were actually distributed in society, how priorities were set, and who made 
these decisions. According to him, “not only there are different ethical systems, but also 
different economic theories. So, how the problem of limited resources has been set out in 
healthcare and what solutions have been adopted in Colombia reveals that a particular 
economic point of view has predominated: neoliberalism.” Nowadays public institutions are 
frequently accused of inefficiency and corruption and neoliberal discourses promote the idea 
that „private administration‟ is synonymous with efficiency, rational use of resources and a 
better cost/efficiency ratio. Thus, as VRR stressed, “a rhetorical strategy to gain support for 
the reform was accusing public administration of inefficiency, whereupon it was concluded 
that the healthcare system should be in private hands… the people who know how to 
administer it.”  
But although the 1993 healthcare reform has shown serious inconveniences, those backing 
the reform have argued that it led to an increase in healthcare coverage. In this regard, LCM 
said that according to the statistics Colombia ranked well if compared to its neighbours. 
However, she stressed, there were huge internal asymmetries: “In some regions healthcare 
standards were similar to those of Western Europe, but in others they were similar to those of 
a poor African country.” Additionally, regarding public health, the healthcare reform of 1993 
has been a disaster. PRB stressed that Law 100 ignored public health. For her, the interest of 
healthcare companies in health promotion and disease prevention is just to meet all the 
requirements „on the paper‟ to be certified,212 but not because they really want to improve the 
population‟s health. Moreover, ABC pointed out that a major problem was that the 
Colombian public healthcare service was progressively and drastically reduced. For instance, 
public hospitals were transformed in „state social companies‟,213 i.e. public organisations 
operating with a market-oriented logic. This proved, he said, that in Colombia the healthcare 
system was privatised. 
According to SHJ, patients have become consumers and then they are increasingly 
requesting procedures, treatments or medicines to fulfill their particular wishes. Hence, 
doctors are now subjected to fulfill patients‟ wishes, even against the lex artis. In Colombia, 
for example, he said, it became a common practice that teenage girls received as a gift from 
their parents for their fifteenth birthday, an enlargement mammoplasty or other kinds of 
plastic surgery. As a result, SHJ continued, many doctors in Colombia supported the 
                                                             
212
 That is, to receive from governmental regulatory bodies a legal permission to operate.  
213 Empresas Sociales del Estado. This was the name with which Law 100 renamed public hospitals.  
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healthcare reform as it represented a niche business since the cost of many procedures, like 
plastic surgeries, should be covered by patients directly. For LBG, a physician and university 
lecturer, doctors became „sales executives‟ of pharmaceutical companies, using their own 
practice‟s space and time to sell new prescription drugs, vaccines, medical devices and so on. 
In ETJ‟s words, “the problem of the Colombian healthcare reform is that all the standards 
and activities (medical, professional, and social, etc.) are now dominated by a commercial 
approach, something that is deleterious not only for medical practice, but also for the whole 
society.” AQJ, an emergency room doctor, puts it in one phrase: “the „principle of 
profitability‟ is nowadays driving medical practice”. As a matter of fact, the commodification 
of health is one of the most prominent effects of the reform. For EGR, “Law 100 created a 
new institutional structure, which is efficiency- and profit-orientated, and which introduced 
intermediaries between doctors and patients.” In the words of TME, a physician and 
university lecturer, “healthcare companies are the winners of this reform because they are the 
ones who are accumulating capital.” The commodification of health is expressed in other 
aspects as well. For example, for VRR, “when a healthcare company needs to appoint the 
director general of a hospital, it usually seeks for anyone with a business mentality rather than 
a public health expert or an experienced clinician.” The reason is simply that “healthcare 
companies are investors who expect profit, not philanthropic entities”. 
In the experience of JNM, a philosopher working in a health administration department, 
discussing ethical issues with doctors who are attending health administration and managed 
care postgraduate programmes was complex for two reasons. First, ethical problems arising 
in the clinical setting differ from those at the administrative level. Second, postgraduate 
programmes in managed care include professionals other than doctors, such as engineers, 
accountants and lawyers. These people have never taken the Hippocratic Oath nor do they 
have the same ethical background as doctors. This lack of knowledge and first-hand 
experience in medical ethics makes difficult for them to understand the genesis of and 
possible solutions for ethical problems arising in clinical practice. According to JNM, the 
people who attend managed care postgraduate programmes usually are not interested in 
discussing medical ethical issues. Instead, what interests them is increasing their knowledge 
and skills to improve the performance of their healthcare-related businesses. In fact, she said, 
the ethical discussion has traditionally been given little room in managed care postgraduate 
programmes. This shows that the clinical rationality, which is usually patient-centred, is 
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different, even opposite to, the managed care rationality that is commercial-centred and seeks 
for profit in healthcare institutions.  
Law 100 stated that in Colombia health-promoting entities would provide healthcare to 
their affiliates by hiring the services of health providers and/or individual healthcare 
professionals.
214
 However, according to LMG, an expert in health administration, when a 
health-promoting entity (i.e. a health insurance company) hires the services of a health 
provider (i.e. an individual doctor or a hospital), the former usually takes advantage of its 
powerful position to impose the contractual conditions on the latter. Then, health providers 
such as hospitals, clinics and independent health professionals have no option other than to 
accept health-promoting entities‟ conditions in order to survive.215 Moreover, “there is huge 
difference between private and public hospitals. Usually public ones are in bankruptcy, 
resources are insufficient and, most notably, nobody cares about them”. 
Affiliates‟ complaints about the bad quality of health-promoting entities service and the 
obstacles people constantly have to face to get adequate medical service are daily news in 
Colombia. Thus, the abuses of health-promoting entities led the Constitutional Court, through 
the landmark Case Decision C-768/08, to rule that the healthcare system should provide equal 
and good medical service to all Colombians. The court requested from the government and 
healthcare companies to make the necessary measures to fulfil this aim. However, for LCM, a 
physician working for a NGO that supervises the performance of the healthcare system, as for 
FAS, a physician and expert in public health, the core of the court‟s ruling was the guarantee 
of a universal and good quality healthcare service in Colombia. However, LCM said that the 
court decision was yet to be fully implemented and as healthcare companies were powerful 
lobbyists the situation of health services in Colombia would not change much.
216
 
                                                             
214 A Health-Promoting Entity can attend its affiliates through its own Health Service Providers. However, by 
law no more than 30% of the attention that an Health-Promoting Entity provides to its affiliates can be rendered 
this way. Hence an Health-Promoting Entity must hire the services of external or independent Health Service 
Provider. This is to avoid the so-called „vertical integration‟ that in Colombia has been another way for Health-
Promoting Entity to monopolize the healthcare market. However, there are many indirect ways to carry out such 
a „vertical integration‟ that are beyond legal control and with which governments have been so „flexible‟.  
215 As health-promoting entities implemented different strategies to avoid paying or delaying payments to health 
providers (both in the fee-for-service and capitation models), for example, through medical audit, many 
independent health providers and health care professionals have simply gone bankrupt.  
216 In 2010 Norman Daniels, Thomas Bossert and William Hsiao, three internationally renowned experts who 
knew the Colombian healthcare system well, met in Bogota. They acknowledged good things like the increase 
in healthcare coverage and the subsidies for poorer patients. However, they also criticised the system as the 
competition between health-promoting entities had not really worked, letting them to form a monopoly, and, 
moreover, so powerful that they had become difficult to control. Finally, for them, Law 100 “democratised the 
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9.2. Negative impact on the medical ethos and new types of doctors  
For STF, a physician and bioethicist, the Colombian medical ethos was severely damaged 
by the presence of healthcare insurance companies, which act as „intermediaries‟ exploiting 
doctors. For him, doctors lost job security and many are now employed without legal labour 
guarantees. According to PRB, a nurse and bioethicist, the International Labour Organisation 
confirmed that the work conditions of healthcare professionals have deteriorated: they work 
long hours despite the stressful and demanding hospital environment and many healthcare 
workers are paid neither overtime nor for weekend shifts. Contracts of employment contracts 
are managed by intermediaries with exploitative practices and, as a general effect healthcare 
workers‟ wages are dramatically low. According to LMG, a physician and member of the 
administrative board of a public hospital, “doctors are recruited via associated work 
cooperatives because that is the law.” These co-operatives are in reality commercial 
outsourcings, profit-oriented and managed by people with a business mentality. This 
intermediation, she said, has destroyed the sense of belonging that the medical staff should 
have for the proper operation of a hospital. 
In contrast, GCA‟s view, a physician and bioethicist, was that “the healthcare reform did 
not destroy the Colombian medical practice; it just exacerbated existing problems”. For her 
many problems that are now linked to the healthcare reform existed before. For example, a 
frequent complaint of doctors is that healthcare companies have imposed tight schedules, 
limiting the time doctors have to appropriately see their patients.
217
 However, GCA said that 
before Law 100 many doctors did not spend enough time with their patients either. For SHJ, a 
physician and medical lecturer, doctors‟ behaviour before the reform allowed healthcare 
companies to conclude that a doctor could see a patient in just a few minutes. Then, there is 
no reason for doctors to complain about unfair schedules imposed by healthcare companies, 
SHJ said, since ironically they themselves had already proved with their wrong behaviour 
how quickly they were able to see patients. Similarly, STF recalled that when he was director 
of a hospital in the 1980s, “doctors used to skip work” and also LCM said that before the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
opportunities to carry out acts of corruption. [Although] in highly centralised systems corruption also exists, [in 
the Colombian case] it is just that the money goes to fewer hands” (Ronderos, 2009). 
217The imposition of timetables is perhaps one of the clearest expressions of the „proletarisation‟ of medical 
practice. Different newspaper articles have illustrated this issue, for instance, „the jet-doctor‟ (Alvarez, C.G., 
1993), „doctors with taximeters‟ (Escobar, A., 1995). In another newspaper article, a doctor compared medical 
practice to bus drivers‟ work: the more passengers (patients) a driver picks up, the bigger the salary he (the 
doctor) earns (Rubio, 1995). According to the law, doctors have up to 20 minutes to see one patient. However, 
sometimes healthcare companies subtly forced them to see one patient every 5 minutes. To more information 
about this, see: www.medicosgeneralesdecolombia.com, a webpage of general doctors, accessed 20 July 2011. 
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reform of 1993 doctors “would go barely to work, particularly in public hospitals, where 
moreover doctors used to be well paid. However, they did not spend enough time with their 
patients. Then, it is unfair when doctors say that healthcare companies have cut the medical 
consultation time.” 
For JEO, an emergency room doctor, “the income and status of GPs used to be much 
better. In 1982/83 a GP earned about 15 to 20 times the minimum legal wage, but nowadays 
it is less than 10 times even for those who earn very well.”218 For him, “unfortunately the 
reform was implemented at the expense of doctors‟ wages since the first strategy that 
healthcare companies implemented to reduce their spending was to cut down doctors‟ 
honorariums.” For SHJ, a physician and university lecturer, under Law 100 healthcare 
companies are eager only to profit and also more interested in offering medical treatment than 
prevention. These companies have limited doctors‟ autonomy as a „cost containment‟ strategy 
and do not devote resources to prevention which is regarded as a „bad business‟. According to 
him, as hospitals are permanently forced to reduce costs, the first measure they usually 
implement is to cut healthcare professionals‟ wages. According to BPA, a lawyer and expert 
in medical liability, GPs have seen their incomes rise, but in the case of specialists a decrease 
has been the case. In contrast, for PMJ, a former emergency room doctor and medical 
activist, GPs are in the worst position. He claimed that although 75% of physicians in 
Colombia are GPs, the medical ethos was dominated by specialists. Moreover, he added, 
current medical associations in Colombia do not represent properly the interests of GPs. The 
National Academy of Medicine, for instance, is an elitist association that neither represents 
the Colombian medicine nor Colombian doctors, while the Colombian Medical Federation 
represents the interests of a few.  
Some of the interviewees said that doctors were not consulted when the reform was 
planned and implemented. However, according to ROE, the Academy did organise 
workshops to discuss the bill before it was passed by the Congress. In these meetings, he 
                                                             
218 In 1973 a GP used to earn 19.8 times the statutory minimum wage and in 1990, before the healthcare reform, 
it was between 7.22 and 9.42 times. In 1998 it was 4 times. Healthcare companies frequently claim that they 
spend a lot of money to pay doctors‟ services, but doctors have disagreed: “That medical salaries are high is 
false. In 1994 medical wages were only 14.9% of the operational costs of healthcare companies” (Redondo & 
Guzmán, 2000, p. 85) Moreover, by 1997, 42% of doctors did not have a legal contract, which means a violation 
of labour laws. For this reason it is almost customary in Colombia that doctors work in different healthcare 
institutions to make a comfortable living. In 1997 a business magazine stressed that high school students still 
chose medicine when going to the university, but doctors were the lowest paid professionals in Colombia (El 
Tiempo, 1997b). In sum, “doctors, unaware of how macroeconomics works, have been transformed into the 
technical branch of a big business sector” (Redondo & Guzmán, 2000, p. 87). 
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recalled, doctors were told by the promoters of the reform about a promising future in which 
the „good doctors‟ would have a large clientele. But the reality was different, he lamented, 
because in the end “healthcare companies imposed their will and policies and doctors did not 
receive what they were promised” and a good doctor became the doctor who followed 
healthcare companies‟ policies. For VRR, a physician and expert in health administration, the 
kind of physician that Colombian medical schools are producing is „functional‟ to the system 
and incompetent to critically approach current healthcare policies in the country. In his view, 
medical schools are power structures that prepare medical students to work in hospitals, 
which are also power structures. Therefore, doctors enter the healthcare system well trained 
as rule-followers, making it easy for healthcare corporations to subject them to their own 
rationalities, normative discourses and practices. Thus, in medical schools doctors learn not 
only medicine but also obedience. In VRR‟s opinion, healthcare companies control the 
medical market place, while doctors have lost their autonomy and the ability to determine 
their professional life. Moreover, the Colombian healthcare system has developed for 
functioning smoothly not only doctors and healthcare professionals, but also managers, 
auditors and other specialised workers. As a result university programmes related to managed 
care, health economics, health administration and others related to „control‟ doctors have 
multiplied in the last few years in Colombia. These new experts are essential as they 
guarantee the continuity of the system. 
For LBG, a medical lecturer, “it can be true that the healthcare reform implemented more 
controls on doctors‟ practice, making them more efficient, but at the same time it downgraded 
the medical profession and imposed a „new order‟ in the clinical decision making process. 
Thus, in the new system, economic and legal criteria became more important than medical 
criteria.” Moreover, doctors became subjected to a new „system of punishment‟ that is 
excessive and asymmetric. For instance, “if a patient in an emergency service considers he 
has been in the waiting room too long and then decides to seek for medical attention in 
another hospital, the doctor who was in charge of the emergency service will be fined or 
admonished, not because a delayed medical attention may damage the patient, but because 
this episode is a loss of a customer.” The problem is, according to LBG, that “sometimes 
emergency room services are just crowded and there is not enough medical staff – as a result 
of the administrative policies of healthcare companies – to guarantee on time medical 
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attention.” LBG complained: “how is it that doctors are made accountable for a situation 
beyond their control?”219 
In the current healthcare system, according to some of the interviewees, different types of 
doctors coexist, suggesting that there are different attitudes to what being a doctor is and how 
medicine should be practised. For LBG, there were three types. First, the “orthodox”, who is 
engaged in a patient-centred clinical practice and has remained attached to a traditional way 
of understanding the DPR, i.e. a fiduciary DPR in contrast to the current one which is based 
on a contract with a healthcare company. Second, the “technician”, for whom practising 
medicine entails only two activities: complying with working time as stated in his contract 
with the healthcare company and prescribing medicines. For the “technician”, healthcare 
companies and not doctors are responsible for patients. And third, the “merchant”, who has 
taken the new healthcare system as an “opportunity for business” and therefore has a profit-
oriented practice. Another medical lecturer, TME, identified four types of doctors. A few 
doctors do not practise within the healthcare system, i.e. they only have a private practice and 
do not accept contracts with healthcare companies. These doctors characteristically prefer a 
patient-centred practice, highly value their independence, and even fight against what they 
consider intrusions of healthcare companies in the clinic. Second, doctors with prepaid 
contracts with healthcare companies, who try to do their best while following the rules of the 
system. Third, younger doctors, who were born into the system, were shaped by it, and who 
unreservedly follow the rules imposed by healthcare companies. According to TME, these 
doctors are “like machines”. They talk too little to their patients and have a poor decision-
making ability.
220
 For EGR, “doctors have lost ability to resolve clinical situations since they 
are constrained by the rules of the system; the system is in the end the decision-maker.” And, 
finally, says TME, there are doctors who have adopted a middle position, those who accept 
the new healthcare system and within it they try to practise good medicine.  
9.3. An inveterate Colombian problem: Violence 
For FAS, a physician and public health expert, the effects of two phenomena should be 
included in the analysis of the current Colombian healthcare system: the violence that has 
                                                             
219 The current medical ethos might be characterised by fragmentation, low morale, demotivation, indifference, 
and feelings of humiliation under the new laws and norms that govern the medical scenario.  
220 In Colombia GPs are too limited to make clinical decisions and people tend to see them as the ones who 
authorise a referral to a consultant rather than medics who have the ability and knowledge to adequately solve 
health problems. At a primary level it is sometimes not possible to distinguish between a GP and a nurse (Ruiz, 
F., et al., 2001, p. 56). 
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plagued the country for decades and the radical healthcare reform of 1993. For him, these two 
circumstances “entail conditions, determinations, dynamics, and important consequences” for 
health in Colombia. For him, the socio-economic and cultural determinants of health are 
important factors in this context. In FAS‟s view the violence that has persistently affected 
Colombian society was just an expression of the contradictions and limitations related to the 
socio-cultural, political and economic project of Colombia as a nation. He mentioned three 
factors that have contributed to prolong violence in Colombia: First, Colombia is a highly and 
increasingly unequal society (monopolies, concentration of capital, political exclusion). 
Second, Colombian society is intolerant. And third, high levels of impunity, not only related 
to failures of the judicial system, but to cultural issues. Thus, there is a lack of self-awareness 
about wrongdoing and misconduct. For example, criminals are celebrated as heroes in TV 
shows. Additionally, FAS said, the rise of drug cartels, the internal armed conflict, and the 
weakness of the state have contributed to a worsening of the situation in Colombia.  
This situation, FAS underlined, has contributed to the degradation of medical practice, and 
in the last years there have been systematic attacks to the „medical mission‟.221 Very often 
people are prevented from reaching a health centre or access medical services because of the 
internal armed conflict.
222
 Violence has limited the possibility of practising good medicine or 
carrying out biomedical research. Also, he said, violence is related to delays in medical 
attention, which is particularly problematic for the treatment of chronic disease and scheduled 
procedures, when surgeries are constantly postponed as „unexpected‟ emergencies resulting 
from violence alter the timetables in hospitals. 
10. Conclusion 
Inveterate problems like poverty, inequality and corruption, the assassinations of political 
leaders, the action of guerrillas, the emergence of paramilitaries and the pernicious influence 
of drug dealers led Colombia to a serious institutional crisis at the end of the 1980s. Against 
this backdrop the Constitution of 1991 emerged as a solution. This constitution has had a 
profound impact on Colombian society, although what kinds of benefits and consequences it 
brought remains a highly debatable issue. On the one hand, as Colombia became a social 
rule-of-law state some have stressed the positive aspects such as the protection of the 
                                                             
221 A term coined in Colombia to describe medical personnel, healthcare facilities, ambulances, and the like.  
222 See, for instance, the report of Doctors Without Borders about Colombia at: 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/ar/report.cfm?id=5343&cat=activity-report, accessed 29 
October 2011.  
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constitutional fundamental rights (based on human rights), the adoption of the acción de 
tutela (writ or demand of custody) as an innovative legal tool to guarantee such fundamental 
rights, the strengthening of personal autonomy and pluralism as foundational principles of 
Colombian society, and the creation of the Constitutional Court, a new high court, which has 
since played a decisive role in the ethical, political and legal transformation of Colombian 
society. On the other hand, some authors argued that the Constitution of 1991 was the result 
of the neoliberal policies that the governments at the time had adopted and which were 
promoted by international economic organisations such as the WB and the IMF. 
Neoliberalism meant deregulation, labour flexibility and the adoption of market-criteria to 
assess almost every aspect of social life, with a negative impact at different levels, 
particularly in terms of increasing the gap between rich and poor.  
 
Based on two articles of the Constitution of 1991, the most radical healthcare reform in the 
history of Colombia was approved when Law 100 of 1993 was passed by the Congress, 
marking a turning point for the Colombian medical ethos. So far this healthcare reform has 
kept Colombian society divided. While its supporters have argued that the inequality, 
inefficiency and low coverage of the former system justified Law 100, its critics have insisted 
that in the name of universal coverage, equality and freedom, a US-like, managed care-
oriented, healthcare system was implemented with disastrous effects and, ironically, without 
really solving health inequalities. With the new healthcare system doctors were transformed 
into employees of health insurance companies, the commodification of health was 
accelerated, and university hospitals were negatively affected. Additionally, given inefficient 
state control and corruption, healthcare companies have subtly constituted a powerful 
monopoly, exploitatively subjecting healthcare professionals to their rules and unjustifiably 
denying medical services which their members or policyholders were entitled to. In recent 
years it was revealed that these companies individually have grown exponentially, 
multiplying their capital, while the system as a whole paradoxically has gone bankrupt. 
 
The implementation of a neoliberal-oriented healthcare system and the flourishing of 
bioethics in Colombia were paralleling phenomena in the 1990s. Moreover, there was a big 
coincidence between the rationalities of the reform and bioethics. Although the first 
individuals and groups working on bioethics appeared in the late 1970s, as I showed in 
chapter four, it was not until the 1990s when the institutionalisation of bioethics in Colombia 
really happened. By the end of the 1990s, American principlism had become the lingua 
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franca in discussions of ethical issues in biomedicine and bioethics was seen as the necessary 
and suitable ethical perspective. My interviews revealed disparate views on how the 
healthcare reform after 1993 actually affected the medical ethos and what role bioethics has 
played in this context. For practising clinicians and nurses the reform meant the destruction 
of the ethical foundations of the healthcare professions. At the same time, bioethics was seen 
as a way to save medical practice from dehumanisation. For others the decline of the 
Colombian medical ethos had already begun even before the healthcare reform of 1993, 
suggesting that the healthcare reform of 1993 did not cause, just deepened the decadence of 
the Colombian medical ethos that had already begun years before. My interviews also 
revealed new medical subjectivities, with different styles of practice co-existing within the 
new healthcare system, suggesting that not all doctors are practising according to the rules of 
the system, a circumstance that can be seen as a sort of „resistance‟ against such rules. For 
Foucault power relations admit resistances, and then the possibility of changing the present 
and even ourselves. This is something that cannot happen when people live under “states of 
domination” (Foucault, 1997a, p. 299). Thus, different categories of doctors were described: 
old clinicians, orthodox, technicians, employees and merchants. New academic fields 
flourished, too, such as managed care, health economics, medical auditory, as well as 
bioethics and medical liability. 
 
The rise of different types of doctors and the creation of new areas of expertise around the 
biomedical field suggests a productive effect of power. Again, it is worth remembering that 
for Foucault power is not only repressive but also productive. Then a myriad of professionals 
and experts such as economists, managers, lawyers, accountants, auditors, and so on has 
accessed the biomedical scenario and are influencing the medical decision making process at 
both a micro-level (e.g. within the DPR) and a macro-level (e.g. through health policies). 
Concomitantly, new institutions became the new space, the new milieu, in which medical 
practice would take place. New institutions and subjectivities were created. Thus Health-
Promoting Entities became the „entities‟ that are responsible for the Colombians‟ health, 
doctors and hospitals became Health Providers, and patients became the clients of the 
healthcare industry created by a law in Colombia. These changes came hand in hand with 
new discourses and rationalities such as cost/effectiveness, solidarity and free choice. As a 
result, in the ontology of the present of medical practice in Colombia, it would be possible to 
say that Law 100 of 1993 transformed the nature of medical practice in Colombia and stated 
new rules for its regulation. In this context, the Colombian bioethical establishment has 
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contributed to reinforce the current state of affairs in the biomedical scenario as its discussion 
and analyses remain too abstract and detached from the real conditions of practice. In other 
words, bioethics has become also a „truth regime‟, privileging some issues while disregarding 
others. Additionally, the Colombian bioethical establishment has shown little interest in the 
genealogy of its own field, blindly promoting bioethics as „the way‟ to analyse and solve the 
ethical problems arising in the healthcare scenario, but neither challenging the system itself 
nor revealing the political and legal origins of such ethical problems. 
Finally, it should be underlined that the transformation of Colombian healthcare into a 
very profitable economic sector and the subjection of doctors and patients to neoliberal 
rationalities and practices were in the name of justice and freedom. Foucault explained how 
in areas like sexuality, education or criminal law we have mistakenly concluded that we have 
been liberated, giving us the feeling of a moral progress as we are supposedly freer. However, 
which I have tried to show in this chapter is that the neoliberal healthcare reform carried out 
through Law 100 of 1993 has meant the transformation of the biomedical milieu in order to 
make it governable. Thus, based on a discourse about free choice and personal autonomy, the 
healthcare reform has meant a way to, using the Foucauldian definition of governmentality, 
“conduct the conduct” of both patients and healthcare professionals. From a Foucauldian 
point of view, the healthcare reform of 1993 led to the conversion of the Colombian 
biomedical scenario in a „securitised territory‟. This means that the biomedical scenario has 
passed from being a „territory‟ ruled almost exclusively by doctors, to be a complex 
„population‟ that includes patients, doctors, other healthcare professionals, public officers, 
private investors, pharmaceutical company representatives and others who are now governed 
at distance. This means that the biomedical scenario in Colombia was, in Foucauldian terms, 
governmentalized. However, there are other forms of power working on the biomedical 
scenario. As I will show in the next two chapters, sovereign power and disciplinary power are 
also exercised nowadays not only over patients, but also over doctors.  
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Chapter six  
Good doctoring in Colombia after the healthcare reform of 1993: Medical ethics, 
bioethics and medical liability 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In 2002 the British Medical Journal published the answers of 102 people, including 
doctors, nurses, medical students and patients from 24 countries to two questions: What 
makes a good doctor? And, how can we make a good doctor? (Benn, 2002; Rizo, Jadad, 
Enkin, et al., 2002, p. 711; West, 2002). Amazingly, 70 different characteristics of a good 
doctor were listed. Among the most cited characteristics were compassion, understanding, 
empathy, honesty, competence, commitment and humanity, while courage, creativity, a sense 
of justice, respect, optimism and grace were mentioned less frequently. In general, being a 
good person, strongly wishing to help people, and going beyond the average were seen as 
basic requirements for being a good doctor. People also describe a good doctor as someone 
who has a holistic view of the patient, and not only sees his anatomical or physiological 
failures. In other words, scientific knowledge and technical skills have to go hand in hand 
with a satisfactory human relationship. According to this survey, doctors themselves also 
thought that good medical practice requires excellent teamwork, a high adherence to 
protocols, putting patient‟s needs first and always ahead of administrative ones, personal 
virtues like honesty, benevolence and competence and a strong concept of goodness (Benn, 
2002; Rizo, Jadad & Enkin, 2002; West, 2002).  
There is no reason to say that in Colombia people would think otherwise about what a 
good doctor is or should be. However, given the serious problems of unfairness, bad quality, 
corruption and exploitation that characterise the current healthcare system in Colombia, the 
concept of good doctoring should be not only taken more seriously, but also be adapted in a 
way that is more appropriate and applicable to the particular conditions of the country. 
Following an Aristotelian point of view, achieving a good life goes hand in hand with the 
correct administration of the polis (Reeve, 1992), which means that ethics and politics are 
closely and indissolubly linked (Fernández, 2002). Thus in the particular case of the medical 
scenario, it is not possible to conceive a good doctor in abstract. Rather, it is necessary to 
consider the particular socio-political and economic conditions in which medical practice 
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takes place. This means that any discourse or approach to good doctoring in Colombia will be 
biased and incomplete if it only takes into account ideals or taken-for-granted truths.  
In the previous chapter I analysed how the conditions for medical practice radically 
changed in Colombia after the healthcare reform of 1993. I showed that such a reform meant 
a transformation of the milieu in which medical practice takes place, leading to the 
governmentalization of the biomedical scenario. In this context, doctors became subjected to 
the practices and rationalities imposed by healthcare companies that were created after the 
implementation of a neoliberal reform. In this chapter I will continue the analysis of the 
transformation of the Colombian medical ethos, but this time pointing to the transformation 
of medical ethics as a discourse about good doctoring into the new normative discourses of 
bioethics and medical law. In Colombia, bioethics and medical law dominate the current 
intellectual horizon where important issues are taken for granted, for instance, what being a 
doctor means or how becoming a doctor occurs. Meanwhile, medical ethics seems more and 
more a kind of „historical remnant‟ to analyse current ethically debatable situations and, 
furthermore, it is usually identified with „medical deontology‟, i.e. the codification of ethics. 
What this chapter seeks to demonstrate is that the rationalities of medical ethics, bioethics 
and medical law about how medicine should be practised, on the one hand, and how doctors 
should act under the rules of the new healthcare system on the other hand, currently overlap, 
producing a complex and conflicting scenario for the medical ethos in Colombia.  
The key questions addressed in this chapter are: How are medical ethics, bioethics and 
medical liability understood in Colombia? What role have they played in re-shaping the 
Colombian medical ethos? How do the rationalities both of bioethics and medical law overlap 
with the rationality of the healthcare reform? And was it just a coincidence that bioethics and 
medical liability developed quickly once the healthcare reform was introduced? In order to 
answer these questions, I will first present an overview of the Colombian medical ethos 
before the reform of 1993. In this part the aim will be to examine how categories such as 
medicine, healthcare, being a doctor and medical ethics have been understood in Colombia. 
Then I will show relevant aspects in the shift from medical ethics to bioethics. After that, I 
will describe the contemporary medical ethos in relation to law and economics, two powerful 
forces that are influencing the definition of good doctoring in our time. Finally, I will analyse 
how medical law and liability is a field that has flourished in Colombia hand in hand with 
bioethics. Finally, as in the two previous chapters, and before the conclusions, I will 
complement the information with the interviews I carried out as part of my doctoral research.  
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2. The Colombian medical ethos before Law 100 of 1993 
Colombian scientific medicine began with José Celestino Mutis, a Spanish botanist, 
mathematician, physician, and professor of anatomy who arrived in Bogota in 1761 as the 
viceroy‟s personal physician. In 1802 medical teaching started in the Our Lady of the Rosary 
Major College
223
 (Rosselli, H., 1960) and later the Central Faculty of Medicine was created 
in 1826 by Francisco de Paula Santander, the Colombian War of Independence hero who laid 
the political, administrative and legal foundations of the young republic. However, the 
political instability of the time affected the continuity of this faculty. By the 1840s anyone 
who wanted to be a physician could either become a student of a qualified doctor in a system 
of „free teaching‟ or go abroad to study, for instance, in Europe and particularly in France 
(Miranda, 1993, p. 20).  
 
In 1873 a group of a few doctors in Bogota created the National Academy of Medicine 
that later would be officially recognised by Law 71 of 1891 and, as ratified by Law 02 of 
1979, was made the national government‟s consultant and advisor regarding public health 
and medical education (Miranda, 1993, p. 110). This Academy played an important role in 
the creation of Law 23 of 1981, best known in Colombia as the „medical ethics law‟ (Otero, 
2003, p. 81). In 1935 the Colombian Medical Federation
224
 hereafter CMF was created. This 
association was “interested in promoting the progress of Colombian medicine and in 
safeguarding the profession‟s moral principles” (A. Jaramillo, 1968). In 1962 the CMF 
promoted the legal regulation of the medical profession through Law 14 of 1962 and 
previously was also involved in the promulgation of a “magnificent code of medical 
morality”225 (A. Jaramillo, 1968). 
  
In the early 1900s, Colombia experienced a first wave of modernisation which went hand 
in hand with an increase of foreign investment, particularly from American companies. The 
industrialised world wanted to „open the tropics‟. In this new economic environment 
philanthropic organisations like the Rockefeller Foundation played an important role in 
improving social conditions that affected the new [American] economic projects (Quevedo, et 
al., 1993, p. 213). In 1931 a French medical mission visited the country emphasised that 
                                                             
223 Colegio Mayor de Nuestra Señora del Rosario. 
224 Federación Médica Colombiana. 
225
 This code was not very well received by many Colombian doctors and it discriminated those who were not 
practicing Catholics.  
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medical schools should be a source of professionalism, with high standards in teaching and 
research, and an early contact of students with patients was advised. By the 1940s the concept 
of social security came into being as a result of new insights into health and social welfare. 
Then the first institutions to provide healthcare to workers were created, for instance, the 
Institute for Social Security in 1946 (Redondo & Guzmán, 2000, p. 69). At the end of the 
1940s and early 1950s two American missions visited the country to promote structural and 
ideological shifts in healthcare and medical education: The Unitary (or Humphrey) Mission 
in 1948, and the Tulaine (or Lapham) Mission, in 1953. 
According to the Unitary Mission it was necessary to strengthen basic pre-clinical 
sciences, cut the number of students, increase the number of full-time teachers and spend 
more time on students‟ supervision. In short, this mission “recommended a reorganisation of 
training following the Flexner
226
 programme, consisting of two years of basic sciences and 
four years of clinical studies, followed by one year of internship” (Marston & Ospina, 2004). 
In 1949 a compulsory social service year was introduced. Thus newly graduated doctors were 
to go to a remote area or part of the country with high demand for medical services where 
they would work for one year while being paid by the state (Quevedo, et al., 1993, p. 263). 
With the Tulaine Mission, internal medicine became the model for medical education and the 
length of the programme increased to six years. At the beginning of the 1950s, Colombia had 
four faculties of medicine, three public
227
 and one private.
228
 In the following ten years, three 
more were created. It has been argued that these new medical schools would provide cheap 
medical labour for the US (Miranda, 1993, p. 146) and during the 1960s the exodus of 
Colombian doctors to the US was a public concern (Calibán, 1967; Galindo, 1968). The 
Tulaine Mission also suggested the creation of an association of medical schools. In 1959 the 
National Association of Faculties of Medicine, ASCOFAME was created.
229
  
 
The mid-twentieth century thus marked a turning point for the Colombian medical ethos 
from the „classic‟ French style of practice to the „pragmatic‟ American one. Since the second 
half of the nineteenth century, France had been a favourite destination for Colombians to 
                                                             
226 For a whole picture of the impact of A. Flexner‟s medical education reform in the USA at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, see: Cooke, M., Irby, D. M., Sullivan, W. & Ludmerer, K. M. (2006). American Medical 
Education 100 Years after the Flexner Report. New England Journal of Medicine, 355(13), 1339-1344. 
227 National University, University of Antioquia, and University of Cartagena.  
228 Javeriana University.  
229 See ASCOFAME‟s webpage: 
 http://www.ascofame.org.co/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=2, accessed 28 
August 2011. 
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study medicine. However, throughout the first half of the twentieth century more and more 
doctors would travel to the US for two reasons. First, because of the leading role of American 
medicine, and second the Second World War prevented people from going to Europe (Otero, 
1994). By the 1950s there were clashes between junior doctors who had recently returned 
from the US and senior teachers who had remained bound to the style of French medical 
practice. It became clear that “the poetic inspiration of French medicine [had given way to 
the] one hundred per cent positivist [American] mentality” (Miranda, 1993, p. 133). 
 
In the 1960s doctors were concerned about becoming salaried workers of socialised 
medicine institutions and the bad effects of this change on their profession as they would be 
subjected to external rules. Doctors feared the end of medicine as a liberal profession 
(Redondo & Guzmán, 2000, pp. 63, 86), i.e. the end of medical autonomy. As a result, 
medical unions became relevant,
230
 which were seen as necessary to defend medics‟ rights 
and promote the welfare of the new „medical proletariat‟ (Galindo, 1968; A. Jaramillo, 1968). 
Medical strikes had a great impact in the 1970s, and they became a „daily bread‟ for 
Colombian society (El Tiempo, 1970, 1973b, 1976a, 1976b). During these medical strikes 
some accused doctors of careless and selfish behaviour (El Tiempo, 1963a, 1966, 1973a). 
Although doctors were still described as “respectable, worthy […] educated and patriotic 
people” in the newspapers (El Tiempo, 1963a) and were honoured and greatly appreciated (El 
Tiempo, 1963b), their behaviour and various aspects related to their profession were now 
under scrutiny in the mass media. By the mid-1970s doctors would be condemned for 
forgetting their profession‟s “humanist side, deontology, and apostolate” (Castelblanco, 
1973), depicted as “bad managers” (El Tiempo, 1974b), and, along with lawyers, seen as 
“morally deficient” (Lerner, 1975). Some non-medical voices started to become louder, 
arguing that medical unions should be more committed to renovating society rather than with 
doctors‟ salaries (Escribano, 1974), that citizens‟ opinion should be taken into account and 
not only doctors‟ requests for privileges (El Tiempo, 1974a), and that the medical profession 
should be legally regulated, similarly to how it was in the US (Mora, 1976).   
 
How many and what kind of physicians the country required also became an issue that 
doctors and non-doctors would discuss more and more. Critical medical lecturers argued that 
Colombia conformed to American demands of medical education too much, for example, by 
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 For instance, the Colombian Medical Union [Asociación Médica Sindical de Colombia, ASMEDAS) that 
was created in 1958 (Calibán, 1967).  
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promoting among doctors „super-specialisation‟, but failed to train GPs fit to practise within 
the country‟s particular socio-political and economic conditions (El Tiempo, 1971; 
Fergusson, 1964). Even tropical diseases were removed from the medical curriculum in a 
tropical country like Colombia and doctors became better trained to treat people in France or 
US than in Colombia (De Zubiría, R., 1972). By the early 1960s a minister of health said that 
“it was necessary to inundate the country with doctors” (El Tiempo, 1963c) as in many areas 
there was none. By the mid-1970s it was said that half a country lacked a doctor, with a 
worse situation in rural areas (Castelblanco, 1975; Turbay, 1974). New medical faculties 
were opened to deal with this problem (El Tiempo, 1978). By the early 1980s the debate 
about suitable medical education for the country had not ceased, but the focus shifted as some 
began to warn about a surplus of physicians and that it was therefore not advisable to create 
more faculties of medicine (Campo, 1981; El Tiempo, 1983).
231
 Moreover, there were 
concerns about a decrease in the quality of medical education as a phenomenon linked to the 
creation of new medical schools and also about the geographical distribution of doctors since 
they tended to remain in the major cities of the country, while the number of health 
professionals in small cities and rural areas remained insufficient (Moanack, 1983; Sánchez, 
1981).  
 
In the 1970s private healthcare insurance companies started to manage a significant part of 
the Colombian healthcare market. Many doctors deplored the price competition imposed by 
these companies and their detrimental influence on doctors‟ private practice. Nevertheless, 
many doctors ended up working for them (Redondo & Guzmán, 2000, pp. 63, 86). In 1975 a 
National Health System was created (Vega, 1999, p. 36), but this system was by no means 
similar to the UK‟s NHS. Rather, it was a non-unitary system that included many 
autonomous institutions, and although in 1975 the government had embraced the World 
Health Organisation‟s campaign Health for All by the Year 2000, its commitment was limited 
to simple actions regarding health promotion, prevention and the improvement of very basic 
medical services (de Currea-Lugo, 2003, pp. 77, 79). By the end of the 1970s the impact of 
socialised/corporative medicine and the increase in medical lawsuits led to a discussion about 
the nature of medicine and doctors‟ legal and ethical duties. By the end of this decade a group 
of doctors in the Academy organised workshops to discuss the creation of a code of medical 
                                                             
231 By 1983 there were 21 medical faculties.  
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ethics. In 1981 the Congress passed a bill that became Law 23 of 1981, or the national Code 
of Medical Ethics.  
3. Medical ethics in Colombia  
In the nineteenth century there was no formal codification of medical ethics. In the first 
half of the twentieth century the laws regulating medical practice included some ethical 
precepts for doctors.
232
 In 1954, when the country was under a military dictatorship, the 
National Association of Colombian Catholic Physicians promoted the Code of Medical 
Morality,
233
 which was promulgated as Decree 2831 of 1954 (Lozano, 1989, p. 89). Although 
the 1954 code was based on the WMA‟s code of ethics, it was practically ignored by the 
Colombian medical profession because it was imposed by a dictatorship and its content was 
too biased towards Roman Catholic beliefs. After the end of the dictatorship in 1956, the 
code was virtually forgotten. Later, medical practice was legally regulated by a new law, Law 
14 of 1962, and a new system of penalties for doctors‟ ethical misconduct was introduced 
(Casas, 1982, p. 9). 
 
In the period 1950-1980 the most important textbook about medical ethics was Medical 
Deontology,
234
 published in 1955 by Gerardo Paz Otero, a Colombian physician and medical 
ethicist. This book showed the influence of the Roman Catholic Church on medical ethics. 
The foreword, written by a renowned Colombian physician of the time, began by praising 
Pius XI‟s encyclical in which moral and economic aspects of marriage were discussed, while 
“modernism” was condemned (Uribe, 1955, p. 22). The book discussed a wide range of 
medico-ethical issues, including chapters that might probably be considered as weird, or at 
least curious today, on topics such as the “pre-nuptial medical certificate” (a eugenic 
measure), the “conjugal onanism”, and the “periodic marital continence”. Condoms were 
forbidden as they opposed God‟s plan, while the Ogino-Knaus method235 to avoid pregnancy 
was supported. Passive euthanasia, a topic that had been debated in a medical congress in 
Paris at the time, was rejected (Paz, 1955, pp. 127-130).  
During the 1970s the idea that the medical profession required better ethical and legal 
regulation began to be openly discussed (Gómez, 1976). In 1978 the Academy and other 
                                                             
232 Law 20 of 1925 
233 Código de Moral Médica. 
234
 Deontología Médica General. 
235 A calendar-based contraceptive method, the only one accepted by the Catholic Church.  
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medical associations like CMF and ASCOFAME started to work on a draft for the code of 
medical ethics, which was finally approved and turned into law, Law 23 of 1981(Socarrás, 
1991). This legal codification of medical ethics has been criticised ever since it was first 
discussed in the Congress at the end of the 1970s. While for some scholars, and particularly 
for medical associations like the Academy, CMF and ASCOFAME, this „law of medical 
ethics‟ was seen as a „protection‟ against medical lawsuits because the standards of practice 
were clearly defined, others argued that such a law was unconstitutional because it created 
courts of ethics in which doctors would be substituting judges in the administration of justice. 
Moreover, this code was seen as “a statute that would allow a privileged medical cast to 
monopolize as some doctors would be given advantages while the vast majority would be 
marginalized” (Cardona, A. 1985, pp. 73, 102). Some doctors argued that if the code of ethics 
was also a law, Colombian doctors would not practise because of an ethical commitment, but 
because of their fear of a legal punishment. Even for some lawyers the oath included in the 
code was useless because, for them, “the Hippocratic Oath was not a legally binding rule” 
(Socarrás, 1991). 
The president of the CMF by that time presented the new code and law describing them as 
“a set of norms aimed at preserving a responsible, correct, and honest practice within the 
profession, while giving to society guiding principles for an adequate doctor-patient 
relationship” (Casas, 1982, p. 10). It consists of 94 articles grouped under three headings. 1. 
general dispositions, 2. professional practice, and 3. disciplinary issues and courts of ethics. 
The code opens with a definition of medicine as  
a profession that aims to take care of human health and the prevention of 
diseases, the refinement of the human species as well as the improvement of the 
living standards of the community, without distinction of nationality, or 
socioeconomic, racial, religious, or political aspects [...] (Code of Medical 
Ethics, 1981). 
Following a Hippocratic tradition, chapter two includes the oath that medical students had 
to take at their graduation ceremony, which required from Colombian doctors the same duties 
that the WMA defined in its 1968 version of the Geneva Declaration.
236
 Courts of Medical 
Ethics
237
 were created to investigate violations of the code. Through a disciplinary process, 
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 See: http://ethics.iit.edu/codes/coe/world.med.assoc.geneva.1968.html, accessed 30 July 2008 
237 Tribunales de Ética Médica.  
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which was copied from the Code of Criminal Procedure, doctors accused of misconduct 
could be found guilty or not guilty (Yepes, 1995, p. 36). Although these courts of ethics 
consist only of physicians, any doctor involved in disciplinary proceedings necessarily 
requires a lawyer in the same way that any defendant in a legal court. Many experts of 
medical ethics in Colombia, like F. Sánchez, think that it is preferable that doctors are tried 
by their peers in cases of ethical misconduct and not by, for example, lawyers (Sánchez, 
1990b). During the 1980s and 1990s talking about medical ethics became synonymous with 
talking about the code of medical ethics of 1981. However, two circumstances have 
transformed the discourse and practice of medical ethics in Colombia: the healthcare reform 
of 1993 and flourishing of bioethics in the 1990s.  
4. The impact of the healthcare reform on medical ethics 
One of the most frequent criticisms of Law 100 of 1993 has been its power to destroy the 
Hippocratic ethical foundations of clinical practice. Doctors frequently write about this 
situation in rather plaintive terms. For instance, a former president of the Academy observed 
that:  
We are experiencing a growing conflict between „corporate ethics‟ of health care 
institutions […], created based on Law 100 of 1993 […] and Hippocratic ethics 
or medical ethics […]. Healthcare based mainly on profit making deeply affects 
notions of social commitment by replacing the essential Hippocratic aim to 
benefit the patient by an economic framework that submits medical practice to 
commercial management of the profession and to the consequences of an ill-
conceived market […]. (Patiño, 2002, p. 6)  
In this quote „Hippocratic ethics‟ and „medical ethics‟ are synonymous. Here the term 
Hippocratic seems to have at least four connotations. First, a complete and unconditional 
commitment to the welfare and needs of the patient. Therefore, a Hippocratic doctor is 
basically a patient‟s advocate. Second, the term refers to a profession that is dealing with 
human life and bodies and which requires a vocation to help others. To some Colombian 
doctors and bioethicists a true physician should love humankind in order to be a „true‟ 
physician (Gaviria Neira, C., 1998). Third, Hippocratic means to be reliable, i.e. that the 
patient, as a vulnerable person, can trust the physician. However, the new healthcare system 
has proven to be a very profitable industry that uses doctors‟ labour  to make money (Rosselli 
& Guzmán, 1997), and this economic priority appears to be incompatible with fulfilling 
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patients‟ needs. Finally, Hippocratic also means good quality medical care. But, with the 
priority given to economic goals over quality of care, Colombian doctors feel that clinical 
medicine is now subjected to an assessment using foreign quality criteria. 
For renowned Colombian physicians like D. Rosselli,
238
 medical ethics in Colombia was 
“fatally wounded” by neoliberalism, which emphasises cost-effectiveness, productivity, profit 
and the market. Rosselli invited his colleagues in Colombia to “accept with resignation the 
neoliberalism that permeates the healthcare system and is making doctors practise a savage 
capitalism similar to that of the [healthcare] intermediaries […] We doctors remain bound to 
the tradition, but we must accept to play with the rules of globalization: in Rome do what the 
Romans do […] Learn the new precept: primum pecuniae, profit first” (Rosselli, D., 2006).  
 
In 2004, ten years after the healthcare reform, ASCOFAME invited another medical 
mission, this time from the United Kingdom. In its final report it said that the quality of 
medical graduates in Colombia had deteriorated over the previous ten years as a result of the 
applied reforms, a proliferation of medical programmes,
239
 and the deterioration and 
disappearance of qualified centres of medical practice (Marston & Ospina, 2004, p. 12). This 
British Mission concluded that: First, although the UK spends some 6.8% of GDP on health 
and Colombia nearer to 10%, yet the UK provides a better overall service. Second, the UK 
has 30 medical schools of fairly uniform standard for a 60m population; Colombia has 51 of 
widely different standard, for a 43m population. As a consequence, the number of Colombian 
schools should either be reduced or at least prevented from increasing. Third, the NHS in the 
UK is mainly based on primary care, which is cost-effective. In Colombia, however, the 
introduction of such a system would require a cultural change. The mission recommended 
that all doctors should hold a postgraduate degree, i.e. that all physicians should be 
„specialists‟, leading to the end of the figure of the generalist doctor. Fourth, it is necessary 
for Colombia to have a strong regulatory body equivalent to the British GMC in order to 
guarantee high standards in medicine (Marston & Ospina, 2004, pp. 59-61).  
 
                                                             
238 Neurologist, expert on public health and epidemiology, and university lecturer. 
239 Law 30 of 1992 allowed universities freely creating academic programs and opened the door to the 
commodification of medical education. In 1992 there were 21 medical schools, by 1999 Colombia had 43 (El 
Tiempo, 1999), and at present there are 57. Even healthcare companies have created their own medical schools, 
like the Spanish multinational Sanitas Internacional, which opened a medical university program in 2005 (El 
Tiempo, 1995). 
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Doctors in Colombia have also argued that with Law 100 of 1993 medicine began a 
process of deprofessionalisation. Medicine is considered a profession as it is practised by a 
group or „professional body‟ that possesses a set of particular skills and knowledge, it meets a 
social necessity and it is self-regulated (Hoogland & Jochemsen, 2000, p. 458). Since medical 
self-regulation has been limited by the healthcare reform, some doctors in Colombia have 
argued that physicians are no longer professionals but „technicians‟. For J. F. Patiño, a 
renowned Colombian surgeon and former president of the Academy, the economic success of 
the healthcare companies has been achieved at expense of the deterioration of the medical 
ethos (Patiño, 2001; 1998). In the new environment, Patiño lamented, if a doctor challenges 
the rules imposed by the system, he/she will be accused of „non-adherence‟ to the „new 
contract‟ between medical profession and society.  
 
Others, like the renowned internist and bioethicist R. Esguerra, have argued that the 
deprofessionalisation of medicine is not the result of external factors such as the healthcare 
reform, but of internal problems of the profession, such as a poor quality medical education 
and a surplus of doctors (Esguerra, 1999). In 1994 Esguerra had already suggested that the 
fundamental principles of the medical profession should be preserved in the new environment 
of the healthcare reform (Esguerra, 1994). For C. Gaviria, an intensive care doctor and 
bioethicist, although everything had changed, the love of doctors for their own profession 
should be everlasting and doctors should be committed mainly to learning medicine, not laws 
and to making of their own professional practice “a bioethical reflection” (Gaviria Neira, C., 
1998, pp. 100, 141). 
5. From medical ethics to bioethics 
By the end of the 1990s, to talk about medical ethics had become synonymous with 
discussing bioethical principles. The words of a president of the Academy are telling in this 
regard: “medical ethics are taught founded on three basic principles: beneficence, autonomy 
and justice” (Patiño, 2002, p. 6). However, already in 1993 he said that bioethics was a „new 
ethics‟ for medicine (Patiño, 1993, p. 199). For the members of the Court of Medical Ethics 
of Bogota it seems that bioethics is nothing but medical ethics using the language of the four 
principles. They said that even the first Hippocratic aphorism
240
 „prefigured‟ such principles 
(Tribunal de Ética Médica de Bogotá, 2004). 
                                                             
240 “Life is short, the art is long, opportunity fleeting, experiment dangerous, and judgment difficult”.  
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F. Sánchez, president of ICEB, proposed a new code of ethics also based on the four 
principles, as for him bioethics is the new approach to medical ethics (Sánchez, 2010; 2006). 
He supports the idea that bioethics is the spearhead of progress in medical ethics. Following 
his position, in Colombia many bioethicists and medical ethicists consider three eras in the 
history of medical ethics: 
 
HIPPOCRATIC 
ETHICS  
MODERN CODES BIOETHICS   
 
Pythagorean basis Deontological Consensus (Political?) 
 
Physician looks for 
reputation 
Physician looks for 
personal/professional 
satisfaction 
 
Physician looks for 
fulfilling social aims 
Based on physician‟s 
authority 
Based on philanthropy  Based on patients‟ choices 
 
Focus on individual needs 
and physician‟s values 
Focus on individual 
needs and professional 
values  
 
Focus on group‟s needs and 
social values 
Emphasis on physician‟s 
wisdom 
Emphasis on physician‟s 
duties 
Emphasis on physician‟s 
legal responsibilities 
 
Physician was a traveller 
and had variable social status 
Physician reaches high 
social status 
Physician becomes a 
worker for a corporation 
 
 
But this alleged „progression‟ from a Hippocratic ethics to bioethics has not necessarily 
meant the end of doctors‟ ethical misbehaviour. After analysing different cases in the period 
1994 – 2002, the Court of Medical Ethics of Bogotá, for instance, revealed that there was a 
significant number of doctors who were accused of awful, reckless and inattentive behaviour 
(Tribunal de Ética Médica de Bogotá, 2004). The most common cases of ethical misconduct 
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included: disclosure of private information, disregard of patient‟s own values and autonomy, 
and failures to correctly fill out the clinical record. The specialists who were most often sued 
were gynaecologists and GPs, and the most frequent type of ethical/legal misconduct was 
negligence.  
 
Unfortunately doctors‟ ethical misbehaviour is not limited to GPs and consultants. 
According to an observational study carried out in a private medical school, the proportion of 
medical students that engaged in misconduct was very high (Vengoechea, Moreno, & Ruiz, 
2008). Many medical lecturers in Colombia think teaching bioethics might help. However, as 
I showed in an article published in 2005, the „hidden curriculum‟, i.e. the actual practices in 
the hospitals, is more powerful than the „formal curriculum‟ (bioethics modules) in shaping 
medical students‟ characters (Suárez & Díaz Amado, 2005). In fact, as also I showed in other 
two articles, medical students in Colombia might be experiencing difficulties in developing 
the ability to adequately make moral judgments in their clinical work and the right attitudes, 
for instance, when they are exposed to cases of biomedical research involving human subjects 
(Escobar, H. & Díaz Amado, 2008, p. 73; Escobar, H., Díaz Amado, Páramo, et al, 2010, p. 
35).  
 
In this conflictive environment in which medical practice takes place nowadays in 
Colombia another regulatory discourse has flourished hand in hand with bioethics: medical 
law and liability.  
 
6. Surveillance and medical liability in Colombia 
In our day, bioethics and medical law are two powerful ways to regulate medical practice, 
although in the Anglo-American and German contexts „medical law‟ has been an established 
discipline since the nineteenth century (Faden & Beauchamp, 1986; Maehle & Geyer-
Kordesch, 2002). Today, appealing to law to solve contentious medical situations seems 
natural and obvious. What a lawyer wrote in the New England Journal of Medicine regarding 
Karen Anne Quinlan‟s case241 at the end of the 1970s depicts very well the new times for the 
medical ethos in Western societies: “whoever the physicians were[, the] lawyers would have 
„the last word‟” (Rothman, D. J., 1991, p. 231). It has been argued, amid the emergence of 
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 She was declared in persistent vegetative state in 1975 and died in 1985 in a nursing home. He became a 
symbol of the right-to-die movement. 
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medico–legal issues during the second half of the twentieth century, that “changing 
perceptions of how medicine could, or should, be practised gave rise to novel legal doctrines” 
(Teff, 2001, p. xv). The increasing tendency to control medical practice through a legal 
discourse has threatened clinical autonomy and changed the ethical framework of clinical 
practice (Morreim, 1995). In short, the influence of law over medicine has become a 
pervasive phenomenon (Bal & Brenner, 2009, p. 323).   
Various authors (Areen, 1988, p. 39; Brazier & Cave, 2007, p. 7; Erin & Ost, 2007, p. 4) 
have explained why doctors are now constantly supervised. Their reasons can be summarised 
as follows: First, more accountability is expected in cases of bad results, which are frequently 
amplified by the mass media. Second, doctors‟ actions have to do with sensitive moral and 
religious issues. Third, new technologies have been associated with abuses and there is a 
social imperative to make an efficient use of resources. Fourth, medical decisions now belong 
to the public sphere and patients have been „empowered‟. And fifth, we live in a „blame 
culture‟. For C. Erin and S. Ost (2007) “[t]he trend to prosecute in the medical arena is 
pervasive [and] there is little evidence that this has been a reflective, carefully measured 
development” (p. 3).  
According to D. Ozar (2001, p. 4) doctors are frequently blamed “for failures that are 
beyond anyone‟s control” as a result of two wrong assumptions: that doctors are in 
possession of complete knowledge about patients‟ conditions (expertise), and that doctors 
have total power to restore body and life. Moreover, many medical scandals caused by 
doctors‟ misbehaviour have been publicized by the mass media in recent years and have 
transmitted the idea that doctors are a „threat‟ to society, being “often reviled in the media as 
pariahs” (Brazier & Cave, 2007, p. 3). As D. Rothman has noted, already in the mid-
twentieth century, doctors had become “evil actors” because of several factors (Rothman, D. 
J., 1991, pp. 15-29, 70-84). First, abuses in biomedical research, such as those carried out not 
only by the Nazis, but also by those who I called the „good guys‟, as in the infamous 
Tuskegee experiment (Reverby, 2009; Díaz Amado, 2010a, p. 432). Second, the way doctors 
dealt with ethical and legal issues arising from biomedical progress. And third, the turn of 
doctors into strangers at the bedside,
242
 leading in contemporary societies to setting a 
political, ethical and legal agenda of control and supervision over them.   
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 Rothman gives at least four arguments to explain the process through which doctors became strangers. First, 
the trend towards specialisation and the disappearance of the family doctor. Second, the little importance given 
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In the US many physicians will have to deal with a medical malpractice lawsuit at least 
once during their professional lives (Bal & Brenner, 2009, p. 323). In legal systems like those 
of the US and UK, medical malpractice usually falls within the scope of tort law, which is 
part of private law and includes negligence, nuisance, trespass and defamation. In these legal 
systems, medical malpractice cases are usually solved based on case law, i.e. decisions made 
by the courts, which constitutes the common law, but also by appealing to legislative norms 
(e.g. Acts of Parliament or Statutes, which constitutes the statutory law) (Bal, 2009, p. 340). 
While public law is largely related to criminal matters, although it also includes constitutional 
law and administrative law, private law is mainly about civil cases (Hope, et al., 2008, p. 47). 
A major concern and a matter of professional as well as academic debate is the tendency in 
recent years to criminalise medical practice. According to M. Brazier and E. Cave (2007, p. 
8), only in medicine might an ethical and professional dispute result in a criminal 
prosecution.  
 
Discourses about medical malpractice and the rise of medical liability as a differentiated 
and independent academic and professional field have a relatively short history in Colombia. 
The first known medical lawsuit in Colombia was in the 1950s, but it was not until the 1990s 
when these cases became common. By the early 1990s the number of scholars and academic 
or professional groups working on issues of medical malpractice started to increase. In this 
respect, the Colombian Association of Anaesthesiology has promoted among healthcare 
professionals in Colombia a culture of legal insurance. In 1995, this association launched a 
specialised journal for medico-legal issues that has contributed to building up the corpus of 
literature in Colombia on medical malpractice and medical liability, disseminating legal 
decisions relevant for medical practice and helping to shape the „legal mind‟ of  Colombian 
doctors.  
 
In the last few years the term „juridification of medicine‟ has become a topos in the field 
of medical ethics in Colombia. According to E. Otero, this term was formally introduced in 
Colombia by Eduardo Rey, a professor of internal medicine, who has strongly criticised the 
current healthcare system for its negative effects on the medical ethos. For him the term 
referred to “those legal actions that interfere with a responsible and regulated autonomy that 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
to talk to the doctor as being informed about new technologies became more important. Third, hospitals and 
other places related to healthcare became more and more a „strange‟ environment for lay people –e.g. the 
environment of an ICU or an operation theatre. And, finally, the typical “self-segregation” of doctors 
encouraged by medical school (Rothman, D. J., 1991, pp. 122-147).  
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doctors should be granted in their practice” (Otero, 2004, p. 11). The strong emphasis on the 
legal side of the code of medical ethics of 1981 might have contributed to the process of 
juridification since the 1980s of the Colombian medical ethos. By the mid-1990s, F. Sánchez 
claimed that due to this juridification, medical practice was no longer a question of „moral 
commitment‟ (Sánchez, 1997a).  
 
Two main factors might be behind the „necessity‟ that doctors in Colombia feel for 
devoting substantial amounts of their time, effort and money to reduce the influence of law 
on their professional lives. First, the medical field is depicted by a variety of actors
243
 as a 
hostile environment in which doctors must be well prepared to deal with criticisms and 
attacks from different flanks. In order to be protected, experts working on medical 
malpractice, like the surgeon and lawyer F. Guzman, have warned about the signs of an 
imminent lawsuit: “medical complications or death, evidence of family/patient 
dissatisfaction, formal complaint to hospital board, request for a copy of the clinical record, 
missing medical appointments or checks, rejection to pay the hospital/honorariums, and 
warnings from colleagues” (Guzmán, et al., 1996, p. 47f). F. Guzmán (1998) has also 
described types of “problematic patients”: the flatterer, the one who speaks ill of another 
doctor, the “owner” of the doctor, “the medical expert”, the hater of the medical profession, 
the “gold digger”, and the sociopaths (Guzmán, 1998, p. 53). It is important to stress that the 
number of doctors entering law schools in the last twenty years is a noticeable phenomenon 
in Colombia. The physician-lawyer is, alongside the bioethicist, a new expert in the field of 
medical ethics/law in Colombia. The emergence of this new expert, is it a sort of doctors‟ 
response to the increasing legal challenges they have to face in the new environment of 
medical practice? To answer this question, it will be necessary to carry out additional 
research outside the scope of this thesis, but according to what I have informally learned from 
these lawyer-physicians when they reflect on their professional choice, there is a growing 
feeling that the only way for doctors to deal with lawyers is to become lawyers themselves.    
 
Second, the growing body of literature and development of academic programmes on 
medical liability have shaped this new academic and professional field in Colombia. 
Moreover, lawyers have tried to justify their intervention in the medical setting by arguing 
                                                             
243 E.g. mass media, social scientists, bioethicists, and, of course, lawyers.  
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that, first, they considered themselves as patients‟ advocates,244 and, second, that doctors 
should not be treated as if they had „legal immunity‟ (Sarmiento, 1994). In Latin America as 
a whole, medical liability has developed quickly over the last twenty years. The Venezuelan 
physician-lawyer Rafael Aguiar has defined medical law in his extensive Treatise of Medical 
Law (2001)
245
 as a set of legal norms and ethico-moral precepts, public and private, which 
regulate medical practice and the doctor-patient relationship; a definition which has been 
adopted by Colombian lawyers working in the field (Manrique, J. E., 2008, p. 29). Although 
in this perspective social and structural considerations are taken into account, medical 
liability is fundamentally regarded as a matter of „individual liability‟. As L. Meerabeau 
(2006) has argued “the legal system encourages the individualization of blame” (p. 130). This 
is the way medical liability is taught in Colombia, for example, in a programme for the 
specialisation in medical law at Javeriana University, which began in 2005. In El Rosario 
University the term „sanitary law‟ is used in a broader sense than medical law as it includes 
not only laws relating medical liability, but also those regulating the whole healthcare system.  
  
In Latin America there have been critical voices against the growing tendency to sue 
doctors. G. Russo, an Argentinian author, has called it the “new industry of medical lawsuits” 
(Russo, 1994). In Colombia, some authors have argued that the growing industry of medical 
malpractice has transformed medicine in a „risky‟ activity (Ramírez, 1995), others have 
commented ironically that filing a legal claim against a doctor is nowadays “as common and 
easy as giving a glass of water” (Morales, 1996). Unfortunately, medical lawsuits in 
Colombia are focused on doctors‟ mistakes, while neglecting patients‟ and healthcare 
companies‟ responsibilities; not to mention that doctors‟ rights are frequently neglected 
(Otero, 1995, p. 2; 2004, p. 11). Among doctors, statistics showing the increase in the number 
of medical lawsuits in Colombia (López, 2003; Manrique, J. I., 2000), have reinforced the 
idea that it is necessary to be particularly careful about the „legal risk‟ of practising medicine, 
promoting what L. Peña, a lawyer working in the field of medical liability, calls “the 
conscience of risk of medical liability” (Peña, 1995). It is now common that medical 
malpractice literature includes „tips‟ on how doctors can avoid or cope with medical lawsuits. 
Such tips include strictly following the code of medical ethics of 1981, practising according 
to the lex artis, correctly applying informed consent, exercising sometimes defensive 
                                                             
244 It is a paradox that in the medical ethics literature, doctors, and not lawyers, have traditionally been 
considered the patients‟ advocates (Pellegrino, 1999; Morreim, 2001).  
245 Tratado de Derecho Médico.  
169 
 
medicine, and avoiding promising positive outcomes (Peña, 1997, p. 45; Ramírez, 1995, p. 
32; Sánchez, 1993). Once a doctor is involved in a lawsuit, the advice is that he/she should 
try “to look like a compassionate, competent physician, and never plead guilty” (Guzmán, 
1997).  
 
7. From the medicalisation of society to the juridification of medicine: A power 
displacement in the biomedical scenario 
Although Foucault was not particularly concerned with the medicalisation of society, his 
work has indirectly contributed to understanding this phenomenon through his analyses of 
how power operates in particular areas of medical practice like, for instance, psychiatry 
(Foucault, 2006). Here, it is also Foucault who can help us to find an answer to Kimsma and 
Van Leewen‟s question regarding current medical practice: “why the subject of 
medicalisation and demedicalisation, important issues in the seventies and eighties of the last 
century, has disappeared from the mainstream debates in health care” (Kimsma & Van 
Leewen, 2005, p. 559). The preponderance that legal and economic considerations has had in 
contemporary medical practice has to do with a new way of exercising power in this field. It 
is no longer a power exercised by doctors (as medicalisation discourses emphasised), but over 
doctors.
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 It seems that as a reaction against medical power, demedicalising society became 
a political programme, widely promoted particularly by critical social scientists in the 1970s 
(Zola, 1972; Illich, 1975; Kimsma & Van Leewen, 2005, p. 561). However, and this is the 
interesting hypothesis of Kimsma and Van Leewen, the demedicalisation programme was in 
the end carried out at the expense of a process of juridification and economization of 
medicine. For them, as the HIV/AIDS case illustrates, “[a] shift from the humane goals of 
medical support to dominance of legal and economic discursive strategies has taken place, 
resulting in a replacement of medical strategies in understanding and controlling deviant 
behaviour by economic and political ways of thinking and doing, fuelled by issues of 
discrimination and stigmatisation” (Kimsma & Van Leewen, 2005, p. 560).  
                                                             
246 From a Foucualdian point of view it is necessary to be careful about „moralising‟ the discussion. Here, for 
instance, by saying that now it is about power over doctors, and not by doctors, I am not making a moral 
judgment, but giving an analytical description. In other words, it is about a power displacement, which is not 
bad or good in itself; it just determines a different way of practising medicine in the context of advanced 
liberal/neoliberal societies.  
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It appears that in contemporary societies the medical discourse is no longer the „natural‟ 
space to define standards, rules and roles in medical practice. There is a contentious 
relationship at least between medical, legal and economic discourses that defines the scope 
and provision of medicine. However, what should be recognised is that conflicts arising in 
this environment are very often expressed as „ethical/legal dilemmas‟. Their origins and true 
nature, related to a power struggle over who controls medicine, remain hidden. The defining 
questions in this struggle are: Who defines what medicine is? Who decides about what being 
a good doctor is? In the past the intuitive answer would have been: doctors themselves. But 
such an answer is untenable nowadays. Medicine is expected to preserve what is supposed to 
be its ethical core: “to care for suffering and to heal the afflicted, [although doctors have 
started] to fight the unsolicited influences of legal and economical discourse” (Kimsma & 
Van Leewen, 2005, p. 563). If this is to be realised, society cannot continue assuming that 
doctors‟ reaction to recent healthcare reforms is just an expression of their „resistance‟ to 
accept new responsibilities. It is also a „resistance‟ against a power exercise coming from the 
legal and economic spheres, but done in the name of the greater good (the utilitarian motto). 
There is a contemporary attempt to „control‟ or, better, to „govern‟ medicine as well as to 
redistribute power in the medical scenario, and bioethics and medical law/liability contribute 
to this dynamics through the implementation of new practices related to surveillance, 
committees, subjection to principles and rules, lay experts, and so on. Moreover, as M. 
Dennis has argued, “[t]he lay experts‟ strategy often consists in drawing attention to the 
fateful consequences which may follow from the reforms proposed by the doctors, who, for 
their part, are liable to present their case badly by tending to err on each occasion in the 
mistaken belief that the opinion of the lay experts is that of the public” (Dennis, 1994, p. 72). 
 
As I already suggested in chapter five, in Foucauldian terms we can say that doctors used 
to be „sovereigns‟ of their own profession, but since “the head of the king was cut off” 
(Foucault, 1998, p. 89) power has been spread throughout the clinical sphere. This 
redistribution of power in the clinical scenario has been interpreted as a shift “from 
paternalism to autonomy” (González, N., et al., 1997, p. 17; Maehle & Geyer-Kordesch, 
2002). At the same time the new power relationships have helped to introduce economic 
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arguments in clinical decision making and turned doctors into double agents.
247
 Yet, this 
power effect remains hidden. First of all, as L. McCullough (2011, p. 73) has argued, the new 
regulatory discourses of medicine, such as bioethics and medical liability, have gone too far 
in arguing that paternalism was a norm in Western medical practice, contributing to its 
deprofessionalisation. Secondly, as already suggested, the clinical scenario might be 
assimilated to a „territory‟ where doctors used to „reign‟. However, having been „invaded‟ by 
outsiders, the power embodied in the „monarch‟ [doctors] has been disseminated throughout 
the entire medical field. But, who exactly then controls the medical scenario, who decides 
about life and death? „Sovereignty‟, i.e. paternalism, is gone and the medical field is now 
being re-founded as a „democratic territory‟ whose inhabitants understand themselves as free, 
autonomous and rational agents. Medical practice is no longer governed by doctors; medical 
practice is now governed by bioethics and medical liability as discourses that talk about 
freedom, autonomy, and free choice. Neither doctors nor bioethicists nor lawyers nor patients 
monopolize power in the medical scenario. All of them are subjects of the free choice, 
governed through a discourse on freedom. Nonetheless, this does not mean that sovereign 
power has entirely disappeared from the medical scenario. Doctors still exercise a lot of 
power over patients, but now doctors are also subjected to the „sovereign power‟ of bioethics 
and law. 
 
8. Interviews: How the surveillance environment of contemporary medical practice is 
felt and narrated 
8.1. Regarding medical ethics 
The senior doctors interviewed said that before the Code of Medical Ethics of 1981, self-
government was the most important way of regulation of the medical profession. For MGD, a 
senior internist, although fifty years ago there was no code of medical ethics, there was a 
bundle of implicit rules that every doctor was supposed to know which referred to issues such 
as honorariums, patients privacy and inter-professional relationships. However, he said, 
ethical misconduct used to be discussed only privately by doctors. If a doctor was involved in 
                                                             
247 It is not difficult to see that in market-driven healthcare systems “doctors are increasingly being asked, in one 
way or another, to save money for a third party –and sometimes for themselves- by scrimping on the medical 
care they deliver. But the pressure is seldom described in these terms. Instead, it is described as practicing „cost-
effective‟ medicine” (Angell, 1998, p. 147). The double agency is a new kind of subjectivity, a Frankensteinian 
expression of how neoliberal rationalities understand the clinical set and its regulation.  
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a despicable action, he would lose his good reputation and his colleagues would isolate him 
professionally. ROE, a clinic director, stressed that good reputation and prestige constituted 
the most important assets for a doctor in a time when, if one wanted to secure a large 
clientele, it was necessary to have a good name. As PRG, a retired nurse and bioethicist, 
remembered, “the modules on professional ethics were given with a strong religious [Roman 
Catholic] influence. At the time [in the 1950s-60s] personal self-care and dressing were 
important. Teachers emphasised good habits, good manners, and an impeccable uniform. The 
nurse cap should be correctly placed.”  
The code of medical ethics of 1981 is a landmark document in the history of the 
Colombian medical ethos. MVJ said that some reasons that in the 1970s led to the creation of 
a code of medical ethics included “problems linked to doctors‟ work in private clinics, 
abusive contracts between doctors and healthcare companies, and relationships between 
doctors and drugstores”. Moreover, as STF said, in the 1970s any problematic situation 
related to healthcare or medical practice was reduced to a problem of medical ethics. The 
consequence was according to STF that doctors frequently ended up in trouble, being 
constantly accused of ethical misconduct since there was a lack of clear norms and rules to 
guide medical practice. Therefore, a code of ethics was seen by doctors in the late 1970s as a 
mechanism to cope with these situations and as a self-protection strategy against the threats 
brought by the socialised medical practice. Additionally, MVJ argued that “the code of 
medical ethics has been very useful to inform doctors about the right way to practice and it 
has also provided the content to teach medical ethics in medical schools”. 
However it seems that, according to ETJ, only a small group of doctors and some 
professional associations were involved in writing the code. For ROE, who was a medical 
student at the end of the 1970s, the National Academy of Medicine was the medical 
association behind this code. It is interesting that many Colombian doctors feel that the code 
of ethics of 1981 is an „alien‟ document. For instance, as SHJ, a physician and university 
lecturer, said: “the code of ethics of 1981 is simply a set of rules that a doctor has to accept, 
although such rules were written by people he does not know”. Moreover, the double nature 
of this code, i.e. its deontological as well as legal nature, was controversial among doctors 
when it was introduced. According to STF “many doctors disagreed about creating a code of 
medical ethics that was at the same time a law since ethics was, in their opinion, a matter of 
„personal‟ views and then it was not possible to legislate about that.” Following the case of 
doctors, other healthcare professionals such as nurses had to create their own „laws‟ of 
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professional ethics. PRG, a retired nurse and ethicist, said that nurses were advised by 
lawyers to transform their code of ethics also into a „law‟ because this was the only way to 
guarantee that the decisions of the Nursing Court of Ethics were valid and binding. As a 
result, the nurses‟ code of ethics also became law through Law 911 of 2004. 
Despite its evidently being outdated, the code is still regarded as an important document of 
the Colombian medical ethos. For BPA, a lawyer, “the code of 1981 helped to preserve the 
spirit of the medical profession, although it needs to be updated.” In relation to the same 
issue, PAG, another lawyer, said that “its articles are not only ethical commands, but also 
legal duties. However, the code was written for doctors who practised individually, which is a 
problem as today doctors are tied by legal contracts and there are third parties [healthcare 
companies] making medical decisions.” For GCA, a physician and bioethicist, the code “was 
ahead of its time because it included, years before bioethics was known in Colombia, the duty 
of informing patients.” However, in the GCA‟s opinion there were new problems in the 
healthcare system that must be legitimately considered as problems of medical ethics, for 
instance, the problem of double agency, conflicts of interest and moral risk. For ETJ, “the 
code of 1981 required reforms as well as updates because the world was now more complex, 
and bioethical as well as legal issues should be considered in such a code.” In this regard, 
MVJ mentioned that the draft of a new code that was being discussed by various medical 
associations included, first, a reformulation of the goals of medicine; second, the 
acknowledgement that in many situations it is not a doctor but healthcare companies that 
make the decisions, and that these companies should be accountable in terms of medical 
ethics; and third, an adequate and clear procedure to file complaints of medical misconduct.   
Some of the interviewees remembered that when they were at the medical school, 
„medical ethics‟ was seen very often as an unimportant, useless and boring part of the 
medical curriculum. Still, practitioners see medical ethics and bioethics as an important part 
of medical education. But doctors‟ professional life contradicts the importance verbally given 
to medical ethics and bioethics. This contradiction is because good comments about medical 
ethics and bioethics are a matter of political correctness. As LCM, a physician, has argued, 
the problem of medical ethics in Colombia has to do with its „academic‟, disconnected 
character, distant field from daily practice. An emergency room doctor, JEO, said that the 
code was barely mentioned in his service; it was “dead letter”. According to AQJ, another 
emergency room doctor, the code of ethics was considered as an unimportant document by 
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clinicians, although as many other clinicians in Colombia, AQJ thought that following the 
code might protect doctors from being involved in medical lawsuits.  
According to LBG, a physician who was also a member of a court of ethics, the analysis of 
the most common cases known by its tribunal showed that: First, in the new healthcare 
system doctors were pressurised to accept unfair labour contracts with healthcare companies. 
Second, medical confidentiality was not possible within the bureaucratic style of the new 
healthcare system. Third, medical students were learning how to engage in the bureaucracy of 
the system, instead of developing the ability to make right medical decisions. Fourth, doctors 
were no longer committed to the patient as a whole, only to the tasks or activities they were 
hired for according to their own speciality or function in the system.
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 Fifth, the new 
healthcare system worked as a „production chain‟ in which accountability was dissolved and 
medical attention deteriorated. One doctor sees a patient for the first time, other doctor orders 
some tests, another one carries out the required surgery, a different one is in charge of 
postoperative care, and so on. 
Some of the interviewees, like FAS, a physician and expert in public health, strongly 
criticised what I would call the blameworthy sides of the Colombian bioethics. He said that 
“if anyone wants to assess the role that ethics and bioethics [as disciplines] are truly playing 
in the current healthcare scenario, it would be necessary to ask whom or what interests is 
bioethics working for”. He also said that bioethicists in Colombia, particularly the renowned 
ones, probably were honestly doing great and interesting work, but the fact remains that their 
work had no intention of any social transformation. On the contrary, “bioethics is mainly 
about reinforcing the status quo and the discourses of some Colombian bioethicists are really 
regressive… It is not a surprise since in Colombia bioethics has never been in progressive 
hands. This is the problem!” For SHJ, a physician and university lecturer, “medical ethics and 
bioethics are „visible‟ only in complex cases that exemplify the so-called „ethical dilemmas‟”. 
However, for him, daily medical practice was full of ethical aspects that unfortunately were 
underestimated or disregarded because they were not „spectacular‟. 
 
 
                                                             
248 LBG provided this example, which was a real case: a radiologist saw a malformation during an echography 
session, but because his contract was just to inform about the foetus‟ age and some data such as its weight and 
height, he did not write in his report anything about the finding because „it was not his business‟.  
175 
 
8.2. The emergence of medical liability 
For BPA, a lawyer, medical malpractice and medical liability were terms that, in the 
context of the broader field of medical law, described the legal accountability of individuals 
and institutions within the healthcare system. As PQP, another lawyer specialising in medical 
liability, explained, medical liability arises from medical error. In medical malpractice cases 
it is necessary to prove that a bad outcome was because of reasons other than patient's 
disease. For BPA, medical liability was just a particular case of liability in general; all 
professionals are legally liable, not only doctors. However, as an emerging field medical 
liability has been gradually growing because, she said, it was clear that the more educated 
people were, the more likely they were to claim compensation for damages they suffered. 
Therefore the academic and professional field of medical liability had grown so much in the 
last few years as “a natural outcome of society‟s progress”. This opinion was shared by some 
of the interviewed doctors like GCA, who thought that because today people were much 
more informed about medical issues as well as their rights, they tended to claim more. For 
ABC, the presence of lawyers in the clinical scenario meant a crisis of accountability in the 
healthcare sector. According to STF, thirty years ago a doctor would not have been 
compelled to appear before a judge unless he had done something really horrible. But today, 
as MGD argued, the growing legal regulation of medical practice was unavoidable as the 
scenario for practicing medicine had been radically transformed. 
Within the medical malpractice discourse, bad medical outcomes tend to be regarded as a 
consequence of one individual‟s failure. However, the structure of the system itself can also 
harm patients. BPA, a lawyer, argued that “in the new healthcare system the likelihood for a 
doctor to be sued has increased and is linked to the presence of „risk factors‟ such as the short 
time a doctor is given in a healthcare company to see a patient and the tendency of doctors to 
overwork to compensate the drastic fall in their earnings”. In BPA‟s opinion the increase in 
medical lawsuits was not a consequence of the healthcare reform of 1993, but merely two 
coincidental phenomena. MVJ, a physician and medical ethicist, agreed and argued that “the 
health system is a „professional misconduct maker‟ since sometimes doctors cannot do 
anything other than obey the rules imposed by the system. Unfortunately, lay people do not 
know about this reality. Therefore, people have ended up blaming doctors without 
considering the role that the system itself is playing in the production of bad medical results”.  
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However, according to PAG, a lawyer, the way medical liability is understood was 
changing. He said that “the practice of medicine in corporative, managed care contexts is 
challenging the traditional concept of medical liability. At present, Colombian high courts‟ 
jurisprudence is that individuals and institutions share accountability and, therefore, liability. 
In 2008, for instance, there were some high court rulings against healthcare insurance 
companies instead of individual doctors. This illustrates a shift in the jurisprudence regarding 
medical lawsuits in Colombia because so far health providers and individual doctors had been 
the only ones targeted by lawyers when filing a medical lawsuit, while healthcare companies 
had remained untouched.”  
According to BPA, the medical malpractice discourse was aiming at preserving the ethical 
standards of the medical profession as well as compensating patients when they were harmed 
as a result of a medical act
249. “When things went wrong in the clinical setting, medical ethics 
means nothing for patients”. From the perspective of a „victim‟, the disciplinary penalties that 
a doctor is given are not a compensation. For BPA, “while bioethics remains in the realm of 
the hypothetical, the law does actually regulate practices, interventions, actions, etc.”  
However, as FAS pointed out, “many people take for granted that law is neutral and good 
per se, but actually the law is just the expression of a balance between different social forces 
in conflict”. Many lawyers like BPA thought that judges in courts of law were truly impartial, 
as “they know their decisions might be reviewed at a higher level, i.e. superior court, leading 
them to seek „objectiveness‟ in all their decisions.”250 VRR, a physician and expert in 
managed care, pointed out that “different discourses, such as technical, scientific and others 
are articulated and expressed in the laws and norms regulating the healthcare system”. The 
idea of neutrality of the law was also criticised by ABC. He said that taking up the law as 
neutral “is an ideological effect that allows certain groups to impose their will, but from a 
                                                             
249 The concept of „medical act‟ is central both for medical ethics and medical malpractice/liability discourses in 
Colombia, and should be differentiated from the term „medical practice‟. Medical accountability only exists as 
long as a medical act has taken place. From the perspective of the European Union of Medical Specialists, a 
medical act “encompasses all the professional action, e.g. scientific, teaching, training and educational, clinical 
and medico-technical steps, performed to promote health, prevent diseases, provide diagnostic or therapeutic 
care to patients, individuals, groups or communities and is the responsibility of, and must always be performed 
by a registered medical doctor/physician or under his or her direct supervision and/or prescription.” Retrieved 
from: http://admin.uems.net/uploadedfiles/754.pdf, accessed 28 August 2011. 
250 The idea that lawyers, judges, and juries are impartial is very widespread, and nowadays reinforced by TV 
dramas and news. However, legal proceedings are full of subjective and ideological biases. See, for instance, 
Kerruish, V. (1991). Jurisprudence as Ideology. London: Routledge. In Latin America also some jurists have 
analysed this problem. See: Cuéllar, A. (2007) Las sentencias judiciales en América Latina [Legal Decisions in 
Latin America]. Retrieved from www4.jfrj.jus.br/seer/index.php/revista_sjrj/article/view/151/163, accessed 20 
September 2011.  
177 
 
sociological perspective laws are just part of the social structure.” Moreover, PAG claimed 
that, “lawyers are able to make-up a case from nothing”. In his opinion, to file a medical 
malpractice case before a court was not a problem because finding weaknesses, failures and 
misconduct in the current healthcare scenario was too easy. 
According to GCA, a physician and bioethicist, the first postgraduate programme in the 
field of medical liability was opened by the Bolivarian University in Medellin, in 2005, after 
which three universities in Bogota also opened similar programmes (El Rosario in 2006, 
Javeriana and Externado in 2007). GCA emphasised that these reflected a variety of 
approaches to the field. While at Javeriana University medical law was synonymous with 
medical malpractice/liability, El Rosario adopted a broader approach. GCA‟s view was that 
medical law encompassed “any problematic issue regarding life”, which included not only 
medical liability, but also legal regulations to guarantee access to medicines, the 
administrative structure of the healthcare system, biotechnology and laws to regulate 
reproductive issues. 
But not all doctors considered the presence of lawyers in the clinical scenario as negative. 
STF, for instance, said that his experience in a court of medical ethics of more than eleven 
years taught him that medical self-regulation did not work as “guild brotherhood” made 
impartiality a goal hard to achieve. He thought the intervention of law was necessary. LCM 
suggested a perspective not centred on lawsuits to consider the influence of lawyers on 
medical practice. For her it was also important to acknowledge that lawyers helped people to 
obtain from either state or healthcare companies medical services, which they were entitled to 
receive. For ETJ, the presence of lawyers in the medical scenario could help to guarantee 
patients‟ autonomy as well as justice. For him, “there is no such thing as an undue 
interference of law into medical practice. The law is there for protecting [individual‟s] 
rights”. Yet, in his view “the increase of medical lawsuits in the USA might have contributed 
to the rise of bioethics as a successful new discipline”. For STF, “lawyers are necessary, for 
instance, in ethics committees and also courts of medical ethics because ethical misconduct 
proceedings might end up in civil, criminal, or administrative lawsuits.” Thus, as PQP 
clarified, medical misconduct usually led to malpractice lawsuits, although misconduct was 
not the main source of medical malpractice cases.  
In contrast, for MVJ “if doctors‟ accountability is going to be assessed based on civil laws 
about compensations, the conflict between doctors and lawyers will be a war-like situation.” 
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According to him, the medical malpractice discourse should replace neither medical ethics 
nor bioethics, as doctors should be taught how to be committed to doing their work well 
rather than to blindly obey a legal norm. The code of ethics was pointless, he insisted, if 
doctors did not have the intention to behave correctly. For MVJ, the increase in medical 
lawsuits was owed to the loss of respect for doctors. In MGD‟s view, patients did not trust 
doctors in the same way they used to in the past. According to PAG, a lawyer, the problem 
was that “people used to accept passively bad medical outcomes since they were an 
expression of God‟s will or just bad luck. But now people are prone to claim and – according 
to his professional experience – they claim whatever the outcome is”. Thus reasons to sue a 
doctor in Colombia include: the idea of „guaranteed rights‟, the weaknesses of the medical 
profession‟s self-regulation, the idea of having a mechanism of compensation whenever 
patients are injured by a medical intervention, and the loss of respect for doctors. 
According to BPA, Colombian doctors had reacted against the medical malpractice 
phenomenon in two ways. Some implemented a kind of “safe practice”, i.e. their practice was 
guided by both the lex artis and the code of medical ethics. But others preferred to implement 
a “defensive practice”. At the moment the clinical scenario in Colombia is impregnated with 
fear. As AQJ noticed, “we doctors are constantly under risk of getting into legal trouble.” 
Unfortunately, he said, “defensive medical practice has led to an increase of unnecessary 
laboratory tests and referrals to specialists. In the emergency room some doctors even avoid 
attending seriously ill patients since they represent a higher risk of being sued”. Similarly, 
JEO thought that “at present doctors prefer to adopt a „low-profile‟ style at their work, doing 
just the minimum required as the best way to avoid legal risks”. Of course, as SHJ observed, 
doctors should record every medical intervention to have evidence that he/she has followed 
best practice, although “instead of hoping to be declared „not guilty‟ in court, it is better for 
doctors to avoid legal confrontations. Then, doctors should request as many tests as possible 
in order to shield themselves against lawyers”. However, in PAG‟s opinion, “Colombia is far 
from the „witch-hunt‟ situation that characterises the US, where an increase of medical 
lawsuits with high premiums has occurred in the last few years.” 
In EGR‟s words, “although in Colombian law „everyone is innocent until proven guilty‟, 
in the case of doctors it was otherwise, as they were treated as „guilty until proven innocent‟”. 
Moreover, as VRR said, doctors were subjected to a bundle of rules that were often out of 
their control. For him, the discourse of ethics presupposed freedom. Hence medical ethics 
was not viable in the current healthcare system since it imposed severe limitations on doctors‟ 
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autonomy. As PRB said, “there is an overabundance of legal norms in Colombia that makes 
the healthcare sector too complex.” Paradoxically, many legal and administrative norms 
ruling the clinical scenario can restraint doctors of doing their clinical work properly, i.e. 
focus on the individual‟s needs.251 
10. Conclusion 
The discourse of medical ethics in Colombia can be characterised by three aspects. First, it 
is a discourse that appeals to the mythical figure of Hippocrates to support the idea that the 
medical profession has a fundamental and unchangeable „ethical core‟ now threatened by the 
new conditions of practice. Second, it is usually taken as synonymous with a code of ethics 
(medical deontology). And third, it has traditionally been a discourse related to elite medical 
associations, such as the National Academy of Medicine, conservative groups, the Roman 
Catholic Church and „experts‟ in medical ethics/bioethics. It was interesting to observe that in 
order to face the advent of corporate medicine, with the creation of the first private healthcare 
insurance companies, the use of new technologies, and a growing influence of lawyers over 
the biomedical field, the Colombian medical establishment promoted the creation of the code 
of ethics of 1981.  Medical ethics in Colombia has been a discourse used to saying what 
medicine is and what not. Moreover, as medical ethics became synonymous with this code, 
the discourse of medical ethics in Colombia was impoverished as it was reduced to mere 
medical deontology. Additionally, I would also argue that by making this code a law, Law 23 
of 1981, the road was paved to the juridification of medicine about which many talk 
nowadays in Colombia. The historical concurrence of an American-style healthcare system, 
the values brought by the constitution of 1991, the arrival of discourses about bioethics and 
malpractice coming from the US, and the healthcare reform of 1993 might explain the 
„conditions of possibility‟ for medical law, as a discourse and professional field, to have 
rapidly developed in Colombia since the 1990s. 
During the last fifty years, accompanying the techno-scientific advance that has 
revolutionised the practice of medicine and led to the rise of corporate healthcare, discourses 
and practices of surveillance have gained importance in the biomedical scenario. This is the 
case for the discourses about bioethics and medical liability, which are reshaping the 
biomedical ethos and have also created new disciplinary and professional fields. Then, 
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 The clinical method is about individuals, not groups, which are the target of public health, epidemiology and 
health economics.  
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keeping an eye on doctors has, according to the American bioethicist A. Jonsen, become a 
profession. He has argued that “some people have arranged to watch from afar [the DPR]. 
Our culture has transformed the fascinating pastime of doctor-watching into a science [and] 
we have orchestrated the ooh‟s and ah‟s into a critical literature” (Jonsen, 1992, p. 1). 
Bioethics and medical liability constitute discourses about highly appreciated social values 
such as individual autonomy, freedom to choice, fair distribution of resources and protection 
from doctors‟ abuses and exploitation.    
Once medical practice and healthcare services were transformed into a powerful and huge 
economic sector, the so-called medical industrial complex, new regulations were required, 
too, in order to keep such a sector working properly. Bioethics and medical law are part of 
these new regulations by providing necessary elements. First, they provide a rhetorical 
discourse about moral values, ethical principles, individual‟s rights and protection. They 
coloured healthcare and medical practice of humanism, respect for persons, and freedom in 
such a way that structural and socio-political aspects related to them remain hidden. Second, 
they constitute a particular way of disciplining not only healthcare professionals, and doctors 
in particular, but also all the inhabitants of the biomedical scenario, i.e. patients, healthcare 
providers, managers and so on.  
From a Foucauldian point of view, bioethics has contributed, with its emphasis on 
personal autonomy and free choice, to the governmentalization of biomedicine, helping in 
„conducting the conduct‟ of healthcare professionals, patients, and research subjects in a way 
that is functional to the rationalities and practices of neoliberal healthcare systems. However, 
the governmentalization of medicine does not mean that other forms of power have 
disappeared from the biomedical field and, most importantly, that talking about power in 
medicine only means the power exercised by doctors over patients (i.e. paternalism) and/or 
the power exercised by medicine over society (i.e. medicalisation). In this chapter I have 
particularly illustrated how bioethics and medical law are current ways of exercising 
sovereign and disciplinary power over the biomedical field. In the next chapter I will examine 
how bioethics has also become part of contemporary biopolitics in Colombia in the context of 
the new constitution of 1991 and the healthcare reform of 1993. The Foucauldian perspective 
allows us see that different kinds of power are operating simultaneously and in different ways 
in the biomedical field. Thus, in Colombia the contemporary shift from a 
Hippocratic/deontological view of medical practice, which was focused on self-regulation, 
trust and medical authority, to a practice oriented towards individuals‟ choices and regulated 
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not only by doctors, but also by bioethicists, lawyers, and economists, can be seen as a power 
effect.  
In the way bioethics and medical liability discourses have worked over the biomedical 
scenario in Colombia, one can also see the productive effects of power and the inextricably 
relationship between power and knowledge. On the one hand, a new concept of good 
doctoring has evolved in Colombia as a result of changes brought by the new constitution of 
1991, the healthcare reform of 1993 and the arrival of discourses of surveillance such as 
bioethics and medical liability. Today, being a good doctor not only means the possession of 
certain personal qualities and virtues, but also to be bound to administrative, legal, and 
economic norms of healthcare. On the other hand, medical law has become a new specialised 
area in which expert knowledge, expert subjects, and particular forms of judging the reality 
have been created. It is a practical discourse that has transformed the medical ethos by 
introducing new values, new accountabilities, new rationalities, and it is embodied in 
different institutions related to healthcare, the judiciary, schools of medicine, insurance 
companies and so on.   
Although the law is necessary to protect the vulnerable, guarantee individual rights and 
compensate those who have been injured after a medical intervention, it is undeniable that the 
development of discourses and practices around medical malpractice has also represented a 
lucrative business for several actors: lawyers, legal insurance and healthcare companies. This 
has been another productive effect of power in liberal contemporary societies with American-
style healthcare systems, such as Colombia. Following F. Ewald (1991), it can be argued that 
the creation of a „legal risk‟ in medical practice is a power effect, which has meant that 
doctors are having to pay insurance policies and are practising defensive medicine, having the 
counterproductive effect of growing distrust between doctors and patients, and the 
exploitation of healthcare professionals by healthcare companies. While Law 100 of 1993 
transformed the milieu in which medical practice has to take place in Colombia, making it 
governable, as I showed in the preceding chapter, by individualising accountabilities, using a 
pastoral discourse, and also the force of law to punish (sovereign power), bioethics and 
medical liability represent a particular way of subjection of the bodies of healthcare 
professionals, particularly doctors, to the particular practices and institutions imposed by the 
neoliberal healthcare reform of 1993 (disciplinary power). A good doctor in Colombia 
nowadays seems to be the „disciplined doctor‟; one who fears the law instead of respecting it 
and remains completely bound to the rules, practices and rationalities imposed by the system.  
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Chapter seven 
The Colombian Constitutional Court and its „bioethical‟ decisions 
 
1. Introduction 
According to T. Hope, J. Savulescu, and J. Hendrick (2008, p. 35), from a legal 
perspective there are three main concepts to take into account in medical ethics: the patient‟s 
best interests, autonomy and rights. A medical decision based on patients‟ best interests is 
intended to guarantee that account is taken of their wellbeing, which is particularly important 
when patients “lack the capacity to take part in their own medical decisions” (Hope, et al., 
2008, p. 35). Although there is no unanimous view on what a patient‟s wellbeing means, the 
concept of best interest is basically linked to respect for autonomy. This principle is key not 
only to medical practice, but also for the whole socio-political life of Western societies. Its 
impact on how to understand the DPR has been enormous in the last 30 years (Hope, et al., 
2008, p. 40). The discourse on individual autonomy has two roots in the Western political 
philosophy. From a Kantian point of view, human beings are supposed to have a special 
dignity and should be considered ends in themselves, while from J.S. Mill‟s point of view, 
people‟s freedom should not be limited unless they harm others. Within the liberal paradigm, 
moral authority is derived from the individual, which means that in a medical context any 
decision or intervention requires the patient‟s consent. In fact, T. H. Engelhardt (1996, p. 72) 
renamed the principle of respect for autonomy as “principle of permission”. The legal and 
economic counterpart of this ethical position in the medical context is that patients are seen as 
consumers (Díaz Amado, 2009b, p. 23). The preponderance of the individual is nevertheless 
a source of conflicts since his “[r]ights impose moral (and legal) constraints on collective 
social goals” (Hope, 2008, p. 43). Thus, finding the equilibrium between „the individual‟ and 
„the social‟ is of political importance. However, as I have shown in chapter two, from a 
Foucauldian point of view the pre-eminence of individual autonomy in liberal societies 
should not naïvely be understood merely as a proof of „moral progress‟, but also as an 
effective and dynamic strategy of governmentality. After the PC of 1991, and with the 
particular role played by the Constitutional Court (CC), concepts such as best interest, respect 
for autonomy, and individual rights have gained momentum in the ethical discourse of 
biomedicine.  
In this new political and legal environment, the Colombian people could obviously have 
celebrated that they got more freedom but, to which extent? Does „more individual 
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autonomy‟ mean „more freedom‟? Is the current legal regulation of human life and body 
emancipating the individual or is it just a very effective extension of biopower? And, as P. 
Miller and N. Rose have asked: “how, and to what ends, did so many socially legitimated 
authorities seek to interfere in the lives of individuals in sites as diverse as the school, the 
home, the work-place, the courtroom and the dole queue?” (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 1) The 
answer, as I have also argued in previous chapters, might be governmentality, a concept used 
by M. Foucault that embraces “the tactics of government that make possible the continual 
definition and redefinition of what is within the competence of the state and what is not, the 
public versus the private, and so on” (Foucault, 1991, p. 221). As part of the ongoing task to 
analyse how and why regulating every aspect of human life might be a strategy to govern 
individuals, I will therefore characterise the Colombian case as a paradigmatic example of 
these contemporary power dynamics in the biomedical scenario by analysing three CC 
decisions, the highest court, created by the PC of 1991.  
The CC‟s decisions have introduced case law into Colombian law, leading to a gradual 
abandonment of  
the formalist legal approach, which disregarded the importance of preserving 
constitutional mandates in real-life situations. [Also the CC‟s role] has 
substantially altered imbalances of power in the Colombian social, political, and 
economic spheres [as its] decisions are highly sensitive to social inequalities and 
to the needs of the vulnerable, weak, and marginalized. [Moreover, the CC] has 
become a forum where the most difficult, pressing, complex, and sensitive 
national problems have found increasingly legitimate responses. (Cepeda, 2004, 
p. 536)  
The role played by this court marks a turning point in Colombian political, legal and 
ethical life. The CC‟s activity since its creation has been remarkable in terms of promoting 
the realisation of the pluralistic, inclusive and rights-oriented values of the PC of 1991. As I 
mentioned in chapter five, this Constitution tried to embrace two conflicting models of the 
state: on the one hand, the social rule-of-law state oriented to provide welfare and, on the 
other hand, a neoliberal state driven by the market (Alvarez, J. R. 2007, p. 126), the latter 
being the model privileged by governments of the last 20 years. However, through its 
decisions the CC has counterbalanced the latter trend by, for example, considering rights 
widely, taking into account international treatises when making decisions, and guaranteeing 
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the Colombian citizens their fundamental rights (Eslava, 09, p204). These dynamics can be 
seen in several landmark CC decisions, e.g. when guaranteeing religious pluralism, an 
important decision in a country that has been traditionally been dominated by Roman 
Catholicism (case C-027/93); the decriminalisation of the personal consumption of certain 
psychotropic substances (case C-221/94); the decriminalisation of active euthanasia (case C-
239/97), the unconstitutionality of discriminating homosexuality (case C-481/98); and more 
recently the decriminalisation of abortion (case C-355/06). 
However, the role of the CC has not been easy and it has often met resistance. During the 
20 years when governments have tended to push neo-liberal economic policies, the CC has 
always been a powerful voice emphasising that rights cannot be ignored and this has meant „a 
stone in the shoe‟ for the political establishment. The economic consequences of the CC‟s 
decisions in the field of healthcare have resulted in disagreements and tensions between the 
government and the CC.
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 In the debate accusations of “judicial activism” by the CC have 
been made and the problem of a lack of clear legislation on collective rights has been pointed 
out (Murillo & Gómez, 2005, p. 8). The CC has even been accused of “sentimental 
populism” (Cepeda, 2004, p. 536). Moreover, some legal scholars have argued that in 
Colombia judges are having too much prominence, leading to the „judiridification of politics‟ 
when, for example, the fundamental rights should be explained via legal decisions rather than 
via political agreements (Uprimny, 2006, p. 97f).  Others have described this development as 
the “constitutionalization of daily life” in Colombia, since one of the effects of the PC of 
1991 has been to channel accumulated frustrations of the Colombian people, infusing them 
with the optimism of having in the constitution a set of fundamental rights. Overall, the PC of 
1991 has shown that the law might have an emancipatory role and not only serve as a tool to 
domination. Nevertheless, to change complex social realities by simply introducing new laws 
is difficult (Eslava, 2009, pp. 191, 215).  
In this chapter I will examine in particular the CC case decisions on euthanasia (case C-
239/97), medical treatment of intersexual states (case SU-037/99) and abortion (case C-
355/06). Through the analysis of these decisions I want to show how the bioethical language, 
e.g. the concept of informed consent, has entered and is currently used in the Colombian 
constitutional discourse. In this way, I want to illustrate how Colombian jurisprudence 
                                                             
252 In the US the situation seems to be similar. E. Morreim (2001, p. 18) has pointed out that “courts‟ judge-
made insurance rulings that look not at the actual contract language, so much as at patients‟ expectations” have 
given the public the idea that everyone is entitled to receive anything as part of their medical treatment.  
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regarding biomedical issues has been bioethicalised and, concomitantly, how the 
juridification of the Colombian medical ethos has been reinforced. In the conclusion, I will 
argue that to better understand the complex relationships between medicine, law and 
economics in contemporary medical practice in the case of Colombia the use of concepts like 
biopolitics and governmentality as analytical tools is necessary. 
 
2. The Colombian Constitutional Court and the language of bioethics  
In the Colombian political-legal system the Constitution is the supreme law and has to 
prevail in conflicts between legal norms. The duty of the CC is to preserve the integrity and 
supremacy of the Constitution. For M.J. Cepeda, a former justice of this court, the creation of 
the CC meant “(i) the creation of a specialized tribunal at the head of a new „constitutional 
jurisdiction‟ to which all Colombian judges belong; (ii) the application of constitutional 
judicial review to concrete situations through the writ of protection of fundamental rights 
(acción de tutela); (iii) the expansion of abstract review of laws, whether ex officio or through 
actio popularis; and (iv) the adoption of a means to contextualize decisions adopted in 
abstract review” (Cepeda, 2004, p. 537). The CC can make three kinds of decisions. First, 
through a judicial review process, the CC makes decisions about the „constitutionality‟ of 
norms, laws, decrees and administrative decisions (Cepeda, 2004, p. 536) These decisions are 
identified with a letter „C‟, e.g. the case decision C-355/06 that decriminalised abortion. 
Second, sometimes the Court makes decisions to provide criteria on how to analyse future 
cases related to a particular issue through the so-called „unification judgments‟. These 
decisions are identified by the letters „SU‟, e.g. SU-037/99, a guideline to decide on 
intersexual states. And finally, decisions of tutela when citizens or social organisations 
demand from the state that their fundamental rights are protected. Although the majority of 
tutelas are solved by judges in lower courts, some reach the CC for review. In these cases the 
CC not only resolves a case, but also provides important elements of jurisprudence. These 
decisions are identified with a letter „T‟, e.g. T-209/08 in which a 13 years old teenager, who 
had been raped, was guaranteed the right to a legal abortion which her healthcare insurance 
company had initially refused to cover. In this ruling, for instance, the Court not only 
resolved the case of this teenager, but also provided a guideline on the correct use of the 
conscience objection.  
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As of 23
rd 
of February 2009 there were 1863 case decisions of the Constitutional Court 
related to the right to health. In many of these decisions the language of bioethics, 
particularly principlism, was visible. By the end of 1990s the CC had a well-developed 
doctrine about informed consent, which focused on protecting patients‟ autonomy (Cabal, 
1999, p. 35). The CC decisions related to bioethics are based on various articles of the 
Constitution. For example, Articles 1, 12, and 16 are related to human dignity, the 
inviolability of life and the autonomy of the individual; Article 49 talks about protection of 
life and people‟s integrity, which in the case of minors is referred to in Article 44; Articles 70 
and 71 promote scientific progress and the improvement of techniques; Articles 13 and 49 are 
related to the principle of justice (Cabal, 1999, pp. 39-40).  
The CC‟s function can be framed within a context of the judiciary‟s growing influence and 
judges‟ power in Colombia after the PC of 1991 (Murillo & Gómez, 2005, p. 7). The increase 
in the power of judges in Colombia has had important consequences in the field of health care 
since, as Eslava (2009) has argued “when the law offers a dignity that the state cannot 
provide, legal technologies have catapulted individual and social aspirations” (p. 191). The 
CC has sometimes been praised for protecting individual‟s rights and adequately balancing 
[doctors‟] beneficence against [patients‟] autonomy (Sánchez, 1996), i.e. limiting doctors‟ 
discretion to make medical decisions and protecting the right of patients to decide on issues 
related to their own body and health. But other times it has been accused of deciding on 
medical treatments and being contradictory on how the bioethical principles should be 
understood (El Tiempo, 1994; Galán, 1995). 
 
3. The decriminalisation of euthanasia 
3.1. Brief history of euthanasia 
Although the Hippocratic Oath forbids to provide patients with deadly substances, 
“[s]uicide and euthanasia were common acts in classical antiquity because fundamentally 
they did not conflict with the moral beliefs of the time […] When faced with hopeless 
circumstances, the ancient Greeks and Romans suffered little social disapproval if they chose 
to end their lives, commit infanticide, or perform abortions” (Dowbiggin, 2005, p. 8). In the 
Middle Age, Crusaders carried a special knife called Misericorde, a “long, narrow knife [to 
deliver] the death stroke […] to a seriously wounded knight” (Bradbury, 2004). For 
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Suetonius in the first century and still for Francis Bacon in the seventeenth century, 
euthanasia was understood etymologically, “that is, to signify an easy death through the 
mitigation of pain rather than a death hastened by a physician through the administration of 
poison.” However by the eighteenth century, in the context of the Enlightenment, euthanasia 
and suicide were seen as an expression of autonomy (Dowbiggin, 2005, pp. 23, 27). 
In the twentieth century, particularly after the experience of racist and Social Darwinist 
eugenic programmes during the Nazi period in Germany, the word euthanasia was associated 
with killing people whose life was considered not worthwhile to live. But it was with the 
medicalisation of death that euthanasia re-entered the medical and political discourse. Thus, 
the history of euthanasia is “a story that is influenced by technological and behavioural 
changes in the practice of medicine. Today, when modern medicine can do so much to 
prolong lives, it is no coincidence that a right-to-die movement flourishes in many countries 
around the world” (Dowbiggin, 2005, p. 6). Euthanasia is then a reaction against the 
„excesses‟ of contemporary medical intervention and an attempt to exercise free will –a long-
lasting effect of the Enlightenment- in this case to decide when and how to die. However, it is 
necessary to bear in mind that euthanasia has different meanings depending on the socio-
political, cultural, and economic context. Today the debate about euthanasia takes place in the 
field of bioethics. In this field, legal, economic, ethical, religious and political aspects are 
discussed as bioethics is constituted as an interdisciplinary and pluralistic discipline. Once 
euthanasia becomes a „bioethical issue‟, it is then managed, recast and outlined in a particular 
manner.  
Any bioethics textbook includes a chapter about euthanasia and by and large these 
chapters follow a similar rationality. To illustrate this, I read the chapter on euthanasia in a 
book of bioethics that I randomly pick up from the bioethics shelf in the library of Durham 
University, W. Glannon‟s book Biomedical Ethics (2005). The debate about euthanasia is 
usually placed in the broader context of end-of-life issues and closely linked to the question 
of the definition of death,
253
 physician-assisted suicide, the doctrine of double effect, the 
withdrawing of treatment, ordinary/extraordinary means, and futility (Glannon, 2005, pp. 
120-137). During the last 30 years the euthanasia debate has increasingly taken the 
appearance of a „technical issue‟, philosophically and medically. For instance, in their edited 
book Bioethics: An Anthology P. Singer and H. Kuhse (2006) present the issue in terms of a 
                                                             
253 Cardiopulmonary, whole brain and higher brain death. 
188 
 
discussion between active and passive euthanasia
254
 and its philosophical consequences. J. 
Rachels (2006, p. 288) opens by providing four reasons to argue that such a distinction 
should be avoided. These arguments are: first, active euthanasia is in many cases more 
humane than passive euthanasia; second, sometimes decisions are made on irrelevant 
grounds; third, the distinction itself has no moral importance; fourth, arguments backing the 
argument are invalid. For him, doctors are mainly concerned with the legal consequences of 
their acts, tend just to follow guidelines and therefore the function of the distinction between 
active and passive euthanasia is merely to conform to the law and not the result of a moral 
reasoning. In contrast, using interesting thought experiments W. Nesbitt (2006, p. 295) tries 
to demonstrate that “killing is indeed morally worse than letting die”, although this is a claim 
that does not follow from the premises offered by Nesbitt, says H. Kuhse (2006, p. 297) for 
whom killing and letting die are interchangeable terms. But, apart from a certain familiarity 
with utilitarian and/or principlist theories, anyone who wanted to enter the debate would also 
need to have basic medical knowledge as well. Or, is it possible to debate euthanasia without 
having a basic knowledge about what and how permanent vegetative state, ventilators, 
intensive care units and gastrostomy tube feedings are and work? Instead of analysing the 
bio-ethical debate on euthanasia in an analytical Anglo-American philosophy, as if it was a 
problem of “consistency of the premises”, a inductive-deductive logical exercise, or a 
linguistic puzzle, and as if euthanasia was a universal, clear concept, I would rather like to 
make a case for an approach that considers the historical, socio-political, cultural, and, most 
importantly, biopolitical dimension of euthanasia. 
 
3.2. Biopolitics and euthanasia 
In the last 40 years, euthanasia has been at the centre of a „global debate‟ about life and 
death. After the Nazis‟ euthanasia programmes in the 1930s and 1940s, the first case that 
drew public attention was Karen Anne Quinlan in 1978, a young woman who was left in 
permanent vegetative state after consuming alcohol and drugs in 1975. She died in 1985 from 
pneumonia. This case illustrated how the courts became the location where decisions about 
life and death would be made in our time (Rothman, D. J., 1991, p. 3). More recently the 
story of Terri Schiavo was widely covered in the media, a woman in a permanent vegetative 
state who was kept alive until a court gave her husband permission to remove the feeding 
                                                             
254 This differentiation has also a historical dimension that has not been properly analysed by bioethicists.  
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tube in 2005 „to let her die‟. This case generated much attention and was so politicised that 
the US president personally intervened. In his analysis of Schiavo‟s case, J. Bishop has 
shown that “bioethics is complicit in the totalising effects of contemporary medicine [and 
that] life and law have always been indistinguishable” (Bishop, 2008, pp. 538, 539). Bishop‟s 
analysis can be useful to illustrate also a characteristic aspect of many current bioethical 
debates: the „dilemma-framework mo el’ in which bioethics is depicted as a „field of 
dilemmas‟, logical contentions between A and B, or as in the Shiavo case, between 
conservatives and liberals, which notwithstanding depicting a political discussion is 
translated in bioethics into the aseptic language of „dilemmas‟. Something similar happens 
with abortion, embryo research, and so on. All the while an inability of the participants in the 
debate to „see‟ its power-related roots is really evident. In order to be able to „see‟, as Bishop 
suggests, the analysis should focus on the discourses that fuel certain practices and not only 
on logical arguments stripped of content (Bishop, 2008, p. 539).  
In the Schiavo case, we saw a „spectacle‟ in which conservatives and liberals each sought 
to present their perspective as the right one. In this debate, conservatives wanted to protect 
life, so they promoted governmental interventions whenever it was necessary to do so. For 
social conservatives the good life could be reduced to bare life (zoe). For Bishop, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, “[…] social conservatives wish to politicize bare life, mere life of 
each body within the body politic. Thus, in modern conservative politics, bare life has 
become the good life” (Bishop, 2008, p. 545). Meanwhile, liberals were focused on “quality 
of life, notions of good life, and notions of a bios politikos. In other words, for social liberals 
the good life became the foundational justification for possession of bare life. That is to say, 
social liberals tend to focus on liberty” (ibid., p. 546). Instead of closing the gap between bare 
life and bios-politikos, as conservatives did, liberals made it bigger, “for there are many kinds 
of life that would be worse than death because there is no liberty to pursue the good life” 
(ibid.). For liberals only those forms of life that were already enjoying the good life (bios) 
deserved legal protection (ibid.).  
Following G. Agamben, Bishop said that in her situation Schiavo was in a no man‟s land, 
somewhere between bare life and bios politikos. This state was reflected in a judge‟s decision 
in which Schiavo was declared a being in a “state between life and death” (Bishop, 2008, p. 
547). Thus, bare life has become indistinguishable from the decision, that is, that biological 
life has become indistinguishable from law, and zoe has become equivalent to bios. 
Conservatives as well as liberals are convinced they are „protecting life‟ and „doing the right 
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thing‟, but they do not see that by politicizing bare life and drawing the dividing line between 
life and liberty, they have precisely linked bare life to good life and, paradoxically, hooked 
them together, no matter how irreconcilable they pretend their positions are. The same could 
be said of bioethicists who debate what ethical theories to use or what principles to apply.     
The position of Schiavo once she became an object of bioethical debate can be seen as 
biopolitically determined. Once we distance ourselves from the dry, formalistic view of 
analytical philosophy, we can agree with Bishop that the boundaries between life and death 
are today not metaphysical but biopolitical: “[…] our belief in brain death, or our beliefs in 
notions of personhood are little more than post hoc metaphysical justifications for decisions 
already taken by the biopolitics of medicine” (Bishop, 2008, p. 554). However, when 
bioethicists address a particular issue such as euthanasia, the discussion is usually outlined in 
terms of abstract concepts or ethical theories. But how the discussion itself came into being is 
rarely discussed. The „conditions of possibility‟ for a bioethical issue to emerge depend on 
how an issue is previously framed in particular areas like, for instance, medicine, law and 
economics, but this aspect is never part of the bioethical discussion itself.   Thus, bioethics is 
blind about its own role in the biopolitization of life and the administration of the body 
politics, which not only includes patients but doctors as well. Inspired by Agamben, Bishop 
thinks that it is not about zoe/bios, but about inclusion/exclusion. The aporia of Western 
politics is where to draw the line between inclusion and exclusion and how to avoid those 
who fall in the no man‟s land being exploited, harmed or denigrated.  
Bishop argued that medicine had become “one of the more subtle forms of totalitarianism 
in the modern biopolitics” (Bishop, 2008, p. 552). But this would not have been possible 
without legitimising discourses such as bioethics and medical law. Yet bioethicists, 
philosophers of medicine, ethicists, lawyers and theologians hardly ever put the general 
framework of these discourses under scrutiny. They assume that they are just freely debating, 
refining arguments, building interdisciplinarity and founding pluralism. However, with this 
naïve approach they are indeed contributing to keeping the power effects of biopolitics 
hidden behind good intentions and fine arguments.  
In modern times, as Marx noted, “all that is solid melts into air” (Berman, 1982) and 
everything is moveable, loose, changeable, light, even frivolous. We live in “liquid times” 
(Bauman, 2007) and this situation might, misleadingly make us feel as if we have more 
freedom. However, as happens many times in our day, the promise of freedom‟ might 
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actually entail a sophisticated power mechanism acting upon human life. Paradoxically, we 
are subjected to restraining and enabling powers since freedom is at the same time a strategy 
to be externally governed, but also to be autonomous, i.e. to be self-governed. In fact, power 
creates us. Against the liberal dogma according to which human beings are free agents who 
behave rationally to fulfil their wishes, a belief particularly promoted by economists (Bishop, 
2008, p. 541), we are instead subjected to power relations. There is a deep relation between 
power and the constitution of our own subjectivity. Although we believe that the individual is 
a monarch, a sovereign subject of himself, in reality “we are subjects of the social and 
political power structures that come to shape the form of our lives” (Bishop, 2008, p. 549). 
Because the new regimes of power in the biomedical scenario such as bioethics and 
medical law “are more subtle, and because they promise new freedoms, and new possibilities 
for the good life, they are more seductive than the horrors betrayed by the old totalising 
regimes” (J. P. Bishop, 2008, p. 552). Biopsychosocial medicine, for example, which has 
become so fashionable in the last thirty years, is a „totalising‟ strategy. There is virtually 
nothing beyond the scope of „the bio-psycho-social‟ as “[i]t covers the totality of human 
being […] It is totalising, it is […] an internalized totalitarianism” (J. P. Bishop, 2008, p. 
553). Mutatis mutandis, is it not the same with bioethics in a country like Colombia where 
this „new discipline‟ has been described as „useful and necessary‟ for „everything‟ in the 
name of human dignity, defence of life, protection of nature and so on? Don‟t bioethics and 
legal discourses like medical liability promise the protection of bare life, of the vulnerable, of 
those without a voice? The answer is „yes‟. However, we cannot forget that these discourses 
are indeed “constituted power” administering life in the name of protecting it. This dynamics 
remains nonetheless unknown for bioethicists, who are not aware of how these discourses 
came into being, how they were constituted as legitimate and how the spaces of „exception‟ 
are configured. Bioethicists are convinced that legal and ethical norms are the product of 
consensus (J. Rawls), mutual deliberation (J. Habermas), a sophisticated logical operation of 
analytical philosophy, or any other rational paradigm widely accepted today in a department 
of philosophy. With such ideas bioethicists want to „guide‟ the biomedical enterprise, the 
medical-industrial complex, a land of neoliberal rationalities linked to the contemporary 
mutation in the way power operates now through individual „freedom‟.  
A common view is that power emanates from law as well as from ethical principles, and 
that as a consequence power is not a cause but an effect. If one carefully examines the modus 
operandi of bioethicists and lawyers in the biomedical field, one can see the same rationality 
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behind it. Legal norms and bioethical principles constitute the a priori, the taken-for-granted 
truths that are used to build arguments and give legitimacy to decisions about life and death. 
However, the influence of power on the constitution of bioethics and medical liability, as 
disciplinary and professional fields, is considered neither by bioethicists nor by lawyers. Yet, 
it is necessary to acknowledge the extent to which power constitutes law and bioethics and 
how doctors‟ and patients‟ behaviour is not merely a question of legal norms and ethical 
principles, but of practices, discourses, institutional policies and truth regimes - in short, of a 
power effect. For instance, a patient can try to make autonomous decisions, but this 
possibility is limited by the structure and stated practices of the particular healthcare system 
in which he is precisely a patient. Even those discourses we regard as „sacred‟, such as the 
discourse about human rights, are deeply interconnected with power mechanisms. In this 
case, for example, Bishop has argued that in modern biopolitics “constituting power” is 
hidden beneath the language of human rights that conflates bare life and the good life 
(Bishop, 2008, p. 548). For this reason, neither conservatives nor liberals are aware of their 
own role in cases like Schiavo‟s, in which the politicization of bare life is clear. By trying to 
keep her „alive‟, conservatives were convinced they were proudly preserving bare life (zoe). 
However, they did not see that they had kept „alive‟ someone who had no possibilities of 
living a good life (bios). In contrast, for liberals it was the possibility of having a good life 
what really counted, and because of this, they missed the point that someone like Schiavo, 
although in a permanent vegetative state, was alive. However, according to Bishop, liberals 
did not see that their rationale could have opened the door for intuitively wrong actions like 
harvesting her organs or carrying out with/in her any kind of biomedical research. 
Nevertheless, both conservatives and liberals appealed to the law and bioethics, to back their 
position. Yet, by completely subjecting life and death to law “what rears its ugly face is the 
unceremonious violence of constituting power, of the sovereign decision of life and death” 
(Bishop, 2008, p. 553).  
 
3.3. The Case Decision C-257/97: The decriminalisation of euthanasia in Colombia 
Although “mercy killing” was decriminalised by the CC in 1997, Colombia is hardly 
mentioned in the extensive bioethical literature about assisted suicide and euthanasia. This 
might suggest that global bioethics literature is biased, giving much room to the developed 
world‟s issues and privileging articles published in English, while issues of the developing 
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world and articles in other languages are ignored or treated only in the context of a kind of 
„anthropological‟ interest for the exotic. Hence it is no surprise that the most cited cases are 
Australia, where euthanasia was legalised for the first time worldwide in May 1995, Oregon, 
where it was effectively decriminalised in 1997, and the Netherlands, where euthanasia was 
also effectively legalised in November 2001, although in this country the practice had been 
tolerated for many years. In this context, the Colombian case is relevant since it became in 
1997 the only country with a Roman Catholic Church predominance where providing 
medical help to die on the grounds of mercy became legally possible. Moreover, it was the 
second country in the world to legalise euthanasia (after Australia) and the first one in the 
Americas (Ogilvie, 1997, p. 1849). Not to mention that Colombia “is the only country in the 
world where active euthanasia was, to some extent, decriminalised by a Constitutional Court 
decision, based on human rights arguments” (Michalowski, 2009, p. 183). 
According to article 326 of the 1981 Colombian Criminal Code, a person “who killed 
someone else for mercy, to end the acute suffering caused by a bodily injury or serious and/or 
incurable disease, will be sentenced to imprisonment between six months and three years” (C. 
P., 1981). In 1996 a lawyer considered this punishment too lenient and that this article 
discriminated against those who, as a result of a disease, were severely suffering or terminally 
ill. Subsequently, through a tutela, he asked the Court to declare this article „unconstitutional‟ 
and to impose harder punishment on mercy killing. Paradoxically, in the highly contested 
Decision C-239/97 the CC not only considered the article as constitutional, but also ensured 
doctors would not be charged in cases of mercy killings. In its decision, the court also ruled 
that active euthanasia could only be legal if it complied with certain requirements: First, that 
the subject of the procedure is a patient who is terminally ill; second, that the subject is 
suffering severely, for example, by experiencing intense pain; third, that the subject has freely 
and in full possession of his/her mental capacities requested such a procedure; and fourth, 
that the procedure is carried out by a qualified doctor
255
 (CC, 1997). In its ruling, the court 
had to analyse in depth the topic of mercy killing under the new PC of 1991, as the 
challenged Article 326 belonged to the earlier Penal Code of 1981. 
The arguments that the CC took into account to decriminalise mercy killing were based on 
three constitutional principles: 
                                                             
255 This point generated criticisms as to why physicians should be the ones who perform the procedure, although 
it was clear that they are necessary to make the diagnosis and provide information, in short, to comply with the 
informed consent procedure (Michalowski, 2009, p. 210). 
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1. According to Article 1 of the Constitution, “Colombia is a social rule-of-law 
state […] based on respect for human dignity” (PC, 1991). From a secular point of 
view, human dignity is expressed in the freedom that an individual has to decide 
about his/her own body and life. Moreover, such dignity implies considering human 
life as not reducible to mere biological existence. Hence anyone suffering from a 
serious, painful, incurable and/or disabling disease would have the right to request 
medical help to die if they thought that their life lacking in meaning and dignity 
because of their suffering.  
2. According to Article 16, “all persons are entitled to their free personal 
development without limitations other than those imposed by the rights of others and 
those which are prescribed by the legal system” (PC, 1991). This article is the 
constitutional mandate of respect for autonomy in Colombia, which guarantees 
citizens a right to live according to their own personal convictions. This right would 
not exclude end of life decisions.  
3. The Constitutional Court also considered the principle of solidarity in Article 
95 of the Political Constitution, which states that Colombian citizens have the duty “to 
strive in accordance with the principle of social solidarity [and] to defend and foster 
human rights as a basis of peaceful coexistence” (PC, 1991). Based on this article, the 
Court argued that “it is not difficult to discover a motivation of altruism and solidarity 
in the person whose act is prompted by the impulse to suppress the suffering of 
another, overcoming, probably, his own inhibition and repugnance of an act aimed at 
terminating an existence” (CC, 1997 quoted in: Michalowski, 2009, p. 191f). 
Accordingly, based on the principle of solidarity, the intervention of third parties, in 
this case the physician performing euthanasia, would not be threatened by possible 
charges of murder.  
The constitutional consideration of human dignity, respect for autonomy and solidarity 
made it possible and comprehensible to hold such a favourable position regarding active 
euthanasia in Colombia. The judge who made the decision, summarised the arguments on 
which the court based its decision: First, Colombia is a plural society; second, Colombians 
have a right to a dignified death; third, not only atheists would opt for euthanasia as even 
some religious people might choose this path; fourth, the difference between active and 
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passive euthanasia is „artificial‟; and fifth, Article 326 of the Penal Code of 1981 should be 
reinterpreted under the new perspective of the Constitution of 1991 (Gaviria Díaz, C., 1998).  
However, the decriminalisation of euthanasia had a big impact and drew much public 
attention to important questions regarding quality of life, body-ownership, the nature of the 
medical profession and the limits of state intrusion in citizens‟ private lives (ASCOFAME, 
1997; Cepeda, 2004, p. 581). Criticisms of the decision came from a variety of sides:  
1. Some argued that a „right to die‟ would contradict the right to life that is 
guaranteed by Article 11 of the Constitution. However, the justice who formulated the 
Court's majority ruling replied that the right to life should not be read as if the 
Constitution had imposed “a duty to live”. For him, to choose to die does not 
contravene the life in the same way that an individual can choose to remain even if 
he/she has the right to move (Gavíria D., 1998).  
2. Fundamental rights are inviolable, so if an exception is allowed, any 
fundamental right might be regarded as disputable and contingent (Michalowski, 
2009, p. 199). However, for the Court fundamental rights should be considered 
according to a principle of proportionality,
256
 i.e. they “need to be harmonised with 
other constitutional rights and interests of the individual him/herself and others” 
(Michalowski, 2009, p. 193).  
3. For a dissenting judge, every human being has dignity regardless of his/her 
physical or mental condition, and quality of life arguments cannot outweigh it. 
(Michalowski, 2009, p. 202) However, in the Court‟s view the offender helps 
someone to die precisely because he/she wants to protect the human dignity of the 
person who requested assisted suicide that is being eroded due to his/her deplorable 
health conditions. Thus, “the tribunal stated that the person who helps people in these 
circumstances die, would be acting out of humanitarian feelings, rather than a desire 
to kill” (Cepeda, 2004, p. 580). 
4. Some argued that accepting euthanasia would set a very bad precedent in a 
country like Colombia with serious problems of violence and that it might serve as 
“license to kill” (Coronado, 1997; Michalowski, 2009, pp. 186, 202). The judges who 
opposed the ruling would refer to totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany or 
Communist states, “where the weakest and sickest are led to gas chambers […] surely 
                                                             
256 This argument was also used in the decision about abortion. See below 
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in order to „help them to a better death‟” (Quoted in Michalowski, 2009, p. 186). 
Some bioethicists took sides against euthanasia based on the slippery slope argument 
(Garzón, 2000, p. 238).  
5. The petitioner stressed in the tutela that accepting a lesser punishment in cases 
of mercy killing would violate the principle of equality (Article 13 of the 
Constitution). Also, the elderly, terminal patients and other vulnerable groups might 
be victimized. For a dissenting judge and others mercy killing might be avoided if 
palliative care was available (Ogilvie, 1997; Zea, 1997). However, in Law 100 “the 
expression palliative care [was] not even mentioned, and the only concept more or 
less closely related to it [was] a form of precarious and very limited domiciliary care 
provided by people with no specialized training” (Moyano & Zambrano, 2008).  
6. Some argued that in cases of „intense suffering or pain‟ and with patients who 
are terminally ill, informed consent might not be valid, since under hopeless and 
despair conditions the individual might only have limited mental capacity. A 
dissenting judge compared the consent of a terminal ill person with a confession 
obtained under torture (Michalowski, 2009, p. 203). However, others argued that if 
patients are allowed to reject medical treatment or palliative care, why would they not 
be allowed to opt for assisted suicide? For the Court one thing was the “capacity to 
make a decision [and other thing was the] evaluation of the content of the decision, 
however harmful or otherwise undesirable it might seem from the outside” 
(Michalowski, 2009).  
7. Some argued that the Court overstepped its powers because its duty was to 
declare if article 326 of the 1981 Criminal Code was constitutional, but not to 
legislate on the matter and to introduce changes to the Criminal Code. The Court had 
concluded unanimously that article 326 of the Penal Code was unconstitutional, but 
five out of the nine judges went further since, according to them, “it was necessary to 
consider broader constitutional questions arising in this context” (Quoted in 
Michalowski, 2009, p. 190).  
3.4. The debate about the decriminalisation of euthanasia in Colombia 
After the decriminalisation of euthanasia, the Colombian bioethical establishment 
organised forums to discuss the issue and also made its position public in newspapers. With 
the decision, the language to address death and dying as it has been promoted by bioethics 
during the last thirty years was reinforced in Colombia. In the early 1990s, however, 
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newspapers in Colombia began to talk about ortho-thanasia, dying with dignity and 
therapeutic obstinacy (Moanack, 1991). F. Sánchez, a renowned medical ethicist, proposed 
the term „iatrothanasia‟ since according to the Court‟s decision, only doctors would be 
allowed to perform euthanasia (Sánchez, 2001). His view was that the doctor‟s conscience, 
his “wisdom and prudence”, should guide him to “silently do” what is necessary to do 
regarding end-of-life decisions in the context of the DPR (Sánchez, 2005, 1997b). For 
another doctor, C. Solórzano (1999),  this decision was now possible, since with the PC of 
1991 the right to live and the right to personal autonomy were made equal. In general, it is 
possible to say that the decriminalisation of euthanasia was backed by people who held a 
liberal, non-religious view of medical practice (Mendoza, 2005; Trías, 1997).  
Others, however, openly opposed the decision on various grounds. The Catholic Church 
intensely opposed it and even excommunicated the judges who made the decision. The 
Vatican called them “notaries of death” and demanded a revision of the decision (El Tiempo, 
1997b). A. Llano (1997a, 1997b), a Jesuit and renowned bioethicist in Colombia, condemned 
the decision and suggested that the patient should simply be allowed to die. At the 2
nd
 
Congress of FELAIBE that was held in Bogotá in 1998, three speakers debated the CC 
decision: the judge who made the decision (Carlos Gavíria Díaz), another judge who held an 
opposite view, and a Roman Catholic bishop. During the debate it became clear that the 
decision was solidly rooted in the liberal rights guaranteed by the PC of 1991 (CENALBE, 
1998). Interestingly, some lay Catholics seemed to be more passionately opposed to the 
Decision than the bishops. For the president of the Latin American Association of Catholic 
Physicians, who was also a member of the Colombian National Academy of Medicine, after 
this CC Decision doctors would be called „killers‟ (Cuéllar, Z., 1997). According to a 
member of Blue Physicians, a professional non-governmental association, as life belongs to 
God, nobody should be allowed to take their own. For him, euthanasia was an act of killing, 
not a therapeutic medical intervention, since it neither re-established patient‟s health nor did 
it preserve life. He suggested that relatives should be allowed to perform euthanasia so that 
they would be morally and legally accountable  and not physicians (Merchán, 2006; 2008, p. 
42). Some asked to create a „culture of life‟ as the right thing in this “convulsed and violent 
country” (Nieto, G. I., 1998). Although for Catholics personal autonomy must not override 
the right to life, the CC considered that in these cases the state was at the same time not 
allowed to protect life “in disregard of the autonomy and dignity of the person involved” 
(Michalowski, 2009, p. 193). In 2009, Isa Fonnegra, the founder of the Omega Foundation, a 
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non-governmental organisation that campaigns for dignified death, published Facing Death, a 
book in which the discourse of the four principles was linked to the Catechism of the Roman 
Catholic Church, which was quoted to explain how to make ethical decisions regarding dying 
with dignity (Fonnegra, 2009, p. 91).  
A survey carried out a few months after the CC Decision amongst the lecturers of 23 
medical schools affiliated to ASCOFAME found that doctors were fearful of publicly giving 
their opinion on this issue. Almost half of them agreed with the legalisation on active 
euthanasia, although only 35.6% would practise it. The majority, 95.8%, disagreed with the 
idea that paramedics should be given licence to practice euthanasia and 49.2% would request 
assisted suicide should they be in a state as described by the CC in its decision 
(ASCOFAME, 1997, pp. 183, 196). In 2002, the ICEB published a set of ethical and medical 
guidelines on attending to terminally ill patients, encouraging informed consent, 
recommending doctors to follow their conscience and reminding them of their right to 
conscientious objection (Sánchez, 2002, pp. 88-90). Unfortunately, guidelines like these 
remain confined to closed circles like the ICEB itself, or to the academic sphere of 
bioethicists, because in practical terms mass media and legislators have much more impact on 
doctors‟ practices than what bioethicists or medical ethicists say.  
In its ruling the CC asked the Congress to introduce a law to regulate euthanasia, but at 
present the moral debate has not abated nor has any bill been passed (El Tiempo, 2008b). 
Hence “[t]he current legal situation is characterised by the provisions of the Criminal Code 
penalising mercy killings, side by side with the Constitutional Court decision legalising them 
under certain circumstances” (Michalowski, 2009, p. 16). This means that euthanasia is still a 
criminal offence in Colombia, even included in the new Criminal Code of 2000, and a doctor 
might be prosecuted for practising it. Neveretheless, one doctor publicly claimed in 2007 to 
have carried out euthanasia on more than 37 patients without ever being prosecuted (El 
Tiempo, 2007). In August 2006, senator Armando Benedetti presented to the Senate Bill 
200/2006 to regulate euthanasia based on the CC Decision, but it was withdrawn because of a 
lack the necessary political support (Michalowski, 2009, p. 16). This bill was controversial 
for several reasons. It embodied an elitist medicine since only people with resources would 
have met the procedural requirements (many people, for instance, do not have even access to 
good quality healthcare services), it opened the door for relatives to make the decision when 
the patient was unconscious or he/she was a minor, it stated the possibility of requesting 
euthanasia as an advance directive, there was confusion between „active euthanasia‟ and 
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physician-assisted suicide, and it included some imprecise terms and opened the door for 
euthanasia to be carried out based on economic grounds (Díaz Amado, 2007c; Michalowski, 
2009, p. 17f). In 2007 another bill was presented, the Senate Bill 05/2007, which did not 
conform with what the CC had ruled in C-239/1997 (Merchán, 2008) and was also rejected. 
In short, despite its decriminalisation in 1997, euthanasia has remained as a grey area in 
Colombia. But it seems that grey areas in bioethical discussions are the rule and not the 
exception, as the Schiavo‟s case showed us all. 
4. The case decision about intersexual states 
Today transsexuals undergo sex reassignment surgery because they feel they are living in 
the „wrong body‟ on a fairly regular basis. They are adults able to express their own wishes 
and feelings. However, the case of newborns with intersex states
257
 is a big challenge, for 
they are unable to express any opinion yet. The media therefore occasionally bring stories 
about people who were damaged, both physically and morally, by corrective surgery 
performed during their childhood and without their consent. As E. Morris has argued “since 
treatment is irreversible and permanent, discerning what is important to the child is essential 
for the parents or physicians who wish to do no harm. How can we ascertain what is best for 
the child when they are still too young to speak?” (Morris, 2004). This uncertainty has 
brought to light a conflict between the medical approach to this condition and the new ideas 
about autonomy in biomedicine. In 1999 the Colombian CC made a unifying decision
258
 on 
the issue. In the Case Decision SU-037, the Court considered that a 3-year-old infant, who 
was declared by a midwife as a girl, should not undergo the sex reassignment surgery 
suggested by her doctors when a medical examination found she had ambiguous genitals 
(CC, 1999).  
Some of the key points made by the Court in this case were: 
1. Sexual identity is a fundamental element of the individual‟s subjectivity and it 
is highly dependent on anatomical characteristics. However, this identity is not merely 
„natural‟, but the result of the interplay between biological facts and historical 
circumstances.  
                                                             
257 An intersexual state is a condition “where a newborn's sex organs (genitals) look unusual, making it 
impossible to identify the gender of the baby from its outward appearance.” In: Fallow, L. (2006) Gale 
Encyclopedia of Children's Health: Infancy through Adolescence. Retrieved from 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3447200316.html, accessed on 4 August 2009. 
258 Decisions in which the Court states the criteria to be followed in future decisions related to the same issue.  
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2. In the case of children, it seems to be more adequate to postpone any radical 
and irreversible surgical modification of the genitals. In the Court‟s view, it would be 
wrong to allow doctors to impose their own criteria to determine the sexual identity 
anyone should have, particularly when an individual is unable to express his/her 
wishes. Only an autonomous and fully responsible individual should decide on this 
matter. 
3. The individual/patient is the only one entitled to decide about his/her own 
body. Accordingly, any kind of surgical procedure cannot be carried out without 
his/her permission.  
Power and intersexual states 
In the case of medical treatment for children with intersexual states, the Court has 
confirmed once more that personal autonomy is an essential precondition to make decisions 
on medical treatment. In the last ten years the constitutional discourse on personal autonomy 
has led to a discussion of many sensitive and even taboo issues in the public. From the 
restricted and reductionist view that sees sexuality in terms of only two categories, male and 
female, decisions like SU-037/99 have opened a door to a pluralistic idea according to which 
gender, although deeply rooted in anatomical characteristics, is indeed socially constructed 
and depends on individual preferences. Based on the right to free development of personality, 
the Colombian constitutional equivalent to the principle of respect for autonomy,
259
 citizens 
have been given the opportunity to freely express their individual identities. For example, 
most recently the Court ruled that homosexual couples should be legally recognised, asking 
the Congress to legislate on the matter within a period of two years. Another a big issue to be 
discussed in the near future will be the right of these couples to adopt children (Amat, 2011). 
In many decisions the CC has integrated bioethical principles into its decisions. For 
instance, in T-551/99, a decision about intersex states following the SU-037/99, a judge 
argued that in the medical treatment of intersex children “the tension between the principle of 
beneficence and the principle of autonomy [was] evident” (CC, T-551/99). Once again, the 
„dilemma model‟ of bioethics is reinforced as the issue is presented in terms of two opposed 
ethical principles, attributed to the doctor and the patient respectively. Moreover, an implicit 
idea is that, regarding medical decisions for intersex children, biomedicine is an area where 
                                                             
259 Article 16 of the Constitution. 
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doctors are permanently trying to impose their power and that patients should therefore be 
permanently on guard to avoid losing their autonomy. In her analysis of the SU-037/99, a 
Colombian lawyer and bioethicist concluded that decisions on sex reassignment surgery 
“require a bioethical approach through an interdisciplinary committee […] rather than the 
surgery in itself, it is medical evidence about the individual‟s sense of belonging to the 
opposite sex that is important for law” (Rojas, 2004, p. 59). Bioethics then becomes the 
advocate of individual autonomy and a tool to resist medical power, although in this case it is 
possible to observe how medicine and law go hand in hand. As I have argued elsewhere, the 
dominant hybrid medical/legal discourse about intersex conditions has meant that it is the 
individual who has to decide whether or not to accept medical treatment. However, if an 
individual rejects what medicine has to offer, he/she might face multiple forms of 'veiled 
punishment‟, e.g. discrimination, condemnation, humiliation. Western societies are still 
reluctant to a different degree to accept „grey zones‟ in the sexual sphere (Díaz Amado, 
2008). The problem is that sex reassignment surgery reinforces the idea of a dismorphous 
understanding of biological sex as well as a dichotomous understanding of gender (Kaivola, 
1997). This is a power effect that bioethicists barely seem to recognise.  
It is not difficult to understand why the advice states that sex reassignment surgeries in 
intersex children should be avoided. They are invasive and irreversible interventions on the 
body. Such interventions should be postponed until the patient is able to give informed 
consent, as stated by the CC in SU-037/99. All of this is done in the name of promoting 
autonomy and restraining medical power, although other issues should be considered, too. In 
the last thirty years or so there has been an explosion of terms related to intersex states. From 
the single term „transvestite‟, commonly used before the 1980s, we moved on to an 
overwhelming myriad of terms such as LGTB,
260
 transgender, gender-bender, gender-
outlaws, gender-trash, gender-queer, to name but a few (Carroll, et al., 2002, p. 131). As 
Foucault argued, we talk today more about sex, but this is not say we have been liberated 
from it nor have we escaped from power influence either (Foucault, 1998). Yet, with their 
insistence on principles and the „dilemma model‟, bioethicists have obscured important 
aspects of the discussion. This is perhaps because, as J. Nelson argued, bioethics is mainly 
engaged in “discourses of value”, which emphasise moral notions such as duties, obligations, 
rights and virtues. Discourses of value are useful to orientate and legitimise policies, 
guidelines, decisions, etc. However, on this path „discourses of power‟ are disregarded and 
                                                             
260 Acronym for Lesbians, Gays, Transvestites, and Bisexuals. 
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then any analysis intended to reveal relations of force, domination or subjugation (Nelson, 
1998, p. 215). In this sense, it is worth mentioning here that “the legal system is a governing, 
ordering, normative discourse [and] one effect of this system is that it constructs identity 
[…]” (Bell, 2004, p. 1713). This power of law to shape indentities should not be 
underestimated. However, as Nelson has noted, bioethicists tend to ignore not only the power 
that is incarnated in law, but also the ethical and cultural implications of medicalised sex-
reassignment procedures (Nelson, 1998, p. 214). For him, although  
there are at least as many transsexuals as there are „surrogate mothers‟ […] 
bioethics is interested in many types of artifactuality –artificial hearts, artificial 
feeding- but not in the artifactuality of our sex or our subjectivities [and this is 
because bioethics] focuses too much on patients and providers as autonomous, 
individual moral agents and too little on the social and political structures that 
form, nourish, and distort that agency. (Nelson, 1998, p. 226) 
Some have argued that sex reassignment surgeries are intended to make intersex children 
„more normal‟, as they “are performed in order to regulate normative gender and sex by 
ruling out the possibility of alternatively sexed individuals […] silencing […] intersexed 
people who are usually not told about their physical condition nor the reasons for their 
extensive surgeries in childhood” (Hausman, 2001, p. 482f). As mentioned above, Decision 
SU-037/99 solved this by ruling that such surgeries should be postponed until the person 
decides what identity to choose. However, even when the decision is made by a completely 
autonomous and competent person, it does not mean that the power dynamics have 
disappeared. Still, “[t]he rhetoric of choice in current transgender theory, while echoing the 
rhetoric of the abortion rights movement [should make us think of] the vehement expansion 
of consumer culture in the 1980s – buy a new body, new face, „you‟re worth it‟- is an 
indispensable backdrop to this new theoretical field and continually emerging cultural 
phenomenon” (Hausman, 2001, p. 486). It is clear that the approach to intersex conditions has 
changed from a medical-centred paradigm to a [rational and free] individual-centred 
paradigm, or better, to a client-centred paradigm (Bockting, 2005, p. 269; Carroll, et al., 
2002, p. 131). In this way, surgeons who perform sex reassignment surgeries are similar to 
cosmetic surgeons, i.e. they transform bodies because it is requested paid for by the patients 
(Hausman, 2001, p. 486). The problem is that this kind of surgery “holds out the illusory 
promise that the acquisition of a simulated vagina or penis will lead to wholeness and 
happiness” (Kaivola, 1997, p. 202). Thus, instead of liberating individuals, medical 
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interventions „on demand‟ end up being another way of subjecting such individuals to 
particular modes of understanding human nature, medical practice and society. In Colombian 
society as it is today these particular modes are nothing but the neoliberal rationalities and 
ideas in vogue (Díaz Amado, 2009b).  
For the Colombian lawyer and bioethicist J. Gaitán, in the relationship bioethics/law, the 
former would have three main functions: first, to contribute to the creation of positive legal 
norms; second, to clarify bioethical issues included in laws; and third, to help in the legal 
decision-making process (Gaitán, 2004). In the case of intersex states, bioethics has helped to 
integrate different aspects of the discussion. B. Espinosa, a lawyer, has argued that the body, 
as a positive legal concept, is very recent in Colombian jurisprudence and particularly related 
to the PC of 1991 (Espinosa, 2008, p. 69). J. Gaitán has also claimed that bioethics is 
necessary for the law in cases of sex reassignment surgeries, because bioethics provides an 
interdisciplinary perspective (Gaitán, 2008, p. 80). In this regard, I have argued that bioethics 
has three main functions in discussions like these about transsexualism and sex reassignment 
surgeries: first, a political function by contributing to creating a pluralist, non-confessional 
and interdisciplinary discussion; second, an epistemic and ethical function by stressing the 
role of deliberation as the best mechanism to reach agreements; and third, a strategic function 
by building a friendly, respectful and open setting for the discussion (Díaz Amado, 2008, p. 
54) 
 
5. The decriminalisation of abortion  
5.1. A brief history of abortion 
The history of abortion is as old as human civilisation. There are reports of induced 
abortions in China dating back 5000 years and in the Hippocratic Oath, from the fourth 
century BC, physicians were forbidden to give abortive to women who wanted to terminate 
their pregnancy prematurely. However, back then physicians were “free to employ 
contraceptives, oral abortifacients, and the various surgical and manipulative procedures 
available” to produce an abortion (Riddle, 1997, p. 9). Once Christianity expanded across 
Europe, the Augustinian doctrine provided a guideline to decide when an abortion might be 
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allowed. Before the „quickening‟261, which determined the ensoulment, abortion was not 
banned. By the sixteenth century abortion had become a crime in the eyes of the Roman 
Catholic Church (Rothman, B. K., 1997, p. 104f), and in 1869 Pope Pius IX declared that 
abortion was always a mortal sin. An important aspect of the contemporary approach to 
abortion is its medicalisation. Today, doctors are seen as the natural and indisputable 
advocates of pregnancy, and high-tech procedures are used to conceive (e.g. IVF
262
, ICSI
263
), 
manage the pregnancy itself (e.g. sonographies, prenatal tests, foetal surgery), and the 
delivery (e.g. caesareans, surrogate wombs). As pregnancy became medicalised, so too was 
abortion, opening the door to justify an abortion on medical grounds and, in this way, 
skipping the necessity of appealing to ethical theories. It seems that medical arguments are 
able to replace sometimes ethical arguments (Hull & Hoffer, 2001, p. 57).  
Yet, the abortion debate might be characterised as one of the fiercest debates in 
contemporary societies, with extensive biomedical, legal, political, religious and ethical 
consequences. For R. Reagan it is “the prime contemporary problem of public morals” 
(Reagan, 1986, p. 100) and for R. Dworkin, it is the US new version of the seventeenth-
century European religious wars (quoted in Boyle, 1997, p. 1). Almost all religions 
disapprove of abortion and many also of contraception.
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 For many Christians and Muslims, 
for instance, abortion is a crime against the human person (Hedayat, 2006; John Paul II, 
1995). Although forbidden since the nineteenth century, abortion has become legal in many 
countries. Since the 1960s a wave of abortion legalisation has spread across the globe.
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However, the degree to which it is permitted can widely vary.
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The ethical debate about abortion in bioethical textbooks is mainly focused on the intrinsic 
logic of the contended arguments. Thus, each side usually departs from particular ontological 
a-prioris. Personhood, for example, is usually cited by pro-lifers, while practical implications 
and socio-political and economic roots of abortions are put in second place. For instance, 
poverty and illiteracy are deeply linked to unwanted pregnancies. Traditionally there were 
                                                             
261 The moment when foetal movements are felt by the woman, usually between 20 and 22 weeks in a primipara 
and around 16 weeks in a multipara. 
262
 In-Vitro Fertilisation.  
263
 Intra-Cytoplasmic Sperm Injection 
264 For a brief summary of the attitudes and beliefs of the leading religious groups in the United Kingdom to 
contraception see: „Religion, Contraception and Abortion‟. Pp. 1 – 3 in The abortion Debate, vol. 126, edited by 
Craig Donellan. Cambridge: Independence, 2006.   
265 In the UK abortion was legalised in 1967, and in the US in 1973 with the famous case Roe v. Wade. 
266
 See: Center for Reproductive Rights (2007) The Worl ’s A ortions Laws. Available at: 
http://www.reproductiverights.org/pub_fac_abortion_laws.html, accessed 4 May 2008.  
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two opposed extreme positions. On the one hand, the pro-life view, according to which 
abortion is nothing but murder as the embryo/foetus has full moral status (Warren, 1997). On 
the other hand, the pro-choice position which emphasises that it is up to women to decide on 
their bodies. These two positions are so antagonistic that the debate looks more like a war 
than a discussion (Solinger, 1998).
267
 In its current form this debate remains an unsolvable 
ethical dilemma, since it is largely shaped by an analytical philosophy model in bioethical 
textbooks (Díaz Amado, 2009a, p. 118).
268
 For T.H. Engelhardt (1996), “[t]he stridency of 
the abortion debate marks the strength of such disagreements […] The abortion debate is only 
one of a number of issues where the controversies are both impassioned and reflect well-
entrenched and conflicting moral visions, [but] physicians, after all, must apply abstract 
concepts of being alive or being dead to actual situations” (pp. 8, 240). 
Yet, while bioethicists and philosophers continue in search for the perfect ethical 
argument, either to support or to condemn abortion, its unsafe practice continues to kill 
thousands of women around the world, particularly in poor countries. In Latin America, for 
instance, the number of clandestine and unsafe abortion remains high despite restrictive 
abortion laws, or even because of that, with serious consequences for women‟s health and 
life, particularly among the poor (Guttmacher Institute, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 2005b; 
Kane, 2008; Rance, 2008; Yam, et al., 2006). Illegal and unsafe abortion usually leads to high 
rates of maternal morbidity and mortality (Guttmacher Institute, 1996; Human Rights Watch, 
2005a; Rance, 2008), so the absolute criminalisation of abortion leads to a serious public 
health problem and social inequality (González, A. C., 2005). But in recent years abortion has 
increasingly become an openly and publicly discussed issue, with different social 
organisations demanding from governments to provide adequate medical attention for those 
women seeking to terminate a pregnancy (Boland, 1993; Estrada, D., 2010). In Colombia in 
2006 the CC partially decriminalised abortion, a decision that has been even more 
controversial than that of euthanasia, although it has also illustrated that a suitable „solution‟ 
to the contemporary abortion debate can be found when the ethical discussion moves onto 
politics and law (Díaz Amado, 2009a, p. 114).  
 
                                                             
267 For a good overview of the different positions in the debate about abortion see: Sommerville, A. (1993) 
Medical Ethics Today: Its Practice and Philosophy. Plymouth: British Medical Association, p. 103 – 109.  
268 An example of how the abortion debate is shaped in an analytical framework, see: LaFollete, H (ed.) 1997 
Ethics in Practice. An anthology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, which includes: Thomson, J. A Defense of 
Abortion; Warren, M. On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion; Marquis, D. An Argument that Abortion Is 
Wrong; and, Rothman, B. K. Redefining Abortion. 
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5.2. The Case Decision C-355/2006 that decriminalised abortion in Colombia  
For many years in Colombia the abortion issue has been „the elephant in the room‟ 
regarding women‟s health and sexual and reproductive rights. Despite of a lack of reliable 
statistics, the number of abortions in Colombia has always been considered high. In the 
1980s, based on the number of hospital admissions for abortion-related complications, an 
estimated 250,000 to 350,000 abortions were performed per year (Singh, 2006). In the 1990s, 
while abortion was more frequent among young and poor women, one third of urban women 
would undergo the procedure (Zamudio, et al., 1999). As F. Sánchez (1990a) argued, the 
practice of abortion has always been tolerated in Colombia despite being absolutely banned 
by the Criminal Code. Everyone knew where to go if one required such a service. Far from 
preventing the occurrence of abortions, this repressive policy created a flourishing 
underground abortion industry where women would receive poor medical care and risked 
their lives (Ceaser, 2006). The most recent study showed that in 2008 there were an estimated 
400,400 abortions, and 93,300 women were treated for complications related to abortion, 
while only 322 had a legal abortion (Prada, Singh, Remez & Villarreal, et al., 2011).  
However, with abortion being a serious public health problem, legislative initiatives 
challenging the restrictive law in the Colombian Congress have failed. Five bills were 
presented but rejected between 1975 and 2006 (M.P.S. & U.N., 2007). It was not until May 
2006, as the result of a petition filed by a female lawyer challenging the constitutionality of 
the Criminal Code‟s articles that penalised any kind of abortion,269 that the CC partially 
decriminalised abortion through the Case Decision C-355/06 (CC, 2006; Women's Link 
Worldwide, 2007). It is also true that the constant work of several social organisations 
advocating women‟s rights for years and the presence of progressive justices in the Court also 
crucially contributed to this decision (Díaz Amado, et al., 2010, p. 119). The lawyer argued 
that, in the light of the PC of 1991 that, first, women had the right to decide on their own 
bodies, including pregnancy; second, abortion was basically a women‟s issue therefore its 
prohibition would violate the right to equality; and third, to impose a „duty to continue with a 
pregnancy‟ would be cruel and violate women‟s human dignity.270 The Court concluded that 
in three cases women‟s fundamental rights were indeed violated when they were denied a 
legal abortion: first, when the woman‟s life or health is threatened as a result of a pregnancy; 
                                                             
269 Articles 122, 123 and 124 of the Penal Code in force since 2000.  
270
 E.g. when the woman‟s life is in danger, to ask her to continue with her pregnancy would be against 
constitutional right to life. 
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second, when the foetus has severe malformations incompatible with life; and third, in cases 
of rape, incest or non-consensual insemination (M.P.S. & U.N., 2007, p. 47).  
In its ruling the CC took into account that international human rights law was part of the 
Colombian constitutional jurisprudence
271
 and that the legal protection of the unborn should 
be balanced against other rights, principles and values included in the Constitution. 
Moreover, women‟s rights and gender equality are constitutionally protected and the 
principle of proportionality, developed by the CC in previous decisions, imposed limits on 
the legislature regarding the criminalisation of abortion (Undurraga & Cook, 2009). Although 
for the Court the foetus was a „human life‟ and therefore should be protected by the 
Constitution, such a right was not absolute and should be balanced against the rights of the 
woman. The total ban on abortion, argued the Court, imposes a disproportionate burden on 
women since they are forced to accept the pregnancy. Furthermore, the Court took into 
account international treaties signed by Colombia that advocate safe abortion services as are 
part of women‟s sexual and reproductive rights. Finally, the CC also admitted that there are 
limits for the jurisprudence to decide on moral matters. Individuals can have different ethical 
viewpoints and then it would be inadmissible for any of these particular ethical positions to 
be imposed by the state (Díaz Amado, 2009a, p. 121).  
Yet, despite the decriminalisation of abortion, in practice for Colombian women to access 
a legal abortion is still an ideal (El Tiempo, 2008a; Moloney, 2009). In 2010, along with three 
independent consultants and a representative of a non-governmental and women rights‟ 
advocate organisation, I analysed 46 cases of women who were denied a legal termination of 
pregnancy during the first two years after the decriminalisation. Through these cases, we 
illustrated how Colombian women still experience serious difficulties to access a legal 
abortion, even when they are entitled to it (Díaz Amado, et al., 2010). The barriers to access 
legal abortion have to do with two circumstances: “first, the basic failure of Colombian 
society to understand what the Court ruling means, and second, the unrecognised and 
unresolved ethical, medical and legal differences over abortion that have continued to exist, 
which have made the implementation and fulfilment of the ruling a complex and difficult 
task” (Díaz Amado, et al., 2010, p. 121). There are difficulties in Colombian society to 
distinguish between the ethical and the politico-juridical level of the debate, (Díaz Amado, 
                                                             
271 For example, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination of 1979 (no discrimination 
against women); the World Conference on Women, Cairo, 1995 (sexual and reproductive rights as human 
rights); and the Inter-American Convention of Human Rights, 1969. 
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2009a, p. 122) and “[c]onfusion between ethical beliefs and legal obligations regarding the 
Court's decision is at the bottom of profound disputes and contention in relation to medical 
autonomy vs. women's autonomy, protection of fetal life vs. protection of women's lives, and 
ignorance or abuse of the law” (Díaz Amado, et al., 2010, p. 121).  
Although at present healthcare providers and women are better informed about the content 
of the Decision C-355/06 many abortions are still clandestine. Moreover, right wing groups 
have not ceased in their efforts to reverse the decision (Dalén, 2011). A case that is worth 
mentioning is that of the current Inspector General who came into office in January 2009. 
Being an ultraconservative Roman Catholic, this inspector has publicly opposed the decision, 
although paradoxically his duty is to protect citizen‟s rights and to enforce the law and not the 
opposite (Díaz Amado, et al., 2010, p. 124). More recently, the Conservative Party, with the 
support of some religious organisations, presented a bill to include a new article in the 
Constitution, according to which life should be protected since its very beginnings, making 
abortion, euthanasia and even assisted procreation services unconstitutional practices (El 
Espectador, 2011b; 2011c). Two issues seem to be key in the present polarized discussion 
about abortion. There are profound disagreements and difficulties to accept the health 
exception, which “refers to the possibility of terminating a pregnancy when the pregnancy 
puts the woman‟s health at risk” (González, A. C., 2010, p. 13). Pro-lifers have argued that 
the health exception argument might open the door to abortion on demand. They have also 
suggested that the right to conscientious objection should also cover healthcare institutions, 
such as Catholic hospitals, which then would not be legally obliged to provide abortion 
services. But the supporters of the Court‟s decision have argued that in this way 
conscientious objection may be used as an argument to avoid the legal obligation that 
healthcare professionals and institutions have to comply with the law. 
6. Conclusion 
One of the most important creations of the political constitution of 1991 was the 
Constitutional Court (CC) as the highest court in the Colombian political and legal system. 
This court has played a central role in the implementation of the norms and values guaranteed 
by the constitution of 1991. Thus, case law, the pre-eminence of fundamental individuals‟ 
rights, and the promotion of ethical pluralism entered the Colombian mainstream. In this 
chapter, through the analysis of three landmark decisions, I have shown that that the language 
of bioethics and the language introduced by the new political constitution of 1991 are 
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sometimes indistinguishable. The approach of the CC to controversial issues like euthanasia, 
sex reassignment surgery and abortion suggests that the bioethical language, particularly 
American principlism, frames the public debate and the legal analysis.   
In this new political environment the Colombian people obviously have felt they have got 
more freedom but, to what extent have they actually done so? Following J. Bishop I have 
shown that although it is led in the name of personal autonomy and freedom, the 
contemporary debate on euthanasia takes place within the boundaries defined by the 
bioethical discourse and embodies a power exercise to frame the discussion and its practice in 
a particular way. Bioethics and law not only protect the vulnerable or promote individuals‟ 
autonomy, they are „constituted power‟ defining what, how, when, under what circumstances 
and who can decide on life and death. Moreover, the contemporary debate about euthanasia 
originates from and is modelled by a medical practice driven by hi-tech- as well as the 
discourse on autonomy, which is a fashionable discourse in our globalised world. The 
question about whether to withhold or withdraw medical treatment only makes sense within 
the contemporary intensive care unit-like scenario. Only in a world where the individual 
believes he/she is the „sovereign‟ of himself/herself, could euthanasia be considered an 
„individual right‟. Yet, what bioethicists call „autonomous decisions‟ take place in a 
biopolitically determined scenario. We often do not realise that categories like „brain-dead 
person‟, „terminally ill individual‟, „patient in a permanent vegetative state‟ or „deeply 
handicapped individual‟ do not just create special moral obligations or are related to the 
origins of bioethics. They are indeed biopolitical constructions, i.e. the result of particular 
expertise „in action‟ trying to realise the modern dream of administering and governing 
human life. 
The debate about euthanasia has often been on newspapers‟ front pages in Colombia. 
However, this does not mean that euthanasia is frequently practised in Colombia or that 
Colombians are frequently in a situation in which high medical technology intervenes in their 
lives. As Michalowski has argued, this decision “had a very limited impact both on medical 
practice and on the criminal law discussion of active euthanasia […] a court decision alone is 
unlikely to bring about fundamental changes in practice unless it finds acceptance by the 
main players […], in particular the medical profession, but also lawyers and politicians” 
(Michalowski, 2009, p. 19). Beyond the typical arguments in the bioethical debate on 
euthanasia that emphasise the rightness or wrongness of practising it (e.g. respect for 
autonomy vs. sacredness of life), it is important to underline how the debate is framed: while 
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dying with dignity is perhaps a fundamental issue for bioethicists and academics in the 
developed world, in a country like Colombia, „how to live with dignity‟ surely should come 
first. 
The CC decision on sex reassignment also shows that patients‟ autonomy and their choices 
are essential for any legitimate medical decision-making. It is interesting to see that, as this 
decision illustrates, it is the power of law, not medicine, which now decides what is right and 
wrong regarding sex reassignment. This shift of power from medicine to law has not only 
occurred in terms of sex reassignment, but probably across the entire biomedical field. Thus, 
in Colombia not only has medicine been bioethicalised and juridified, but the law has 
similarly been bioethicalised. These displacements do not just reflect the setting of new 
boundaries between disciplines or professions, but also mean power displacements. How 
subjects and discourses are formed, the strategies of authorities to gain legitimacy, and the 
construction of truths regimes reflect processes and dynamics that are necessarily 
transformed.    
The decriminalisation of abortion in Colombia, in the three circumstances described by the 
CC, has also revealed the intimate relationship between bioethics and law. Taking the 
Colombian case, it is possible to conclude that although the ethical discussion about issues 
like abortion seems to have no end, in the legal and political sphere important agreements can 
be reached to overcome ethical disagreements. The Colombian case suggests that ethical 
disagreements, which are common in plural societies, cannot be resolved by appealing to 
ethical theories only. In these cases, the power of both law and politics to solve such ethical 
disagreements should be acknowledged, particularly by bioethicists. However, at the same 
time, political, legal, cultural and economic issues might represent an obstacle to the exercise 
of individual freedom. In Colombia the decriminalisation of abortion in three situations did 
not mean the end of the abuse and exploitation of women. “The Court ruling was not the end 
of the debate about abortion in Colombia. However, the partial decriminalisation of abortion 
has created a huge challenge for Colombian society, as legal abortion services become part of 
essential health care provision” (Díaz Amado, et al., 2010, p. 124). 
According to Foucault, law and medicine create a particular order by classifying, 
governing and shaping subjects and mentalities. Beyond the endless ethical discussion about 
the right or wrong of medical interventions on the body (the endless dispute between 
conservatives and liberals or between dissimilar ethical theories), we must bear in mind that 
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today life is much more regulated and controlled than ever before. The bioethical discussion 
is usually framed by forces and tensions which are not properly recognised, e.g. powerful 
subjects with particular interests (healthcare insurers, religious groups, governmental 
agencies and so on) and discourses that legitimise the current state of affairs (law driving 
medical practice, economics driving legal regulations and so on).  
Biopolitics creates new medico-legal categories which are deeply related to the control 
and discipline of the body. Medical knowledge and expertise do not decide alone when, how 
and by whom medical procedures like euthanasia, abortion or genital surgeries will be 
performed. The law today empowers people to obtain the medical services they want to 
receive. This happens in a particular socio-cultural and historical context. In contemporary 
liberal societies there is a tension between individual‟s autonomy to decide personal issues 
and the legitimacy of the state to govern people‟s lives. In the case of medicine this tension is 
actually expressed in the body, which is taken as a „field‟ of conflict between different 
discourses, as Kimsma and Van Leewen (2005) have noted. Bioethics is now informing legal 
decisions, as I have shown in the case of three landmark decisions of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court. Regarding life and death, sex and body and the reproduction bioethics 
seems to be a part of biopolitics, i.e. a part of the contemporary way of administering 
populations as well as individual lives.  
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General conclusion 
 
According to Foucault (1973), modern medicine was born in the late eighteenth century 
when, due to a reconfiguration between „the visible‟ and „the sayable‟, ideas about what was 
a disease turned into the problem of what could be localized in the body. Thus, the rise of an 
anatomo-clinical-pathological gaze and the birth of the clinician, in the context of a particular 
socio-political and institutional framework at the end of the eighteenth century, constituted a 
reconfiguration of the whole medical scenario from which modern medicine emerged. But 
the brilliant and enlightened analysis that Foucault gave of the birth of modern medicine 
would be insufficient to explain why and how medicine has taken on a different appearance 
today. If Foucault had lived longer, he would surely have acknowledged that present-day 
medicine is a different medicine. In the early 1960s, when The Birth of the Clinic (1973) was 
first published in 1963, Foucault could not have foreseen how deeply and radically medicine 
was going to change at the turn of the twentieth century.       
According to A. Relman (1980), contemporary medicine has become a medical-industrial 
complex. However, this process has not been exactly the same in all countries. In the case of 
Colombia, for instance, the influence of neoliberal forces and the dependency on the centres 
of power in the globalised world are especially visible. Additionally, the Colombian case 
illustrates the profound link between a neoliberal transformation of the medical ethos and a 
flourishing of new normative discourses on medicine such as bioethics and medical liability. 
These discourses represent not only a new regulatory framework for medicine in terms of a 
new set of rules and norms, but also a complete reconfiguration of the whole biomedical 
scenario, encompassing new practices (e.g. the DPR as a matter of public inquiry or the 
practice of informed consent) and new subjectivities (e.g. different ways of being a doctor 
and a patient).    
Bioethics has been criticised since its very beginnings in the USA in the 1960s and 70s. 
These criticisms have been mainly of three kinds: philosophical, sociological, and political. 
Philosophical criticisms have pointed to the shortcomings of American principlism for its 
inability to solve the complex moral problems arising in the biomedical field; mostly because 
there is no clear rule to decide how to rank and/or apply these principles. Sociological 
criticisms have stressed that bioethics might be an expression of cultural imperialism since it 
embodies the particular values of US American society such as individualism, pragmatism 
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and legalism. In developing countries political criticisms have been raised against another 
trend of the dominant model of bioethics: its almost exclusive concern with ethical dilemmas 
related to biotechnological progress. It has been argued that the scope of bioethics should be 
widened to include issues such as poverty, health inequality, corruption, sustainable 
development and exploitation of human subjects in the context of biomedical research, to 
name but a few. In this way, it has been argued that a bioethics moulded by the dry, cold and 
analytical style of Anglo-American philosophy, which is too focused on biotechnological 
progress, but blind to acknowledging cultural and socio-political differences, should be 
overcome. Latin American bioethicists are perhaps among the first and fiercest critics of this 
narrowness of the US American bioethics. It has even been argued that an emphasis on „the 
social‟ and the idea of making bioethics „more political‟ was the Latin American contribution 
to the field. 
Similarities and differences were found between the US American and Latin American 
approaches to bioethics regarding historical accounts, scope and methods. In the USA the 
formation of the new field was fundamentally related to the problematization of the DPR, the 
role of biotechnology in medical practice, and biomedical research. This led to a migration of 
academics of different backgrounds to constitute the new field, particularly from theology 
and law, and later from biomedical sciences and philosophy. In Latin America, the voice of 
the so-called „pioneers‟, members of elite medical associations, private universities and the 
Roman Catholic Church promoted the idea that it was necessary to be aware and concerned 
about the dangers of biomedical progress. Having learnt about the new field in the USA, 
these „pioneers‟ managed to introduce bioethics in the mass media, governmental institutions, 
private universities and professional medical-related associations as an important field for the 
region. In this process a similar rhetoric to that which had been used by the first US 
bioethicists to legitimise the new field was adopted. These pioneers also spoke a new 
language when they talked about the necessity of overcoming medical paternalism and 
adopting the principle of respect for autonomy and of controlling doctors‟ activity in both 
clinical and research scenarios. It was argued that traditional medical ethics was inadequate to 
solve a set of supposedly new ethical dilemmas brought by biomedical progress; in short, that 
doctors lacked the necessary moral wisdom to correctly do their work as medical ethics had 
traditionally been a field exclusively for doctors.  
The role played by powerful organisations, such as PAHO and UNESCO was 
fundamental, not only to the successful institutionalisation of the field in Latin America, but 
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also to the formation of the two ideological and political poles of the Latin American 
bioethics. On the one hand, those who are identified as followers of the PAHO‟s bioethics 
unit, which was seen as too bound to the issues and methods of the US American bioethics. 
On the other hand, those who are close to UNESCO‟s RedBioetica and the so-called 
“Brazilian group”, and deemed to be inclined to a more political bioethics, critical of the US 
model, and committed to the solution of the inveterate problems affecting the region. 
Additionally, the role played by the Roman Catholic Church in the way bioethics is 
understood and practised in Latin America should be underlined. Although the Catholic 
Church is involved in ethical debates in other countries like the USA or in Europe, its 
influence in Latin America, for historical reasons, is bigger than in any other region.  
The „politization‟ of bioethics in Latin America has led to radical divisions and has even 
sown discord among Latin American bioethicists. In this environment, some have warned 
that Latin American bioethics should avoid „tropicalisms‟ and „populisms‟, while others have 
called for strengthening it academically. These struggles are not only about „the best 
argument‟, „the appropriate ethical theory to apply‟, or „the wellbeing of patients in the 
region‟. They reflect what only few bioethicists are willing to openly acknowledge: that at the 
core of the Latin American bioethical establishment there are ferocious disputes about power, 
i.e. about who produces the official bioethical discourse, who controls the bioethical 
establishment, and who has access to resources. It is not a surprise then that many people are 
interested in „owning‟ bioethics in Latin America since from this field it is possible to 
exercise great power. Who would doubt of a field that has been seen as the land of the „good 
guys‟, the bioethicists, who look after society‟s important values and protect people, 
particularly the vulnerable, from the abuses and exploitation of doctors and biomedical 
researchers? By holding this pastoral discourse, in Foucauldian terms, bioethics is invested 
with social power, a power to „conduct the conduct‟, or what Foucault called 
governmentality. 
Latin American bioethics was the result of an amalgamation of the promises brought by 
US bioethics with the anxieties and hopes of Latin American people. American bioethics, 
with its emphasis on principlism, personal autonomy, analytical philosophy, and legal 
contracts, fitted well in the Latin American environment that might be characterised by its 
hope to one day solve inveterate problems such as poverty, inequality, exploitation, 
dependence, violence, and corruption. It also reflects the action of medical associations and 
groups related to the Catholic Church and people who have found in bioethics a new way to 
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talk about medical humanism and morality in the biomedical scenario. However, bioethics 
has not meant a real transformation of the medical establishment at all, and it remains blind to 
the challenges and necessities of the region. Given the influence of the Roman Catholic 
Church, certain conservative groups have used the bioethical discourse to promote doctrinal 
positions. However, some members of the Church‟s hierarchy are critical of such official 
ecclesiastical and conservative positions. This regional scenario configured, to some extent, 
the „conditions of possibility‟ for the emergence of bioethics in Colombia. There are, 
however, some aspects that make the history of bioethics in Colombia distinctive.  
In Colombia, comprehensive and critical work on the history of bioethics has not yet been 
carried out. So far, the historical literature about bioethics in Colombia has been produced by 
bioethicists themselves and basically provides a whiggish history of progress and success. By 
and large, Colombian bioethicists have explained the beginnings of the field by borrowing the 
same rhetoric that characterises the myths of origin of American bioethics. Because in the 
case of Colombia the official history of bioethics has been written by its „pioneers‟, it is no 
surprise that this history is more about their own achievements than a truly historical analysis 
of, for instance, the institutionalisation of bioethics or the characterisation of the bioethical 
discourses and practices in the country. In this regard, this thesis is a critical revision of these 
narratives, inspired by Foucault and those who have continued his critical work. It is also a 
critical assessment of the official historical accounts produced by the Colombian bioethical 
establishment. Thus, I have shown that the historical literature about bioethics in Colombia 
has been written by members of the bioethical establishment, i.e. the owners of the bioethical 
discourse for the sake of their social, economic and academic position. They have built a 
historical explanation of bioethics that depicts it as a necessary and optimal answer of 
contemporary society to the threats of biomedical progress and the current model of medical 
development. Also, they have reinforced the idea that bioethicists, as individual experts or in 
bioethical committees and a national commission, are the ones who know best how to make 
ethical decisions in the biomedical field and other instances.  
The Colombian bioethical establishment has awarded great relevance to V. R. Potter, who 
became something like the „patron saint‟ of bioethics in this country. This is neither a 
capricious nor an innocent choice. Drawing on Potter‟s work, the Colombian bioethical 
establishment has promoted a supposedly ecological and broad understanding of the field, in 
opposition to the narrow American approach that sees bioethics as fundamentally a 
biomedicine-related field. The official discourse of bioethics in Colombia embodies two main 
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ideas: that neither medical ethics nor bioethics is the „property‟ of doctors and that bioethics 
is the advocate of life in general. But the eagerness of the Colombian bioethical establishment 
to gain followers for their own cause, distances itself from the American bioethics model and 
recycle discourses formerly tainted by religious associations (e.g. the sacredness of life and 
the dignity of the human person) has ended up making of bioethics a totalising, even 
totalitarian, all-embracing field. By using the expression „the bioethical aspects of‟, the 
Colombian bioethical establishment have managed to make of virtually any object, problem, 
field or issue something amenable to a bioethical enquiry. In this context, allusions to 
interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, consensus, and dialogue are frequent. The interviews I 
carried out in 2008-09 revealed that philosophers saw bioethics as a kind of „applied ethics‟. 
This appreciation can be seen as a form of resistance against the totalitarian way of 
understanding bioethics. On their part, doctors were inclined to identify bioethics as a sort of 
new medical humanism. But this invocation of medical humanism has not meant the 
possibility of self-awareness among doctors about the current challenges for their own 
profession in Colombia. Rather, it has meant the defence of old values related to medical 
professionalism and privileges.  
Additionally, my critical assessment of the history of bioethics in Colombia has provided 
useful and original information on two issues. First, I have shown that the healthcare reform 
of 1993 and the flourishing of bioethics in the 1990s was not a mere historical coincidence. 
Second, in so far as the analysis of the medical ethos has received little attention from 
medical historians in Colombia, the critical history of bioethics that I have offered in this 
thesis makes a contribution to the history of medicine in Colombia. In this point I followed R. 
Cooter (2000) who argued that no history of medicine in the twentieth century would be 
complete without examining “the social pervasiveness of the ethical contemplation of bio-
medical practices” (p. 452).  
In this thesis, the birth and rapid development of bioethics in Colombia has been put in a 
broader context, as bioethics is part of the emergence in the biomedical scenario of certain 
discourses, a wide array of objects, new practices and subjectivities, and new experts and 
authorities related to a new form of governing medicine in the contemporary world. I have 
shown that there are important coincidences between the rhetoric frequently used by 
bioethicists and the rhetoric brought by the arrival of a neoliberal rationality to the country in 
the 1990s. Both bioethics and neoliberal discourses emphasise the pre-eminence of the 
individual and „free choice‟. While in bioethics paternalism is condemned, in political life the 
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intervention of the state is rejected. In bioethics as well as in politics the responsibility of the 
individual is underlined. Thus, instead of having becoming an emancipatory force in the 
biomedical scenario, the bioethisation of the Colombian medical ethos has meant the 
reinforcement of categories, rationalities, structures and subjectivities that are functional to a 
neoliberal understanding of social and individual life. It also became evident that among 
Colombian bioethicists the technology-driven explanation was the most common account of 
the origins of bioethics. Regarding the unexplored facets of the history of bioethics in 
Colombia, there were only a few critical voices pointing to, for example, the links between 
bioethics and the elite and most conservative academic and political circles of Colombia. 
Having graduated as a physician in 1994 and having worked for almost ten years as an 
emergency room doctor in Bogotá, I have first-hand experience of the transformation of the 
Colombian medical ethos, which is linked to the socio-political and legal changes brought by 
a new political constitution (1991) and a radical reform of healthcare (1993). In this new 
environment, the clinician about whom Foucault spoke in his Birth of the Clinic (1973) has 
been co-opted by neoliberal rationalities and practices that inspired and guided such socio-
political and legal changes. Clinicians have been subjected to a process of 
deprofessionalisation and proletarisation. Although social scientists, particularly since the 
1970s, had criticised the exercise of power by doctors and the medical establishment over 
patients and society (the medicalisation thesis), and argued that health had been expropriated 
by doctors, the current Colombian scenario constitutes a different situation. In the case of 
Colombia, doctors do not exercise as much power as the theorists of the medicalisation thesis 
in other latitudes have assumed.  
However, the role that bioethics has played in the governmentalization of the biomedical 
field in Colombia has been an unacknowledged phenomenon. In this thesis I have made a 
case for an understanding of bioethics as a kind of „power struggle‟ in the contemporary 
biomedical field, paralleling other phenomena like the commodification of health and the 
contemporary challenge to medical authority. Bioethics has re-shaped old medico-legal 
discussions, for instance, about life and death, uses of the body and sex, as the legal decisions 
of the Colombian Constitutional Court illustrate. Beyond what bioethicists claim as the 
originality and essence of bioethics, i.e. interdisciplinarity, transdisciplinarity, consensus and 
dialogue, it is necessary to recognise that the totalising, all-embracing nature that is ascribed 
to bioethics might instead be an expression of a will to power and to define truth. The 
Colombian case clearly shows the power dynamics behind the rise of bioethics in 
218 
 
contemporary, liberal societies under the influence of neoliberalism. As I have argued 
elsewhere, there is a link between consumerism in the biomedical scenario and the discourses 
of respect for autonomy and free choice promoted in bioethics (Díaz Amado, 2009b). 
The truth is that in Colombia medicine has been expropriated by the overwhelming forces 
of the market and doctors have become subjected to these forces. This economic and political 
reality has been accompanied by a new ethical and legal framework for medicine. Thus, in 
the 1990s new normative discourses on medicine, such as bioethics and medical law 
flourished. From a Foucauldian point of view, the medical ethos was transformed by a power 
effect and in the last twenty years new practices, truths, subjects, rationalities, authorities, 
discourses and institutions have emerged, constituting the present of the medical profession 
in Colombia. Bioethics was not an isolated phenomenon regarding the transformation of the 
medical ethos. It came into being hand in hand with the rise of surveillance discourses and 
practices such as medical liability, medical audit, managed care, health economics and 
evidence based medicine. It was argued that the new regulations and discourses of 
surveillance are part of the necessary measures to make the medical-industrial complex work.  
The flourishing of bioethics occurred in a particular moment of the history of Colombia. 
The institutional crisis and violence at the end of the 1980s had led to a new political 
constitution in 1991, which was seen by the Colombian people as the „remedy for all ills‟. 
However, although this constitution emphasised that Colombia was a social rule-of-law state, 
this constitution did not solve the inveterate problems of Colombia such as violence, 
inequality, corruption, and poverty. To have proclaimed that the foundations of the nation 
were the respect for human dignity and personal autonomy, and give greater preponderance 
to individual rights was insufficient. Moreover, a neoliberal rationality had strongly 
permeated Colombian society, paving the way to carry out a wave of neoliberal reforms in 
the 1990s, similar to those in other Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil and 
Argentina. These reforms followed an agenda promoted by international financial 
organisations like the IMF, WB, and BID, and the American government. For many 
academic, professional and political sectors in Colombia the healthcare reform of 1993, 
which was implemented through Law 100 of 1993, was in reality an outcome of the 
neoliberalization of the country. Although this reform was carried out in the name of justice 
to guarantee universal access to healthcare services, it brought deregulation, labour 
flexibilisation and privatisation to healthcare services and medical practice. Almost 20 years 
after Law 100, the roots and impact of the healthcare reform in terms of its economic, legal 
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and political aspects have been largely studied. However, the nature and role of pastoral and 
new regulatory discourses that have flourished paralleling the healthcare reform, such as 
bioethics, medial liability, medical audit, health administration, health economics, managed 
care, and evidence based medicine, has received little attention.  
Since the healthcare reform of 1993, economists, lawyers, managers and bioethicists have 
formed an interesting symbiotic relationship in Colombia. For instance, all of them talk about 
ethical dilemmas in the biomedical arena, ethical committees, fair distribution of resources, 
respect for autonomy and human dignity; all of them discuss what being a good doctor is, 
what the legitimate goals of medicine are, how a fair distribution of resources in health care 
should be achieved and so on. The power effect of bioethics and medical liability consists in 
keeping the discussion within the limits of the discourses, rationalities, institutions and 
practices imposed by a neoliberal understanding of healthcare and medical practice. Thus, 
doctors do learn how to solve ethical dilemmas „within‟ the system, but not that such ethical 
dilemmas are very often produced by the system itself, that there are better ways to practise 
medicine, and that a different healthcare system is possible in Colombia. Thus, while the 
healthcare reform in Colombia meant the governmentalization of the biomedical scenario, 
bioethics and medical liability have played the role of pastoral discourses that are necessary 
to effectively „conduct the conduct‟ of both patients and healthcare professionals within the 
new system. From a Foucauldian point of view, it would be possible to assimilate these 
discourses to a truth regime since they impose an „order‟ in the clinical world, and they 
decide, for instance, what issues, problems and objects are worthy of discussion.  
Also, from a Foucauldian point of view it is necessary to recognise that power has 
productive effects. The transformation of the Colombian medical ethos has entailed, first, the 
development of new academic and professional fields that represent new forms of „know-
how‟, including bioethics, health economics, managed care and medical law, and second, 
new subjectivities have proliferated in the biomedical scenario. During the interviews it 
became clear that various models of being a doctor coexist within the current healthcare 
system. The old clinician, the doctor-employee, the technician, and the merchant were 
mentioned. These models do not simply represent personal options to exercise the profession 
or different tastes among doctors. Rather, they reflect differences between generations and 
modes of being a doctor that are determined by socio-political and historical conditions. 
Thus, while senior doctors were identified with the old clinicians, who were strongly 
influenced by the French school of medicine that dominated the Colombian medical ethos 
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until the second third of the twentieth century, the youngest generations were seen as the 
„product‟ of neoliberal rationalities and influence. Under this influence some doctors have 
become business people and others have adopted the role of a doctor-employee, a kind of 
doctor who is completely subsumed into the policies and regulations stated by healthcare 
companies.  
The existence of these types of doctors suggests different mechanisms of the exercise of 
power and resistance to it. Although doctors seem to live in a Benthamite Panopticon as a 
result of the rise of new discourses and practices of surveillance within the new healthcare 
system, it does not mean that doctors are completely constrained. They have learned to play 
with the norms now governing the medical ethos. In addition to the exercise of power over 
the biomedical scenario that seeks to influence „the milieu‟ in which medical practice takes 
place (governmentalization), the implementation of strict regulations and a system of 
punishment (sovereign and disciplinary powers), particularly through law, are characteristic 
of the current Colombian medical scenario. Healthcare companies have developed subtle 
mechanisms to punish doctors when they „disobey‟ the norms, for instance, no renewal of 
labour contracts, internal admonitions, memos and threats about losing the job. An interesting 
phenomenon that has become apparent in the last few years in Colombia is the growing 
number of doctors entering law schools. Although this phenomenon has not been 
appropriately studied yet, it might be seen as a form of resistance against the asphyxiating 
action of lawyers in the biomedical scenario, at least for doctors, resembling what has 
happened also in the USA in the last three decades.  
With the arrival of medical liability/medical malpractice discourses as an independent 
academic and professional field in Colombia, the concept of good doctoring has shifted. 
Although the action of law in medicine has been beneficial to guarantee patients‟ rights and 
to obtain compensation when things went wrong, this has also been part of a disciplining 
process useful to subject doctors to the goals of the medical-industrial complex. Nowadays 
doctors are not only „controlled‟, but even „threatened‟ by legal mechanisms. The more 
governmentalized and disciplined doctors are, the easier it becomes to manage the healthcare 
system and for the investors to achieve their economic goals. The aforementioned 
deprofessionalisation and proletarisation of medicine are two phenomena linked to this 
disempowerment of doctors in Colombia. Moreover, this medical disempowerment occurs 
via clinical audit, health policies, administrative rules, clinical guideline, and so on. What it 
means to be a good doctor within the new healthcare system is no longer exclusively 
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dependant on internal dynamics of the medical profession. External forces are now even more 
important to decide what being a good doctor is, for instance, compliance with administrative 
rules, being subject to the economic policies of healthcare companies, and satisfying legal 
requirements even though they not necessarily mean the best medical diagnostic or 
therapeutic procedure.   
The good doctor is nowadays the one who remains bound to the policies of healthcare 
companies. Although bioethics and medical liability are supposedly interested in patients‟ 
well-being, and have been publicly announced as patients‟ advocates, too little has been said 
about the self-interests of bioethicists and lawyers in Colombia. Here I am not making a 
moral judgment, i.e. doctors are good and lawyers are evil, but just emphasising that 
bioethicists and lawyers exercise much power over the biomedical scenario and that this 
should be recognised. From a Foucauldian perspective, the question is not about the good and 
the bad, but about acknowledging the strategic relations that are now determining the creation 
of new subjectivities as well as ideas about justice and freedom, i.e. free vs. dominant 
relationships in the biomedical scenario, and beyond the medicalisation thesis of the 1970s, 
the self-legitimatising discourses and lawyers, and the naïve invitations to broaden the field 
of bioethics.  
Regarding Colombian jurisprudence I have been able to show how the bioethical discourse 
influenced legal decisions in an interplay between the new values brought by the Constitution 
of 1991, the framework of Law 100 of 1993, and bioethics. In the analysis that I carried out 
of three key decisions of the Colombian Constitutional Court, I argued that both bioethics and 
law could be seen as constituted power (Agamben, 1998). This means that bioethics and 
medical law now define how, when, for whom and where medical care is made available. 
Similar to what has happened globally, the decriminalisation of euthanasia, the guarantee of 
sex reassignment surgeries, and the decriminalisation of abortion in Colombia have been 
made in the name of personal autonomy and free choice. Such decisions have been celebrated 
as a triumph of individual rights and pluralism. However, it is important to underline that all 
decisions have to do with categories that are biopolitically delineated, such as brain death, 
permanent vegetative state, sexual identity and the embryo/foetus. Bioethics is then helping 
to administer life, not only seeking to advocate or protect it.  
Despite everything said so far, a Foucauldian perspective does contribute to a critical 
assessment of the history of bioethics. Unlike other approaches that are primarily interested in 
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the truthfulness or falsehood of such a history, criticising the ideological American bias of 
bioethics, denouncing the lack of ability of bioethics to deal with the typical problems of the 
developing world or lamenting that bioethics has been too focused on biotechnology and 
biomedical issues, the Foucauldian approach provides the necessary inspiration, the analytical 
tools and the right theoretical framework to analyse the rise of bioethics as the result of a new 
balance of forces in the biomedical scenario, revealing hidden aspects of this history.  
In my analysis I have shown that it is possible to characterise bioethics as a discursive 
formation. Through its invocation of interdisciplinarity, bioethics includes statements of 
different kinds, e.g. ethical, sociological, political, scientific, economic, legal and so on, 
which are referred to a particular object: the medical ethos. Bioethics targets doctors, 
healthcare professionals, medical researchers, patients, hospitals, labs, administrative boards 
and the like. As a discourse, bioethics is much more than the words, signs or texts that are 
found in it. In Foucauldian terms, it is a practical discourse, which is able to create its own 
objects: the DPR as a territory subjected to surveillance and administration or the ethical 
dilemmas that constitute the basic categories of contemporary medical ethics. Inspired by 
how Foucault explained the formation of the psychiatric field (in which madness took on its 
modern medico-juridical appearance) and of the anatomo-clinical medicine (that meant a new 
correlation between the sayable and the visible), I have argued in this thesis that the birth of 
bioethics was an expression of a new relationship between discourse, truth, and subjectivity 
in a biomedical field.  
In Foucauldian terms the birth of bioethics can also be characterised as an „historical 
event‟. For Foucault, following Nietzsche, “[a historical event] is not a decision, a treaty, a 
reign, or a battle, but the reversal of a relationship of forces, the usurpation of power, […] the 
forces operating in history are not controlled by destiny or regulative mechanisms, but 
respond to haphazard conflicts” (Foucault, 1984b, p. 88). It was thus neither merely a set of 
ethical challenges posed by biomedical progress, nor medical abuses in human research, nor 
the coming up of the neologism „bioethics‟, nor the rise of new ethical dilemmas in medicine 
that explains the birth and rapid development of bioethics. From a genealogical point of view, 
it was a rearrangement of forces, a displacement of power in and around the biomedical 
scenario that would explain the rise of bioethics and other regulatory and normative 
discourses around medical practice in advanced liberal or, as in the case of Colombia, 
neoliberal societies.  
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Being a cultural phenomenon of our time and with the rise of the medical-industrial 
complex, medicine became a territory to be conquered, where doctors should not rule any 
more as sovereigns. In the same way that America, as a new continent, meant an 
unimaginable source of richness and profit to the Europeans of the sixteenth century, 
contemporary medicine was discovered as a rich land that had to be conquered. America was 
exploited and looted in the name of Christian and Medieval European values, while economic 
and political motivations were not talked about. In the case of the biomedical scenario, the 
conquest is being done in the name of respect for autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, 
justice and human dignity, while at the same time big corporations, professional associations, 
pharmaceutical companies, governmental agencies, banks, multinationals and medical 
technology manufacturers are having their golden age. The medical industrial complex 
represents a rich mine that the financial capital has discovered. No surprise then that 
healthcare has been then subjected to a process of neoliberalization and financiarization 
(Waitzkin & Jasso-Aguilar, 2011, p. 64).  
Although bioethics was announced in Colombia as a kind of „ethical revolution‟, in  
biomedical practice it has not meant anything other but the ethical oil that helps to lubricate 
the gears of the system. The implemented model, according to which healthcare services 
should be managed by big private corporations, the reinforcement of the idea that doctors are 
dangerous and have expropriated health, the myth that patients are free agents making 
rational decisions, the reduction of medical ethics to a limited number of ethical dilemmas, 
and the idea that medical ethics is independent from the political and economic realities of 
the country configure the current panorama of a medical ethos in which discourses such as 
bioethics and medical liability fit perfectly. In this sense, the argument of R. Cooter (2000) is 
painfully true in Colombia: “Managers, not bioethicists, […] changed the ethical face of 
medicine by routinizing, if not alienating clinicians [in a context in which medical ethics is] a 
form of politics by other means” (p. 458-59).  
The Foucauldian approach is not only particularly useful to delineate new trajectories of 
inquiry, to challenge truths taken for granted, or to reveal hidden or neglected aspects in any 
field, but also to provide insights and guidance about how to understand ethics. In order to 
consider possible exits to the crisis of the Colombian medical ethos as well as to open new 
perspectives on the nature, scope, methods and role that fields like bioethics and medical 
liability should have in the particular context of Colombia, the Foucauldian scholarship offers 
interesting insights and promising paths to go forward. For Foucault (1985), the “„ethical 
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subject‟ [is formed in] a process in which the individual delimits that part of himself that will 
form the object of his moral practice, defines his position relative to the precept he will 
follow, and decides on a certain mode of being that will serve as his moral goal” (p. 28). To 
do this, first, it is necessary to problematize what we do, what we are, and the world in which 
we live. Then, we should make “the decision to submit to certain rules, precepts, truths or 
convictions” (Huijer, 1999, p. 74), i.e. to decide about the modes of subjection. For Foucault, 
following Nietzsche, ethics entails neither acting as a „universal legislator‟ (as Kant would 
expect from us) nor accepting rules just because they were „new‟ or made by a certain 
„authority‟. Instead, what Foucault proposes is an aesthetic of existence (Foucault, 1997e, p. 
255).  
It is possible to imagine an ethics as aesthetics. This is not a superficial, relativist, or 
simply „postmodern‟ claim. It entails the possibility of making of one‟s life a work of art. In 
this way, Foucault derived from the ethics in the Ancient World the idea that it was necessary 
to become engaged in a process of self-formation (Bernauer & Mahon, 1994, p. 151), which 
included not only knowing oneself, but also the caring for the self. The cultivation of the self 
(heautou epimeleisthai) is the central argument in volume three of the history of sexuality 
(Foucault, 1986, p. 43). Thus, problematization, mode of subjection, working on oneself, and 
a focus on an aesthetics of existence characterise a Foucauldian-based ethics (Huijer, 1999, p. 
70). For A. Davidson (1994), “ethics, or the self‟s relation to itself, is therefore part of both 
the history of subjectivity and the history of governmentality” (p. 119). Then, from a 
Foucauldian point of view ethics is fundamentally about what we are and how we govern 
ourselves, a project that the Colombian medical and bioethical community should seriously 
consider. If such an ethics is adopted, a process of de-bioethicalisation and de-juridification 
of the Colombian medical ethos might begin, i.e. the possibility of living differently. The 
question of how to carry out this process nevertheless falls outside of the scope of this thesis, 
although it outlines the basis of an ethico-political project to be examined in Colombia.  
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Appendix 1 
The interviewees 
 
As part of my doctoral research, I carried out 27 interviews in Bogotá in 2009.
272
 The aim 
was to illustrate how the transformation of the Colombian medical ethos in the last 20 years 
has been reconfigured, particularly in relation to the new political constitution of 1991 and 
the radical healthcare reform of 1993.  
My hypothesis was that listening to the stories that bioethicists and non-bioethicists related 
directly or indirectly to the changes in healthcare could provide important clues that would 
help me to better understand the roots and dynamics of the current crisis of the Colombian 
medical ethos. At the same time, these interviews would complement the history of bioethics 
that has become „canonical‟ in the literature. These interviews were not thought of as a 
statistically viable survey but of an empirical qualitative nature. The information obtained 
from the interviews complements the literary sources reviewed for my thesis. In this way, 
both personal narratives and literature on medical ethics, bioethics, and medical law in 
Colombia contribute to the understanding of how the conditions in which medical practice 
takes place in Colombia have been reshaped in recent history. The interviews also allow a 
better understanding of the role that new normative discourses such as bioethics and medical 
liability have played in this change. In this sense, the interviews provided qualitative 
information to complement the historical/philosophical analysis of contemporary medical 
practice in Colombia in this thesis.  
The interviews included 27 individuals of different backgrounds and age: 
Gender 
 Number 
Male 19 
Female 8 
 
 
                                                             
272
 Although the approval of an ethics committee was considered unnecessary because of the nature of the 
survey, an informed consent form was designed and filled by all the interviewees. See appendices 2 and 3. 
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Profession 
 Number 
Physicians 17 
Nurses 2 
Philosophers 2 
Lawyers 3 
Others 3 
 
Year of graduation 
 Number 
Before 1980s 11 
1980s – 1990s 13 
After 1990s 3 
 
 
Physicians 
 Gender / year 
of graduation 
Current 
work 
Additional 
activities 
Other Date of 
interview 
STF Male, 1953 Physician, 
medical 
ethicist, and 
bioethicist 
Member of 
medical 
associations 
Author of 
publications in 
medical ethics 
and bioethics 
24 March 
2009 
ETJ Male, 1957 Physician 
and 
bioethicist  
Lecturer in 
bioethics 
Author of 
publications in 
bioethics 
8 May 2009 
MGD Male, 1959 Physician Private practice, 
medical lecturer 
 26 March 
2009 
MVJ Male, 1960 Physician, 
medical 
ethicist 
Member of 
medical 
associations 
Author of 
publications in 
medical ethics 
30 March 
2009 
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ROE Male, 1975 Physician 
and director 
of a clinic  
Administrative 
work 
 11 May 2009 
FAS Male, 1975 Physician  
 
Former lecturer 
in public health. 
Social activist 
Public health & 
social sciences 
2 April 2009 
VRR Male, 1981 Physician Lecturer in health 
administration. 
Social activist  
Social sciences  30 April 2009 
LMR Male, 1983 Physician Worker in a 
government 
office related to 
public health 
Public health 
and bioethics 
11 May 2009 
PMJ Male, 1984 Physician Member of a 
medical 
association 
Politics. 
Former 
emergency 
room doctor 
2 April 2009 
AQJ Male, 1985 Physician Emergency room 
doctor 
 22 April 2009 
LCM Female, 1986 Physician Non-
governmental 
organisation 
assessing the  
healthcare system 
Health 
administration  
5 June 2009 
LBG Male, 1986 Physician Medical lecturer, 
private practice 
Work in 
medical ethics 
26 March 
2009 
SHJ Male, 1987 Physician Lecturer in 
medicine, private 
practice 
 20 April 2009 
JEO Male, 1987 Physician Emergency room 
doctor, 
administrative 
work in a hospital 
Health 
administration 
4 May 2009 
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EGR Male, 1988 Physician Member of a 
medical 
association  
Epidemiology 
and medical 
education  
30 March 
2009 
GCA Female, 1989 Physician 
and 
bioethicist 
Medical lecturer  Bioethics, 
medical law 
and medical 
education 
7 May 2009 
TME Female, 1991 Physician Medical lecturer, 
private practice 
Medical 
education 
14 May 2009 
 
Nurses 
PRG Female, 1964 Professional 
nurse 
Former 
university 
lecturer 
Nursing 
professional 
ethics 
25 March 
2009 
PRB Female, 1975 Professional 
nurse and 
bioethicist 
Clinical practice 
and university 
lecturer 
Nursing 
professional 
ethics and 
bioethics 
16 April 2009 
 
Philosophers  
HVG Male, 1965 Philosopher University lecturer 
and member of 
different 
associations  
Author of 
publications in 
philosophy, 
ethics, and 
bioethics 
8 May 2009 
JNM Female, 1983 Philosopher University lecturer   Working in 
bioethics and 
health 
administration  
7 May 2009 
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Lawyers 
BPA Female, 1988 Lawyer University 
lecturer, private 
practice 
Expert in 
medical 
liability 
21 April 2009 
PAG Male, 1985 Lawyer Working for a 
legal insurance 
company 
Expert in 
medical 
liability 
1 June 2009 
QPP Female, 2002 Lawyer Working for a 
health 
organisation  
Expert in 
medical 
liability 
28 April 2009 
 
Others 
ABC Male, 1993 Dentist  University 
lecturer 
Working in a 
non-
governmental 
organisation 
16 April 
2009 
LEA Male, 1965 Catholic priest Lecturer in 
bioethics 
Medical ethics 
and bioethics  
18 June 2009 
UTC Male, 1974 Anthropologist Lecturer in 
anthropology 
Medical 
anthropology 
10 June 2009 
 
All of the interviewees had a direct or indirect relation to medical practice. While some 
were clinicians with different medical specializations, other doctors and non-doctors were at 
the time of the interviews working in bioethics, social sciences and/or medical law. Some of 
them were people who I knew directly because of my work as physician and bioethicist; 
others were contacted after someone else suggested them to me or because I thought his/her 
opinion could be important for my research. I included doctors who graduated in different 
decades, from the 1950s until the 1990s. 
230 
 
Appendix 2 
The interviews: Aims, questions, and the analysis 
 
The aims of the interviews and a basic set of questions were previously discussed with my 
supervisors.   
Aims:  
1. To get first hand opinions from professionals and some scholars about the 
Colombian healthcare reform of 1993 and its influence on the medical ethos. 
2. To hear opinions and gain some insights about the influence, ways of working, 
concepts and criticisms regarding three contemporary normative discourses of clinical 
practice: medical ethics, bioethics and medical liability/malpractice.  
3. To catch up some key concepts, objects, ideas and problems which would be 
crucial to analyse in the context of my research 
 
Basic questions guideline: 
After explaining the main points of my project and once the informed consent form was 
filled in, signed, and in particular permission given to record, I held a semi-open interview 
following this guide-questionnaire: 
1. Ideas, concepts, perceptions, and criticisms regarding medical ethics 
and medical practice before and after Law 100 of 1993. Question examples: What 
is, in your personal opinion, medical ethics? How did you learn medical ethics? 
What is the importance of medical ethics in the context of the Law 100 of 1993? 
How should medical ethics be taught today? What do you think about the Code of 
Ethics of 1981? What do you think of the role of ethics tribunals? 
2. Ideas, concepts, perceptions and criticisms regarding bioethics and 
medical law. What is for you an “ethical dilemma” in the context of clinical 
practice? Can you give me some example? How do you deal with such ethical 
dilemmas? Do you know what bioethics is? Do you know what respect for 
autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, justice, virtue, informed consent, and a 
good doctor is? Do you know or have you participated in an ethic committee? 
What is your opinion of such committees? Have you received formal training in 
231 
 
bioethics? What is your opinion about the formal bioethics training you have 
received? What is the importance of the law for your practice? Which are the most 
important laws you know regarding your professional practice? What is the 
difference, importance and place of both bioethics and medical liability in your 
practice? Do you know some legal cases (Constitutional Court) or laws regarding 
bioethics or bioethical issues? What do you think about these cases and laws? 
Have you been sued or do you know some colleague who has been sued for 
malpractice?  What is your opinion about his/these case/s? Do you have legal 
insurance? What do you think about having legal insurance? 
3. Ideas, concepts, perceptions and role of the Law 100 of 1993 and the 
NSSSH. Question examples: How does medical practice change with the Law 100 
of 1993? Why do you think medical practice changed in this way? What do you 
think about the role of Law 100 of 1993 for Colombian medical practice (new 
actors, hospital structure, medical autonomy, salary, legal responsibility, doctor-
patient relationship, etc.)? How was your own practice affected by the Law 100 of 
1993?  
 
The answers were recorded and then transcribed in the original Spanish. After that, I wrote 
summaries and translated relevant parts of the interviews into English that contained the main 
points of each interview. The quotations from the interviews, which I included in different 
chapters, are from this English version. 
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Appendix 3 
Covering letter and consent form for the interviews (English and Spanish) 
 
 
English version 
 
Mr/Mrs/Mss/Dr 
XXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Ref: Juridification and Biopolitics. The Practice of Medicine in Colombia in the Context of the New 
Health Care System of 1993. (Doctoral Research Project) 
 
 
In many western societies the medical ethos has experienced deep changes, particularly since the 
second half of the twentieth century. Some circumstances frequently associated with the origins of 
these changes are: a huge development of biomedical technology, the crumbling of trust in the doctor-
patient relationship, the commodification of health, and the presence of non-medical agents in the 
clinical field, such as managers, lawyers, and philosophers. In this context, bioethics and medical law 
are the two main normative discourses regulating contemporary medical practice.  
In the case of Colombia, the rise of bioethics and medical law has paralleled the new socio-
political environment which followed the new political constitution of 1991 and the health care 
reform of the Law 100 of 1993. Thereafter the medical profession has been experiencing a crisis, 
since it is not clear anymore what its nature is and which standards should drive its practice. The 
impact of the Law 100/93 on the medical ethos has only been assessed in part, since almost all 
analyses regarding the new health care system have been focused on the managerial, economical and 
legal aspects. Beyond this, it is necessary to assess the role that bioethics and medical law have played 
in shaping the Colombian medical ethos after the 1993 health care reform. The purpose of my 
doctoral research is to contribute to carrying out this task. In doing so, I have planned to interview 
some professionals, whose work, knowledge, and experience might be useful and relevant to bring to 
light different aspects of this process. 
My purpose in writing to you is to ask if you would accept to be interviewed and, thus, contribute 
to our thinking around this important matter for the medical profession in Colombia. I would really 
like to hear about your views. If you agree to the interview, I can come to your office or the most 
convenient place for you. The interview will take no more than one hour and a half. To ensure an 
233 
 
accurate representation of your views, I will audio-tape the interview and transcribe it. To do so, I will 
first request your permission by using an informed consent form.  
Because I know that you have many pressing calls upon your time, I will contact you in a couple 
of days after you have received this letter to hear about your decision. However, if you would like to 
let me know about it before, please contact me by phone or by e-mail (see below).  
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
Eduardo Díaz Amado, MD, MA 
PhD Student 
Department of Philosophy & 
Centre for the History of Medicine and Disease 
Durham University 
E-mail: eduardo.diaz-amado@durham.ac.uk 
 
 
Contact in Colombia: 
Mobile: (+57) 311 5926118 
Office: (+57 1) 3208320 Ext 4537, 4538, Fax 4539 
Bioethics Institute,  
Javeriana University 
Bogotá, D.C. 
 
 
 
Should you have any further queries or complaints, you can also contact the supervisors of this 
research in the UK using their e-mail: 
 
 
Prof. Holger Maehle     Dr. Tiago Moreira 
Department of Philosophy and    School of Applied Social   
Centre for the History of Medicine and Disease  Sciences 
a.h.maehle@durham.ac.uk    tiago.moreira@durham.ac.uk  
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UNIVERSITY OF DURHAM 
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY & 
CENTRE FOR THE HISTORY OF MEDICINE AND DISEASE 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
JURIDIFICATION AND BIOPOLITICS. THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE IN COLOMBIA 
IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEW HEALTH CARE SYSTEM OF 1993 
(Doctoral Research Project) 
Please, tick  
the box if 
you agree 
 
I have received clear and wide information on what this study is about and 
had an opportunity to ask questions related to it……...  
 
 
I agree to take part in the one-to-one interview for the Juridification and 
Biopolitics. The Practice of Medicine in Colombia in the Context of the New 
Health Care System of 1993 
research…………................................................................................ 
 
 
I agree to the interview being tape recorded and transcribed. I understand 
that the recordings and transcripts will be treated as confidential and securely 
stored at all times and that only members of the research team will have 
access to them……………………….. 
 
 
I agree to having direct or indirect quotations of the interview used in 
publications of the research, on the understanding that they will be 
anonymised…………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Name________________________________________      Date_________________ 
 
Signature_____________________________________ 
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Spanish version (the version the interviewees signed) 
 
Bogotá, DC, DD/MM/AÑO 
 
Sr/Sra/Dr 
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX 
 
Ref: Juridificación y biopolítica. La práctica de la medicina en Colombia en el contexto del nuevo 
sistema de salud de 1993 (Proyecto de investigación doctoral) 
 
Cordial saludo. 
 
En la mayoría de sociedades occidentales el éthos de la medicina ha experimentado cambios 
profundos, en especial desde la segunda mitad del siglo XX. Algunas circunstancias frecuentemente 
asociadas al origen de dichos cambios son: el enorme desarrollo de la tecnología biomédica, el 
desmoronamiento de la confianza en la relación médico-paciente, la mercantilización de la salud y la 
presencia de actores no-médicos en el escenario clínico, tales como administradores, abogados, 
filósofos, entre otros. En este contexto, la bioética y el derecho médico constituyen los dos discursos 
normativos más importantes en la regulación de la práctica médica contemporánea.  
 
En el caso de Colombia, la aparición de la bioética y el derecho médico han coincidido con el 
nuevo ambiente socio-político que siguió a la nueva Constitución Política de 1991 y la reforma de la 
salud por cuenta de la Ley 100 de 1993. Después de esto la profesión médica ha estado 
experimentando una crisis por cuanto ya no es claro cuál es su naturaleza y cuáles han de ser los 
estándares que guíen su práctica. El impacto de la Ley 100/93 en el éthos de la medicina ha sido 
parcialmente valorado por cuanto casi todos los análisis en relación con el nuevo sistema de salud han 
estado sólo enfocados en sus aspectos administrativos, económicos y legales. Además, es necesario 
valorar el rol que la bioética y el derecho médico han jugado en el moldeamiento del éthos de la 
medicina en Colombia luego de la reforma de la salud de 1993. El propósito de mi investigación 
doctoral es contribuir en dicha tarea. Para esto, he planeado entrevistar algunos profesionales cuyo 
trabajo, conocimiento y experiencia podrían ser útiles y relevantes para revelar diversos aspectos de 
este proceso.  
 
Le estoy haciendo llegar esta carta con el objeto de preguntarle si Ud. aceptaría ser entrevistado y, 
de este modo, contribuir en la reflexión alrededor de este importante tema para la profesión médica en 
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Colombia. De verdad estoy muy interesado en conocer sus puntos de vista y si Ud. accede a 
entrevistarse conmigo, lo podría visitar en su oficina o en el lugar más conveniente para Ud. La 
entrevista no durará más de una hora y media. Con el fin de que sus opiniones sean correctamente 
tomadas grabaré la entrevista que posteriormente será transcrita. Para hacer esto, le solicitaré 
previamente su permiso mediante un formato de consentimiento informado.  
 
Como sé que Ud. es una persona muy ocupada, lo estaré contactando un par de días luego de haber 
recibido esta carta para saber sobre su decisión. Sin embargo, si desea hacerme saber antes su 
decisión, por favor contácteme ya sea telefónicamente o por e-mail (ver abajo).   
Cordialmente,  
 
Eduardo Díaz Amado, MD, MA 
Estudiante de doctorado 
Departamento de filosofía  
Centro para la historia de la medicina y la enfermedad 
Universidad de Durham 
E-mail: eduardo.diaz-amado@durham.ac.uk 
 
Contacto en Colombia: 
Celular: (+57) 311 5926118 
Oficina: (+57 1) 3208320 Ext 4537, 4538, Fax 4539 
Instituto de Bioética 
Universidad Javeriana 
Bogotá, D.C. 
 
En caso de que Ud. tenga preguntas adicionales o quejas, Ud. también puede contactar a los 
supervisores de esta investigación en el Reino Unido a través de correo electrónico: 
 
Prof. Holger Maehle     Dr. Tiago Moreira 
Department of Philosophy and    School of Applied Social  
Centre for the History of Medicine and Disease  Sciences 
a.h.maehle@durham.ac.uk     tiago.moreira@durham.ac.uk  
 
237 
 
UNIVERSIDAD DE DURHAM 
DEPARTAMENTO DE FILOSOFÍA 
CENTRO PARA LA HISTORIA DE LA MEDICINA Y LA ENFERMEDAD 
 
FORMATO DE CONSENTIMIENTO 
 
JURIDIFICACIÓN Y BIOPOLÍTICA. LA PRÁCTICA DE LA MEDICINA EN 
COLOMBIA EN EL CONTEXTO DEL NUEVO SISTEMA DE SALUD DE 1993 
(Proyecto de investigación doctoral) 
 
Por favor marque 
en la casilla 
si está de acuerdo 
 
He recibido información amplia y clara sobre este estudio y tuve la 
oportunidad de hacer preguntas relacionadas con él………………… 
 
Estoy de acuerdo en tomar parte en una entrevista personal para el proyecto 
Juridificación y biopolítica. La práctica de la medicina en Colombia en el 
contexto del nuevo sistema de salud de 1993……… 
 
Estoy de acuerdo en que dicha entrevista sea grabada y transcrita. 
Entiendo que las grabaciones y transcripciones serán manejadas con 
confidencialidad y serán convenientemente guardadas y sólo los miembros 
del grupo investigador tendrán acceso a ellas……… 
 
Estoy de acuerdo en que partes de esta entrevista sean citadas, directa o 
indirectamente, bajo el entendimiento de que tales citas se harán sin nombrar 
al autor………………………………………….. 
 
 
Nombre______________________________________       Fecha________________ 
 
 
Firma_____________________________________ 
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